Analys
Oil price is mostly fundamentals, not geopolitical risk premium
Brent crude has recovered to above USD 90/b again. Risk premium due to Israel/Gaza? Maybe not so much at all. Latest data from the IEA indicates that the global oil market ran an implied deficit of 2.1 m b/d in August, a deficit of 0.7 m b/d in September and a likely deficit of 1.2 m b/d in Q4-23. Inventory draws have mostly taken place in floating stocks and in non-OECD. Inventories which are typically harder to track. Demand growth of 2.3 m b/d this year has more or less entirely taken place in non-OECD. As such it is not so strange that inventory draws have first taken place just there as well. But if we continue to run a deficit of 1.2 m b/d in Q4-23 then we should eventually see OECD stocks starting to draw down as well. This should keep oil prices well supported in Q4-23. The US EIA last week lifted its outlook for Brent crude for 2024 to USD 95/b (+7) on the back of slowing US shale oil growth leaving OPEC in good control of the market.
Brent crude sold off sharply at the end of September as longer dated bond yields rallied and markets feared that central banks would keep rates high for longer leading to a recession in the end with associated weak oil demand and falling oil price. One can of course question if that is the right interpretation. If market had really turned bearish on the economic outlook (recession, crash,..), then longer dated bond yields should have gone down and not up as they did. Hm, well, maybe oil was just ripe for a bearish correction following a long upturn in prices since late June and only needed some kind of bearish catalyst story to set off that correction in late September. The sell-off was short-lived as the attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October made oil jump back up above USD 90/b again. The low-point in the recent sell-off was a close of USD 84/b on 6 October. With Brent crude now at USD 90/b the most immediate interpretation is that we now have a USD 6/b risk premium in the oil price due to Israel/Hamas/Gaza. The fear is that the conflict might spiral out and eventually lead to real loss of supply with Iran being most at risk there. But such geopolitical risk premiums are usually short-lived unless actual supply disruptions occur. The most immediate fear is that the US would impose harsher sanctions towards Iran which is Hamas’ biggest backer. But US Treasury Secretary Jannet Yellen stated on 11 Oct that the US has no plans to impose new sanctions on Iran.
So let’s leave possible recession fears as well as geopolitical risk premiums aside and instead just look at the current state and the outlook for the oil market. The three main monthly oil market reports from IEA, US EIA and OPEC were out last week. One thing that stands out is a continued disagreement of what oil demand is today and what it will be tomorrow. On 2024 the IEA and the EIA partially agrees while OPEC is in a camp of its own. But one thing is to have strongly diverging outlooks for demand in 2024. Another is to have extremely wide estimates for what demand is here and now in Q4-23. This shows that there is still a very high uncertainty of what is actually the current state of the oil market. Deficit, balanced, surplus?
The most prominent of the three reports, the IEA, made few changes to its overall projects vs. its September report. Changes were typically +/- 100 k b/d or less for most items. The reports was however still very interesting with respect to clues to what is the actual state of the market balance. The proof of the pudding is always the change in oil inventories and as such always in hindsight. IEA data showed that global oil inventories declined by 63.8 m b in August which equals a deficit of 2.1 m b/d. Preliminary inventory data for September indicates an implied deficit of 0.7 m b/d.
Important here is that the stock draws in August mostly took place in oil on water and in non-OECD. These stocks are typically less easily observable. Oil markets are often highly focused on more easily observable data like the weekly US oil inventories as well as EU and Japan. The US commercial crude and product stocks have moved upwards since week 35 (late August) so that in the last data point the US commercial stocks are only 10 m b below the 2015-19 seasonal average. This has undoubtedly been a bearish factor for oil prices lately and probably contributed to the sell-off in late September, early October.
US crude and product stocks (excl. SPR)
1) The global August and September (indic.) inventory data from IEA gives credibility to its current assessment of the global oil market. For Q4-23 it estimates Call-on-OPEC at 29.3 m b/d. Russia and Saudi Arabia last week held a joint statement heralding that they would keep production at current level to the end of year. With OPEC production steady at 28 m b/d it implies a global oil market deficit of 1.2 m b/d. For H1-24 its estimates a call-on-OPEC of 27.7 m b/d. This means that Saudi Arabia and Russia will likely stick to their current production levels also in H1-24. But then the market will likely be balanced rather than in deficit like it has been in Q3-23 and Q4-23.
2) The global oil market is very large with significant dynamical time lags. IEA estimates a global consumption growth this year of 2.3 m b/d. China accounts for 77% of this and non-OECD accounts for 97%. So oil demand growth this year is all taking place in non-OECD. As such it is not so surprising that inventory draws have been taking place there and on-water rather than in the OECD. But a global deficit will eventually involve also the OECD inventories. The demand-pull this year has been all about non-OECD. First you draw down non-OECD supply chains, inventories and on-water oil. Then you start to pull more oil from the wider market which eventually involve a draw-down also in OECD inventories. IEA’s estimate of an implied deficit of about 1.2 m b/d in Q4-23. So if we have already drawn down non-OECD supply chains and oil on water we might start to see a significant draw in OECD stocks in Q4-23 if the market runs an estimated 1.2 m b/d as estimated by the IEA.
3) Worth noting however is IEA’s warning that higher oil prices are starting to hurt demand. Demand in Nigeria, Pakistan and Egypt are all down 10% or more while US demand for gasoline also has shown significant demand weaknesses. For 2024 the IEA only projects a global demand growth of 0.9 m b/d YoY along with weaker global economic growth. Non-OPEC production continues to grow robustly at 1.3 m b/d with the result that call-on-OPEC falls from 28.8 m b/d this year to 28.3 m b/d next year. This is of course negative for OPEC and gives a bearish tint to the oil market next year. But it is still not so weak that OPEC will give up on holding the price where they (Saudi/Russia) want it to be. But implies that Saudi/Russia/OPEC will have to stick to current production levels through most of 2024.
Floating crude oil stocks in million barrels
Analys
Brent prices slip on USD surge despite tight inventory conditions
Brent crude prices dropped by USD 1.4 per barrel yesterday evening, sliding from USD 74.2 to USD 72.8 per barrel overnight. However, prices have ticked slightly higher in early trading this morning and are currently hovering around USD 73.3 per barrel.
Yesterday’s decline was primarily driven by a significant strengthening of the U.S. dollar, fueled by expectations of fewer interest rate cuts by the Fed in the coming year. While the Fed lowered borrowing costs as anticipated, it signaled a more cautious approach to rate reductions in 2025. This pushed the U.S. dollar to its strongest level in over two years, raising the cost of commodities priced in dollars.
Earlier in the day (yesterday), crude prices briefly rose following reports of continued declines in U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excl. SPR), which fell by 0.9 million barrels last week to 421.0 million barrels. This level is approximately 6% below the five-year average for this time of year, highlighting persistently tight market conditions.
In contrast, total motor gasoline inventories saw a significant build of 2.3 million barrels but remain 3% below the five-year average. A closer look reveals that finished gasoline inventories declined, while blending components inventories increased.
Distillate (diesel) fuel inventories experienced a substantial draw of 3.2 million barrels and are now approximately 7% below the five-year average. Overall, total commercial petroleum inventories recorded a net decline of 3.2 million barrels last week, underscoring tightening market conditions across key product categories.
Despite the ongoing drawdowns in U.S. crude and product inventories, global oil prices have remained range-bound since mid-October. Market participants are balancing a muted outlook for Chinese demand and rising production from non-OPEC+ sources against elevated geopolitical risks. The potential for stricter sanctions on Iranian oil supply, particularly as Donald Trump prepares to re-enter the White House, has introduced an additional layer of uncertainty.
We remain cautiously optimistic about the oil market balance in 2025 and are maintaining our Brent price forecast of an average USD 75 per barrel for the year. We believe the market has both fundamental and technical support at these levels.
Analys
Oil falling only marginally on weak China data as Iran oil exports starts to struggle
Up 4.7% last week on US Iran hawkishness and China stimulus optimism. Brent crude gained 4.7% last week and closed on a high note at USD 74.49/b. Through the week it traded in a USD 70.92 – 74.59/b range. Increased optimism over China stimulus together with Iran hawkishness from the incoming Donald Trump administration were the main drivers. Technically Brent crude broke above the 50dma on Friday. On the upside it has the USD 75/b 100dma and on the downside it now has the 50dma at USD 73.84. It is likely to test both of these in the near term. With respect to the Relative Strength Index (RSI) it is neither cold nor warm.
Lower this morning as China November statistics still disappointing (stimulus isn’t here in size yet). This morning it is trading down 0.4% to USD 74.2/b following bearish statistics from China. Retail sales only rose 3% y/y and well short of Industrial production which rose 5.4% y/y, painting a lackluster picture of the demand side of the Chinese economy. This morning the Chinese 30-year bond rate fell below the 2% mark for the first time ever. Very weak demand for credit and investments is essentially what it is saying. Implied demand for oil down 2.1% in November and ytd y/y it was down 3.3%. Oil refining slipped to 5-month low (Bloomberg). This sets a bearish tone for oil at the start of the week. But it isn’t really killing off the oil price either except pushing it down a little this morning.
China will likely choose the US over Iranian oil as long as the oil market is plentiful. It is becoming increasingly apparent that exports of crude oil from Iran is being disrupted by broadening US sanctions on tankers according to Vortexa (Bloomberg). Some Iranian November oil cargoes still remain undelivered. Chinese buyers are increasingly saying no to sanctioned vessels. China import around 90% of Iranian crude oil. Looking forward to the Trump administration the choice for China will likely be easy when it comes to Iranian oil. China needs the US much more than it needs Iranian oil. At leas as long as there is plenty of oil in the market. OPEC+ is currently holds plenty of oil on the side-line waiting for room to re-enter. So if Iran goes out, then other oil from OPEC+ will come back in. So there won’t be any squeeze in the oil market and price shouldn’t move all that much up.
Analys
Brent crude inches higher as ”Maximum pressure on Iran” could remove all talk of surplus in 2025
Brent crude inch higher despite bearish Chinese equity backdrop. Brent crude traded between 72.42 and 74.0 USD/b yesterday before closing down 0.15% on the day at USD 73.41/b. Since last Friday Brent crude has gained 3.2%. This morning it is trading in marginal positive territory (+0.3%) at USD 73.65/b. Chinese equities are down 2% following disappointing signals from the Central Economic Work Conference. The dollar is also 0.2% stronger. None of this has been able to pull oil lower this morning.
”Maximum pressure on Iran” are the signals from the incoming US administration. Last time Donald Trump was president he drove down Iranian oil exports to close to zero as he exited the JCPOA Iranian nuclear deal and implemented maximum sanctions. A repeat of that would remove all talk about a surplus oil market next year leaving room for the rest of OPEC+ as well as the US to lift production a little. It would however probably require some kind of cooperation with China in some kind of overall US – China trade deal. Because it is hard to prevent oil flowing from Iran to China as long as China wants to buy large amounts.
Mildly bullish adjustment from the IEA but still with an overall bearish message for 2025. The IEA came out with a mildly bullish adjustment in its monthly Oil Market Report yesterday. For 2025 it adjusted global demand up by 0.1 mb/d to 103.9 mb/d (+1.1 mb/d y/y growth) while it also adjusted non-OPEC production down by 0.1 mb/d to 71.9 mb/d (+1.7 mb/d y/y). As a result its calculated call-on-OPEC rose by 0.2 mb/d y/y to 26.3 mb/d.
Overall the IEA still sees a market in 2025 where non-OPEC production grows considerably faster (+1.7 mb/d y/y) than demand (+1.1 mb/d y/y) which requires OPEC to cut its production by close to 700 kb/d in 2025 to keep the market balanced.
The IEA treats OPEC+ as it if doesn’t exist even if it is 8 years since it was established. The weird thing is that the IEA after 8 full years with the constellation of OPEC+ still calculates and argues as if the wider organisation which was established in December 2016 doesn’t exist. In its oil market balance it projects an increase from FSU of +0.3 mb/d in 2025. But FSU is predominantly part of OPEC+ and thus bound by production targets. Thus call on OPEC+ is only falling by 0.4 mb/d in 2025. In IEA’s calculations the OPEC+ group thus needs to cut production by 0.4 mb/d in 2024 or 0.4% of global demand. That is still a bearish outlook. But error of margin on such calculations are quite large so this prediction needs to be treated with a pinch of salt.
-
Analys4 veckor sedan
Crude oil comment: OPEC+ meeting postponement adds new uncertainties
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Vad den stora uppgången i guldpriset säger om Kina
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Meta vill vara med och bygga 1-4 GW kärnkraft, begär in förslag från kärnkraftsutvecklare
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Kina gör stor satsning på billig kol i Xinjiang
-
Analys3 veckor sedan
OPEC takes center stage, but China’s recovery remains key
-
Analys2 veckor sedan
Brent crude rises 0.8% on Syria but with no immediate risk to supply
-
Nyheter1 vecka sedan
De tre bästa aktierna inom olja, gas och råvaror enligt Rick Rule
-
Nyheter1 vecka sedan
Christian Kopfer ger sin syn på den stora affären mellan Boliden och Lundin Mining