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SEB Metals Weekly: China Covid exit is bullish for metals

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China Covid exit is bullish for metals

Softer inflation, slight macro-optimism, and China taking a rapid exit from Covid restrictions. Markets have become more optimistic. Inflation indices have eased and that has created some hopes that central banks won’t lift interest to a level that will kill the economy in 2023. Natural gas prices in Europe have fallen sharply. This has suddenly reduced energy-inflationary pressure and removed the direst downside economic risks for the region. But general market optimism is far from super-strong yet. The S&P 500 index has only gained 1.9% since our previous forecast on 1 Nov 2021, and oil prices are down nearly 10% in a reflection of concerns for global growth. China has however removed all Covid-restrictions almost overnight. It is now set to move out of its three years of Covid-19 isolation and lockdowns at record speed. Industrial metals are up 20% and the Hong Kong equity index is up 40% as a result (since 1 Nov-22). China’s sudden and rapid Covid-19 exit is plain and simply bullish for the Chinese economy to the point that mobility indices are already rebounding quickly. SEB’s general view is that inflation impulses will fade quickly. No need then for central banks across the world to kill the global economy with further extreme rate hikes. These developments have removed much of the downside price risks for metals in 2023 and we have to a large degree shifted our 2024 forecast to 2023.

Lower transparency, more geopolitics, more borders, and higher prices and exponential spikes. The first decade of this century was about emerging markets, the BRICs, the commodity price boom, the commodity investment boom, and free markets with free flow of commodities and labor with China and Russia hand in hand with western countries walking towards the future. High capex spending in the first decade led to plentiful supply and low prices for commodities from 2011 to 2020. A world of plenty, friends everywhere, free flow of everything, and no need to worry. The coming decade will likely be very different. Supply growth will struggle due to mediocre capex spending over the past 10 years. Prices will on average be significantly higher. There will be frequent exponential price spikes whenever demand hits supply barriers. Price transparency will be significantly reduced due to borders, taxes, sanctions, geopolitical alignments, and carbon intensities. Prices will be much less homogenous. Aluminium will no longer be just one price and one quality. Who made it, where was it made, where will it be consumed and what the carbon content will create a range of prices. Same for most other metals.

Copper: Struggling supply and China revival propel copper prices higher. Unrest in Peru is creating significant supply risks for copper as the country accounts for 10% of the global supply. Chile accounts for 27% of global production. Production there is disappointing with Codelco, the Chilean state-owned copper mining company, struggling to hit production targets. The Cobre Panama mine in Panama is at risk of being closed over a tax dispute between Quantum and the government. Cobre Panama is one of the biggest new mines globally over the past 10 years. The rapid exit from Covid restrictions in China is bullish for the Chinese economy and thus for copper demand and it has helped to propel prices higher along with the mentioned supply issues. The Chinese property market will continue to struggle, and it normally accounts for 20% of global copper demand while China accounted for 55% of global copper demand in 2021. While China is no longer prioritizing the housing market it is full speed ahead for solar, wind, EVs, and electrification in general. So, weakening Chinese copper demand from housing will likely be replaced by the new prioritized growth sectors. Global supply growth is likely going to be muted in the decade to come while demand growth will be somewhere between a normal 3% pa. to a strong 4% pa. to a very strong 5% pa. Copper prices will be high, and demand will hit the supply barrier repeatedly with exponential spikes as the world is working hard to accelerate the energy transition. Copper prices could easily spike to USD 15-16,000/ton nearest years.

Nickel: Tight high-quality nickel market but a surplus for a low-quality nickel. Nickel production is growing aggressively in Indonesia. The country is projected to account for 60-70% of global supply in 2030. This will become a huge and extremely concentrated geopolitical risk for the world’s consumers of nickel. Indonesia has an abundance of low-grade C2 nickel. The challenge is to convert low-quality C2 nickel to high-quality C1. We are set for a surplus of C2 nickel but the market for C1 nickel will depend strongly on the conversion capacity for C2 to C1. Low price transparency will also help to send prices flying between USD 20,000/ton and USD 30,000/ton. Strong growth in nickel production in Indonesia should initially call for prices down to USD 20,000/ton. But Indonesia is a price setter. It will account for 50% of global supply in 2023. It doesn’t make sense for Indonesia to kill the nickel price. If the nickel price drops, then Indonesia could quickly regulate supply. There should be a premium to nickel due to this. As a result, we expect the nickel price to average USD 24,000/ton in 2023. C2 to C1 conversion capacity may be strained and there should also be a monopoly premium due to the size of Indonesia. Converting C2 to C1 is however extremely carbon intensive and that could be an increasing issue in the years to come.

Zinc: Super-tight global market. European LME inventories are ZERO and zinc smelters there are still closed. European zinc smelters account for 16% of global zinc smelter capacity. Most of this was closed over the past year due to extremely high energy prices. European LME zinc stockpiles are now down to a stunning zero! The global zinc market is extremely tight. Reopening of European zinc smelting seems unlikely in H1-23 with a continued super-tight market as a result both in Europe and globally.

Aluminium: Price likely to be in the range of USD 2400 – 3200/ton and line with coal prices in China. Aluminium prices have historically been tightly tied to the price of coal. But coal prices have been all over the place since the start of 2021 with huge price differences between Amsterdam, Australia, and domestic Chinese coal prices which are now largely state-controlled. China banning imports of Australian coal, the Chinese energy crisis in 2021, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are ingredients here. This sent aluminium prices flying high and low. Coal prices in China today imply a price of aluminium between USD 2400/ton and 3150/ton with the LME 3mth aluminium price nicely in between at USD 2590/ton. The global coal market should now become more orderly as China now again is accepting Australian coal. Energy costs have fallen sharply in Europe and some producers in the Netherlands have talked about possible restarts of production. China is likely to reduce its exports of primary aluminium. Energy security of supply is high on the agenda in China, and it makes no sense to emit lots of CO2 in China and indirectly export energy in the form of primary aluminium. Growth in non-China aluminium demand in the years to come will have to be covered by non-China producers which have the potential to force prices higher and away from coal as the price driver. While LME has one price for the 3mth aluminium price we’ll likely get larger and larger price differences across the world in the form of possibly extreme price premiums for example in the EU and the US.

SEB Commodities price outlook
Source: SEB Markets – Commodities. Historical data: Bloomberg 

Analys

’wait and see’ mode

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So far this week, Brent Crude prices have strengthened by USD 1.3 per barrel since Monday’s opening. While macroeconomic concerns persist, they have somewhat abated, resulting in muted price reactions. Fundamentals predominantly influence global oil price developments at present. This week, we’ve observed highs of USD 89 per barrel yesterday morning and lows of USD 85.7 per barrel on Monday morning. Currently, Brent Crude is trading at a stable USD 88.3 per barrel, maintaining this level for the past 24 hours.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

Additionally, there has been no significant price reaction to Crude following yesterday’s US inventory report (see page 11 attached):

  • US commercial crude inventories (excluding SPR) decreased by 6.4 million barrels from the previous week, standing at 453.6 million barrels, roughly 3% below the five-year average for this time of year.
  • Total motor gasoline inventories decreased by 0.6 million barrels, approximately 4% below the five-year average.
  • Distillate (diesel) inventories increased by 1.6 million barrels but remain weak historically, about 7% below the five-year average.
  • Total commercial petroleum inventories (crude + products) decreased by 3.8 million barrels last week.

Regarding petroleum products, the overall build/withdrawal aligns with seasonal patterns, theoretically exerting limited effect on prices. However, the significant draw in commercial crude inventories counters the seasonality, surpassing market expectations and API figures released on Tuesday, indicating a draw of 3.2 million barrels (compared to Bloomberg consensus of +1.3 million). API numbers for products were more in line with the US DOE.

Against this backdrop, yesterday’s inventory report is bullish, theoretically exerting upward pressure on crude prices.

Yet, the current stability in prices may be attributed to reduced geopolitical risks, balanced against demand concerns. Markets are adopting a wait-and-see approach ahead of Q1 US GDP (today at 14:30) and the Fed’s preferred inflation measure, “core PCE prices” (tomorrow at 14:30). A stronger print could potentially dampen crude prices as market participants worry over the demand outlook.

Geopolitical “risk premiums” have decreased from last week, although concerns persist, highlighted by Ukraine’s strikes on two Russian oil depots in western Russia and Houthis’ claims of targeting shipping off the Yemeni coast yesterday.

With a relatively calmer geopolitical landscape, the market carefully evaluates data and fundamentals. While the supply picture appears clear, demand remains the predominant uncertainty that the market attempts to decode.

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Analys

Also OPEC+ wants to get compensation for inflation

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Brent crude has fallen USD 3/b since the peak of Iran-Israel concerns last week. Still lots of talk about significant Mid-East risk premium in the current oil price. But OPEC+ is in no way anywhere close to loosing control of the oil market. Thus what will really matter is what OPEC+ decides to do in June with respect to production in Q3-24 and the market knows this very well. Saudi Arabia’s social cost-break-even is estimated at USD 100/b today. Also Saudi Arabia’s purse is hurt by 21% US inflation since Jan 2020. Saudi needs more money to make ends meet. Why shouldn’t they get a higher nominal pay as everyone else. Saudi will ask for it

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Brent is down USD 3/b vs. last week as the immediate risk for Iran-Israel has faded. But risk is far from over says experts. The Brent crude oil price has fallen 3% to now USD 87.3/b since it became clear that Israel was willing to restrain itself with only a muted counter attack versus Israel while Iran at the same time totally played down the counterattack by Israel. The hope now is of course that that was the end of it. The real fear has now receded for the scenario where Israeli and Iranian exchanges of rockets and drones would escalate to a point where also the US is dragged into it with Mid East oil supply being hurt in the end. Not everyone are as optimistic. Professor Meir Javedanfar who teaches Iranian-Israeli studies in Israel instead judges that ”this is just the beginning” and that they sooner or later will confront each other again according to NYT. While the the tension between Iran and Israel has faded significantly, the pain and anger spiraling out of destruction of Gaza will however close to guarantee that bombs and military strifes will take place left, right and center in the Middle East going forward.

Also OPEC+ wants to get paid. At the start of 2020 the 20 year inflation adjusted average Brent crude price stood at USD 76.6/b. If we keep the averaging period fixed and move forward till today that inflation adjusted average has risen to USD 92.5/b. So when OPEC looks in its purse and income stream it today needs a 21% higher oil price than in January 2020 in order to make ends meet and OPEC(+) is working hard to get it.

Much talk about Mid-East risk premium of USD 5-10-25/b. But OPEC+ is in control so why does it matter. There is much talk these days that there is a significant risk premium in Brent crude these days and that it could evaporate if the erratic state of the Middle East as well as Ukraine/Russia settles down. With the latest gains in US oil inventories one could maybe argue that there is a USD 5/b risk premium versus total US commercial crude and product inventories in the Brent crude oil price today. But what really matters for the oil price is what OPEC+ decides to do in June with respect to Q3-24 production. We are in no doubt that the group will steer this market to where they want it also in Q3-24. If there is a little bit too much oil in the market versus demand then they will trim supply accordingly.

Also OPEC+ wants to make ends meet. The 20-year real average Brent price from 2000 to 2019 stood at USD 76.6/b in Jan 2020. That same averaging period is today at USD 92.5/b in today’s money value. OPEC+ needs a higher nominal price to make ends meet and they will work hard to get it.

Price of brent crude
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Inflation adjusted Brent crude price versus total US commercial crude and product stocks. A bit above the regression line. Maybe USD 5/b risk premium. But type of inventories matter. Latest big gains were in Propane and Other oils and not so much in crude and products

Inflation adjusted Brent crude price versus total US commercial crude and product stocks.
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Total US commercial crude and product stocks usually rise by 4-5 m b per week this time of year. Gains have been very strong lately, but mostly in Propane and Other oils

Total US commercial crude and product stocks usually rise by 4-5 m b per week this time of year. Gains have been very strong lately, but mostly in Propane and Other oils
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Last week’s US inventory data. Big rise of 10 m b in commercial inventories. What really stands out is the big gains in Propane and Other oils

US inventory data
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Take actual changes minus normal seasonal changes we find that US commercial crude and regular products like diesel, gasoline, jet and bunker oil actually fell 3 m b versus normal change. 

Take actual changes minus normal seasonal changes we find that US commercial crude and regular products like diesel, gasoline, jet and bunker oil actually fell 3 m b versus normal change.
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data
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Analys

Nat gas to EUA correlation will likely switch to negative in 2026/27 onward

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Historically positive Nat gas to EUA correlation will likely switch to negative in 2026/27 onward

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Historically there has been a strong, positive correlation between EUAs and nat gas prices. That correlation is still fully intact and possibly even stronger than ever as traders increasingly takes this correlation as a given with possible amplification through trading action.

The correlation broke down in 2022 as nat gas prices went ballistic but overall the relationship has been very strong for quite a few years.

The correlation between nat gas and EUAs should be positive as long as there is a dynamical mix of coal and gas in EU power sector and the EUA market is neither too tight nor too weak:

Nat gas price UP  => ”you go black” by using more coal => higher emissions => EUA price UP

But in the future we’ll go beyond the dynamically capacity to flex between nat gas and coal. As the EUA price moves yet higher along with a tightening carbon market the dynamical coal to gas flex will max out. The EUA price will then trade significantly above where this flex technically will occur. There will still be quite a few coal fired power plants running since they are needed for grid stability and supply amid constrained local grids.

As it looks now we still have such overall coal to gas flex in 2024 and partially in 2025, but come 2026 it could be all maxed out. At least if we look at implied pricing on the forward curves where the forward EUA price for 2026 and 2027 are trading way above technical coal to gas differentials. The current forward pricing implications matches well with what we theoretically expect to see as the EUA market gets tighter and marginal abatement moves from the power sector to the industrial sector. The EUA price should then trade up and way above the technical coal to gas differentials. That is also what we see in current forward prices for 2026 and 2027.

The correlation between nat gas and EUAs should then (2026/27 onward) switch from positive to negative. What is left of coal in the power mix will then no longer be dynamically involved versus nat gas and EUAs. The overall power price will then be ruled by EUA prices, nat gas prices and renewable penetration. There will be pockets with high cost power in the geographical points where there are no other alternatives than coal.

The EUA price is an added cost of energy as long as we consume fossil energy. Thus both today and in future years we’ll have the following as long as we consume fossil energy:

EUA price UP => Pain for consumers of energy => lower energy consumption, faster implementation of energy efficiency and renewable energy  => lower emissions 

The whole idea with the EUA price is after all that emissions goes down when the EUA price goes up. Either due to reduced energy consumption directly, accelerated energy efficiency measures or faster switch to renewable energy etc.

Let’s say that the coal to gas flex is maxed out with an EUA price way above the technical coal to gas differentials in 2026/27 and later. If the nat gas price then goes up it will no longer be an option to ”go black” and use more coal as the distance to that is too far away price vise due to a tight carbon market and a high EUA price. We’ll then instead have that:

Nat gas higher => higher energy costs with pain for consumers => weaker nat gas / energy demand & stronger drive for energy efficiency implementation & stronger drive for more non-fossil energy => lower emissions => EUA price lower 

And if nat gas prices goes down it will give an incentive to consume more nat gas and thus emit more CO2:

Cheaper nat gas => Cheaper energy costs altogether, higher energy and nat gas consumption, less energy efficiency implementations in the broader economy => emissions either goes up or falls slower than before => EUA price UP 

Historical and current positive correlation between nat gas and EUA prices should thus not at all be taken for granted for ever and we do expect this correlation to switch to negative some time in 2026/27.

In the UK there is hardly any coal left at all in the power mix. There is thus no option to ”go black” and burn more coal if the nat gas price goes up. A higher nat gas price will instead inflict pain on consumers of energy and lead to lower energy consumption, lower nat gas consumption and lower emissions on the margin. There is still some positive correlation left between nat gas and UKAs but it is very weak and it could relate to correlations between power prices in the UK and the continent as well as some correlations between UKAs and EUAs.

Correlation of daily changes in front month EUA prices and front-year TTF nat gas prices, 250dma correlation.

Correlation of daily changes in front month EUA prices and front-year TTF nat gas prices
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

EUA price vs front-year TTF nat gas price since March 2023

EUA price vs front-year TTF nat gas price since March 2023
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Front-month EUA price vs regression function of EUA price vs. nat gas derived from data from Apr to Nov last year.

Front-month EUA price vs regression function of EUA price vs. nat gas derived from data from Apr to Nov last year.
Source: SEB graph and calculation

The EUA price vs the UKA price. Correlations previously, but not much any more.

The EUA price vs the UKA price. Correlations previously, but not much any more.
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Forward German power prices versus clean cost of coal and clean cost of gas power. Coal is totally priced out vs power and nat gas on a forward 2026/27 basis.

Forward German power prices versus clean cost of coal and clean cost of gas power. Coal is totally priced out vs power and nat gas on a forward 2026/27 basis.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Forward price of EUAs versus technical level where dynamical coal to gas flex typically takes place. EUA price for 2026/27 is at a level where there is no longer any price dynamical interaction or flex between coal and nat gas. The EUA price should/could then start to be negatively correlated to nat gas.

Forward price of EUAs versus technical level
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Forward EAU price vs. BNEF base model run (look for new update will come in late April), SEB’s EUA price forecast.

Forward EAU price vs. BNEF base model run
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data
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