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SHB Råvaruplanket 19 september 2012

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Handelsbanken - Råvarubrevet inklusive ädelmetallerCentralbankerna har sista ordet

Bottenfiske lönade sig

För ett kvartal sedan hittade vi mycket som pekade på att vi var nära botten i det negativa sentimentet. Det ser alltid som mörkast ut innan det vänder – och så var det även den gången. Vi trodde att olja, bas- och ädelmetaller skulle stiga från låga nivåer. Ett kvartal senare står de flesta råvaror 15-20 % högre i pris och årets utveckling påminner om ett ”V”.

Goda utsikter trots fladdrig realekonomi

Högre priser på råvaror och nedreviderade utsikter för de stora ekonomierna skapar förnimmelser av en marknad likt ett korthus. Vi lutar oss dock mot att Kina intensifierat stimulansvågen och att centralbankerna åter satt ner foten både genom mycket prat men till slut även handling, viktigast genom QE3. Perioder med lättare penningpolitik har under de senaste åren gett en råvarumarknad som ”glider uppåt”. Med stimulanser i luften tror vi att breda råvaruindex kommer stiga under resten av året. I en sådan miljö, med ett starkare Kina och stimulanspengar i systemet, förväntar vi oss att bas- och ädelmetaller kommer stiga mer än olja och spannmål. Guld har fått styrfart uppåt på utsikterna om frikostig penningpolitik i USA och Europa och vi intensifierar vår tro på ett stigande guldpris.

Oljerallyt drivet av ”en perfekt storm”

Strejken i Norge, stundande orkansäsong på Atlanten, konflikten mellan Israel och Iran samt ökad riskvilja på finansiella marknaden är oberoende händelser som snabbt drivit upp oljan från årslägsta omkring midsommar. Vi tycker att underliggande fundamenta är väl balanserad och ser inte högre oljepriser med mindre än en krigshandling från Israel mot Iran – vilket vi håller som osannolikt före valet i USA.

Vete har nått toppen

Efter den amerikanska torkans inverkan på vetepriset har mycket elände prisats in i grödan som, trots allt, har goda lagernivåer. Vi tror på lägre priser.

Kopparpriset och QE / LTRO stimulanser

Prognoser från SHB på ädelmetaller, energi, basmetaller och jordbruk

Basmetaller

Kinas nedgång är inprisad

Det kan tyckas udda att vi håller basmetallerna bland det mest köpvärda i råvaru-universum just nu när ekonomer reviderat ner kinas tillväxtutsikter och Kina konsumerar 45 % av den globala produktionen av dessa konjunkturkänsliga metaller. Svaga globala tillväxtutsikter och en inbromsning i Kina är dock knappast en överraskning för någon längre. Kinas inköpschefsindex har kretsat omkring 50 i 12 månader nu. Fysiska handlare har haft gott om tid att sälja av lager av metall medan hedgefonder har kunnat ta positioner för en fallande marknad under lång tid. Därmed är också ett sämre Kina inprisat i dagens låga nivåer på basmetaller. Ett tydligt tecken på det är att basmetallerna inte föll när svag kinesisk makrodata för augusti släpptes.

Ny våg av stimulanser

Den kinesiska ekonomin har inte responderat speciellt väl på de stimulanser som har annonserats. Förklaringen är enkel; efterfrågan på krediter är klart lägre och därför får inte centralbankens likviditetsinjektioner lika stor effekt som under tidigare cykler. Vi tänker oss att de kinesiska ledarna har blivit tagna på sängen av den starka inbromsningen, delvis därför att de – som många andra- underskattat eurokrisens styrka och därmed underskattat exportbortfallets påverkan på BNP. Ledarna har helt enkelt hamnat bakom kurvan i ambitionen att styra ekonomin. I kölvattnet ser vi att ytterligare stimulansåtgärder annonserats. Denna gång dock inte i form av ökade krediter utan i form av infrastruktur projekt. Den medicin som fungerade så väl 2009. På längre sikt skapar detta mer av samma problem som man redan har men på kort sikt hjälper det ekonomin att hålla farten uppe.

Se upp för sojaprisdriven inflation

Sommarens värmebölja i USA har drivit upp priserna på bland annat sojabönor. Kina är världens största importör med en självförsörjningsgrad på låga 15 %. Kinas inflation drivs till stor del av livsmedelspriserna där soja är den enskilt viktigaste komponenten. I grafen till höger ses det starka sambandet mellan förändringar i sojapriset och kinas matinflation. Vi flaggar för att Kina står inför en kraftigt ökande importerad inflation från den stundande globala matpriskrisen simultant som inhemska stimulanser bidrar till inflationen. Två oberoende händelser som kommer verka för att mönstret med en allt starkare inhemsk konjunkturcykel i Kina håller på att växa fram -först stimulans sedan inflation.

Lång basmetallkorgen och lång nickel

Diagram över infrastruktur, elproduktion och sojapriset

Energi

USA ovilligt att stödja Israel

Under hela året har oljan handlats upp och ner på konflikten mellan Israel och Iran. Israel vill undanröja Irans möjligheter att anrika uran till halter dugliga för kärnvapen. Sanktionerna från USA och Europa gör att Iran nu har mycket svårt att exportera olja och därmed har produktionen fallit. I dag är det bara Indien och Kina som köper Irans olja.

Nyligen uttryckte Israels premiärminister, Netanyahu frustration över att USA sagt att man har ett år på sig att agera före Iran lyckats utveckla kärnvapen. Uttalandet är den första publika indikationen på att Washington och Israel inte drar jämt om hur Tehran ska hanteras. Israel fokuserar på riskerna kring att Iran skaffar sig möjligheterna att bygga kärnvapen medan USA avvaktar i fall de verkligen bygger kärnvapen. Vi tror inte att Israel vågar gå i krig med Iran utan stöd från USA, vilket israelerna verkar ha svårt att få under den rådande presidentvalskampanjen i USA. Mot den bakgrunden tycker vi att Brent handlas på höga nivåer med en stor riskpremie som snabbt kan pysa ut.

Utbudsstörningar i Nordsjön

Brent handlas FOB Shetlandsöarna. Utbudsstörningar i Nordsjön har haft en kraftig inverkan på priset under september. Dessa är av tillfällig art, Nordsjön kommer öka med 25 % i oktober och vi ser mer nedsida än uppsida i Brentpriset rent fundamentalt. Att centralbankerna står på gasen väger dock på uppsidan. Vi upprepar vår prognos för H2 på 110 USD.

Nu handlar SHB Power mot Q1 terminspris

Alla grundläggande fundamenta talar för låga elpriser; mycket vatten i magasinen inför vintern, låga kolpris, lågt pris på utsläppsrätter och en situation för kärnkraften som ser ovanligt bra ut. Dessa fundamenta är också inprisat i terminskurvan som handlas på riktigt låga nivåer. Vi ser därför att den samlade bilden talar för att risken ligger för högre elpriser den här vintern. Vad som krävs för att ge priset styrfart uppåt är ett omslag i väderprognosen, från nu rådande blöta läge med mycket vatten i magasinen. I grafen till höger är noll ett normalår för vattenmagasinen, definierat som senaste fem årens medelvärde för vattenståndet.

Lång El

Diagram över energi, olja och riskaptit

Ädelmetaller

ECB och Fed har riggat för guld-rally

Vi har trott på stigande guld- och silverpriser sedan i april då vi såg den upptornande skuldkrisen och svaga amerikanska ekonomin som goda skäl för investarere att söka sig till de ädla värdebevarande metallerna.

Under de senaste veckorna har EMU:s stödfond ESM kommit i ordning, ECB har signalerat oändliga interventioner och ovanpå detta lanserade Fed QE3. När det gäller Fed är det anmärkningsvärt vad den centralbanken har utfäst sig att göra. Man ska fortsätta eller öka stimulansåtgärderna fram till att utsikterna för arbetsmarknaden förbättras påtagligt förutsatt att centralbankens inflationsmål möts. Inflationsförväntningarna hoppade också upp kraftigt efter Feds besked och guldet har handlats hand i hand med förväntningarna, se bild upp till höger.

Åtgärderna från centralbankerna skapar den sedvanliga ”chock och bävan”-effekten. Tillgångspriserna stiger när centralbankernas balansräkning växer. Den enkla förklaringen lyder: mer risk för skattebetalarna betyder mindre risk för privat sektor. Guld och silver gynnas särskilt i egenskap av traditionellt skydd mot inflation. Guld har stigit 70 % under Feds två tidigare QE perioder då man hållit lånekostnaderna låga och köpt obligationer för 2,3 triljoner USD. Nu ska Fed köpa obligationer för 40 miljarder USD i månaden och hålla räntorna låga till 2015. Vi tror därför på högre guld och silverpriser.

Platina-brist efter strejkerna

Oron i Syd-afrikas platinagruvor har fått platinapriset att rusa. Vågen av uppror startade i gruvan Marikana som ägs av Lonmin och Anglo. Produktionen har nu varit stängd i fem veckor efter att polis öppnat eld mot gruvarbetare. Anglo har stängt fem andra gruvschakt för att kunna garantera säkerheten för arbetskraften, som består av 26 000 personer. Gold Fields är en annan producent som haft två strejker som avlöst varandra.

Platinagruvorna i Syd-afrika är dåligt mekaniserade har dålig infrastruktur och är därför arbetskraftintensiva. I början på året hade Impala en strejk som varade i 6 veckor vilket då fick priset att rusa. Vi tror att orosvågen kommer att fortsätta och konsekvenserna av den kommer försämra produktionen i Syd-afrika som står för 76 % av den globala produktionen.

Lång guld och ädelmetallkorgen

Diagram över guldpris och platinapris

Jordbruk

Torkan har satt sina spår

Efter en vinter och vår som såg mycket lovande ut för årets grödor så kom den värsta torkan i USA på mannaminne och förstörde mellan 12-15 % av den amerikanska soja- och majsskörden. Bristen på majs driver upp priset på vete som kan ersätta majs som djurfoder.

I den senaste rapporten från amerikanska jordbruksdepartementet fanns dock få justeringar för vete, soja och majs. Vi tror nu att det mesta från den fundamentala bilden kring årets skörd är känt och marknaden för soja börjar se ”toppig” ut med minskande export de senaste veckorna, trots det har terminerna stigit i pris. Vi tror att priserna kommer vara höga baserat på den strama marknaden men tror att terminskurvan kommer att skifta nedåt.

Framför oss ligger nu sådd av höstvete i USA, Europa och kring Svarta Havet, skörd av höstvete i Australien och sedan skörd av höstvete, soja och majs i Argentina och Brasilien efter nyår.

”Demand destruction” för majs

Efterfrågan på spannmål må vara inelastisk när vi människor konsumerar spannmålsbaserad mat. För djurfoder och etanoltillverkning är däremot kalkylerna avgörande för efterfrågan. Vi ser nu att en stor mängd köttdjur slaktas ut, framför allt i USA därför att fodret har blivit för dyrt med nuvarande köttpriser. Vi ser också att USAs etanolproduktion saktar ner även om marginalen åter blivit positiv med dagens höga pris på råolja som driver upp priset på bensin.

Starkt för soja svagt för vete

Starkast fundamenta har fortfarande soja där kinas import ligger kring rekord varje månad, trots höga priser. Kina har förmodligen nått sitt inhemska produktionstak och importen stiger för varje år. Soja har också längst till dess att odlingsåret avslutas med skörd i Argentina i februari. Svagast fundamenta finner vi för vete där utgående lager är bra och med mindre substitutionsdrivet stöd från majs så har vete stor fallhöjd sett över de kommande 6 månaderna. Det kanske bästa tecknet på att spannmålsmarknaden är ”toppig” är att den inte ”orkar” stiga ens när normalt prisdrivande data kommer ut.

Kort vete

Spreaden: Kort majs lång live cattle

Prisutvecklin på majs - Köttdjur - Etanol

Data

Priser på stål, järnmalm, skrot, olja och bensin

[box]SHB Råvaruplanket är producerat av Handelsbanken och publiceras i samarbete och med tillstånd på Råvarumarknaden.se[/box]

Ansvarsbegränsning

Detta material är producerat av Svenska Handelsbanken AB (publ) i fortsättningen kallad Handelsbanken. De som arbetar med innehållet är inte analytiker och materialet är inte oberoende investeringsanalys. Innehållet är uteslutande avsett för kunder i Sverige. Syftet är att ge en allmän information till Handelsbankens kunder och utgör inte ett personligt investeringsråd eller en personlig rekommendation. Informationen ska inte ensamt utgöra underlag för investeringsbeslut. Kunder bör inhämta råd från sina rådgivare och basera sina investeringsbeslut utifrån egen erfarenhet.

Informationen i materialet kan ändras och också avvika från de åsikter som uttrycks i oberoende investeringsanalyser från Handelsbanken. Informationen grundar sig på allmänt tillgänglig information och är hämtad från källor som bedöms som tillförlitliga, men riktigheten kan inte garanteras och informationen kan vara ofullständig eller nedkortad. Ingen del av förslaget får reproduceras eller distribueras till någon annan person utan att Handelsbanken dessförinnan lämnat sitt skriftliga medgivande. Handelsbanken ansvarar inte för att materialet används på ett sätt som strider mot förbudet mot vidarebefordran eller offentliggörs i strid med bankens regler.

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Analys

[If demand] ”comes around as forecast, Hallelujah, we can produce more”

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, last week stated at a conference in Calgary: ”I believe it when I see it. When reality comes around as it’s been forecast, Hallelujah, we can produce more” (Reuters, John Kemp). So Saudi Arabia wants to and will produce more once it is confident that there really is demand for additional crude. Saudi Arabia has good reason to be concerned for global oil demand. It is not the only one struggling to predict global demand amid the haze and turmoil in the global oil market following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and sanctions towards Russian crude and product stocks. Add a shaky Chinese housing market and the highest US rates since 2001. Estimates for global oil demand in Q4-23 are ranging from 100.6 m b/d to 104.7 m b/d with many estimates in between. Current crude and mid-dist inventories are low. Supply/demand is balanced to tight and clearly very tight for mid-dists (diesel, jet fuel, gasoil). But amid current speculative bullishness it is important to note that Saudi Arabia can undo the current upwards price journey just as quickly as it created the current bull-market as it drop in production from 10.5 m b/d in April to only 9.0 m b/d since July. Quickly resolving the current mid-dist crisis is beyond the powers of Saudi Arabia. But China could come to the rescue if increased oil product export quotas as it holds spare refining capacity. 

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

The oil market is well aware that the main reasons for why oil has rallied 25% over the past months is  reduced production by Saudi Arabia and Russia, global oil demand holding up better than feared together with still declining US shale oil activity. US oil drilling rig count fell by 8 rigs last week to 507 rigs which is the lowest since Feb 2022.

The big question is how strong is global oil demand and how will it hold up or even maybe increase in the coming quarters? And here the spread of estimates are still all over the place. For Q4-23 we have the following range of estimates for global oil demand in m b/d: 100.6; 101.8; 103.1; 103.2 and 104.7 from main oil market research providers. This wide spread of estimates is mindbogglingly and head-scratching both for analysts and for oil producers. It leads to a wide spread in estimates for Call-on-OPEC. Some say the current market is in a 2-3 m b/d deficit while others calculate that the global oil market today is nicely balanced.

The sanctions towards Russian crude and oil product exports with a ban on imports to the EU and UK has led to a large reshuffling of the global oil market flows which again has created a haze through which it is hard to gauge the correct state of the global oil market. 

We have previously argued that there may be a significant amount of ”pent-up-demand” following the Covid-years with potential for global oil demand to surprise on the upside versus most demand forecasts. But there are also good reasons to be cautious to demand given Chinese property market woes and the highest US interest rates since 2001!

The uncertainty in global oil demand is clearly at the heart of Saudi Arabia’s production cuts since April this year. Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister, Prince Abulaziz bin Salman, last week stated at a conference in Calgary: ”I believe it when I see it. When reality comes around as it’s been forecast, Hallelujah, we can produce more” (Reuters, John Kemp).

So if it turns out that demand is indeed stronger than Saudi Arabia fears, then we should see increased production from Saudi Arabia. Saudi could of course then argue that yes, it is stronger than expected right now, but tomorrow may be worse. Also, the continued decline in US oil drilling rig count is a home-free card for continued low production from Saudi Arabia.

Both crude stocks and mid-dist stocks (diesel, jet fuel, gasoil) are still significantly below normal and the global oil market is somewhere between balanced, mild deficit or large deficit (-2-3 m b/d). The global oil market is as such stressed due to low inventories and potentially in either mild or large deficit on top. The latter though can be undone by higher production from Saudi Arabia whenever it chooses to do so.

What is again getting center stage are the low mid-dist stocks ahead of winter. The war in Ukraine and the sanctions towards Russian crude and product stocks created chaos in the global oil product market. Refining margins went crazy last year. But they are still crazy. The global refining system got reduced maintenance in 2020 and 2021 due to Covid-19 and low staffing. Following decades of mediocre margins and losses, a lot of older refineries finally decided to close down for good during Covid as refining margins collapsed as the world stopped driving and flying. The global refining capacity contracted in 2021 for the first time in 30 years as a result. Then in 2022 refining margins exploded along with reviving global oil demand and the invasion of Ukraine. Refineries globally then ran  as hard as they could, eager to make money, and reduced maintenance to a minimum for a third year in a row. Many refineries are now prone for technical failures following three years of low maintenance. This is part of the reason why mid-dist stocks struggle to rebuild. The refineries which can run however are running as hard as they can. With current refining margins they are pure money machines.

Amid all of this, Russia last week imposed an export ban for gasoline and diesel products to support domestic consumers with lower oil product prices. Russia normally exports 1.1 m b/d of diesel products and 0.2 m b/d of gasoline. The message is that it is temporary and this is also what the market expects. Russia has little oil product export storage capacity. The export ban will likely fill these up within a couple of weeks. Russia will then either have to close down refineries or restart its oil product exports.

The oil market continues in a very bullish state with stress both in crude and mid-dists. Speculators continues to roll into the market with net long positions in Brent crude and WTI increasing by 29 m b over the week to last Tuesday. Since the end of June it has increased from 330 m b to now 637 m b. Net-long speculative positions are now at the highest level in 52 weeks.

The market didn’t believe Saudi Arabia this spring when it warned speculators about being too bearish on oil and that they would burn their fingers. And so they did. After having held production at 9 m b/d since July, the market finally believes in Saudi Arabia. But the market still doesn’t quite listen when Saudi says that its current production is not about driving the oil price to the sky (and beyond). It’s about concerns for global oil demand amid many macro economic challenges. It’s about being preemptive versus weakening demand. The current oil rally can thus be undone by Saudi Arabia just as it was created by Saudi Arabia. The current refinery stress is however beyond the powers of Saudi Arabia. But China could come to the rescue as it holds spare refining capacity. It could increase export quotas for oil products and thus alleviate global mid-dist shortages. The first round effect of this would however be yet stronger Chinese crude oil imports. 

Brent crude and ARA diesel refining premiums/margins. It is easy to see when Russia invaded Ukraine. Diesel margins then exploded. The market is not taking the latest Russian export ban on diesel and gasoline too seriously. Not very big moves last week.

Brent crude and ARA diesel refining premiums/margins
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

ARA mid-dist margins still exceptionally high at USD 35-40/b versus a more normal USD 12-15/b. We are now heading into the heating season, but the summer driving season is fading and so are gasoline margins.

ARA refinary crack margin
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

ARA mid-dist margins still exceptionally high at USD 35-40/b versus a more normal USD 12-15/b. Here same graph as above but with longer perspective to show how extreme the situation is.

ARA refinary crack
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

US crude and product stocks vs. the 2015-19 average. Very low mid-dist stocks.

US crude and product stocks vs. the 2015-19 average
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

Speculators are rolling into long positions. Now highest net long spec in 52 weeks.

Speculators are rolling into long positions
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data
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Analys

The ”normal” oil price is USD 97/b

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

The Dated Brent crude oil price ydy closed at USD 96/b. Wow, that’s a high price! This sensation however depends on what you think is ”normal”. And normal in the eyes of most market participants today is USD 60/b. But this perception is probably largely based on the recent experience of the market. The average Brent crude oil price from 2015-2019 was USD 58.5/b. But that was a period of booming non-OPEC supply, mostly shale oil. But booming shale oil supply is now increasingly coming towards an end. Looking more broadly at the last 20 years the nominal average price was USD 75/b. But in inflation adjusted terms it was actually USD 97/b.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, Abdulaziz bin Salman, yesterday stated that its production cuts was not about driving the price up but instead it was preemptive versus the highly uncertain global economic development. In that respect it has a very good point. The US 2yr government bond rate has rallied to 5.06% which is the highest since 2006 and just a fraction away of being the highest since December 2000. The Chinese property market is struggling and global PMIs have been downhill since mid-2021 with many countries now at contractive, sub-50 level. Thus a deep concern for the health of the global economy and thus oil demand going forward is absolutely warranted. And thus the preemptive production cuts by Saudi Arabia. But killing the global economy off while it is wobbling with an oil price of USD 110-120/b or higher is of course not a smart thing to do either.

At the same conference in Canada yesterday the CEO of Aramco, Amin H. Nasser, said that he expected global oil demand to reach 110 m b/d in 2030 and that talk about a near term peak in global oil demand was ”driven by policies, rather than the proven combination of markets, competitive economics and technology” (Reuters).

With a demand outlook of 110 m b/d in 2030 the responsible thing to do is of course to make sure that the oil price stays at a level where investments are sufficient to cover both decline in existing production as well as future demand growth.

In terms of oil prices we tend to think about recent history and also in nominal terms. Most market participants are still mentally thinking of the oil prices we have experienced during the shale oil boom years from 2015-2019. The average nominal Brent crude price during that period was USD 58.5/b. This is today often perceived as ”the normal price”. But it was a very special period with booming non-OPEC supply whenever the WTI price moved above USD 45/b. But that period is increasingly behind us. While we could enjoy fairly low oil prices during this period it also left the world with a legacy: Subdued capex spending in upstream oil and gas all through these years. Then came the Covid-years which led to yet another trough in capex spending. We are soon talking close to 9 years of subdued capex spending.

If Amin H. Nasser is ballpark correct in his prediction that global oil demand will reach 110 m b/d in 2030 then the world should better get capex spending rolling. There is only one way to make that happen: a higher oil price. If the global economy now runs into an economic setback or recession and OPEC allows the oil price to drop to say USD 50/b, then we’d get yet another couple of years with subdued capex spending on top of the close to 9 years with subdued spending we already have behind us. So in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, Amin H. Nasser and Abdulaziz bin Salman, the responsible thing to do is to make sure that the oil price stays up at a sufficient level to ensure that capex spending stays up even during an economic downturn.

This brings us back to the question of what is a high oil price. We remember the shale oil boom years with an average nominal price of USD 58.5/b. We tend to think of it as the per definition ”normal” price. But we should instead think of it as the price depression period. A low-price period during which non-OPEC production boomed. Also, adjusting it for inflation, the real average price during this period was actually USD 72.2/b and not USD 58.5/b. If we however zoom out a little and look at the last 20 years then we get a nominal average of USD 75/b. The real, average inflation adjusted price over the past 20 years is however USD 97/b. The Dated Brent crude oil price yesterday closed at USD 96/b.

Worth noting however is that for such inflation adjustment to make sense then the assumed cost of production should actually rise along with inflation and as such create a ”rising floor price” to oil based on rising real costs. If costs in real terms instead are falling due to productivity improvements, then such inflation adjusted prices will have limited bearing for future prices. What matters more specifically is the development of real production costs for non-OPEC producers and the possibility to ramp up such production. Environmental politics in OECD countries is of course a clear limiting factor for non-OPEC oil production growth and possibly a much more important factor than the production cost it self.  

But one last note on the fact that Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, Abdulaziz bin Salman, is emphasizing that the cuts are preemptive rather then an effort to drive the oil price to the sky while Amin H. Nasser is emphasizing that we need to be responsible. It means that if it turns out that the current cuts have indeed made the global oil market too tight with an oil price spiraling towards USD 110-120/b then we’ll highly likely see added supply from Saudi Arabia in November and December rather than Saudi sticking to 9.0 m b/d. This limits the risk for a continued unchecked price rally to such levels.

Oil price perspectives. We tend to think that the nominal average Brent crude oil price of USD 58.5/b during the shale oil boom years from 2015-19 is per definition the ”normal” price. But that period is now increasingly behind us. Zoom out a little to the real, average, inflation adjusted price of the past 20 years and we get USD 97/b. In mathematical terms it is much more ”normal” than the nominal price during the shale oil boom years 

The new normal oil price
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Bloomberg data feed.

Is global oil demand about to peak 1: OECD and non-OECD share of global population

OECD and non-OECD share of global population
Source: SEB graph and calculations, UN population data

Is global oil demand about to peak 2: Oil demand per capita per year

Oil demand per capita per year
Source: SEB graph and calculations, BP oil data
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Analys

USD 100/b in sight but oil product demand may start to hurt

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Some crude oil grades have already traded above USD 100/b. Tapis last week at USD 101.3/b. Dated Brent is trading at USD 95.1/b. No more than some market noise is needed to drive it above USD 100/b. But a perceived and implied oil market deficit of 1.5 to 2.5 m b/d may be closer to balance than a deficit. And if so the reason is probably that oil product demand is hurting. Refineries are running hard. They are craving for crude and converting it to oil products. Crude stocks in US, EU16 and Japan fell 23 m b in August as a result of this and amid continued restraint production by Saudi/Russia. But oil product stocks rose 20.3 m b with net draws in crude and products of only 2.7 m b for these regions. Thus indicating more of a balanced market than a deficit. Naturally there has been strong support for crude prices while oil product refinery margins have started to come off. Saudi/Russia is in solid control of the market. Both crude and product stocks are low while the market is either in deficit or at best in balance. So there should be limited down side price risk. But oil product demand is likely to hurt more if Brent crude rises to USD 110-120/b and such a price level looks excessive.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Crude oil prices have been on a relentless rise since late June when it became clear that Saudi Arabia would keep its production at 9 m b/d not just in July but also in August. Then later extended to September and then lately to the end of the year. On paper this has placed the market into a solid deficit. Total OPEC production was 27.8 m b/d in August and likely more or less the same in September. OPEC estimates that the need for oil from OPEC in Q3-23 is 29.2 m b/d which places the global market in a 1.4 m b/d deficit when OPEC produces 27.8 m b/d.

The proof of the pudding is of course that inventories actually draws down when there is a deficit. A 1.4 m b/d of deficit for 31 days in August implies a global inventory draw of 43.4 m b/d. If we assume that OECD countries accounts for 46% of global oil demand then OECD could/should have had a fair share of inventory rise of say 20 m b in August. Actual inventory data are however usually a lagging set of data so we have to work with sub sets of data being released on a higher frequency. And non-OECD demand and inventory data are hard to come by.

If we look at oil inventory data for US, EU16 and Japan we see that crude stocks fell 23 m b in August while product stocks rose 20.3 m b with a total crude and product draw of only 2.7 m b. I.e. indicating close to a balanced market in August rather than a big deficit. But it matters that crude stocks fell 23 m b. That is a tight crude market where refineries are craving and bidding for crude oil together with speculators who are buying paper-oil. So refineries worked hard to buy crude oil and converting it to oil products in August. But these additional oil products weren’t gobbled up by consumers but instead went into inventories.

Rising oil product inventories is of course  a good thing since these inventories in general are low. And also oil product stocks are low. The point is more that the world did maybe not run a large supply/demand deficit of 1.5 to 2.5 m b/d in August but rather had a more balanced market. A weaker oil product demand than anticipated would then likely be the natural explanation for this. Strong refinery demand for crude oil, crude oil inventory draws amid a situation where crude inventories already are low is of course creating an added sense of bullishness for crude oil.

On the one hand strong refinery demand for crude oil has helped to drive crude oil prices higher amid continued production cuts by Saudi Arabia. Rising oil product stocks have on the other hand eased the pressure on oil products and thus softened the oil product refinery margins.

The overall situation is that Saudi Arabia together with Russia are in solid control of the oil market. Further that the global market is either balanced or in deficit and that both crude and product stocks are still low. Thus we have a tight market both in terms of supplies and inventories. So there should be limited downside in oil prices. We are highly likely to see Dated Brent moving above USD 100/b. It is now less than USD 5/b away from that level and only noise is needed to bring it above. Tupis crude oil in Asia traded at USD 101.3/b last week. So some crude benchmarks are already above the USD 100/b mark.

While Dated Brent looks set to hit USD 100/b in not too long we are skeptical with respect to further price rises to USD 110-120/b as oil product demand likely increasingly would start to hurt. Unless of course if we get some serious supply disruptions. But Saudi Arabia now has several million barrels per day of reserve capacity as it today only produces 9.0 m b/d. Thus disruptions can be countered. Oil product demand, oil product cracks and oil product inventories is a good thing to watch going forward. An oil price of USD 85-95/b is probably much better than USD 110-120/b for a world where economic activity is likely set to slow rather than accelerate following large interest rate hikes over the past 12-18 months.

OPEC’s implied call-on-OPEC crude oil. If OPEC’s production stays at 27.8 m b/d throughout Q3-23 and Q4-23 then OPECs numbers further strong inventory draws to the end of the year.

OPEC's implied call-on-OPEC crude oil.
Source: SEB graph and calculations. Call-on-OPEC as calculated by OPEC in its Sep report.

Net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI. Speculators have joined the price rally since end of June.

Graph of net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

End of month crude and product stocks in m b in EU16, US and Japan. Solid draw in crude stocks but also solid rise in product stocks. In total very limited inventory draw. Refineries ran hard to convert crude to oil products but these then went straight into inventories alleviating low oil product inventories there.

End of month crude and product stocks
Source: SEB table, Argus data

ARA oil product refinery margins have come off their highs for all products as the oil product situation has eased a bit. Especially so for gasoline with now fading summer driving. But also HFO 3.5% cracks have eased back a little bit. But to be clear, diesel cracks and mid-dist cracks are still exceptionally high. And even gasoline crack down to USD 17.6/b is still very high this time of year.

ARA oil product refinery margins
Source: SEB graph and calculations

ARA diesel cracks in USD/b. Very, very high in 2022. Almost normal in Apr and May. Now very high vs. normal though a little softer than last year.

ARA diesel cracks in USD/b.
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

US crude and product stocks vs. 2015-2019 average. Still very low mid-dist inventories (diesel) and also low crude stocks but not all that low gasoline inventories.

US crude and product stocks vs. 2015-2019 average.
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data feed

US crude and product stocks vs. 2015-2019 averages. Mid-dist stocks have stayed persistently low while gasoline stocks suddenly have jumped as gasoline demand seems to have started to hurt due to higher prices.

US crude and product stocks vs. 2015-2019 averages.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data feed.

Total commercial US crude and product stocks in million barrels. Rising lately. If large, global deficit they should have been falling sharply. Might be a blip?

Total commercial US crude and product stocks in million barrels.
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data feed, EIA data
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