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The last hurrah from Vienna

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Handelsbanken - Råvarubrevet - Nyhetsbrev om råvaror

Kvartalsrapport för råvaror från HandelsbankenWe see a close to 100% probability of an extension of oil production cuts from OPEC at the upcoming OPEC meeting in Vienna on May 25. For H2 2017, we see compliance with proposed cuts as a much more difficult issue than the deal itself. We think there is a 95% probability that Russia will sign on for a new six-month production cut period, but we see only a 30% probability that Russia will keep compliance for that period. Oil cuts during H2 2017 will come at a high cost due to seasonally higher production. We believe the next big price turn will come from non-compliance from Russia in particular but also other OPEC countries, as growing US production shows evidence of the futility of subsidising growth there by keeping production off stream. Saudi Arabia seems assured that production cuts at any price are the right way to go; it seems to us that the longer OPEC tries to keep production down, the more such measures backfire.

Core OPEC members give a good lead

Oil inventoriesThe OPEC and several other key producers including Russia have agreed to cut production by 1.8 million bbl/d for H1 2017 to reduce global glut, formally defined as retreating global stocks to normal levels, i.e. the five-year average. It is increasingly clear that the target will not be reached after the first six months of this year. Saudi Arabian oil minister Al-Falih opened up initially for an extension for H2 2017, and last week for nine months, including Q1 2018. Other core OPEC members have gradually confirmed the extension as well. We assume a Brent crude price of USD 50 fully reflects a six-month extension of OPEC production cuts.

Saudi Arabia supports extension

It has become obvious that Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has emerged as Saudi Arabia’s leading economic force, was the architect behind the Saudis’ policy U-turn in Doha, leading up to the cut at the official meeting in Vienna in November 2016. In our view, this was confirmed by the shuffle of the Kingdom’s oil minister, replacing Ali al-Naimi after two decades. If this were a game of chess, we would view this as a rokade.

Prince Mohammed has designated divesting Armaco at the top of his agenda, and that forms the basis of the Saudis’ policy and willingness to cut production in compensation for a short-term higher oil price.

Costly mistake

US oil productionThe savvy players recognise the danger of taking real action in cutting production. History is repeating itself. Higher prices have reversed the US production drop, extending the time it takes for the market to balance, and pushing the volume share away from OPEC and toward two non-cut participants, the US and lately also Libya.

We strongly argue it was too early for OPEC to take action. The rebalancing process had another year, perhaps two, before running its course. If OPEC had waited, a number of bankruptcies in the US energy sector would have played out, and some banks would have lost their faith in energy lending for a long time. Instead, US shale oil is growing at the same rate as it did before the 2014 oil slump and production is now higher than in 2014, which was about the time that OPEC initiated its strategy aimed at knocking off higher costs by flooding the market. Costs are dynamic, however, and the low-price era has pushed breakeven levels lower and provided a solid platform for future growth.

Shale oil growthRussia: biggest loser in extension deal

We base our strong opinion of a low 30% chance of an implemented cut during the second half on Russia’s seasonal oil production pattern. Russia has shown its usual low interest in active cuts, and takes its cut from a very high October 2016 production as a reference point for the curbs. Russia has cut about 250,000 bbl/d from its pledge of a 300,000 bbl/d cut, but production is still 1.6% higher than in 2016 and export are 2.14% higher than in March 2016. The first quarter is seasonally weak in Russian crude production, while the second half is stronger, and cuts in the seasonal peak require a strong commitment. We doubt that Russia will turn down additional market share for the sake of Saudi Arabia’s Aramco divestment.

 

Russian production

Russia has another reason to be careful in long-term cooperation with the Saudis. Russia has been successful in grabbing market share in China, the only oil consumer growing at any significant pace. This is not the right time to give up footprint anywhere, as competition will increase in all markets ahead.

“Everything is fine”

With little chance of action from Vienna on May 25, we think eroding compliance will set the tone after the May meeting. The oil price will likely hover at around USD 40/bbl when the agreement on production cuts vanishes, and an extension of production cuts will not come into question at the second OPEC meeting this year in November-December.

Saudi and Russia oil production

 

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Oil product price pain is set to rise as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed into summer

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Market is starting to take US/Iran headlines with a pinch of salt. Brent crude rose $2.8/b yesterday to an official close of $112.1/b. But after that it traded as low as $108.05/b before ending late night at around $109.7/b. Through the day it traded in a range of $106.87 – 112.72/b amid a flurry of news or rumors from Iran and the US. ”US temporary sanctions during negotiations” (falls alarm). ”We will bomb Iran” (not anyhow),… etc. While the market is still fluctuating to this kind of news flow, it is starting to take such headlines with a pinch of salt.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

We’ll see. Maybe, maybe not. The Brent M1 contract is trading at $110.2/b this morning which very close to the average ticks through yesterday of $110.4/b.

Trump with bearish, verbal intervention whenever Brent trades above $110/b it seems. What seems to be a pattern is that Trump states something like ”very good negotiations going on with Iran”, ”New leaders in Iran are great,..”, ”Great progress in negotiations,…”, ”Deal in sight,..” etc whenever the Brent M1 contract trades above $110/b. An effort to cool the market. These hot air verbal interventions from Trump used to have a heavy bearish impact on prices, but they now seems to have less and less effect unless they are backed by reality.

As far as we can see there has been no real progress in the negotiations between the US and Iran with both sides still standing by their previous demands.

Iran is getting stronger while the cease fire lasts making a return to war for Trump yet harder. Iran is naturally in constant preparation for a return to war given Trump’s steady threats of bombing Iran again. Iran is naturally doing what ever is possible to prepare for a return to war. And every day the cease fire lasts it is better prepared. This naturally makes it more and more difficult and dangerous for the US to return to warring activity versus Iran as the consequences for energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf will be more and more severe the longer the cease fire lasts. Israel seems to see it this way as well. That the war is not won and that current frozen state of a cease fire gives Iran opportunity to rebuild military and politically.

Global inventories are drawing down day by day. How much? In the meantime the Strait of Hormuz stays closed. There is varying measures and estimates of how much global inventories are drawing down. Our rough estimate, back of the envelope, is that global inventories are drawing down by at least some 10 mb/d or about 300 mb/d in a balance between loss of supply versus demand destruction. Other estimates we see are a monthly draw of 250-270 mb/d. The IEA only ’measured’ a draw in global observable stocks of 117 mb in April with oil on water rising 53 mb while on shore stocks fell 170 mb. But global stocks are hard to measure with large invisible, unmeasured stocks. As such a back of the envelope approach may be better.

Oil products is what the world is consuming. Oil product prices likely to rise while product stocks fall. Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) are predominantly crude oil. Discharging oil from OECD SPR stocks, a sharp reduction in Chinese crude imports and a reduction in global refinery throughput of 6-7 mb/d has helped to keep crude oil markets satisfactorily supplied. But global inventories are drawing down none the less. And oil products is really what the world is consuming. So if global refinery throughput stays subdued, then demand will eventually have to match the supply of oil products. The likely path forward this summer is a steady draw down in jet fuel, diesel and gasoline. Higher prices for these. Then, if possible, higher refinery throughput and higher usage of crude in response to very profitable refinery margins. And lastly sharper draw in crude stocks and higher prices for these. But some 6 mb/d of oil products used to be exported through the Strait of Hormuz. And it may not be so easy to ramp up refinery activity across the world to compensate. Especially as Ukraine continues to damage Russian refineries as well as Russian crude production and export facilities.

Watch oil product stocks and prices as well as Brent calendar 2027. What to watch for this summer is thus oil product inventories falling and oil product premiums to crude rising. Another measure to watch is the Brent crude 2027 contract as it rises steadily day by day as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed and global oil inventories decline. The latter is close to the highest level since the start of the war and keeps rising.

The Brent M1 contract and the Brent 2027 prices and current price of jet fuel in Europe (ARA). All in USD/b

Source: SEB graph, Bloomberg data

Our back of the envelope calculation of the global shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Note that 3.5 mb/d of discharge from SPR is also a draw. Note also that ’Forced demand loss’ of 2.5 mb/d is probably temporary and will fall back towards zero as logistics are sorted out leaving ’Price demand loss’ to do the job of balancing the market. Thus a shortfall of at least 9 mb/d created by the closure. More if SPR discharge is included and more if Forced demand loss recedes.

Our back of the envelope calculation of the global shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Source: SEB graph and calculations
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Brent crude up USD 9/bl on the week… ”deal around the corner” narrative fades

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Brent is climbing higher. Front-month is at USD 106.3/bl this morning, close to a weekly high and a USD 9/bl jump from Mondays open. This is the move we flagged as a risk earlier in the week: the market shifting from ”a deal is around the corner” to ”this is going to take longer than we thought”.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye,
Analyst Commodities, SEB

During April, rest-of-year Brent remained remarkably stable around USD 90/bl. A stability which rested on one single assumption: the SoH reopens around 1 May. That assumption is now slowly falling apart.

As we highlighted yesterday: every week of delay beyond 1 May adds (theoretically) ish USD 5/bl to the rest-of-year average, as global inventories draw 100 million barrels per week. i.e., a mid-May reopening implies rest-of-year Brent closer to USD 100/bl, and anything pushing into June or July takes us meaningfully higher.

What’s changed in the last 48 hours:

#1: The US military has formally warned that clearing suspected sea mines from SoH could take up to six months. That is a completely different timescale from what the financial market is pricing. Even a political deal tomorrow does not immediately reopen the strait.

#2: Trump has shifted his tone from urgency to ”strategic patience”. In yesterday’s press conference: ”Don’t rush me… I want a great deal.” The market is reading this as a president no longer feeling pressured by timelines, with the naval blockade running in the background.

#3: So far, the military activity is escalating, not de-escalating. Axios reports Iran is laying more mines in SoH. The US 3rd carrier strike group (USS George H.W. Bush) is arriving with two countermine vessels. Trump yesterday ordered the US Navy to destroy any Iranian boats caught laying mines. While CNN reports that the Pentagon is actively drawing up plans to strike Iranian SoH capabilities and individual Iranian military leaders if the ceasefire collapses. i.e., NOT a attitude consistent with an imminent deal!

Spot crude and product prices eased off the early-April highs on a combination of system rerouting and deal optimism. Both now weakening. Goldman estimates April Gulf output is reduced by 14.5 mbl/d, or 57% of pre-war supply, a number that keeps getting worse the longer this drags on.

Demand-side adaptation is ongoing: S. Korea has cut its Middle East crude dependence from 69% to 56% by pulling more from the Americas and Africa, and Japan is kicking off a second round of SPR releases from 1 May. But SPRs are finite.

Ref. to the negotiations, we should not bet on speed. The current Iranian leadership is dominated by genuine hardliners willing to absorb economic pain and run the clock to extract concessions. That is not a setup for a rapid resolution. US/Israeli media briefings keep framing the delay as ”internal Iranian divisions”, the reality is more complicated and points toward weeks and months, not days.

Our point is that the complexity is large, and higher prices have only just started (given a scenario where the negotiations drag out in time). The market spent April leaning on the USD 90/bl rest-of-year assumption; that case is diminishing by the hour. If ”early May reopening” is replaced by ”June, July or later” over the next week or two, both crude and products have meaningful room to reprice higher from here. There is a high risk being short energy and betting on any immediate political resolution(!).

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Market Still Betting on Timely Resolution, But Each Day Raises Shortage Risk

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Down on Friday. Up on Monday. The Brent June crude oil contract traded down 5.1% last week to a close of $90.38/b. It reached a high of $103.87/b last Monday and a low of $86.09/b on Friday as Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open for transit. That quickly changed over the weekend as the US upheld its blockade of Iranian oil exports while Iran naturally responded by closing the SoH again. The US blew a hole in the engine room of the Iranian ship TOUSKA and took custody of the ship on Sunday. Brent crude is up 5.6% this morning to $95.4/b.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

The cease-fire is expiring tomorrow. The US has said it will send a delegation for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad in Pakistan. But Iran has for now rejected a second round of talks as it views US demands as  unrealistic and excessive while the US is also blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

While Brent is up 5% this morning, the financial market is still very optimistic that progress will be made. That talks will continue and that the SoH will fully open by the start of May which is consistent with a rest-of-year average Brent crude oil price of around $90/b with the market now trading that balance at around $88/b.

Financial optimism vs. physical deterioration. We have a divergence where the financial market is trading negotiations, improvements and resolution while at the same time the physical market is deteriorating day by day. Physical oil flows remain constrained by disrupted flows, longer voyage times and elevated freight and insurance costs.  

Financial markets are betting that a US/Iranian resolution will save us in time from violent shortages down the road. But every day that the SoH remains closed is bringing us closer to a potentially very painful point of shortages and much higher prices.

The US blockade is also a weapon of leverage against its European and Asian allies. When Iran closed the SoH it held the world economy as a hostage against the US. The US blockade of the SoH is of course blocking Iranian oil exports. But it is also an action of disruption directed towards Europe and Asia. The US has called for the rest of the world to engaged in the war with Iran: ”If you want oil from the Persian Gulf, then go and get it”. A risk is that the US plays brinkmanship with the global oil market directed towards its  European and Asian allies and maybe even towards China to force them to engage and take part. Maybe unthinkable. But unthinkable has become the norm with Trump in the White House.

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