Analys
What is behind the recent fall in US crude oil stocks?
US crude oil stocks have fallen significantly during the summer months. This was mainly attributable to an increase in crude oil processing. In this way US refineries reacted to robust demand for middle distillates, which is reflected in low US distillate stocks and record US distillate exports. As crude oil processing declines, US crude oil stocks will likely rise again in the fourth quarter. Robust US distillate exports are exerting pressure on refinery margins in Europe, which will probably increase Europe’s dependency on imports of oil products.
US crude oil stocks have fallen significantly during the summer months. Since the end of June they have declined by 38m barrels and in mid-September reached their lowest level for 18 months. Destocking has been concentrated on two regions: in the Midwest (PADD 2) stocks have fallen by more than 20m barrels, and on the US Gulf Coast (PADD 3) by more than 14m barrels (chart 1). The lion’s share of the destocking in the Midwest related to the storage hub in Cushing, where stocks have fallen by a total of 16.5m barrels for 13 weeks in succession. What is the reason for this surprising trend and will the destocking continue?
The trend in stock levels can be divided into three sub-components: on the supply side are US oil production and US oil imports, and on the demand side, crude oil processing by refineries. US oil production has increased until recently. In mid-September it reached its highest level since May 1989 of more than 7.4m barrels per day. This component cannot therefore explain the destocking of recent weeks. On the other hand, imports of crude oil have fallen sharply. In the summer months they were, on average, 1m barrels per day lower than in the previous year. However, this will not be sufficient to balance out the simultaneous increase in US oil production. Between the end of June and mid-September this was, on average, 1.4m barrels per day above the previous year’s level. The trend on the supply side would therefore have been an indication of stockbuilding. The main reason for the significant destocking this summer is therefore to be found on the demand side, i.e. from the higher volumes of crude oil processed at refineries.
Crude oil processing in the USA was higher than usual this summer
US refineries stepped up crude oil processing much more significantly than usual this summer. Between the end of June and mid-September, an average of 16m barrels of crude oil was processed daily. This was 600,000 barrels per day more than in the corresponding period last year, and 900,000 barrels per day more than the long-term average level (chart 2). At the beginning of July, more crude oil was processed than at any time in the last eight years. It was also striking that refineries maintained processing rates at their high levels of July and August up to mid-September. Normally, refineries scale back their utilisation from the end of August as the summer driving season approaches an end. Refineries usually use the time in early autumn to carry out maintenance and to switch operations to the winter season. Hence, significantly more crude oil has been processed this summer than would otherwise be normal at this time of the year. This has only been possible by consistently dipping into crude oil stocks, although more crude oil has also been available as a result of the increased level of domestic oil production.
This cannot be explained with trends in the US gasoline market…
The fact that US refineries have increased their crude oil processing so strongly over an extended period this summer cannot be explained by trends in the US gasoline market, which is normally the most important driver of refinery activity in the summer months. Demand for gasoline in the US during the summer driving season showed virtually no increase compared to last year. US gasoline stocks have remained consistently 5 to 6 per cent above their long-term average for weeks with a few exceptions. US gasoline production was just slightly higher this summer than in the previous years. Moreover, the US exported less gasoline between March and July than one year ago, according to the EIA.
…but is attributable to distillate production in particular
The reason for the unusually high level of refinery activity over a prolonged period is above all attributable to middle distillates. US refineries have significantly increased the production of middle distillates in particular. This increased to an average of 5m barrels per day in the summer months, which was 13% higher than average for the last five years. More than half of the increase in crude oil processing this summer is therefore attributable to the middle distillates segment. The varying trend in processing margins is likely to have played a part here. While margins for gasoline production have fallen to the lowest level since end of 2011, they are still relatively high for middle distillates (chart 3). The fact that margins for middle distillates have held up much better is attributable to low US distillate stocks, which have remained well below their long-term average levels despite robust production of middle distillates.
Strong demand for distillates in and outside the USA
This is mainly the result of higher domestic demand and robust demand for distillates from abroad. Distillate demand from US consumers was 10% higher than last year during the summer months and 6% above the average of the last five years. Moreover, the USA exported 1.276m barrels of middle distillates per day on balance in July after having reached a level nearly as high in June (chart 4, page 3). Daily net distillate exports were almost twice as high in June and July as in the first four months of the year and also 26% above the same period last year. Weekly estimates from the US Energy Information Administration also indicate that distillate exports remained at a similarly high level in August and September.
Refinery activity is unlikely to sustain these exceptionally high levels
US refineries have benefited from cheaper crude oil from the country’s interior until recently, which, thanks to new pipeline capacity, can be transported to the US Gulf Coast, where roughly half of US refinery capacity is situated. This also enables US refineries to avoid the continuing restrictions on crude oil exports from the USA, since these restrictions do not apply to the export of oil products. Despite everything, US refineries are unlikely to maintain their distinctly high levels of crude oil processing of recent months, given lower margins. The EIA expects average crude oil processing of 15.3m barrels per day in the fourth quarter. This would still be more than 500,000 barrels per day above the average of the last five years, but some 600,000 barrels per day less than in the third quarter. The lower demand for crude oil from refineries indicates higher stock levels, if US oil imports are not being reduced markedly, as US oil production is likely to increase further as a result of the surge in shale oil production in North Dakota and Texas. In fact, the decline in US crude oil stocks seems to have come to an end. In the second half of September stocks were already increasing by roughly 8m barrels, due to lower volume of crude oil processing and higher oil imports.
Decline in crude oil stocks has recently also slowed at Cushing
The 13-week long decline in crude oil stocks at Cushing has also weakened visibly in recent weeks (chart 5). Whereas, between the beginning of July and the end of August, on balance an average of 1.36m barrels of crude oil per week were drained off Cushing, in September the figure had fallen to an average of less than 500,000 barrels per week. At the end of September, the decline in stocks at Cushing had almost come to an end. Should stocks be built up also at Cushing in the weeks ahead, this would not be attributable to a lack of transport or processing capacities. These are now sufficient – as the steady fall in Cushing stocks over the summer months despite rising shale oil production in the Midwest demonstrated. In fact, once the Southern leg of the Keystone XL pipeline is completed, additional transport capacities of 700,000 barrels per day will be available by year-end. A stock build-up would instead be attributable to lower crude oil processing at refineries. This should exert pressure on the WTI price in particular.
Record US distillate exports creating problems for refineries in Europe
What are the implications of these trends for Europe? According to data from the EIA, the USA was already exporting record volumes of middle distillates to Europe in May and June. Based on shipping data, this trend has continued in September. The high levels of US distillate exports will exert pressure on refinery margins in Europe. Despite low gasoil stocks, the price differential between gasoil and Brent oil has been moving in a narrow range around USD 15 per barrel for some months, which is hardly sufficient to offset the very low margins in gasoline production. The situation has been compounded by the fact that the USA itself has now become a net gasoline exporter. As a result the US market – formerly the most important sales market for European refineries – has been lost. At the same time, the USA is also competing in gasoline on other sales markets such as South America, for instance. Further refinery closures in Europe are thus on the cards, which would further increase Europe’s dependency on imports of oil products.
Analys
Oil market assigns limited risks to Iranian induced supply disruptions
Falling back this morning. Brent crude traded from an intraday low of $59.75/b last Monday to an intraday high of $63.92/b on Friday and a close that day of $63.34/b. Driven higher by the rising riots in Iran. Brent is trading slightly lower this morning at $63.0/b.

Iranian riots and risk of supply disruption in the Middle East takes center stage. The Iranian public is rioting in response to rapidly falling living conditions. The current oppressive regime has been ruling the country for 46 years. The Iranian economy has rapidly deteriorated the latest years along with the mismanagement of the economy, a water crisis, encompassing corruption with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps at the center and with US sanctions on top. The public has had enough and is now rioting. SEB’s EM Strategist Erik Meyersson wrote the following on the Iranian situation yesterday: ”Iran is on the brink – but of what?” with one statement being ”…the regime seems to lack a comprehensive set of solutions to solve the socioeconomic problems”. That is of course bad news for the regime. What can it do? Erik’s takeaway is that it is an open question what this will lead to while also drawing up different possible scenarios.
Personally I fear that this may end very badly for the rioters. That the regime will use absolute force to quash the riots. Kill many, many more and arrest and torture anyone who still dare to protest. I do not have high hopes for a transition to another regime. I bet that Iranian’s telephone lines to its diverse group of autocratic friends currently are running red-hot with ”friendly” recommendations of how to quash the riots. This could easily become the ”Tiananmen Square” moment (1989) for the current Iranian regime.
The risks to the oil market are:
1) The current regime applies absolute force. The riots die out and oil production and exports continue as before. Continued US and EU sanctions with Iranian oil mostly going to China. No major loss of supply to the global market in total. Limited impact on oil prices. Current risk premium fades. Economically the Iranian regime continues to limp forward at a deteriorating path.
2) The regime applies absolute force as in 1), but the US intervenes kinetically. Escalation ensues in the Middle East to the point that oil exports out of the Strait of Hormuz are curbed. The price of oil shots above $150/b.
3) Riots spreads to affect Iranian oil production/exports. The current regime does not apply sufficient absolute force. Riots spreads further to affect oil production and export facilities with the result that the oil market loses some 1.5 mb/d to 2.0 mb/d of exports from Iran. Thereafter a messy aftermath regime wise.
Looking at the oil market today the Brent crude oil price is falling back 0.6% to $63/b. As such the oil market is assigning very low risk for scenario 2) and probably a very high probability for scenario 1).
Venezuela: Heavy sour crude and product prices falls sharply on prospect of reduced US sanctions on Venezuelan oil exports. The oil market take on Venezuela has quickly shifted from fear of losing what was left of its production and exports to instead expecting more heavy oil from Venezuela to be released into the market. Not at least easier access to Venezuelan heavy crude for USGC refineries. The US has started to partially lift sanctions on Venezuelan crude oil exports with the aim of releasing 30mn-50mn bl of Venezuelan crude from onshore and offshore stocks according to the US energy secretary Chris Wright. But a significant increase in oil production and exports is far away. It is estimated that it will take $10bn in capex spending every year for 10 years to drive its production up by 1.5 mb/d to a total of 2.5 mb/d. That is not moving the needle a lot for the US which has a total hydrocarbon liquids production today of 23.6 mb/d (2025 average). At the same time US oil majors are not all that eager to invest in Venezuela as they still hold tens of billions of dollars in claims against the nation from when it confiscated their assets in 2007. Prices for heavy crude in the USGC have however fallen sharply over the prospect of getting easier access to more heavy crude from Venezuela. The relative price of heavy sour crude products in Western Europe versus Brent crude have also fallen sharply into the new year.
Iran officially exported 1.75 mb/d of crude on average in 2025 falling sharply to 1.4 mb/d in December. But it also produces condensates. Probably in the magnitude of 0.5-0.6 mb/d. Total production of crude and condensates probably close to 3.9 mb/d.

The price of heavy, sour fuel oil has fallen sharply versus Brent crude the latest days in response to the prospect of more heavy sour crude from Venezuela.

Analys
The oil market in 2026 will not be about Venezuela but about OPEC+ cutting or not
Lower this morning as Rodriguez opens for US cooperation. Brent crude is down 1.4% to USD 69.95/b this morning. The acting president in Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez, has struck a much more conciliatory tone and offered to cooperate with the US. This reduces the risk for an extended embargo on Venezuelan oil exports with oil potentially flowing freely out of Venezuela in not too long if Rodriguez actually do cooperate as the US whishes.

Venezuela is not a big oil producer today. It produced 960 kb/d in November. At the same time it consumes some 400 kb/d with net to the world exports of only 560 kb/d. Supply risk to the global oil market is thus very limited as it stands today.
Venezuela produced closer to 2.4 mb/d in 2015. But years of corruption plus US sanctions has eroded production capacity. Its oil infrastructure is worn down. Engineers who could get jobs in other countries have left.
What makes everyone lift their eyebrows over Venezuela with respect to oil is that it has the world’s largest oil reserves. The idea is that US capital coupled with Venezuelan oil reserves could lead to a major upturn in oil production. But it will require billions and billions of dollar and also time to drive production higher.
China has poured billions into infrastructure in Venezuela with most of it lost due to corruption. While Rodriguez now has opened for cooperation with the US, the corrupt regime under Maduro is probably still fully intact. It may not be all that safe for US oil majors to pour billions in capex into Venezuela.
Venezuela has the potential to produce significantly more oil. But lots of money and time to materialize it. Yes, it has the world’s largest oil reserves, but the world is full of oil reserves. The key question is thus more about where do you want to place your capex? What reserves will yield the greatest returns and the lowest risks versus corruption and geopolitics? Impressions from latest headlines is that US money is already knocking on the door in Venezuela, but it is too early to say whether such a dollar-flow will really materialize in the end or not.
The global oil market in 2026 will not be about Venezuela. It will be about OPEC+ balancing act between oil price and market share. Making cuts or not. The IEA projected in December that the world will only need 25.6 mb/d from OPEC in 2026 versus a production in November of 29.1 mb/d. If the IEA is correct then the OPEC will need to cut production by 3.5 mb/d to keep the oil market balanced.
Brent crude is at USD 69.95/b and OPEC+ confirmed this weekend that it will keep production unchanged in Q1-26. The consequence is that the oil price is heading lower by the week. We expect OPEC+ to shift from ”hold” to ”cut” as Brent crude moves to the low 50ies.
Venezuela crude oil production in mb/d

Production by OPEC versus what IEA projects is needed by the group in 2026.

Global observable oil inventory level according to the IEA in December.

Analys
Brent calendar 2026 on sale for $40.0/b (in 2008-dollar)
A great bearish week last week for the world’s oil consumers. Brent fell 4.1% and closed the week at $61.12/b and not too far from the low of the week at $60.77/b. Continued Russia/Ukraine peace negotiations helped to keep a bearish tone in the market. Renewed bearish outlook for 2026 by the IEA which basically stated that if OPEC want a balanced market in2026 they’ll need to cut production by 3.5 mb/d from current level. On 10 December the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued an extension to 17. January of the deadline for compliance to the sanctions connected to Rosneft and Lukoil. The US essentially do not want any disruption to the flow of oil out of Russia. Further extensions again and again is likely with no real disruption to the flow of oil to markets. Except some friction.

The Brent 2026 is trading at $60.7/b at the moment. A great price for the consumers of the world. But not a lot of buying interest it seems. Though we do know that most of our consuming clients just love this price level. Thus on a general basis they’ll buy at this price any day. But outlooks for 2026 oil are of course very bearish (Ref IEA last week) and the general economic and political outlook for 2026 is a real headscratcher for most. So many consumers naturally sit back carefully waiting.
Brent 2026 at $60.7/b is only $40.0/b in 2008 dollar! But to get a sense of how cheap $60.7/b for Brent 2026 really is it is good to take a look at it in 2008-dollar for which the price is no more than $40/b! Of course the price is what it is and 2008 is a long time ago. But still we can’t help being amazed over how cheap it is. Due to incredible, continuous oil productivity since then of course as we wrote about in a recent note. To the joy for consumers and to the despair for OPEC.
Cheap oil and gas is a great vitamin injection for the world economy in 2026. But another aspect of cheap oil in 2026 is of course how incredibly positive it is for the global economy. This is juice and vitamins in bundles! Add in natural gas in the global LNG market which for 2026 is trading at only $53/boe! Down from around $72/boe on average in 2025 (and more than $200/boe in 2022). It will be the lowest cost level for natural gas for global LNG importers since 2021! Add in lower US interest rates and a yet softer USD as Trump gets control of the new Fed chair. This is all juice and steroids for the global economy. If the world also can start to reap productivity rewards from the utilization of AI then that is another positive. So solid economic growth and with it solid demand growth for oil and gas most likely.
Huge surplus in 2026? China will horde and OPEC+ will adjust. And what about the 3.5 mb/d which OPEC will have to cut to balance the market in 2026 according to the IEA? Well, China will likely continue to buy a lot of oil for strategic stock building as huge oil imports is one of its weakest geopolitical points. Building strategic reserves is also a good alternative to FX reserves now that US treasuries are not so much in favor by China and EM central banks. China has to buy something for its $1trn trade surplus and oil for strategic reserves is a natural and easy choice. And, OPEC(+) will cut a bit as well.
OPEC+ has already taken a half-turn as it has shifted from monthly increases to ”no change” in Q1-26. The next message will likely be ”cut”. One should possibly by oil forward before such a message hits the headlines. But of course, if OPEC+ sits back and closes its eyes and do no changes to its production, then the oil price will likely totally crash. We do however think that the group’s eyes are wide open.
OPEC production in mb/d versus IEA’s call-on-OPEC for 2026. To get a balanced market in 2026 the group needs to cut 3.5 mb/d from current level. But the group needs money too and not just market share.

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