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Det stora spannmålsrånet

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Spannmål

Det stora spannmålsrånet, eller The Great grain robbery, också känt som The Russian wheat deal, refererar till när det forna Sovjetunionen 1972 köpte betydande mängder spannmål, främst vete och majs men också sojabönor, av USA till låga priser. Orsaken till att Sovjetunionen köpte sådana mängder spannmål från USA berodde på att Sovjetunionen drabbats av en betydande torka som förstörde 20 procent av landets skördar.

Vete växer för marknadenEgentligen hade Sovjetunionen börjat köpa amerikanskt spannmål redan innan, trots det kalla kriget som då rådde och gjorde att det i princip var omöjligt för amerikanska företag att handla med företag i Östeuropa.

De stora köpen kom under perioden juli och augusti 1972, när Sovjetunionen köpte 440 miljoner bushels vete, cirka 25 procent av USAs skörd det året, till ett pris om 700 MUSD. Från början var det endast tänkt att Sovjetunionen skulle köpa spannmål till ett värde om 150 MUSD, men i all tysthet signerade den amerikanska regeringen ett treårigt avtal med Sovjetunionen enligt vilket de styrande i det stora landet i öst förband sig att köpa stora mängder spannmål från USA.

Sovjetunionen gjorde sedan ytterligare köp från en rad olika spannmålshandlare. Sovjetunionen använde en kredit på 750 MUSD som landet hade fått från den amerikanska regeringen samt 500 MUSD av sin egen hårdvaluta för att köpa majs, vete och sojabönor. Sovjetunionen köpte när priserna var låga och i all tysthet, faktum är att det tog flera månader innan det kom ut att Sovjetunionen agerat så pass tungt på köpsidan. När detta väl läckte ut kom spannmålspriserna att explodera uppåt.

De högsta spannmålspriserna på 125 år

Händelsen ledde sedan till de högsta spannmålspriserna på 125 år i USA, en av de verkliga tjurmarknaderna som varade mellan 1972 och 1973. Under en femmånadersperiod 1973 handlades sojabönorna till 8 USD per bushel och noterade sedan en toppnotering på Chicago Board of Trade på 12,90 USD per bushel. Mindre än ett år tidigare hade sojabönorna handlats till 3,31 USD per bushel, en prisuppgång på 390 procent. Att priserna steg så pass kraftigt var inte enbart en effekt av Sovjetunionens köp, det sammanföll med en torka i Australien och av att Indien vid detta tillfälle kom att bli en stor aktör på de globala råvarubörserna, i detta fall som en stor köpare av spannmål.

Samtidigt kom ett antal av USAs spannmålsexportörer att göra stora vinster på denna affär, uppskattningsvis kunde de dela på 300 MUSD av de amerikanska skattebetalarnas pengar. Att händelsen kom att bli känd som The Great grain robbery är således inte så konstigt. Flera av dessa spannmålshandlare hade dessutom agerat som köpare, i syfte att hedga det spannmål de sålde till Sovjetunionen så hade de köpt vete, majs och sojabönor på råvarubörserna. När de sovjetiska spannmålsköpen blev allmän kännedom ledde det till att råvaruhandlarna gjorde enorma vinster. Det förekom också beskyllningar om att Sovjet hade köpt stora mängder terminskontrakt i syfte att göra vinster som skulle finansiera köpen av den fysiska spannmålen. Senare ledde detta till att en rad anklagelser om att insidertrading hade skett, men inga åtal väcktes och det gick inte att påvisa att det förekommit någon otillbörlig marknadspåverkan trots senatsförhör och liknande undersökningar. Det enda signifikanta resultatet av detta var att konsumenterna drabbades av högre priser på spannmålsprodukter.

Neil Sanders, Londonbaserad detaljhandelsanalytiker, sade att vetekrisen 1973 bidrog till att priset på en limpa bröd steg med 87 procent, från 10,1 pence, till 18,9 pence året efter. I slutet av 2011 låg priset på motsvarande limpa i England på 84 pence. Även andra livsmedel som till exempel pasta, foder och i förlängningen kyckling och kött kom också att påverkas, om än i mindre omfattning.

Vid FN:s mat och jordbruksorganisation, FAO, i Rom, säger ekonomen Abdolreza Abbassian att det är ländernas regeringar som skall ta skulden i de fall konsumenterna drabbas av spannmålskriserna. Han säger att världen blivit för fokuserad på vete från Svarta havs-regionen. Skördarna i detta område är emellertid mindre pålitliga än det spannmål som odlas i stabilare regioner som Kanada och USA. Enligt Abbassian måste det vidtas åtgärder för att mildra effekter av händelser som torka eller skyfall.

Ryska spioner avlyssnade råvaruhandlarnas telefoner

The Great grain robbery var en lysande insats som bland annat inbegrep den före detta spionorganisationen KGB som avlyssnade råvaruhandlarnas telefoner. Målet med detta var att de ryska spannmålshandlarna skulle kunna hitta de lägsta priserna och kunna köpa spannmålet där det var billigast utan att driva upp priset. På detta sätt kom Sovjet åt 300 MUSD av de amerikanska skattebetalarnas pengar i form av exportsubventioner, i en tid då den amerikanska regeringen var ute efter att lindra de kroniskt låga spannmålspriser genom att uppmuntra spannmålsexport.

Efterdyningar

The Great grain robbery var en av de ekonomiska händelser som kom att ändra världen för alltid. Det stora spannmålsrånet ledde till nya, stränga rapporteringsregler för de amerikanska råvaruhandlarna, regler som gäller än i dag. Det stora spannmålsrånet kom också att leda till en massiv ökning av råvarupriserna i allmänhet, och bidrog till att driva den amerikanska ekonomin till både recession och stagflation. Detta resulterade sedan i vad som kom att kallas för Reaganomics.

President Nixon införde ett exportförbud av sojabönor för att bromsa ytterligare prishöjningar på sojabönor. Detta partiella embargo ledde till kritik från utlandet eftersom det ledde till att amerikanska kontrakt upphävdes.

En bomullskris uppstod 1973 och 1974 där priset på bomull nästan fördubblats under en sexmånadersperiod. Ungefär 500 stämningar lämnades in avseende bomullskontrakt som hade baserats på lägre priser. Samtidigt steg priset på majs kraftigt. Matpriserna världen över steg med cirka 50 procent under de första sex månaderna av 1973. Livsmedelspriserna exploderade igen 1974.

U.S. General Accounting Office släppte en rapport i juli 1973 som säger att försäljningen hade misskötts och bidrog till att pressa upp livsmedelspriserna. Spannmålsförsäljningen ledde dessutom till att de amerikanska skattebetalarna tvingades till att betala onödiga subventioner. GAO sade att Ryssland borde ha betalat högre priser för det spannmål landet köpte vilket skulle ha minska subventionerna till spannmålsföretagen, och att jordbrukarna inte drog någon nytta av veteaffären, utan att det endast var de exporterande spannmålsföretagen som gjorde vinster på detta.

”The Big Grain Robbery” är ett perfekt exempel på vad som händer när utbud och efterfrågan kullkastas på spannmålsmarknaderna.

1987 kom Sovjetunionen tillbaka till spannmålsbörserna

1987 kom sedan Sovjetunionen tillbaka till de globala spannmålsmarknaderna och genomförde tillsammans med Reaganadministrationen en ny affär i amerikanskt vete. Sovjetunionen köpte då fyra miljoner ton motsvarande 147 miljoner bushels, av det amerikanska vetet. Detta vete motsvarade cirka åtta procent av det amerikanska veteöverskottet på 1,88 miljarder bushels vete.

Hur kunde detta ske?

Under hela det kalla kriget, hade de ryska bönderna utmaningar i form av det ryska klimatet och de tvivelaktiga sovjetiska jordbruksmetoderna, något som gjorde missväxt till ett regelbundet förekommande inslag i Sovjetunionen. Detta gjorde också förekomsten av sovjetiska spannmålshandlare på råvarumarknaderna till något vanligt förekommande. De sovjetiska spannmålshandlarna agerade då oftast som köpare eftersom den sovjetiska ledningen alltid haft svårt att tillhandahålla tillräckliga mängder baslivsmedel till sin befolkning.

Händelserna som kom att utmynna i det som kallades The Great grain robbery inträffade inom loppet av några veckor, och de amerikanska myndigheterna hade ingen aning, eller någon annan heller för den delen, att Sovjet hade drabbats av en akut livsmedelskris som en följd av situationen i landets jordbruksindustri. Det var inte heller allmänt känt att de sovjetiska spannmålshandlarna genomförde små, men tillsammans omfattande inköp av spannmål på råvarubörserna. Hur kunde detta hända? I dag finns det ett stort antal satelliter som cirkulerar runt jorden som fotograferar de områden där spannmål odlas, men på 1970-talet var det få råvaruhandlare som hade direktkontakt med de sovjetiska jordbrukarna. Den tidens satelliter kunde inte heller visa de skador som förorsakats av torka, insekter eller sjukdomar.

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Analys

Brent gains on positive China data and new attacks on Russian oil processing

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Positive China data and further attacks on Russian oil processing facilities lifts Brent yet higher. Brent crude gained 4.1% last week with a close on Friday 15 March at USD 85.3/b. Continued declines in US inventories, a bullish oil market outlook from the IEA and damages on Russia’s Rosneft Ryazan oil processing plant by Ukrainian drones helped Brent crude to break above the USD 85/b level. This morning Brent is adding another 0.4% to USD 85.7/b driven by a range of additional attacks on Russian refineries over the weekend and positive Chinese macro data also showing Chinese apparent oil demand  up 6.1% YoY for Jan+Feb.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Brent crude is getting a steady tailwind from declining US oil inventories. Steady and continued declines in US inventories since the start of the year has been nudging the oil price steadily higher but there has clearly been some resistance around the USD 85/bl level. US inventories continued that decline in data also last week with commercial crude and product stocks down 4.7 m b. Total US stocks including SPR declined 4.1 m b to 1580 m b which is now only 2 m b above the low point on 30 December 2022 at 1578 m b. These persistent declines in US oil inventories is a clear reflection of the global market in deficit where demand is sufficiently strong, cuts by OPEC+ are sufficiently deep while US shale oil production is close to muted with hardly any growth projected from Q4-23 to Q4-24.

Bullish report from IEA last week indicates that further inventory declines is to be expected. The monthly report from IEA last week gave an additional boost to this picture as it lifted projected oil demand for 2024 by 0.2 m b/d, reduced non-OPEC production by 0.2 m b/d and thus increased its estimated call-on-OPEC by 0.4 m b/d for 2024. The world will need steadily more oil from OPEC every quarter to Q3-24 and by Q4-24 the world will need 0.8 m b/d more from the group than it did in Q4-23. That is great news for OPEC+. There is no way that they’ll move away from current strategy of ”Price over volume” with this backdrop. The report from IEA last week is indicating that the gradual declines in US inventories we have seen so far this year will likely continue. And such a trend will give continued support for oil prices in the coming quarters. Oil price projections are lifted in response to this and last out is Morgan Stanley which raises its Q3-24 Brent forecast by US 10/b to USD 90/b.

SEB’s Brent crude forecast for 2024 is USD 85/b (average year) which implies that we’ll likely see both USD 70/b as well as USD 100/b some times during the year.

Attacks on Russian oil processing will mostly impact refining margins and crude grade premiums as crude supply is unlikely to be disrupted. The Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure has surprised the market as many of them are deep within Russia. Facilities in Russia’s Samara region which is more than 1,000 km away from the Ukrainian border were attacked on Saturday. Oil processing plants and oil refineries are highly complex structures. If damaged by drones they can potentially be out of operation for extended periods. Plain oil transportation systems are much simpler and easier and faster to repair. The essence here is that we’ll likely not lose any oil supply while we might lose oil refining capacity due to these attacks. Most of the impact from these attacks should thus be on refining margins and not so much on crude oil prices. But when diesel cracks, gasoil cracks and gasoline cracks goes up then typically also light sweet crude prices goes up. As such there is a spillover effect from damages to Russian oil refineries to Brent crude oil prices even if we don’t lose a single drop of Russian crude oil production and supply.

Total US crude and product stocks incl. SPR has been ticking lower and lower so far this year and are now only 2 m b/d above the low-point in late December 2022. This is a solid indication that the global oil market is running a deficit.

Total US crude and product stocks incl. SPR
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

Total commercial crude and product stocks (excl. SPR) has been ticking lower and lower so far this year. This has helped to nudge oil prices steadily higher. 

Total commercial crude and product stocks (excl. SPR)
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

Brent crude looks very fairly priced at around USD 85/b versus current US commercial oil inventories

Brent crude looks very fairly priced at around USD 85/b versus current US commercial oil inventories
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

Call-on-OPEC by IEA: World will need more and more oil from OPEC through the year. In Q4-24 the world will need 0.8 m b/d more oil from OPEC in Q4-24 than in Q4-23.  

World will need more and more oil from OPEC through the year.
Source: SEB graph, IEA data

ARA refining margins have moved up so far this year => Refineries want to process more crude oil and thus they want to buy more crude oil.

ARA refining margins
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data
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Analys

When affordable gas and expensive carbon puts coal in the corner

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Coal and nat gas prices are increasingly quite normal versus real average prices from 2010 to 2019 during which TTF nat gas averaged EUR 27/MWh and ARA coal prices averaged USD 108/ton in real-terms. In the current environment of ”normal” coal and nat gas prices we now see a darkening picture for coal fired power generation where coal is becoming less and less competitive over the coming 2-3 years with cost of coal fired generation is trading more and more out-of-the money versus both forward power prices and the cost of nat gas + CO2. Coal fired power generation will however still be needed many places where there is no local substitution and limited grid access to other locations with other types of power supply. These coal fired power-hubs will then become high-power-cost-hubs. And that may become a challenge for the local power consumers in these locations.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

When affordable gas and expensive carbon puts coal in the corner. The power sector accounts for some 50% of emissions in the EU ETS system in a mix of coal and nat gas burn for power. The sector is also highly dynamic, adaptive and actively trading. This sector has been and still is the primary battleground in the EU ETS where a fight between high CO2 intensity coal versus lower CO2 intensity nat gas is playing out.

Coal fired power is dominant over nat gas power when the carbon market is loose and the EUA price is low. The years 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 were typical example-years of this. Coal fired power was then in-the-money for around 7000 hours (one year = 8760 hours) in Germany. Nat gas fired power was however only in the money for about 2500 hours per year and was predominantly functioning as peak-load supply.

Then the carbon market was tightened by politicians with ”back-loading” and the MSR mechanism which drove the EUA price up to EUR 20/ton in 2019 and to EUR 60/ton in 2021. Nat gas fired power and coal fired power were then both in-the-money for almost 5000 hours per year from 2016 to 2023. The EUA price was in the middle-ground in the fight between the two. In 2023 however, nat gas was in-the-money for 4000 hours while coal was only in-the-money for 3000 hours. For coal that is a dramatic change from the 2012-2015 period when it was in the money for 7000 hours per year.

And it is getting worse and worse for coal fired generation when we look forward. That is of course the political/environmental plan as well. It is still painful of course for coal power.

On a forward basis the cost of Coal+EUA is increasingly way, way above the forward German power prices. Coal is basically out-of-the money for more and more hours every year going forward. It may be temporary, but it fits the overall political/environmental plan and also the increasing penetration of renewable energy which will push aside more and more fossil power as we move forward. 

But coal power cannot easily and quickly be shut down all over the place in preference to cheaper nat gas based power. Coal fired power will be the primary source of power in many places with no local alternative and limited grid capacity to other sources of power elsewhere.

The consequence is that those places where coal fired power generation cannot be easily substituted and closed down will be ”high power price hubs”. If we imagine physical power prices as a topological map, geographically across Germany then the locations where coal fired power is needed will rise up like power price hill-tops amid a sea of lower power prices set by cheaper nat gas + CO2 or power prices depressed by high penetration of renewable energy.

Coal fired power generation used to be a cheap and safe power bet. Those forced to rely on coal fired power will however in the coming years face higher and higher, local power costs both in absolute terms and in relative terms to other non-coal-based power locations.

Coal fired power in Germany is increasingly very expensive both versus the cost of nat gas + CO2 and versus forward German power prices. Auch, it will hurt more and more for coal fired power producers and more and more for consumers needing to buy it.

Coal fired power in Germany is increasingly very expensive
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

And if we graph in the most efficient nat gas power plants, CCGTs, then nat gas + CO2 is today mostly at the money for the nearest three years while coal + CO2 is way above both forward power prices and forward nat gas + CO2 costs. 

EUR/MWh
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Number of hours in the year (normal year = 8760 hrs) when the cost of coal + CO2 and nat gas + CO2 in the German spot power market (hour by hour) historically has been in the money. Coal power used to run 7000 hours per year in 2012-2016, Baseload. Coal in Germany was only in-th-money for 3000 hours in 2023. That is versus the average, hourly system prices in Germany. But local, physical prices will likely have been higher where coal is concentrated and where there is no local substitution for coal in the short to medium term. Coal power will run more hours in those areas and local, physical prices need to be higher there to support the higher cost of coal + CO2.

Number of hours in the year
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data
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Analys

War-premium back on the agenda?

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

During yesterday’s trading session, Brent Crude made significant gains, marking the largest increase in global oil prices in approximately five weeks. The front-month contract is presently trading at USD 84.3 per barrel, reflecting a robust increase of USD 2.55 per barrel (above 3%) compared to Monday morning’s opening price.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

Furthermore, US crude inventories, excluding those held in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), experienced a notable decline for the first time in seven weeks. This decline suggests a heightened global demand for crude oil, which has played a pivotal role in driving up prices (further details below).

Additionally, of considerable significance is Ukraine’s unexpected success in executing precise drone strikes targeting key Russian oil infrastructure. Yesterday, Ukrainian drone strikes triggered a fire at Rosneft’s Ryazan plant, which has a daily production capacity of 340,000 barrels near Moscow. This facility is a significant provider of motor fuels for the capital region and stands as one of Russia’s largest crude-processing facilities. Notably, this incident marks the third Ukrainian drone attack on Russian refineries this week, following similar incidents at the Novoshakhtinsk and Norsi refineries.

Ukrainian strikes in Russian territories ”appear to aim at disrupting, if not influencing, the Russian elections,” Putin stated in an interview with the RIA Novosti news service released Wednesday. He added, ”Another objective seems to be securing leverage for potential negotiation purposes.”

i.e., we believe the statements suggest that Ukrainian strikes in Russian regions are perceived by Putin as strategic moves with dual purposes. Firstly, they are seen as attempts to disrupt or influence the upcoming elections in Russia, potentially destabilizing the political landscape or casting doubt on the legitimacy of the electoral process. Secondly, they are interpreted as efforts to gain leverage in possible negotiation scenarios, implying that Ukraine seeks to strengthen its bargaining position by demonstrating its capability to inflict economic and strategic damage on Russia.

From a market perspective, it’s crucial to highlight the escalating conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which poses a significant threat to global energy markets. Russia’s role as a major oil and gas supplier is paramount, and any disruptions in its energy infrastructure could lead to widespread supply shortages and price volatility worldwide. The recent drone strikes are a clear reminder that geopolitical tensions continue to impact global oil markets. The fading ”war-premium” should now be factored in more significantly, indicating a need to brace for increased volatility ahead.


An overall significant drawdown of US inventories. In the U.S., commercial crude oil inventories, excluding those in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, dropped by 1.5 million barrels from the prior week to 447.0 million barrels, about 3% below the five-year average. Total motor gasoline inventories fell by 5.7 million barrels, also about 3% below the five-year average. Distillate fuel inventories rose by 0.9 million barrels, approximately 7% below the five-year average. Propane/propylene inventories increased by 0.7 million barrels, marking an 8% rise compared to the five-year average.

Overall commercial petroleum inventories decreased by 4.7 million barrels. Over the past four weeks, total products supplied averaged 19.9 million barrels per day, up by 1.0% from the same period last year. Motor gasoline product supplied averaged 8.7 million barrels per day, down by 1.3% from the same period last year. Distillate fuel product supplied averaged 3.7 million barrels per day over the past four weeks, up by 0.5% from the same period last year. Jet fuel product supplied increased by 2.0% compared to the same four-week period last year.

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