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Analys

Oil price is mostly fundamentals, not geopolitical risk premium

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Brent crude has recovered to above USD 90/b again. Risk premium due to Israel/Gaza? Maybe not so much at all. Latest data from the IEA indicates that the global oil market ran an implied deficit of 2.1 m b/d in August, a deficit of 0.7 m b/d in September and a likely deficit of 1.2 m b/d in Q4-23. Inventory draws have mostly taken place in floating stocks and in non-OECD. Inventories which are typically harder to track. Demand growth of 2.3 m b/d this year has more or less entirely taken place in non-OECD. As such it is not so strange that inventory draws have first taken place just there as well. But if we continue to run a deficit of 1.2 m b/d in Q4-23 then we should eventually see OECD stocks starting to draw down as well. This should keep oil prices well supported in Q4-23. The US EIA last week lifted its outlook for Brent crude for 2024 to USD 95/b (+7) on the back of slowing US shale oil growth leaving OPEC in good control of the market.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Brent crude sold off sharply at the end of September as longer dated bond yields rallied and markets feared that central banks would keep rates high for longer leading to a recession in the end with associated weak oil demand and falling oil price. One can of course question if that is the right interpretation. If market had really turned bearish on the economic outlook (recession, crash,..), then longer dated bond yields should have gone down and not up as they did. Hm, well, maybe oil was just ripe for a bearish correction following a long upturn in prices since late June and only needed some kind of bearish catalyst story to set off that correction in late September. The sell-off was short-lived as the attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October made oil jump back up above USD 90/b again. The low-point in the recent sell-off was a close of USD 84/b on 6 October. With Brent crude now at USD 90/b the most immediate interpretation is that we now have a USD 6/b risk premium in the oil price due to Israel/Hamas/Gaza. The fear is that the conflict might spiral out and eventually lead to real loss of supply with Iran being most at risk there. But such geopolitical risk premiums are usually short-lived unless actual supply disruptions occur. The most immediate fear is that the US would impose harsher sanctions towards Iran which is Hamas’ biggest backer. But US Treasury Secretary Jannet Yellen stated on 11 Oct that the US has no plans to impose new sanctions on Iran.

So let’s leave possible recession fears as well as geopolitical risk premiums aside and instead just look at the current state and the outlook for the oil market. The three main monthly oil market reports from IEA, US EIA and OPEC were out last week. One thing that stands out is a continued disagreement of what oil demand is today and what it will be tomorrow. On 2024 the IEA and the EIA partially agrees while OPEC is in a camp of its own. But one thing is to have strongly diverging outlooks for demand in 2024. Another is to have extremely wide estimates for what demand is here and now in Q4-23. This shows that there is still a very high uncertainty of what is actually the current state of the oil market. Deficit, balanced, surplus?

Global oil demand
Source: EIA, IEA, OPEC

The most prominent of the three reports, the IEA, made few changes to its overall projects vs. its September report. Changes were typically +/- 100 k b/d or less for most items. The reports was however still very interesting with respect to clues to what is the actual state of the market balance. The proof of the pudding is always the change in oil inventories and as such always in hindsight. IEA data showed that global oil inventories declined by 63.8 m b in August which equals a deficit of 2.1 m b/d. Preliminary inventory data for September indicates an implied deficit of 0.7 m b/d.

Change in global oil inventories
Source: IEA, OMR Oct-23

Important here is that the stock draws in August mostly took place in oil on water and in non-OECD. These stocks are typically less easily observable. Oil markets are often highly focused on more easily observable data like the weekly US oil inventories as well as EU and Japan. The US commercial crude and product stocks have moved upwards since week 35 (late August) so that in the last data point the US commercial stocks are only 10 m b below the 2015-19 seasonal average. This has undoubtedly been a bearish factor for oil prices lately and probably contributed to the sell-off in late September, early October.

US crude and product stocks (excl. SPR)

US crude & products inventories (excluding SPR) in million barrels
Source: US EIA, Macrobond

1) The global August and September (indic.) inventory data from IEA gives credibility to its current assessment of the global oil market. For Q4-23 it estimates Call-on-OPEC at 29.3 m b/d. Russia and Saudi Arabia last week held a joint statement heralding that they would keep production at current level to the end of year. With OPEC production steady at 28 m b/d it implies a global oil market deficit of 1.2 m b/d. For H1-24 its estimates a call-on-OPEC of 27.7 m b/d. This means that Saudi Arabia and Russia will likely stick to their current production levels also in H1-24. But then the market will likely be balanced rather than in deficit like it has been in Q3-23 and Q4-23.

2) The global oil market is very large with significant dynamical time lags. IEA estimates a global consumption growth this year of 2.3 m b/d. China accounts for 77% of this and non-OECD accounts for 97%. So oil demand growth this year is all taking place in non-OECD. As such it is not so surprising that inventory draws have been taking place there and on-water rather than in the OECD. But a global deficit will eventually involve also the OECD inventories. The demand-pull this year has been all about non-OECD. First you draw down non-OECD supply chains, inventories and on-water oil. Then you start to pull more oil from the wider market which eventually involve a draw-down also in OECD inventories. IEA’s estimate of an implied deficit of about 1.2 m b/d in Q4-23. So if we have already drawn down non-OECD supply chains and oil on water we might start to see a significant draw in OECD stocks in Q4-23 if the market runs an estimated 1.2 m b/d as estimated by the IEA. 

3) Worth noting however is IEA’s warning that higher oil prices are starting to hurt demand. Demand in Nigeria, Pakistan and Egypt are all down 10% or more while US demand for gasoline also has shown significant demand weaknesses. For 2024 the IEA only projects a global demand growth of 0.9 m b/d YoY along with weaker global economic growth. Non-OPEC production continues to grow robustly at 1.3 m b/d with the result that call-on-OPEC falls from 28.8 m b/d this year to 28.3 m b/d next year. This is of course negative for OPEC and gives a bearish tint to the oil market next year. But it is still not so weak that OPEC will give up on holding the price where they (Saudi/Russia) want it to be. But implies that Saudi/Russia/OPEC will have to stick to current production levels through most of 2024.

Floating crude oil stocks in million barrels

Floating crude oil stocks in million barrels
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Analys

Trump’s China sanctions stance outweighs OPEC+ quota halt for Q1-26

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Easing last week and lower this morning as Trump ”non-enforcement of sanctions towards China” carries more weight than halt in OPEC+ quotas in Q1-26. Brent crude calmed and fell back 1.3% to $65.07/b last week following the rally the week before when it touched down to $60.07/b before rising to a high of $66.78/b on the back of new US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukeoil. These new sanctions naturally affect the biggest buyers of Russian crude oil which are India and China. Trump said after his meeting last week with Xi Jinping that: ”we didn’t really discuss the oil”. China has stated explicitly that it opposes the new unilateral US sanctions with no basis in international law. There is thus no point for Trump to try to enforce the new sanctions versus China. The meeting last week showed that he didn’t even want to talk to Xi Jinping about it. Keeping these sanctions operational on 21 November onwards when they kick into force will be an embarrassment for Donald Trump. Come that date, China will likely explicitly defy the new US sanctions in yet another show of force versus the US.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Halt in OPEC+ quotas shows that 2026 won’t be a bloodbath for oil. Though still surplus in the cards. Brent crude started up 0.4% this morning on the news that OPEC+ will keep quotas unchanged in Q1-26 following another increase of 137k b/d in December. But following a brief jump it has fallen back and is now down slightly at $64.7/b. The halt in quotas for Q1-26 doesn’t do anything to projected surplus in Q1-26. So rising stocks and a pressure towards the downside for oil is still the main picture ahead. But it shows that OPEC+ hasn’t forgotten about the price. It still cares about price. It tells us that 2026 won’t be a bloodbath or graveyard for oil with an average Brent crude oil price of say $45/b. The year will be controlled by OPEC+ according to how it wants to play it in a balance between price and volume where the group is in a process of taking back market share.

Better beyond the 2026 weakness. Increasing comments in the market that the oil market it will be better later. After some slight pain and surplus in 2026. This is definitely what it looks like. The production forecast for non-OPEC+ production by the US EIA is basically sideways with no growth from September 2025. Thus beyond surplus 2026, this places OPEC+ in a very comfortable situation and with good market control.

US IEA October forecast for US liquids and non-OPEC+, non-US production. No net production growth outside of OPEC+ from September 2025 to end of 2026. OPEC+ is already in good position to control the market. It still want’s to take back some more market share. Thus still 2026 weakness.

US IEA October forecast for US liquids and non-OPEC+, non-US production.
Source: SEB graph and highlights, US EIA data
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Analys

OPEC+ quotas looks set to rise and US oil sanctions looks set to be toothless

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Down this morning with concerns that US won’t enforce Russian oil sanctions towards China. Brent crude closed up 0.7% yesterday to a close of $65.0/b after having traded in a fairly narrow range of $64.06 – 65.15/b. This morning it is down 0.1% at $64.7/b while the ICE Gasoil crack is down 1% as reports from Trump’s high level talks with Xi Jinping sows doubts about the enforcement of the new US sanctions towards Russia’s Lukoil and Rosneft.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Concerns that US sanctions will create significant friction in crude and product markets. Much focus in the oil market yesterday was on whether the recent new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukeoil would have a material impact on the supply/demand balance in the global oil market. Total CEO, Patrick Pouyanne, said that the market was underestimating the sanctions with three Indian refineries accounting for half of India’s Russian crude oil imports now placing crude oil orders elsewhere. FGE added that there would be massive trade friction over the coming 6-8 weeks with 800k b/d of products and 1m b/d of crude at risk of being stranded at sea in November and December. While Brent crude traded to an intraday low of $60.07/b on 20 October, it is currently only up $3.4/b since its lowest recent close of $61.3/b on 17 October. That is not much in the scale of things. Maybe the market is underestimating the problem as argued by Total and FGE. But Russia and its shadow fleet companions have been hard at work avoiding western sanctions since 2022. Today they are experts at this. Ship to ship transfers of crude to hide that the oil is coming from Russia. Blending Russian crude into other streams. And if Russian crude oil is cheap then there is a lot of profits on the table for willing hands. 

But it is highly unlikely that the US will enforce Russian oil sanctions when it comes to China. Both crude oil and gasoil are down this morning in part because Trump said about his meeting with Xi Jinping that ”we really didn’t discuss the (Russian) oil”. China is one of the biggest buyers of Russian crude oil. Not discussing the new US sanctions with China is a clear signal that these sanctions won’t be enforced. China has been standing up against the US this year on any issue of importance. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated right after the new sanctions were announced that China “oppose unilateral sanctions which lack a basis in international law and authorization of the UN Security Council”. China won’t be bullied by over something as important as its oil purchases. If Trump tried to push the issue on sanctions on Russian oil versus China he would lose. He would get nowhere. So sensibly enough he didn’t lift the topic at the high level meeting. So China will likely pick up Russian crude cargoes who no one else dare to touch. Naturally at a bargain as well. If at all, the new sanctions are not in effect anyhow before 21 November. And as it said in the sanctions: ”may” and ”run the risk of” be prosecuted. Donald Trump thus stands free to not enforce the new sanctions. And how can he enforce them versus India if he can’t/won’t enforce them versus China. Again, as we said on 24 October: ”Sell the (sanctions) rally..”

OPEC+ likely to lift its December quotas by 137k b/d on 2 November. OPEC+ will on 2 November discuss what it wants to do with its quotas for December. We expect the group to lift its quotas with an additional 137k b/d as it has done the last couple of meetings.

Crude oil at sea rose 69m b over week to 26 October and is up 253m b since mid-August.

Crude oil at sea rose 69m b over week to 26 October and is up 253m b since mid-August.
Source: SEB graph and highlights, Vortexa data, Bloomberg data feed.
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Analys

Brent slips to USD 64.5: sanction doubts and OPEC focus reduce gains

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After reaching USD 66.78 per barrel on Friday afternoon, Brent crude has since traded mostly sideways, yet dipping lower this morning. The market appears to be consolidating last week’s sharp gains, with Brent now easing back to around USD 64.5 per barrel, roughly USD 2.3 below Friday’s peak but still well above last Monday’s USD 60.07 low.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

The rebound last week was initially driven by Washington’s decision to blacklist Russia’s two largest oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil, which together account for nearly half of the country’s crude exports. The move sparked a wave of risk repricing and short covering, with Brent rallying almost 10% from Monday’s trough. Yet, the market is now questioning the actual effectiveness of the sanctions. While a full blacklisting sounds dramatic, the mechanisms for enforcement remain unclear, and so far, there are no signs of disrupted Russian flows.

In practice, these measures are unlikely to materially affect Russian supply or revenues in the near term, yet we have now seen Indian refiners reportedly paused new orders for Russian barrels pending government guidance. BPCL is expected to issue a replacement spot tender within 7–10 days, potentially sourcing crude from non-sanctioned entities instead. Meanwhile, Lukoil is exploring the sale of overseas assets, and Germany has requested extra time for Rosneft to reorganize its refining interests in the country.

The broader market focus is now shifting toward this week’s Fed decision and Sunday’s OPEC+ meeting, both seen as potential short-term price drivers. Renewed U.S.-China trade dialogue ahead of Trump’s meeting with President Xi Jinping in South Korea is also lending some macro support.

In short, while the White House’s latest move adds to geopolitical noise, it does not yet represent a true supply disruption. If Washington had intended to apply real pressure, it could have advanced the long-standing Senate bill enforcing secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian oil, legislation with overwhelming backing, or delivered more direct military assistance to Ukraine. Instead, the latest action looks more like political theatre than policy shift, projecting toughness without imposing material economic pain.

Still, while the immediate supply impact appears limited, the episode has refocused attention on Russia’s export vulnerability and underscored the ongoing geopolitical risk premium in the oil market. Combined with counter-seasonal draws in U.S. crude inventories, record-high barrels at sea, and ongoing uncertainty ahead of the OPEC+ meeting, short-term fundamentals remain somewhat tighter than the broader surplus story suggests.

i.e., the sanctions may prove mostly symbolic, but the combination of geopolitics and uneven inventory draws is likely to keep Brent volatile around the low to mid-USD 60s in the days ahead.

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