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No gold safety net?

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Commerzbank commodities research

Commerzbank commoditiesOn 30th November Switzerland will hold a “Save our Swiss gold” referendum. Should the petition turn out to be successful the Swiss National Bank would have to buy large quantities of gold and would be limited in its monetary policy. The market (and we as well) considers it unlikely that the petition will be successful. As a result the market reaction would be considerable if the referendum passes.

What is it all about?

The initiators of the petition “Save our Swiss gold” are of the view that only “gold can be the foundation of a stable franc”. So as to cement these foundations they demand a change of the constitution in the following points:

  1. The Swiss National Bank is going to be banned from selling gold in the future.
  2. The gold reserves have to be held in Switzerland.
  3. In the future the SNB will have to hold a minimum of 20% of its assets in gold.

Within two years of the referendum being passed the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has to return its gold reserves to Switzerland and has five years to reach the minimum requirement of 20%. The organisers of the petition argue that this is the only way of ensuring the independence of the central bank and the long term stability of the Swiss franc. The reason they state is the strong rise of the SNB’s balance sheet. Since the beginning of the financial market crisis six years ago the balance sheet has risen more than fourfold to CHF 522 bn. (chart 1). An important factor in this context is the introduction of the franc’s minimum exchange rate against the euro on 6th September 2011. The latter ensures that the exchange rate cannot ease below 1.20 francs per euro. In order to defend the minimum exchange rate the SNB had been forced to buy considerable amounts of euros over the past years. Since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate the balance sheet has risen by 40%, with the majority of this rise taking place between September 2011 and September 2012. With the easing of the Euro crisis the appreciation pressure on the franc was reduced and therefore SNB’s interventions subsided notably. However, should the ECB begin buying government bonds on a large scale next year the appreciation pressure on the franc is likely to rise again. This would also increase the likelihood of renewed SNB interventions, which in turn would lead to a further expansion of the SNB balance sheet.

FX market interventions lead balance sheet expansion

The petition demands damage the credibility of the SNB

The petition demand to hold all SNB gold reserves in Switzerland does not limit the SNB. The main advantage of geographically distributing the gold reserves, the possibility to sell the reserves quickly, would become redundant as a result of the ban on selling gold. And as the reserve can no longer be sold in the event of a crisis it no longer constitutes a reserve in the stricter sense and therefore it does not matter whether it is distributed around the globe or sunk in one of the Swiss lakes. If the gold reserves cannot be sold they are “lost” for the Swiss economy and for supporting the franc. However, what does the combination of the sales ban and the 20% minimum gold share in the reserves mean for the SNB’s monetary policy? These two demands limit the central bank’s monetary policy scope considerably and make it more difficult for the SNB to fulfil its mandate: price stability in the sense of a rise of consumer prices of less than 2% per annum.

  • A balance sheet expansion to fight deflation would entail gold purchases at possibly higher prices so as to ensure that the minimum requirement of 20% is met. Gold is considered to constitute the ultimate safe haven and therefore gets more expensive if the desire for more security increases. As a result the threshold for an extension of the balance sheet that requires gold purchases might be increased.
  • Under certain conditions the SNB’s ability to control inflation with the help of a balance sheet contraction might be limited, as the SNB would no longer be able to contract its balance sheet at will. It would only be possible to reduce assets by reducing non-gold holdings as it would not be allowed to sell gold. As a result the gold holdings determine the minimum size of the balance sheet. A balance sheet contraction over and above that is not possible.

The market would be aware of the SNB’s dilemma, so it would constitute the perfect invitation for the market to bet against the SNB. It would open the door to speculators. The difficulties can easily be illustrated by explaining the significance of the petition demands for the EUR-CHF minimum exchange rate of 1.20.

Under the gold initiative the minimum exchange rate in its current form would have been impossible

The SNB introduced the minimum exchange rate to prevent the additional deflationary pressures caused by the appreciation of the franc. The most important reason behind its success is the SNB’s credibility that it would sell unlimited amounts of francs should that be necessary. The SNB would lose this credibility under the conditions of the gold initiative. In this context two factors are important for speculators:

  • (1) If there is a risk that EUR-CHF could ease below 1.20 the SNB is forced to extend its balance sheet with the help of franc sales so as to weaken the franc. The difficulties this would cause were discussed above. After the implementation of the 20% requirement the necessary gold purchases could cause the SNB to hesitate and cause the market to question the SNB’s determination.
  • (2) A successive contraction of the balance sheet might be possible to a limited extend only, theoretically until the gold share reached 100%. If the extension of the balance sheet cannot be fully reversed inflation pressure increases after a while. Medium term the target of maintaining monetary stability might come under threat. In line with its mandate of price stability the SNB has to anticipate the long term effects of an expansion of the balance sheet. This might cause the SNB to hesitate before selling francs. As a result the SNB’s promise to do everything to defend the minimum exchange rate would become less credible.

 Gold share of the SNB balance sheet has fallen despite stable gold reserves

However, short term a positive outcome of the referendum would have little effect on the EURCHF exchange rate. Following the vote the SNB would have five years to meet the minimum requirement of 20% gold holdings. So for the time being it would be able to sell unlimited amounts of francs to defend the 1.20 exchange rate – and it would no doubt do so. It would do so to send out the clear signal that it can and will act.

However, that will not be the case medium to long term. At present the SNB expects a rate of inflation of 0.3% yoy in 2015 – which would not yet allow an exit from the minimum exchange rate strategy. As the requirements of the gold initiative act as an invitation to the market to attack the minimum exchange rate, the SNB would probably be unable to defend the minimum exchange rate long term. Over the coming years the SNB would therefore find it increasingly difficult to maintain the minimum exchange rate in its current form.

As long as the SNB sticks to the minimum exchange rate it is clear though that it would not be able to achieve the requirement to hold 20% gold by contracting the balance sheet. So if the gold initiative was to be successful the SNB would therefore be required to buy substantial amounts of gold, in order to reach the required share of 20% of gold in its assets. This would clearly influence the gold price.

Gold initiative might constitute the turning point for the gold price

As a result of the SNB’s balance sheet expansion the share of the gold reserves in the total balance has fallen continuously over the past few years. Until mid-2008, i.e. before the start of the financial market crisis, it still accounted for more than 20% – the level that the gold initiative would like it to return to. At present the gold holdings account for less than 8% of the balance, sheet without the amount of gold being held having changed during this time (chart 2 and chart 3 below). Since 2008 the reserves have always amounted to 33.44 m ounces (1,040 tons). At current gold price levels this corresponds to CHF 39bn For the gold share to reach 20% again, as demanded by the gold initiative, it would have to rise to CHF 104.5 bn. as long as the total balance remains unchanged. Assuming an unchanged gold price the SNB would have to buy 56.3 m ounces (which corresponds to approx. 1,750 tons) of gold. That would exceed the holdings of all gold ETFs tracked by Bloomberg (chart 4) and would correspond to approx. 60% of the annual global mine production.

Absolute gold holdings are quite stable

Due to the many parameters it is difficult to give the exact purchasing volume required. The SNB balance sheet is likely to increase further next year if the ECB starts its broad-based bond purchases. Under these circumstances the SNB would probably be forced to once again purchase euros so as to defend the minimum exchange rate. So if everything else remains unchanged even larger gold purchases would then be necessary. On the other hand it seems likely that should the referendum end in a win for the gold initiative the gold price would rise. A rise in the gold price on the other hand would lead to a value based increase of the gold reserves’ share of the balance sheet. So that would mean the SNB has to buy less gold. A fall in the gold price would increase the required gold purchases but this is unlikely in view of the market expectations of imminent massive SNB gold purchases.

At present the market considers it relatively unlikely that the initiative will be successful. Current polls put the opponents of the initiative into a clear lead now after first polls had still assumed a majority for the supporters of the initiative. The chances of the initiative’s success have been dampened quite considerably since the executive committee of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) voted against the initiative with a tight majority. That means the initiative’s only supporter amongst the parties has been lost, as the other parties are opposing the initiative. The SNB itself is also opposing the initiative for the reasons explained above. As hardly anybody expects the initiative to be accepted the effects of a surprise acceptance on the gold price would be even more pronounced. An outcome of that nature would be in a position to form the turning point in the development of the gold price and constitute the end of the 3-year bear market.

How pronounced would the price reaction in case of a vote in favour of the gold initiative be? The reaction of the gold price following the announcement of gold purchases by the Chinese and Indian central banks in 2009 might provide an indication. When the Chinese central bank announced in late April 2009 that it had increased its gold holdings by 454 tons in the previous 6 years the gold price rose by 6% within one month (chart 5). When the Indian central bank purchased 200 tons of IMF gold, a transaction that became public in early November 2009, this caused a price rise of 15% within one month. The even larger amount of gold the SNB would have to buy suggests that the price would rise at least by a similar magnitude. On the other hand the clearly more negative market sentiment compared with 2009 points in the other direction. At the time the gold price had been in a 7-year uptrend whereas it has been in a downtrend for three years now (chart 4).

Gold price charts

Analys

What OPEC+ is doing, what it is saying and what we are hearing

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Down 4.4% last week with more from OPEC+, a possible truce in Ukraine and weak US data. Brent crude fell 4.4% last week with a close of the week of USD 66.59/b and a range of USD 65.53-69.98/b. Three bearish drivers were at work. One was the decision by OPEC+ V8 to lift its quotas by 547 kb/d in September and thus a full unwind of the 2.2 mb/d of voluntary cuts. The second was the announcement that Trump and Putin will meet on Friday 15 August to discuss the potential for cease fire in Ukraine (without Ukraine). I.e. no immediate new sanctions towards Russia and no secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian oil to any degree that matters for the oil price. The third was the latest disappointing US macro data which indicates that Trump’s tariffs are starting to bite. Brent is down another 1% this morning trading close to USD 66/b. Hopes for a truce on the horizon in Ukraine as Putin meets with Trump in Alaska in Friday 15, is inching oil lower this morning.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Trump – Putin meets in Alaska. The potential start of a process. No disruption of Russian oil in sight. Trump has invited Putin to Alaska on 15 August to discuss Ukraine. The first such invitation since 2007. Ukraine not being present is bad news for Ukraine. Trump has already suggested ”swapping of territory”. This is not a deal which will be closed on Friday. But rather a start of a process. But Trump is very, very unlikely to slap sanctions on Russian oil while this process is ongoing. I.e. no disruption of Russian oil in sight.

What OPEC+ is doing, what it is saying and what we are hearing. OPEC+ V8 is done unwinding its 2.2 mb/d in September. It doesn’t mean production will increase equally much. Since it started the unwind and up to July (to when we have production data), the increase in quotas has gone up by 1.4 mb/d, while actual production has gone up by less than 0.7 mb/d. Some in the V8 group are unable to increase while others, like Russia and Iraq are paying down previous excess production debt. Russia and Iraq shouldn’t increase production before Jan and Mar next year respectively.

We know that OPEC+ has spare capacity which it will deploy back into the market at some point in time. And with the accelerated time-line for the redeployment of the 2.2 mb/d voluntary cuts it looks like it is happening fast. Faster than we had expected and faster than OPEC+ V8 previously announced.

As bystanders and watchers of the oil market we naturally combine our knowledge of their surplus spare capacity with their accelerated quota unwind and the combination of that is naturally bearish. Amid this we are not really able to hear or believe OPEC+ when they say that they are ready to cut again if needed. Instead we are kind of drowning our selves out in a combo of ”surplus spare capacity” and ”rapid unwind” to conclude that we are now on a highway to a bear market where OPEC+ closes its eyes to price and blindly takes back market share whatever it costs. But that is not what the group is saying. Maybe we should listen a little.

That doesn’t mean we are bullish for oil in 2026. But we may not be on a ”highway to bear market” either where OPEC+ is blind to the price. 

Saudi OSPs to Asia in September at third highest since Feb 2024. Saudi Arabia lifted its official selling prices to Asia for September to the third highest since February 2024. That is not a sign that Saudi Arabia is pushing oil out the door at any cost.

Saudi Arabia OSPs to Asia in September at third highest since Feb 2024

Saudi Arabia OSPs to Asia in September at third highest since Feb 2024
Source: SEB calculations, graph and highlights, Bloomberg data
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Analys

Breaking some eggs in US shale

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Lower as OPEC+ keeps fast-tracking redeployment of previous cuts. Brent closed down 1.3% yesterday to USD 68.76/b on the back of the news over the weekend that OPEC+ (V8) lifted its quota by 547 kb/d for September. Intraday it traded to a low of USD 68.0/b but then pushed higher as Trump threatened to slap sanctions on India if it continues to buy loads of Russian oil.  An effort by Donald Trump to force Putin to a truce in Ukraine. This morning it is trading down 0.6% at USD 68.3/b which is just USD 1.3/b below its July average.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Only US shale can hand back the market share which OPEC+ is after. The overall picture in the oil market today and the coming 18 months is that OPEC+ is in the process of taking back market share which it lost over the past years in exchange for higher prices. There is only one source of oil supply which has sufficient reactivity and that is US shale. Average liquids production in the US is set to average 23.1 mb/d in 2025 which is up a whooping 3.4 mb/d since 2021 while it is only up 280 kb/d versus 2024.

Taking back market share is usually a messy business involving a deep trough in prices and significant economic pain for the involved parties. The original plan of OPEC+ (V8) was to tip-toe the 2.2 mb/d cuts gradually back into the market over the course to December 2026. Hoping that robust demand growth and slower non-OPEC+ supply growth would make room for the re-deployment without pushing oil prices down too much.

From tip-toing to fast-tracking. Though still not full aggression. US trade war, weaker global growth outlook and Trump insisting on a lower oil price, and persistent robust non-OPEC+ supply growth changed their minds. Now it is much more fast-track with the re-deployment of the 2.2 mb/d done already by September this year. Though with some adjustments. Lifting quotas is not immediately the same as lifting production as Russia and Iraq first have to pay down their production debt. The OPEC+ organization is also holding the door open for production cuts if need be. And the group is not blasting the market with oil. So far it has all been very orderly with limited impact on prices. Despite the fast-tracking.

The overall process is nonetheless still to take back market share. And that won’t be without pain. The good news for OPEC+ is of course that US shale now is cooling down when WTI is south of USD 65/b rather than heating up when WTI is north of USD 45/b as was the case before.

OPEC+ will have to break some eggs in the US shale oil patches to take back lost market share. The process is already in play. Global oil inventories have been building and they will build more and the oil price will be pushed lower.

A Brent average of USD 60/b in 2026 implies a low of the year of USD 45-47.5/b. Assume that an average Brent crude oil price of USD 60/b and an average WTI price of USD 57.5/b in 2026 is sufficient to drive US oil rig count down by another 100 rigs and US crude production down by 1.5 mb/d from Dec-25 to Dec-26. A Brent crude average of USD 60/b sounds like a nice price. Do remember though that over the course of a year Brent crude fluctuates +/- USD 10-15/b around the average. So if USD 60/b is the average price, then the low of the year is in the mid to the high USD 40ies/b.

US shale oil producers are likely bracing themselves for what’s in store. US shale oil producers are aware of what is in store. They can see that inventories are rising and they have been cutting rigs and drilling activity since mid-April. But significantly more is needed over the coming 18 months or so. The faster they cut the better off they will be. Cutting 5 drilling rigs per week to the end of the year, an additional total of 100 rigs, will likely drive US crude oil production down by 1.5 mb/d from Dec-25 to Dec-26 and come a long way of handing back the market share OPEC+ is after.

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More from OPEC+ means US shale has to gradually back off further

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

The OPEC+ subgroup V8 this weekend decided to fully unwind their voluntary cut of 2.2 mb/d. The September quota hike was set at 547 kb/d thereby unwinding the full 2.2 mb/d. This still leaves another layer of voluntary cuts of 1.6 mb/d which is likely to be unwind at some point.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Higher quotas however do not immediately translate to equally higher production. This because Russia and Iraq have ”production debts” of cumulative over-production which they need to pay back by holding production below the agreed quotas. I.e. they cannot (should not) lift production before Jan (Russia) and March (Iraq) next year.

Argus estimates that global oil stocks have increased by 180 mb so far this year but with large skews. Strong build in Asia while Europe and the US still have low inventories. US Gulf stocks are at the lowest level in 35 years. This strong skew is likely due to political sanctions towards Russian and Iranian oil exports and the shadow fleet used to export their oil. These sanctions naturally drive their oil exports to Asia and non-OECD countries. That is where the surplus over the past half year has been going and where inventories have been building. An area which has a much more opaque oil market. Relatively low visibility with respect to oil inventories and thus weaker price signals from inventory dynamics there.

This has helped shield Brent and WTI crude oil price benchmarks to some degree from the running, global surplus over the past half year. Brent crude averaged USD 73/b in December 2024 and at current USD 69.7/b it is not all that much lower today despite an estimated global stock build of 180 mb since the end of last year and a highly anticipated equally large stock build for the rest of the year.

What helps to blur the message from OPEC+ in its current process of unwinding cuts and taking back market share, is that, while lifting quotas, it is at the same time also quite explicit that this is not a one way street. That it may turn around make new cuts if need be.

This is very different from its previous efforts to take back market share from US shale oil producers. In its previous efforts it typically tried to shock US shale oil producers out of the market. But they came back very, very quickly. 

When OPEC+ now is taking back market share from US shale oil it is more like it is exerting a continuous, gradually increasing pressure towards US shale oil rather than trying to shock it out of the market which it tried before. OPEC+ is now forcing US shale oil producers to gradually back off. US oil drilling rig count is down from 480 in Q1-25 to now 410 last week and it is typically falling by some 4-5 rigs per week currently. This has happened at an average WTI price of about USD 65/b. This is very different from earlier when US shale oil activity exploded when WTI went north of USD 45/b. This helps to give OPEC+ a lot of confidence.

Global oil inventories are set to rise further in H2-25 and crude oil prices will likely be forced lower though the global skew in terms of where inventories are building is muddying the picture. US shale oil activity will likely decline further in H2-25 as well with rig count down maybe another 100 rigs. Thus making room for more oil from OPEC+.

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