Analys
Elpriset – Hur ser situation ut för nästkommande kvartal?
Bakgrundsdata
Dagens situation och hydrobalans
Vi har idag en hydrobalans (inkl. 10 dagars prognos) på ca -18 TWh. Skulle vi utgå från att hydrobalansen blir ca -15 TWh under Q1-14 så har vi två år bakom oss att titta på: 2009 och 2013. Båda dessa år var marginalkostnaden för kol något högre än prognoserna visar idag; ca €31/MWh mot dagens ca €28/MWh. Vi borde alltså, fundamentalt med dessa traditionella faktorer i bakgrunden, få något lägre priser i Q1-14 än vi hade under dessa två år. Terminspriset ligger idag dock ca €5/MWh högre än utfallet i Q1-09 och ca €1/MWh högre än utfallet i Q1-13. Vi hade under dessa år en mycket hög tillgänglighet på kärnkraft så för att det här ska stämma så måste också kärnkrafttillgängligheten ligga runt 90% under första kvartalet 2014. Vi har haft en del strul med kärnkraftkraften och nu har vi en tillgänglighet på drygt 80%, vi bör dock vara uppe i 90% när Ringhals 3 kommer in till november. Detta är dock en osäkerhet som bör speglas i priset vilket gör att det är rimligt att vi ligger lika eller till och med någon euro över utfallet Q1-09 , alltså som vi gör idag.
Om hydrobalansen försämras…
Sedan är det dock så att de senaste 5 åren så har hydroläget försämrats sedan v.44 hösten innan till kvartal 1 året efter, de flesta år med mellan 10-20 TWh. Trenden pekar alltså på att vi skulle få ett försämrat hydrologiskt läge till Q1-14. Detta skulle isåfall betyda att det finns fog för betydligt högre priser under Q1-14 än om vi tittar endast på nuvarande situation.
Skulle vi, efter en torr höst och start på vinter, landa på en hydrologisk balans runt -35 TWh under Q1-14 så hamnar vi i samma läge som vi hade år 2010 och 2011. Dessa år hade vi en marginalkostnad för kol på €34/MWh respektive €47/MWh, alltså betydligt högre än dagens €28/MWh. 2010 är väl isåfall det år som liknar nuvarande situation bäst då vi hade ett kolpris på ungefär samma nivå som idag men ett CO2 pris på ca €12/MWh. Detta år trodde man i oktober på ett spotpris under Q1 på ca €37/MWh men det blev hela €59,5/MWh! Tyskland (base) landade dock ca €18/MWh under vårt nordiska spotpris. Med vårt dåliga hydrologiska läge fick vi alltså importera kraft till tyska peaknivåer.
Sammanfattningsvis kan man alltså säga att Q1-14 verkar rimligt prissatt idag om det hydrologiska läget stannar på ca -15 TWh men att det finns en betydande uppsida om hydrologin försämras mot -30 TWh. Flera analytiker menar dessutom att vi kan räkna med att priserna i Tyskland under fler timmar än tidigare kan gå upp till marginalkostnaden för gas (ca €50-55/MWh och upp till €70/MWh för kortsiktig uppstart) då den är mer lättreglerad än kol vilket behövs när inte den förnybara kraften räcker till. Generellt så ser vi att spotpriserna i allt större utsträckning påverkas av sol- och vindförhållanderna på kontinenten. Vi har också frågan om CO2 där normalt €1/t uppgång i priset på utsläppsrätter påverkar det nordiska elpriset med ca €0,8/MWh.
Hur ser då utsikterna ut?
Så hur ser det nu ut, vad är sannolikheten för att vi ska få en torr fortsättning på hösten och början på vintern? Lutar det åt en kall eller mild vinter? Kan vi se ökade CO2 priser redan innan årsskiftet? Det är naturligtvis omöjligt att sia om vädret så här tidigt men Georg Müller, meteorolog på Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, och flera med honom menar att vi nog kan få se en relativt mild och våt november medan december och januari troligen kommer bli mer åt det kalla och torra hållet. Vi ser inga tecken på en uppgång i bränslepriser under de närmaste två kvartalen och kärnkraftprognserna pekar på ca 90% tillgänglighet under vintern. Hur mycket vind och sol vi kommer se i Tyskland är tyvärr mycket svårt att ha en prognos på för så lång sikt. När det gäller CO2 så räknar man med att få ett beslut kring ”back-loading” av utsläppsrätter i slutet av året och det verkar i nuläget bli ett positivt utslag vilket troligen kommer få priserna att stiga ett par euro, alltså även här är risken på uppsidan. Vi räknar dock inte med något mer klargörande kring en mer långsiktig lösning på de låga CO2 priserna denna sida av årsskiftet.
Risker på nedsidan
Riskerna på nedsidan är att det blir en betydligt våtare höst/start på vinter än väntat och att hydroläget då förbättras till runt normalen. Då kan vi se lägre terminspriser på Q1-14, ev. ner till runt €40/MWh nivån. Trots att vi, när vi fundamentalt jämför oss med tidigare år, borde kunna ligga ytterligare något lägre så finns där en riskpremie för dålig tillgång på förnyelsebar kraft. Dåligt med vindkraft i Norden och vind– och solkraft på kontinenten skulle innebära tillfälliga importbehov där den reglerbara gaskraften är prissättande. När det gäller leverans så kan spotpriserna under Q1-14 dock mycket väl bli än lägre vid en hydrologi runt normalen, bra med kärnkraft och relativt milt väder. 2012 hade vi t.ex. ett genomsnittligt spotpris under jan-mars på €38,2/ MWh (i linje med dåvarande marginalkostnad på kol) trots ett underskott på -7 TWh. Vi hade då 85 % kärnkrafttillgänglighet i Sverige.
Kort slutsats
Hur sammanfattar vi då allt det här? Jo, vi anser i nuläget att riskerna på uppsidan för terminskontraktet Q1-14 är större än på nedsidan. Får vi se samma utveckling som flera tidigare år där hydrobalansen försämrats kraftigt fram till årsskiftet, prognoser pekar på en kall vinter och om dessutom kärnkraften skulle fortsätta strula kan vi mycket väl närma oss tyska peakpriser runt €50-55/MWh.
Författare: Mia Bodin
[box]Denna artikel om elpriset publiceras på Råvarumarknaden.se med tillstånd och i samarbete med Modity Energy Trading.[/box]
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Analys
Brent crude up USD 9/bl on the week… ”deal around the corner” narrative fades
Brent is climbing higher. Front-month is at USD 106.3/bl this morning, close to a weekly high and a USD 9/bl jump from Mondays open. This is the move we flagged as a risk earlier in the week: the market shifting from ”a deal is around the corner” to ”this is going to take longer than we thought”.

Analyst Commodities, SEB
During April, rest-of-year Brent remained remarkably stable around USD 90/bl. A stability which rested on one single assumption: the SoH reopens around 1 May. That assumption is now slowly falling apart.
As we highlighted yesterday: every week of delay beyond 1 May adds (theoretically) ish USD 5/bl to the rest-of-year average, as global inventories draw 100 million barrels per week. i.e., a mid-May reopening implies rest-of-year Brent closer to USD 100/bl, and anything pushing into June or July takes us meaningfully higher.
What’s changed in the last 48 hours:
#1: The US military has formally warned that clearing suspected sea mines from SoH could take up to six months. That is a completely different timescale from what the financial market is pricing. Even a political deal tomorrow does not immediately reopen the strait.
#2: Trump has shifted his tone from urgency to ”strategic patience”. In yesterday’s press conference: ”Don’t rush me… I want a great deal.” The market is reading this as a president no longer feeling pressured by timelines, with the naval blockade running in the background.
#3: So far, the military activity is escalating, not de-escalating. Axios reports Iran is laying more mines in SoH. The US 3rd carrier strike group (USS George H.W. Bush) is arriving with two countermine vessels. Trump yesterday ordered the US Navy to destroy any Iranian boats caught laying mines. While CNN reports that the Pentagon is actively drawing up plans to strike Iranian SoH capabilities and individual Iranian military leaders if the ceasefire collapses. i.e., NOT a attitude consistent with an imminent deal!
Spot crude and product prices eased off the early-April highs on a combination of system rerouting and deal optimism. Both now weakening. Goldman estimates April Gulf output is reduced by 14.5 mbl/d, or 57% of pre-war supply, a number that keeps getting worse the longer this drags on.
Demand-side adaptation is ongoing: S. Korea has cut its Middle East crude dependence from 69% to 56% by pulling more from the Americas and Africa, and Japan is kicking off a second round of SPR releases from 1 May. But SPRs are finite.
Ref. to the negotiations, we should not bet on speed. The current Iranian leadership is dominated by genuine hardliners willing to absorb economic pain and run the clock to extract concessions. That is not a setup for a rapid resolution. US/Israeli media briefings keep framing the delay as ”internal Iranian divisions”, the reality is more complicated and points toward weeks and months, not days.
Our point is that the complexity is large, and higher prices have only just started (given a scenario where the negotiations drag out in time). The market spent April leaning on the USD 90/bl rest-of-year assumption; that case is diminishing by the hour. If ”early May reopening” is replaced by ”June, July or later” over the next week or two, both crude and products have meaningful room to reprice higher from here. There is a high risk being short energy and betting on any immediate political resolution(!).
Analys
Market Still Betting on Timely Resolution, But Each Day Raises Shortage Risk
Down on Friday. Up on Monday. The Brent June crude oil contract traded down 5.1% last week to a close of $90.38/b. It reached a high of $103.87/b last Monday and a low of $86.09/b on Friday as Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open for transit. That quickly changed over the weekend as the US upheld its blockade of Iranian oil exports while Iran naturally responded by closing the SoH again. The US blew a hole in the engine room of the Iranian ship TOUSKA and took custody of the ship on Sunday. Brent crude is up 5.6% this morning to $95.4/b.

The cease-fire is expiring tomorrow. The US has said it will send a delegation for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad in Pakistan. But Iran has for now rejected a second round of talks as it views US demands as unrealistic and excessive while the US is also blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
While Brent is up 5% this morning, the financial market is still very optimistic that progress will be made. That talks will continue and that the SoH will fully open by the start of May which is consistent with a rest-of-year average Brent crude oil price of around $90/b with the market now trading that balance at around $88/b.
Financial optimism vs. physical deterioration. We have a divergence where the financial market is trading negotiations, improvements and resolution while at the same time the physical market is deteriorating day by day. Physical oil flows remain constrained by disrupted flows, longer voyage times and elevated freight and insurance costs.
Financial markets are betting that a US/Iranian resolution will save us in time from violent shortages down the road. But every day that the SoH remains closed is bringing us closer to a potentially very painful point of shortages and much higher prices.
The US blockade is also a weapon of leverage against its European and Asian allies. When Iran closed the SoH it held the world economy as a hostage against the US. The US blockade of the SoH is of course blocking Iranian oil exports. But it is also an action of disruption directed towards Europe and Asia. The US has called for the rest of the world to engaged in the war with Iran: ”If you want oil from the Persian Gulf, then go and get it”. A risk is that the US plays brinkmanship with the global oil market directed towards its European and Asian allies and maybe even towards China to force them to engage and take part. Maybe unthinkable. But unthinkable has become the norm with Trump in the White House.
Analys
TACO (or Whatever It Was) Sends Oil Lower — Iran Keeps Choking Hormuz
Wild moves yesterday. Brent crude traded to a high of $114.43/b and a low of $96.0/b and closed at $99.94/b yesterday.

US – Iran negotiations ongoing or not? What a day. Donald Trump announced that good talks were ongoing between Iran and the US and that the 48 hour deadline before bombing Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure was postponed by five days subject to success of ongoing meetings. Iranian media meanwhile stated that no meetings were ongoing at all.
Today we are scratching our heads trying to figure out what yesterday was all about.
Friends and family playing the market? Was it just Trump and his friends and family who were playing with oil and equity markets with $580m and $1.46bn in bets being placed by someone in oil and equity markets just 15 minutes before Trump’s announcement?
Was Trump pulling a TACO as he reached his political and economic pain point: Brent at $112/b, US Gas at $4/gal, SPX below 200dma and US 10yr above 4.4%?
Different Iranian factions with Trump talking with one of them? Are there real negotiations going on but with the US talking to one faction in Iran while another, the hardliners, are not involved and are denying any such negotiations going on?
Extending the ultimatum to attack and invade Kharg island next weekend? Or, is the five day delay of the deadline a tactical decision to allow US amphibious assault ships and marines to arrive in the Gulf in the upcoming weekend while US and Israeli continues to degrade Iranian military targets till then. And then next weekend a move by the US/Israel to attack and conquer for example the Kharg island?
We do not really know which it is or maybe a combination of these.
We did get some kind of TACO ydy. But markets have been waiting for some kind of TACO to happen and yesterday we got some kind of TACO. And Brent crude is now trading at $101.5/b as a result rather than at $112-114/b as it did no the high yesterday.
But what really matters in our view is the political situation on the ground in Iran. Will hardliners continue to hold power or will a more pragmatic faction gain power?
If the hardliners remain in power then oil pain should extend all the way to US midterm elections. The hardliners were apparently still in charge as of last week. Iran immediately retaliated and damaged LNG infrastructure in Qatar after Israel hit Iranian South Pars. The SoH was still closed and all messages coming out of Iran indicated defiance. Hardliners continues in power has a huge consequence for oil prices going forward. The regime has played its ’oil-weapon’ (closing or chocking the Strait of Hormuz). It is using it to achieve political goals. Deterrence: it needs to be so politically and economically expensive to attack Iran that it won’t happen again in the future. Or at least that the US/Israel thinks 10-times over before they attack again. The highest Brent crude oil closing price since the start of the war is $112.19/b last Friday. In comparison the 20-year inflation adjusted Brent price is $103/b. So Brent crude last Friday at $112.19/b isn’t a shockingly high price. And it is still far below the nominal high of $148/b from 2008 which is $220/b if inflation adjusted. So once in a lifetime Iran activates its most powerful weapon. The oil weapon. It needs to show the power of this weapon and it needs to reap political gains. Getting Brent to $112/b and intraday high of $119.5/b (9 March) isn’t a display of the power of that weapon. And it is not a deterrence against future attacks.
So if the hardliners remain in power in Iran, then the SoH will likely remain chocked all the way to US midterm elections and Brent crude will at a minimum go above the historical nominal high of $148/b from 2008.
Thus the outlook for the oil price for the rest of the year doesn’t depend all that much of whether Trump pulls a TACO or not. Stops bombing or not. It depends more on who is in charge in Iran. If it is the hardliners, then deterrence against future attacks via chocking of the SoH and high oil prices is the likely line of action. It is impacting the world but the Iranian ’oil-weapon’ is directed towards the US president and the the US midterm elections.
If a pragmatic faction gets to power in Iran, then a very prosperous future is possible. However, if power is shifting towards a more pragmatic faction in Iran then a completely different direction could evolve. Such a faction could possibly be open for cooperation with the US and the GCC and possibly put its issues versus Israel aside. Then the prosperity we have seen evolving in Dubai could be a possible future also for Iran.
So far it looks like the hardliners are fully in charge. As far as we can see, the hardliners are still fully in control in Iran. That points towards continued chocking of the SoH and oil prices ticking higher as global inventories (the oil market buffers) are drawn lower. And not just for a few more weeks, but possibly all the way to the US midterm elections.
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