Analys
Elpriset – Hur ser situation ut för nästkommande kvartal?
Bakgrundsdata
Dagens situation och hydrobalans
Vi har idag en hydrobalans (inkl. 10 dagars prognos) på ca -18 TWh. Skulle vi utgå från att hydrobalansen blir ca -15 TWh under Q1-14 så har vi två år bakom oss att titta på: 2009 och 2013. Båda dessa år var marginalkostnaden för kol något högre än prognoserna visar idag; ca €31/MWh mot dagens ca €28/MWh. Vi borde alltså, fundamentalt med dessa traditionella faktorer i bakgrunden, få något lägre priser i Q1-14 än vi hade under dessa två år. Terminspriset ligger idag dock ca €5/MWh högre än utfallet i Q1-09 och ca €1/MWh högre än utfallet i Q1-13. Vi hade under dessa år en mycket hög tillgänglighet på kärnkraft så för att det här ska stämma så måste också kärnkrafttillgängligheten ligga runt 90% under första kvartalet 2014. Vi har haft en del strul med kärnkraftkraften och nu har vi en tillgänglighet på drygt 80%, vi bör dock vara uppe i 90% när Ringhals 3 kommer in till november. Detta är dock en osäkerhet som bör speglas i priset vilket gör att det är rimligt att vi ligger lika eller till och med någon euro över utfallet Q1-09 , alltså som vi gör idag.
Om hydrobalansen försämras…
Sedan är det dock så att de senaste 5 åren så har hydroläget försämrats sedan v.44 hösten innan till kvartal 1 året efter, de flesta år med mellan 10-20 TWh. Trenden pekar alltså på att vi skulle få ett försämrat hydrologiskt läge till Q1-14. Detta skulle isåfall betyda att det finns fog för betydligt högre priser under Q1-14 än om vi tittar endast på nuvarande situation.
Skulle vi, efter en torr höst och start på vinter, landa på en hydrologisk balans runt -35 TWh under Q1-14 så hamnar vi i samma läge som vi hade år 2010 och 2011. Dessa år hade vi en marginalkostnad för kol på €34/MWh respektive €47/MWh, alltså betydligt högre än dagens €28/MWh. 2010 är väl isåfall det år som liknar nuvarande situation bäst då vi hade ett kolpris på ungefär samma nivå som idag men ett CO2 pris på ca €12/MWh. Detta år trodde man i oktober på ett spotpris under Q1 på ca €37/MWh men det blev hela €59,5/MWh! Tyskland (base) landade dock ca €18/MWh under vårt nordiska spotpris. Med vårt dåliga hydrologiska läge fick vi alltså importera kraft till tyska peaknivåer.
Sammanfattningsvis kan man alltså säga att Q1-14 verkar rimligt prissatt idag om det hydrologiska läget stannar på ca -15 TWh men att det finns en betydande uppsida om hydrologin försämras mot -30 TWh. Flera analytiker menar dessutom att vi kan räkna med att priserna i Tyskland under fler timmar än tidigare kan gå upp till marginalkostnaden för gas (ca €50-55/MWh och upp till €70/MWh för kortsiktig uppstart) då den är mer lättreglerad än kol vilket behövs när inte den förnybara kraften räcker till. Generellt så ser vi att spotpriserna i allt större utsträckning påverkas av sol- och vindförhållanderna på kontinenten. Vi har också frågan om CO2 där normalt €1/t uppgång i priset på utsläppsrätter påverkar det nordiska elpriset med ca €0,8/MWh.
Hur ser då utsikterna ut?
Så hur ser det nu ut, vad är sannolikheten för att vi ska få en torr fortsättning på hösten och början på vintern? Lutar det åt en kall eller mild vinter? Kan vi se ökade CO2 priser redan innan årsskiftet? Det är naturligtvis omöjligt att sia om vädret så här tidigt men Georg Müller, meteorolog på Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, och flera med honom menar att vi nog kan få se en relativt mild och våt november medan december och januari troligen kommer bli mer åt det kalla och torra hållet. Vi ser inga tecken på en uppgång i bränslepriser under de närmaste två kvartalen och kärnkraftprognserna pekar på ca 90% tillgänglighet under vintern. Hur mycket vind och sol vi kommer se i Tyskland är tyvärr mycket svårt att ha en prognos på för så lång sikt. När det gäller CO2 så räknar man med att få ett beslut kring ”back-loading” av utsläppsrätter i slutet av året och det verkar i nuläget bli ett positivt utslag vilket troligen kommer få priserna att stiga ett par euro, alltså även här är risken på uppsidan. Vi räknar dock inte med något mer klargörande kring en mer långsiktig lösning på de låga CO2 priserna denna sida av årsskiftet.
Risker på nedsidan
Riskerna på nedsidan är att det blir en betydligt våtare höst/start på vinter än väntat och att hydroläget då förbättras till runt normalen. Då kan vi se lägre terminspriser på Q1-14, ev. ner till runt €40/MWh nivån. Trots att vi, när vi fundamentalt jämför oss med tidigare år, borde kunna ligga ytterligare något lägre så finns där en riskpremie för dålig tillgång på förnyelsebar kraft. Dåligt med vindkraft i Norden och vind– och solkraft på kontinenten skulle innebära tillfälliga importbehov där den reglerbara gaskraften är prissättande. När det gäller leverans så kan spotpriserna under Q1-14 dock mycket väl bli än lägre vid en hydrologi runt normalen, bra med kärnkraft och relativt milt väder. 2012 hade vi t.ex. ett genomsnittligt spotpris under jan-mars på €38,2/ MWh (i linje med dåvarande marginalkostnad på kol) trots ett underskott på -7 TWh. Vi hade då 85 % kärnkrafttillgänglighet i Sverige.
Kort slutsats
Hur sammanfattar vi då allt det här? Jo, vi anser i nuläget att riskerna på uppsidan för terminskontraktet Q1-14 är större än på nedsidan. Får vi se samma utveckling som flera tidigare år där hydrobalansen försämrats kraftigt fram till årsskiftet, prognoser pekar på en kall vinter och om dessutom kärnkraften skulle fortsätta strula kan vi mycket väl närma oss tyska peakpriser runt €50-55/MWh.
Författare: Mia Bodin
[box]Denna artikel om elpriset publiceras på Råvarumarknaden.se med tillstånd och i samarbete med Modity Energy Trading.[/box]
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Analys
Oil product price pain is set to rise as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed into summer
Market is starting to take US/Iran headlines with a pinch of salt. Brent crude rose $2.8/b yesterday to an official close of $112.1/b. But after that it traded as low as $108.05/b before ending late night at around $109.7/b. Through the day it traded in a range of $106.87 – 112.72/b amid a flurry of news or rumors from Iran and the US. ”US temporary sanctions during negotiations” (falls alarm). ”We will bomb Iran” (not anyhow),… etc. While the market is still fluctuating to this kind of news flow, it is starting to take such headlines with a pinch of salt.

We’ll see. Maybe, maybe not. The Brent M1 contract is trading at $110.2/b this morning which very close to the average ticks through yesterday of $110.4/b.
Trump with bearish, verbal intervention whenever Brent trades above $110/b it seems. What seems to be a pattern is that Trump states something like ”very good negotiations going on with Iran”, ”New leaders in Iran are great,..”, ”Great progress in negotiations,…”, ”Deal in sight,..” etc whenever the Brent M1 contract trades above $110/b. An effort to cool the market. These hot air verbal interventions from Trump used to have a heavy bearish impact on prices, but they now seems to have less and less effect unless they are backed by reality.
As far as we can see there has been no real progress in the negotiations between the US and Iran with both sides still standing by their previous demands.
Iran is getting stronger while the cease fire lasts making a return to war for Trump yet harder. Iran is naturally in constant preparation for a return to war given Trump’s steady threats of bombing Iran again. Iran is naturally doing what ever is possible to prepare for a return to war. And every day the cease fire lasts it is better prepared. This naturally makes it more and more difficult and dangerous for the US to return to warring activity versus Iran as the consequences for energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf will be more and more severe the longer the cease fire lasts. Israel seems to see it this way as well. That the war is not won and that current frozen state of a cease fire gives Iran opportunity to rebuild military and politically.
Global inventories are drawing down day by day. How much? In the meantime the Strait of Hormuz stays closed. There is varying measures and estimates of how much global inventories are drawing down. Our rough estimate, back of the envelope, is that global inventories are drawing down by at least some 10 mb/d or about 300 mb/d in a balance between loss of supply versus demand destruction. Other estimates we see are a monthly draw of 250-270 mb/d. The IEA only ’measured’ a draw in global observable stocks of 117 mb in April with oil on water rising 53 mb while on shore stocks fell 170 mb. But global stocks are hard to measure with large invisible, unmeasured stocks. As such a back of the envelope approach may be better.
Oil products is what the world is consuming. Oil product prices likely to rise while product stocks fall. Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) are predominantly crude oil. Discharging oil from OECD SPR stocks, a sharp reduction in Chinese crude imports and a reduction in global refinery throughput of 6-7 mb/d has helped to keep crude oil markets satisfactorily supplied. But global inventories are drawing down none the less. And oil products is really what the world is consuming. So if global refinery throughput stays subdued, then demand will eventually have to match the supply of oil products. The likely path forward this summer is a steady draw down in jet fuel, diesel and gasoline. Higher prices for these. Then, if possible, higher refinery throughput and higher usage of crude in response to very profitable refinery margins. And lastly sharper draw in crude stocks and higher prices for these. But some 6 mb/d of oil products used to be exported through the Strait of Hormuz. And it may not be so easy to ramp up refinery activity across the world to compensate. Especially as Ukraine continues to damage Russian refineries as well as Russian crude production and export facilities.
Watch oil product stocks and prices as well as Brent calendar 2027. What to watch for this summer is thus oil product inventories falling and oil product premiums to crude rising. Another measure to watch is the Brent crude 2027 contract as it rises steadily day by day as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed and global oil inventories decline. The latter is close to the highest level since the start of the war and keeps rising.
The Brent M1 contract and the Brent 2027 prices and current price of jet fuel in Europe (ARA). All in USD/b

Our back of the envelope calculation of the global shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Note that 3.5 mb/d of discharge from SPR is also a draw. Note also that ’Forced demand loss’ of 2.5 mb/d is probably temporary and will fall back towards zero as logistics are sorted out leaving ’Price demand loss’ to do the job of balancing the market. Thus a shortfall of at least 9 mb/d created by the closure. More if SPR discharge is included and more if Forced demand loss recedes.

Analys
Brent crude up USD 9/bl on the week… ”deal around the corner” narrative fades
Brent is climbing higher. Front-month is at USD 106.3/bl this morning, close to a weekly high and a USD 9/bl jump from Mondays open. This is the move we flagged as a risk earlier in the week: the market shifting from ”a deal is around the corner” to ”this is going to take longer than we thought”.

Analyst Commodities, SEB
During April, rest-of-year Brent remained remarkably stable around USD 90/bl. A stability which rested on one single assumption: the SoH reopens around 1 May. That assumption is now slowly falling apart.
As we highlighted yesterday: every week of delay beyond 1 May adds (theoretically) ish USD 5/bl to the rest-of-year average, as global inventories draw 100 million barrels per week. i.e., a mid-May reopening implies rest-of-year Brent closer to USD 100/bl, and anything pushing into June or July takes us meaningfully higher.
What’s changed in the last 48 hours:
#1: The US military has formally warned that clearing suspected sea mines from SoH could take up to six months. That is a completely different timescale from what the financial market is pricing. Even a political deal tomorrow does not immediately reopen the strait.
#2: Trump has shifted his tone from urgency to ”strategic patience”. In yesterday’s press conference: ”Don’t rush me… I want a great deal.” The market is reading this as a president no longer feeling pressured by timelines, with the naval blockade running in the background.
#3: So far, the military activity is escalating, not de-escalating. Axios reports Iran is laying more mines in SoH. The US 3rd carrier strike group (USS George H.W. Bush) is arriving with two countermine vessels. Trump yesterday ordered the US Navy to destroy any Iranian boats caught laying mines. While CNN reports that the Pentagon is actively drawing up plans to strike Iranian SoH capabilities and individual Iranian military leaders if the ceasefire collapses. i.e., NOT a attitude consistent with an imminent deal!
Spot crude and product prices eased off the early-April highs on a combination of system rerouting and deal optimism. Both now weakening. Goldman estimates April Gulf output is reduced by 14.5 mbl/d, or 57% of pre-war supply, a number that keeps getting worse the longer this drags on.
Demand-side adaptation is ongoing: S. Korea has cut its Middle East crude dependence from 69% to 56% by pulling more from the Americas and Africa, and Japan is kicking off a second round of SPR releases from 1 May. But SPRs are finite.
Ref. to the negotiations, we should not bet on speed. The current Iranian leadership is dominated by genuine hardliners willing to absorb economic pain and run the clock to extract concessions. That is not a setup for a rapid resolution. US/Israeli media briefings keep framing the delay as ”internal Iranian divisions”, the reality is more complicated and points toward weeks and months, not days.
Our point is that the complexity is large, and higher prices have only just started (given a scenario where the negotiations drag out in time). The market spent April leaning on the USD 90/bl rest-of-year assumption; that case is diminishing by the hour. If ”early May reopening” is replaced by ”June, July or later” over the next week or two, both crude and products have meaningful room to reprice higher from here. There is a high risk being short energy and betting on any immediate political resolution(!).
Analys
Market Still Betting on Timely Resolution, But Each Day Raises Shortage Risk
Down on Friday. Up on Monday. The Brent June crude oil contract traded down 5.1% last week to a close of $90.38/b. It reached a high of $103.87/b last Monday and a low of $86.09/b on Friday as Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open for transit. That quickly changed over the weekend as the US upheld its blockade of Iranian oil exports while Iran naturally responded by closing the SoH again. The US blew a hole in the engine room of the Iranian ship TOUSKA and took custody of the ship on Sunday. Brent crude is up 5.6% this morning to $95.4/b.

The cease-fire is expiring tomorrow. The US has said it will send a delegation for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad in Pakistan. But Iran has for now rejected a second round of talks as it views US demands as unrealistic and excessive while the US is also blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
While Brent is up 5% this morning, the financial market is still very optimistic that progress will be made. That talks will continue and that the SoH will fully open by the start of May which is consistent with a rest-of-year average Brent crude oil price of around $90/b with the market now trading that balance at around $88/b.
Financial optimism vs. physical deterioration. We have a divergence where the financial market is trading negotiations, improvements and resolution while at the same time the physical market is deteriorating day by day. Physical oil flows remain constrained by disrupted flows, longer voyage times and elevated freight and insurance costs.
Financial markets are betting that a US/Iranian resolution will save us in time from violent shortages down the road. But every day that the SoH remains closed is bringing us closer to a potentially very painful point of shortages and much higher prices.
The US blockade is also a weapon of leverage against its European and Asian allies. When Iran closed the SoH it held the world economy as a hostage against the US. The US blockade of the SoH is of course blocking Iranian oil exports. But it is also an action of disruption directed towards Europe and Asia. The US has called for the rest of the world to engaged in the war with Iran: ”If you want oil from the Persian Gulf, then go and get it”. A risk is that the US plays brinkmanship with the global oil market directed towards its European and Asian allies and maybe even towards China to force them to engage and take part. Maybe unthinkable. But unthinkable has become the norm with Trump in the White House.



