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No gold safety net?

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Commerzbank commodities research

Commerzbank commoditiesOn 30th November Switzerland will hold a “Save our Swiss gold” referendum. Should the petition turn out to be successful the Swiss National Bank would have to buy large quantities of gold and would be limited in its monetary policy. The market (and we as well) considers it unlikely that the petition will be successful. As a result the market reaction would be considerable if the referendum passes.

What is it all about?

The initiators of the petition “Save our Swiss gold” are of the view that only “gold can be the foundation of a stable franc”. So as to cement these foundations they demand a change of the constitution in the following points:

  1. The Swiss National Bank is going to be banned from selling gold in the future.
  2. The gold reserves have to be held in Switzerland.
  3. In the future the SNB will have to hold a minimum of 20% of its assets in gold.

Within two years of the referendum being passed the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has to return its gold reserves to Switzerland and has five years to reach the minimum requirement of 20%. The organisers of the petition argue that this is the only way of ensuring the independence of the central bank and the long term stability of the Swiss franc. The reason they state is the strong rise of the SNB’s balance sheet. Since the beginning of the financial market crisis six years ago the balance sheet has risen more than fourfold to CHF 522 bn. (chart 1). An important factor in this context is the introduction of the franc’s minimum exchange rate against the euro on 6th September 2011. The latter ensures that the exchange rate cannot ease below 1.20 francs per euro. In order to defend the minimum exchange rate the SNB had been forced to buy considerable amounts of euros over the past years. Since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate the balance sheet has risen by 40%, with the majority of this rise taking place between September 2011 and September 2012. With the easing of the Euro crisis the appreciation pressure on the franc was reduced and therefore SNB’s interventions subsided notably. However, should the ECB begin buying government bonds on a large scale next year the appreciation pressure on the franc is likely to rise again. This would also increase the likelihood of renewed SNB interventions, which in turn would lead to a further expansion of the SNB balance sheet.

FX market interventions lead balance sheet expansion

The petition demands damage the credibility of the SNB

The petition demand to hold all SNB gold reserves in Switzerland does not limit the SNB. The main advantage of geographically distributing the gold reserves, the possibility to sell the reserves quickly, would become redundant as a result of the ban on selling gold. And as the reserve can no longer be sold in the event of a crisis it no longer constitutes a reserve in the stricter sense and therefore it does not matter whether it is distributed around the globe or sunk in one of the Swiss lakes. If the gold reserves cannot be sold they are “lost” for the Swiss economy and for supporting the franc. However, what does the combination of the sales ban and the 20% minimum gold share in the reserves mean for the SNB’s monetary policy? These two demands limit the central bank’s monetary policy scope considerably and make it more difficult for the SNB to fulfil its mandate: price stability in the sense of a rise of consumer prices of less than 2% per annum.

  • A balance sheet expansion to fight deflation would entail gold purchases at possibly higher prices so as to ensure that the minimum requirement of 20% is met. Gold is considered to constitute the ultimate safe haven and therefore gets more expensive if the desire for more security increases. As a result the threshold for an extension of the balance sheet that requires gold purchases might be increased.
  • Under certain conditions the SNB’s ability to control inflation with the help of a balance sheet contraction might be limited, as the SNB would no longer be able to contract its balance sheet at will. It would only be possible to reduce assets by reducing non-gold holdings as it would not be allowed to sell gold. As a result the gold holdings determine the minimum size of the balance sheet. A balance sheet contraction over and above that is not possible.

The market would be aware of the SNB’s dilemma, so it would constitute the perfect invitation for the market to bet against the SNB. It would open the door to speculators. The difficulties can easily be illustrated by explaining the significance of the petition demands for the EUR-CHF minimum exchange rate of 1.20.

Under the gold initiative the minimum exchange rate in its current form would have been impossible

The SNB introduced the minimum exchange rate to prevent the additional deflationary pressures caused by the appreciation of the franc. The most important reason behind its success is the SNB’s credibility that it would sell unlimited amounts of francs should that be necessary. The SNB would lose this credibility under the conditions of the gold initiative. In this context two factors are important for speculators:

  • (1) If there is a risk that EUR-CHF could ease below 1.20 the SNB is forced to extend its balance sheet with the help of franc sales so as to weaken the franc. The difficulties this would cause were discussed above. After the implementation of the 20% requirement the necessary gold purchases could cause the SNB to hesitate and cause the market to question the SNB’s determination.
  • (2) A successive contraction of the balance sheet might be possible to a limited extend only, theoretically until the gold share reached 100%. If the extension of the balance sheet cannot be fully reversed inflation pressure increases after a while. Medium term the target of maintaining monetary stability might come under threat. In line with its mandate of price stability the SNB has to anticipate the long term effects of an expansion of the balance sheet. This might cause the SNB to hesitate before selling francs. As a result the SNB’s promise to do everything to defend the minimum exchange rate would become less credible.

 Gold share of the SNB balance sheet has fallen despite stable gold reserves

However, short term a positive outcome of the referendum would have little effect on the EURCHF exchange rate. Following the vote the SNB would have five years to meet the minimum requirement of 20% gold holdings. So for the time being it would be able to sell unlimited amounts of francs to defend the 1.20 exchange rate – and it would no doubt do so. It would do so to send out the clear signal that it can and will act.

However, that will not be the case medium to long term. At present the SNB expects a rate of inflation of 0.3% yoy in 2015 – which would not yet allow an exit from the minimum exchange rate strategy. As the requirements of the gold initiative act as an invitation to the market to attack the minimum exchange rate, the SNB would probably be unable to defend the minimum exchange rate long term. Over the coming years the SNB would therefore find it increasingly difficult to maintain the minimum exchange rate in its current form.

As long as the SNB sticks to the minimum exchange rate it is clear though that it would not be able to achieve the requirement to hold 20% gold by contracting the balance sheet. So if the gold initiative was to be successful the SNB would therefore be required to buy substantial amounts of gold, in order to reach the required share of 20% of gold in its assets. This would clearly influence the gold price.

Gold initiative might constitute the turning point for the gold price

As a result of the SNB’s balance sheet expansion the share of the gold reserves in the total balance has fallen continuously over the past few years. Until mid-2008, i.e. before the start of the financial market crisis, it still accounted for more than 20% – the level that the gold initiative would like it to return to. At present the gold holdings account for less than 8% of the balance, sheet without the amount of gold being held having changed during this time (chart 2 and chart 3 below). Since 2008 the reserves have always amounted to 33.44 m ounces (1,040 tons). At current gold price levels this corresponds to CHF 39bn For the gold share to reach 20% again, as demanded by the gold initiative, it would have to rise to CHF 104.5 bn. as long as the total balance remains unchanged. Assuming an unchanged gold price the SNB would have to buy 56.3 m ounces (which corresponds to approx. 1,750 tons) of gold. That would exceed the holdings of all gold ETFs tracked by Bloomberg (chart 4) and would correspond to approx. 60% of the annual global mine production.

Absolute gold holdings are quite stable

Due to the many parameters it is difficult to give the exact purchasing volume required. The SNB balance sheet is likely to increase further next year if the ECB starts its broad-based bond purchases. Under these circumstances the SNB would probably be forced to once again purchase euros so as to defend the minimum exchange rate. So if everything else remains unchanged even larger gold purchases would then be necessary. On the other hand it seems likely that should the referendum end in a win for the gold initiative the gold price would rise. A rise in the gold price on the other hand would lead to a value based increase of the gold reserves’ share of the balance sheet. So that would mean the SNB has to buy less gold. A fall in the gold price would increase the required gold purchases but this is unlikely in view of the market expectations of imminent massive SNB gold purchases.

At present the market considers it relatively unlikely that the initiative will be successful. Current polls put the opponents of the initiative into a clear lead now after first polls had still assumed a majority for the supporters of the initiative. The chances of the initiative’s success have been dampened quite considerably since the executive committee of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) voted against the initiative with a tight majority. That means the initiative’s only supporter amongst the parties has been lost, as the other parties are opposing the initiative. The SNB itself is also opposing the initiative for the reasons explained above. As hardly anybody expects the initiative to be accepted the effects of a surprise acceptance on the gold price would be even more pronounced. An outcome of that nature would be in a position to form the turning point in the development of the gold price and constitute the end of the 3-year bear market.

How pronounced would the price reaction in case of a vote in favour of the gold initiative be? The reaction of the gold price following the announcement of gold purchases by the Chinese and Indian central banks in 2009 might provide an indication. When the Chinese central bank announced in late April 2009 that it had increased its gold holdings by 454 tons in the previous 6 years the gold price rose by 6% within one month (chart 5). When the Indian central bank purchased 200 tons of IMF gold, a transaction that became public in early November 2009, this caused a price rise of 15% within one month. The even larger amount of gold the SNB would have to buy suggests that the price would rise at least by a similar magnitude. On the other hand the clearly more negative market sentiment compared with 2009 points in the other direction. At the time the gold price had been in a 7-year uptrend whereas it has been in a downtrend for three years now (chart 4).

Gold price charts

Analys

Brent crude sticks around $66 as OPEC+ begins the ’slow return’

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Brent crude touched a low of USD 65.07 per barrel on Friday evening before rebounding sharply by USD 2 to USD 67.04 by mid-day Monday. The rally came despite confirmation from OPEC+ of a measured production increase starting next month. Prices have since eased slightly, down USD 0.6 to around USD 66.50 this morning, as the market evaluates the group’s policy, evolving demand signals, and rising geopolitical tension.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

On Sunday, OPEC+ approved a 137,000 barrels-per-day increase in collective output beginning in October – a cautious first step in unwinding the final tranche of 1.66 million barrels per day in voluntary cuts, originally set to remain off the market through end-2026. Further adjustments will depend on ”evolving market conditions.” While the pace is modest – especially relative to prior monthly hikes – the signal is clear: OPEC+ is methodically re-entering the market with a strategic intent to reclaim lost market share, rather than defend high prices.

This shift in tone comes as Saudi Aramco also trimmed its official selling prices for Asian buyers, further reinforcing the group’s tilt toward a volume-over-price strategy. We see this as a clear message: OPEC+ intends to expand market share through steady production increases, and a lower price point – potentially below USD 65/b – may be necessary to stimulate demand and crowd out higher-cost competitors, particularly U.S. shale, where average break-evens remain around WTI USD 50/b.

Despite the policy shift, oil prices have held firm. Brent is still hovering near USD 66.50/b, supported by low U.S. and OECD inventories, where crude and product stocks remain well below seasonal norms, keeping front-month backwardation intact. Also, the low inventory levels at key pricing hubs in Europe and continued stockpiling by Chinese refiners are also lending resilience to prices. Tightness in refined product markets, especially diesel, has further underpinned this.

Geopolitical developments are also injecting a slight risk premium. Over the weekend, Russia launched its most intense air assault on Kyiv since the war began, damaging central government infrastructure. This escalation comes as the EU weighs fresh sanctions on Russian oil trade and financial institutions. Several European leaders are expected in Washington this week to coordinate on Ukraine strategy – and the prospect of tighter restrictions on Russian crude could re-emerge as a price stabilizer.

In Asia, China’s crude oil imports rose to 49.5 million tons in August, up 0.8% YoY. The rise coincides with increased Chinese interest in Russian Urals, offered at a discount during falling Indian demand. Chinese refiners appear to be capitalizing on this arbitrage while avoiding direct exposure to U.S. trade penalties.

Going forward, our attention turns to the data calendar. The EIA’s STEO is due today (Tuesday), followed by the IEA and OPEC monthly oil market reports on Thursday. With a pending supply surplus projected during the fourth quarter and into 2026, markets will dissect these updates for any changes in demand assumptions and non-OPEC supply growth. Stay tuned!

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Analys

The path of retaking market share goes through a lower price

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

OPEC+ on Sunday decided to lift production caps by an additional 137 kb/d in October. Thereby starting to unwind the last tranche of voluntary cuts of 1.66 mb/d. It will unwind this last tranche gradually until the end of 2026 depending on market conditions it said.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Brent closed on Friday at USD 65.5/b. The market is up at USD 66.7/b this morning. That is below the high on Friday and USD 2.4/b below where it closed on Tuesday last week. So while the decision by the group was less aggressive than the market feared on Friday afternoon, it was still a very different from the group than what most market participants expected at the beginning of last week.

Our expectation last week was for the group to unwind the remaining 1.66 mb/d of voluntary cuts over only three months to the end of this year and get done with it. But the group decided on a slower path. It will not shock its way back to a larger market share like it tried without much luck in 2014/15/16. It will instead push steadily, steadily and take it back. Allowing US shale oil players time to step aside. But step aside they must.

The implied message from the group this weekend was 1) They are in the process of retaking market share and 2) As long as the price is USD 65.5/b (close on Friday) the group will revive more production.

What we know is that this process of retaking market share by OPEC+ goes through a lower oil price. And that lower price is below USD 65.5/b. A lower price to stimulate more demand. A lower price to hamper supply by non-OPEC+ (predominantly US shale oil).

The fact that Brent crude is still trading at USD 66.6/b despite this very explicit message from the group this weekend is down to still low US and OECD crude and product inventories. The front-end backwardation of the Brent futures curve is a reflection of this tightness. But this tightness will ease along with more oil from OPEC+ over the coming months. The Brent crude oil forward curve will then flip into full contango all along the curve. We then expect the front-end of the Brent curve to trade around USD 55/b with WTI close to USD 50/b.

At the beginning of this year BNEF estimated US shale oil cost break even levels to be in a range from USD 40/b to USD 60/b with a volume weighted average of USD 50/b. The latter our calculation. So a WTI price at the middle of that range is probably what is needed to force activity in US shale oil activity yet lower.

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Analys

OPEC+ in a process of retaking market share

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Oil prices are likely to fall for a fourth straight year as OPEC+ unwinds cuts and retakes market share. We expect Brent crude to average USD 55/b in Q4/25 before OPEC+ steps in to stabilise the market into 2026. Surplus, stock building, oil prices are under pressure with OPEC+ calling the shots as to how rough it wants to play it. We see natural gas prices following parity with oil (except for seasonality) until LNG surplus arrives in late 2026/early 2027.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

Oil market: Q4/25 and 2026 will be all about how OPEC+ chooses to play it
OPEC+ is in a process of unwinding voluntary cuts by a sub-group of the members and taking back market share. But the process looks set to be different from 2014-16, as the group doesn’t look likely to blindly lift production to take back market share. The group has stated very explicitly that it can just as well cut production as increase it ahead. While the oil price is unlikely to drop as violently and lasting as in 2014-16, it will likely fall further before the group steps in with fresh cuts to stabilise the price. We expect Brent to fall to USD 55/b in Q4/25 before the group steps in with fresh cuts at the end of the year.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Natural gas market: Winter risk ahead, yet LNG balance to loosen from 2026
The global gas market entered 2025 in a fragile state of balance. European reliance on LNG remains high, with Russian pipeline flows limited to Turkey and Russian LNG constrained by sanctions. Planned NCS maintenance in late summer could trim exports by up to 1.3 TWh/day, pressuring EU storage ahead of winter. Meanwhile, NE Asia accounts for more than 50% of global LNG demand, with China alone nearing a 20% share (~80 mt in 2024). US shale gas production has likely peaked after reaching 104.8 bcf/d, even as LNG export capacity expands rapidly, tightening the US balance. Global supply additions are limited until late 2026, when major US, Qatari and Canadian projects are due to start up. Until then, we expect TTF to average EUR 38/MWh through 2025, before easing as the new supply wave likely arrives in late 2026 and then in 2027.

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