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The last hurrah from Vienna

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Handelsbanken - Råvarubrevet - Nyhetsbrev om råvaror

Kvartalsrapport för råvaror från HandelsbankenWe see a close to 100% probability of an extension of oil production cuts from OPEC at the upcoming OPEC meeting in Vienna on May 25. For H2 2017, we see compliance with proposed cuts as a much more difficult issue than the deal itself. We think there is a 95% probability that Russia will sign on for a new six-month production cut period, but we see only a 30% probability that Russia will keep compliance for that period. Oil cuts during H2 2017 will come at a high cost due to seasonally higher production. We believe the next big price turn will come from non-compliance from Russia in particular but also other OPEC countries, as growing US production shows evidence of the futility of subsidising growth there by keeping production off stream. Saudi Arabia seems assured that production cuts at any price are the right way to go; it seems to us that the longer OPEC tries to keep production down, the more such measures backfire.

Core OPEC members give a good lead

Oil inventoriesThe OPEC and several other key producers including Russia have agreed to cut production by 1.8 million bbl/d for H1 2017 to reduce global glut, formally defined as retreating global stocks to normal levels, i.e. the five-year average. It is increasingly clear that the target will not be reached after the first six months of this year. Saudi Arabian oil minister Al-Falih opened up initially for an extension for H2 2017, and last week for nine months, including Q1 2018. Other core OPEC members have gradually confirmed the extension as well. We assume a Brent crude price of USD 50 fully reflects a six-month extension of OPEC production cuts.

Saudi Arabia supports extension

It has become obvious that Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has emerged as Saudi Arabia’s leading economic force, was the architect behind the Saudis’ policy U-turn in Doha, leading up to the cut at the official meeting in Vienna in November 2016. In our view, this was confirmed by the shuffle of the Kingdom’s oil minister, replacing Ali al-Naimi after two decades. If this were a game of chess, we would view this as a rokade.

Prince Mohammed has designated divesting Armaco at the top of his agenda, and that forms the basis of the Saudis’ policy and willingness to cut production in compensation for a short-term higher oil price.

Costly mistake

US oil productionThe savvy players recognise the danger of taking real action in cutting production. History is repeating itself. Higher prices have reversed the US production drop, extending the time it takes for the market to balance, and pushing the volume share away from OPEC and toward two non-cut participants, the US and lately also Libya.

We strongly argue it was too early for OPEC to take action. The rebalancing process had another year, perhaps two, before running its course. If OPEC had waited, a number of bankruptcies in the US energy sector would have played out, and some banks would have lost their faith in energy lending for a long time. Instead, US shale oil is growing at the same rate as it did before the 2014 oil slump and production is now higher than in 2014, which was about the time that OPEC initiated its strategy aimed at knocking off higher costs by flooding the market. Costs are dynamic, however, and the low-price era has pushed breakeven levels lower and provided a solid platform for future growth.

Shale oil growthRussia: biggest loser in extension deal

We base our strong opinion of a low 30% chance of an implemented cut during the second half on Russia’s seasonal oil production pattern. Russia has shown its usual low interest in active cuts, and takes its cut from a very high October 2016 production as a reference point for the curbs. Russia has cut about 250,000 bbl/d from its pledge of a 300,000 bbl/d cut, but production is still 1.6% higher than in 2016 and export are 2.14% higher than in March 2016. The first quarter is seasonally weak in Russian crude production, while the second half is stronger, and cuts in the seasonal peak require a strong commitment. We doubt that Russia will turn down additional market share for the sake of Saudi Arabia’s Aramco divestment.

 

Russian production

Russia has another reason to be careful in long-term cooperation with the Saudis. Russia has been successful in grabbing market share in China, the only oil consumer growing at any significant pace. This is not the right time to give up footprint anywhere, as competition will increase in all markets ahead.

“Everything is fine”

With little chance of action from Vienna on May 25, we think eroding compliance will set the tone after the May meeting. The oil price will likely hover at around USD 40/bbl when the agreement on production cuts vanishes, and an extension of production cuts will not come into question at the second OPEC meeting this year in November-December.

Saudi and Russia oil production

 

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Analys

A sharp weakening at the core of the oil market: The Dubai curve

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Down to the lowest since early May. Brent crude has fallen sharply the latest four days. It closed at USD 64.11/b yesterday which is the lowest since early May. It is staging a 1.3% rebound this morning along with gains in both equities and industrial metals with an added touch of support from a softer USD on top.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

What stands out the most to us this week is the collapse in the Dubai one to three months time-spread.

Dubai is medium sour crude. OPEC+ is in general medium sour crude production. Asian refineries are predominantly designed to process medium sour crude. So Dubai is the real measure of the balance between OPEC+ holding back or not versus Asian oil demand for consumption and stock building.

A sharp weakening of the front-end of the Dubai curve. The front-end of the Dubai crude curve has been holding out very solidly throughout this summer while the front-end of the Brent and WTI curves have been steadily softening. But the strength in the Dubai curve in our view was carrying the crude oil market in general. A source of strength in the crude oil market. The core of the strength.

The now finally sharp decline of the front-end of the Dubai crude curve is thus a strong shift. Weakness in the Dubai crude marker is weakness in the core of the oil market. The core which has helped to hold the oil market elevated.

Facts supports the weakening. Add in facts of Iraq lifting production from Kurdistan through Turkey. Saudi Arabia lifting production to 10 mb/d in September (normal production level) and lifting exports as well as domestic demand for oil for power for air con is fading along with summer heat. Add also in counter seasonal rise in US crude and product stocks last week. US oil stocks usually decline by 1.3 mb/week this time of year. Last week they instead rose 6.4 mb/week (+7.2 mb if including SPR). Total US commercial oil stocks are now only 2.1 mb below the 2015-19 seasonal average. US oil stocks normally decline from now to Christmas. If they instead continue to rise, then it will be strongly counter seasonal rise and will create a very strong bearish pressure on oil prices.

Will OPEC+ lift its voluntary quotas by zero, 137 kb/d, 500 kb/d or 1.5 mb/d? On Sunday of course OPEC+ will decide on how much to unwind of the remaining 1.5 mb/d of voluntary quotas for November. Will it be 137 kb/d yet again as for October? Will it be 500 kb/d as was talked about earlier this week? Or will it be a full unwind in one go of 1.5 mb/d? We think most likely now it will be at least 500 kb/d and possibly a full unwind. We discussed this in a not earlier this week: ”500 kb/d of voluntary quotas in October. But a full unwind of 1.5 mb/d”

The strength in the front-end of the Dubai curve held out through summer while Brent and WTI curve structures weakened steadily. That core strength helped to keep flat crude oil prices elevated close to the 70-line. Now also the Dubai curve has given in.

The strength in the front-end of the Dubai curve held out through summer while Brent and WTI curve structures weakened steadily.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Bloomberg data

Brent crude oil forward curves

Brent crude oil forward curves
Source: Bloomberg

Total US commercial stocks now close to normal. Counter seasonal rise last week. Rest of year?

Total US commercial stocks now close to normal.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Bloomberg data

Total US crude and product stocks on a steady trend higher.

Total US crude and product stocks on a steady trend higher.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Bloomberg data
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Analys

OPEC+ will likely unwind 500 kb/d of voluntary quotas in October. But a full unwind of 1.5 mb/d in one go could be in the cards

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Down to mid-60ies as Iraq lifts production while Saudi may be tired of voluntary cut frugality. The Brent December contract dropped 1.6% yesterday to USD 66.03/b. This morning it is down another 0.3% to USD 65.8/b. The drop in the price came on the back of the combined news that Iraq has resumed 190 kb/d of production in Kurdistan with exports through Turkey while OPEC+ delegates send signals that the group will unwind the remaining 1.65 mb/d (less the 137 kb/d in October) of voluntary cuts at a pace of 500 kb/d per month pace.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Signals of accelerated unwind and Iraqi increase may be connected. Russia, Kazakhstan and Iraq were main offenders versus the voluntary quotas they had agreed to follow. Russia had a production ’debt’ (cumulative overproduction versus quota) of close to 90 mb in March this year while Kazakhstan had a ’debt’ of about 60 mb and the same for Iraq. This apparently made Saudi Arabia angry this spring. Why should Saudi Arabia hold back if the other voluntary cutters were just freeriding? Thus the sudden rapid unwinding of voluntary cuts. That is at least one angle of explanations for the accelerated unwinding.

If the offenders with production debts then refrained from lifting production as the voluntary cuts were rapidly unwinded, then they could ’pay back’ their ’debts’ as they would under-produce versus the new and steadily higher quotas.

Forget about Kazakhstan. Its production was just too far above the quotas with no hope that the country would hold back production due to cross-ownership of oil assets by international oil companies. But Russia and Iraq should be able to do it.

Iraqi cumulative overproduction versus quotas could reach 85-90 mb in October. Iraq has however steadily continued to overproduce by 3-5 mb per month. In July its new and gradually higher quota came close to equal with a cumulative overproduction of only 0.6 mb that month. In August again however its production had an overshoot of 100 kb/d or 3.1 mb for the month. Its cumulative production debt had then risen to close to 80 mb. We don’t know for September yet. But looking at October we now know that its production will likely average close to 4.5 mb/d due to the revival of 190 kb/d of production in Kurdistan. Its quota however will only be 4.24 mb/d. Its overproduction in October will thus likely be around 250 kb/d above its quota  with its production debt rising another 7-8 mb to a total of close to 90 mb.

Again, why should Saudi Arabia be frugal while Iraq is freeriding. Better to get rid of the voluntary quotas as quickly as possible and then start all over with clean sheets.

Unwinding the remaining 1.513 mb/d in one go in October? If OPEC+ unwinds the remaining 1.513 mb/d of voluntary cuts in one big go in October, then Iraq’s quota will be around 4.4 mb/d for October versus its likely production of close to 4.5 mb/d for the coming month..

OPEC+ should thus unwind the remaining 1.513 mb/d (1.65 – 0.137 mb/d) in one go for October in order for the quota of Iraq to be able to keep track with Iraq’s actual production increase.

October 5 will show how it plays out. But a quota unwind of at least 500 kb/d for Oct seems likely. An overall increase of at least 500 kb/d in the voluntary quota for October looks likely. But it could be the whole 1.513 mb/d in one go. If the increase in the quota is ’only’ 500 kb/d then Iraqi cumulative production will still rise by 5.7 mb to a total of 85 mb in October.

Iraqi production debt versus quotas will likely rise by 5.7 mb in October if OPEC+ only lifts the overall quota by 500 kb/d in October. Here assuming historical production debt did not rise in September. That Iraq lifts its production by 190 kb/d in October to 4.47 mb/d (August level + 190 kb/d) and that OPEC+ unwinds 500 kb/d of the remining quotas in October when they decide on this on 5 October.

Iraqi production debt versus quotas
Source: SEB calculations, assumptions and graph, Bloomberg actual production data to August
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Analys

Modest draws, flat demand, and diesel back in focus

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

U.S. commercial crude inventories posted a marginal draw last week, falling by 0.6 million barrels to 414.8 million barrels. Inventories remain 4% below the five-year seasonal average, but the draw is far smaller than last week’s massive 9.3-million-barrel decline. Higher crude imports (+803,000 bl d WoW) and steady refinery runs (93% utilization) helped keep the crude balance relatively neutral.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

Yet another drawdown indicates commercial crude inventories continue to trend below the 2015–2022 seasonal norm (~440 million barrels), though at 414.8 million barrels, levels are now almost exactly in line with both the 2023 and 2024 trajectory, suggesting stable YoY conditions (see page 3 attached).

Gasoline inventories dropped by 1.1 million barrels and are now 2% below the five-year average. The decline was broad-based, with both finished gasoline and blending components falling, indicating lower output and resilient end-user demand as we enter the shoulder season post-summer (see page 6 attached).

On the diesel side, distillate inventories declined by 1.7 million barrels, snapping a two-week streak of strong builds. At 125 million barrels, diesel inventories are once again 8% below the five-year average and trending near the low end of the historical range.

In total, commercial petroleum inventories (excl. SPR) slipped by 0.5 million barrels on the week to ish 1,281.5 million barrels. While essentially flat, this ends a two-week streak of meaningful builds, reflecting a return to a slightly tighter situation.

On the demand side, the DOE’s ‘products supplied’ metric (see page 6 attached), a proxy for implied consumption, softened slightly. Total demand for crude oil over the past four weeks averaged 20.5 million barrels per day, up just 0.9% YoY.

Summing up: This week’s report shows a re-tightening in diesel supply and modest draws across the board, while demand growth is beginning to flatten. Inventories remain structurally low, but the tone is less bullish than in recent weeks.

US DOE oil inventories
US crude inventories
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