Analys
From surge to slump for natural gas: Navigating the new normal in Europe

Over the past 4-5 months, EU natural gas prices, indicated by the TTF benchmark, have plummeted by 50% from an October high of EUR 56/MWh to the current EUR 28/MWh for the front-month contract, defying expectations of seasonal price increases. This downturn can be attributed to robust EU inventories at 59% capacity and persistently subdued natural gas demand, down by 11% compared to historical norms. Mild weather in Northwest Europe and a prolonged industrial recession have suppressed consumption, resulting in a significant gas surplus despite nearing the end of the winter heating season (90% complete). These factors collectively exert downward pressure on prices.
The correlation between Brent and TTF prices remains from times partly “fluid”. In our December 2023 natural gas price update, we predicted a constrained global natural gas market, anticipating a swift resurgence in demand following a decline in gas prices. Our projections were underpinned by a robust Brent Crude price outlook, set at USD 85/bl, USD 87.5/bl, and USD 90/bl for 2024, 2025, and 2026 respectively, with a Crude-to-gas rate of 80%. However, this scenario has yet to materialize as the anticipated demand recovery has been notably delayed, requiring even lower prices than initially predicted for its realization—a phenomenon unique in recent memory.
Achieving a global natural gas price convergence towards levels more aligned with Brent Crude appears plausible, signaling a return to a measure of normalcy. The absence of a winter premium during the 2023/24 winter season suggests a healthier outlook for Q2-24, mitigating the risk of substantial short-term price spikes in European gas markets. The sporadic spikes witnessed in 2022 and partially in 2023 are now a thing of the past, indicating a change from the volatility experienced in recent years.
Short-term EU gas prices hinge heavily on immediate weather patterns and industrial gas demand, both exerting considerable influence on inventory levels, which serve as a critical gauge of supply and demand dynamics. Looking further ahead, the trajectory of prices is linked with the global LNG balance, particularly contingent upon factors such as projected US natural gas production and the capacity of US LNG exports to the global market.
Moreover, the declining influence of Russia on the European gas market is notable, with sporadic gas export halts from the former energy powerhouse carrying reduced impact. Global market recalibrations indicate a sustained elevation in price levels, with EUR 30/MWh emerging as a feasible benchmark for the foreseeable future. We also call “the end of the energy crisis”, as the worst is history. Reflecting on the current year, EU TTF prices hit the lowest point in late February, with expectations of a potential slide/climb from current prices at EUR 28/MWh.
In essence, our current natural gas price forecast hinges on a delicate equilibrium among three pivotal factors. Firstly, the TTF price must strike a balance, remaining sufficiently low to stimulate a resurgence in demand. For context, the historical average real price hovers around EUR 27/MWh, with EUR 30/MWh anticipated to gradually encourage demand recovery, thereby mitigating the effects of demand destruction. Secondly, the TTF price should maintain a relatively ”normal” relationship with Crude prices, as historical trends indicate a natural correlation between the two. A notably low rate would invariably attract heightened interest from Asian markets, as LNG emerges as a cost-effective alternative to oil in terms of energy content. Lastly, the TTF price must also exhibit a level of elevation to cover the expenses associated with producing and transporting US natural gas to the European market. This entails factoring in costs related to Henry Hub, tolling fees, liquefaction, transportation, and regasification, among other associated expenses. Achieving a delicate equilibrium among these factors is vital for ensuring the stability and sustainability of natural gas pricing dynamics in the European market.
Consequently, our current stance reflects a delicate balancing act among these three critical factors. Settling on EUR 30/MWh, we predict that prices lower than this threshold would catalyze a swifter demand resurgence, while simultaneously enhancing the appeal of natural gas against oil as the spread widens. Moreover, importation from the USA would encounter mounting challenges as prices decline, particularly approaching the EUR 25/MWh mark when landed in ARA.
The TTF market has been complexly interlinked with the global LNG market at the margins since 2015, many years before the energy crisis. While the proportion of LNG consumed in Europe has surged significantly, the concept of LNG prices influencing TTF prices at the margin is not new. However, in terms of volume, the current situation declares us notably more vulnerable than in previous years.
In our updated projections, we have revised our price forecasts downward, particularly notable at the front end, encompassing Q2-24, Q3-24, and the Full-year (FY) 2024. Other adjustments, though marginally smaller, remain for FY 2025, 2026, and 2027. Despite these reductions, we anticipate a trajectory of increasing European natural gas prices from their current levels. Notably, Q1-24 is now expected to average EUR 27/MWh, followed by predictions of EUR 25/MWh, EUR 28/MWh, and EUR 32/MWh for Q2-24, Q3-24, and Q4-24 respectively. Consequently, the average for FY 2024 is forecasted at EUR 28/MWh, marking a notable decline from the previous estimate of EUR 40/MWh.
In our outlook for longer-term pricing, we anticipate an average of EUR 30/MWh for the years 2025, 2026, and 2027—a reduction of EUR 10/MWh compared to our previous update in December 2023, which projected EUR 40/MWh. This long-term forecast only sits marginally higher, by EUR 3-4/MWh, than the historical average real price of approximately EUR 27/MWh. Such pricing aligns intending to stimulate further demand recovery and maintain consumer affordability within the European economy. Reflecting on historical trends, previous price levels in the European market might be seen as reliant on potentially risky agreements with Russia. Consequently, the era of exceptionally low-cost energy is drawing to a close, indicating a new paradigm where European gas and power are priced slightly higher, establishing a ”new normal” for the foreseeable future.
PRICE ACTION
The absence of a winter premium for global natural gas is notable. Our longer-term natural gas price projection, set at EUR 30/MWh, demonstrates resilience compared to historical market norms. Last quarter (Q4-23) closed at EUR 43/MWh for the front-month contract, a figure approximately EUR 10/MWh lower than our recent expectations. Noteworthy market adjustments have transpired not only within the European gas market but also on a global scale. This ongoing adaptation is expected to continue influencing the gas market into 2024, resulting in fewer severe price spikes and a return to more normal price differentials.
Maintaining our gas price forecast at EUR 30/MWh for 2025 suggests an expectation for European natural gas prices to stabilize at current market rates. This projection extends to 2026 and 2027, which stand roughly 30% higher than historical norms – a contrast to the previous era of favorable deals with Russia flooding European consumers with low-cost piped natural gas.
Considerable attention is drawn to the relationship between gas and oil prices. With our oil market outlook projecting USD 85/bl, USD 87.5/bl, and USD 90/bl for 2024, 2025, and 2026 respectively, the convergence of gas prices to more normal circumstances implies a corresponding alignment with oil prices. Historically, EU natural gas prices have traded at 0.55-0.6 times Brent crude prices, a figure that is expected to converge closer to historical norms. However, our forecasts for 2024, 2025, and 2026 slightly exceed historical norms, at 0.62 x Brent, 0.65 x Brent, and 0.62 x Brent respectively, reflecting a tighter natural gas balance in the coming years.
The transformation of global LNG trade, from roughly 5% spot and short-term LNG trade in 2000 to roughly 30% in 2023, underscores a higher degree of flexibility in negotiating spot and short-term LNG contracts. This evolution suggests a shift towards contracts potentially decoupled from Brent indexations, challenging the conventional reliance on oil prices as a benchmarking tool for global natural gas prices.
US LNG
A significant surge in global liquefaction (export) capacity is anticipated from the US and Qatar starting in 2026 and beyond. These large-scale liquefaction projects typically entail long-term contracts with predefined off-takers or demand centers, primarily serving power plants or industrial applications. The transportation of substantial LNG volumes from the US to Europe underscores strategic economic and energy considerations. The US, propelled by abundant shale gas resources and extensive LNG liquefaction infrastructure, has emerged as a major LNG exporter. Europe, seeking to diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on Russia, offers an attractive market for American LNG. Additionally, LNG’s flexibility as a cleaner-burning fuel aligns with Europe’s environmental sustainability objectives and transition away from coal.
The transatlantic LNG trade between the US and Europe capitalizes on arbitrage opportunities driven by regional gas price variations and demand-supply imbalances. This flow not only enhances energy security for European nations but also aids NE Asia in meeting environmental obligations.
The US-Europe netback for LNG cargo depends on various economic factors, including global natural gas prices, US regional supply and demand dynamics, and fluctuations in shipping costs.
The competitiveness of US LNG in the European market is influenced by several factors, including the US benchmark price for domestic natural gas (Henry Hub), source gas costs, voyage costs, shipping costs, and regasification costs at the destination.
In more detail the competitiveness of US LNG in the European market is influenced by factors such as the US benchmark price for domestic natural gas (Henry Hub); Source gas cost (Henry Hub + Tolling fee and liquefaction fee); voyage cost (Insurance, port, canal, boil-off, and fuel cost); shipping cost at day rate; and regasification cost in the other end.
A simplified calculation demonstrates the US-EU arbitrage opportunity. At current market figures, the total cost of delivering LNG from the US to Europe is roughly USD 7.05/MMBtu or approximately EUR 22/MWh. Comparatively, the EU TTF front-month contract trades at EUR 28/MWh, indicating an average EUR 6/MWh arbitrage opportunity and an equal profit margin for traders. However, with state-of-the-art LNG vessels, the total cost could decrease significantly, resulting in a substantial profit margin for traders.
The calculation (with current market figures all in USD per MMBtu as a standard unit):
Front-month Henry Hub (1.65) + 15% tolling fee (0.25) and liquefaction fee for conventional LNG ships (2.5) + Insurance, port, and canal (on average 0.33) + boil-off and fuel cost (on average 1.2) + regasification (0.5) + shipping cost at current day rate (0.62).
i.e., for total cost from the US to Europe we get 1.65 + 0.25 + 2.5 + 0.33 + 1.2 + 0.5 + 0.62 = USD 7.05/MMBtu – or roughly EUR 22/MWh. At the time of writing, the EU TTF front-month contract is trading at EUR 28/MWh. Hence, in the current spot market, the US-EU arbitrage is at roughly on average EUR 6/MWh and equally EUR 6/MWh profit to trader. However, this is a conservative estimate. In a situation with a state-of-the-art MEGI / X-DF LNG vessel, we would have a lower liquefaction fee and per unit insurance, boil-off, and fuel cost, which would imply a total cost of USD 6.0/MMBtu (EUR 18.5/MWh) – consequently, a massive EUR 9.5/MWh profit to the trader. Understating the massive economic argument in shipping LNG from the US to the EU (at current market rates).
But even though a substantial arrival of LNG export capacity in the US is approaching, it is not like the US has unlimited natural gas production, or unlimited LNG capacity to feed the global thirst for LNG. Hence, it is not like the EU TTF will plunge to levels comparable to the US Henry Hub + all associated costs for delivering to the EU.
A substantial surge in LNG export capacity is imminent, fueled by significant investments totaling USD 235 billion directed towards upcoming super-chilled fuel projects since 2019. The majority of these projects are slated to come online from the second half of 2025 onward, with an additional USD 55 billion investment expected by 2025, driving a remarkable 45% surge in LNG liquefaction capacity by the end of the decade.
Currently, the global LNG export market boasts a total capacity of approximately 420 million tonnes, projected to expand significantly to 610 million tonnes by 2030. The bulk of this expansion will stem from Qatar, Russia, and the US, with capacities increasing by roughly 23, 26, and 117 million tonnes respectively from 2024 to 2030.
However, it’s worth noting that on January 26, 2024, the Biden Administration paused LNG exports to non-FTA countries, awaiting updated analyses by the DOE. This affects 4 major projects and risks WTO challenges. The DOE cites outdated assessments, signaling a policy shift and raising market uncertainties.
This pause could have significant geopolitical and trade implications, as it also becomes an election issue. Stakeholders, including exporters and developers, now face uncertainties and must review agreements. Overall, the pause prompts a broader review of LNG export policies, impacting domestic and international markets. However, it’s too early to fully assess its impact, so the aforementioned capacity forecast remains firm for now.
The industry’s confidence is underpinned by the anticipation of rising LNG demand, driven by Europe’s efforts to reduce reliance on Russian gas and Asia’s shift away from coal, particularly in China. Yet, this expansion is not merely speculative; it represents a long-term commitment between suppliers and off-takers. These projects typically entail long-term contracts of 20+ years, often supplying power plants or industrial applications. Consequently, the new LNG export capacity is expected to match a similar scale of demand.
The significant export ventures from the United States to Qatar will further cement LNG’s role in the global energy landscape, with contracts extending well into the 2050s, even surpassing some carbon-neutral targets.
Moreover, there remains ample room for natural gas in the long run. The COP28 acknowledged that transitional fuels like LNG can facilitate the energy transition, signaling implicit support for LNG over dirtier fossil fuels.
Critics argue that natural gas isn’t the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel due to potential methane leakage along the supply chain. However, such concerns arise belatedly as the wave of new facilities is already underway. With oil demand reaching its peak and coal declining gradually, gas is expected to maintain its prominence in the energy mix.
SUPPLY & DEMAND
In the short term, the winter wildcard/premium is gone, pointing to a healthier Q2 2024. We have, a while back, pinpointed that the European natural gas market is in a limbo state between supply uncertainties and demand uncertainties. With a consequence of a winter wildcard largely being balanced by the short/medium-term weather and withdrawal rate of European natural gas inventories.
Recent weather forecasts predict slightly colder temperatures in early April across Northwest Europe, but the preceding winter months saw normal to milder conditions, resulting in lower-than-expected inventory drawdowns and weak price trends.
Looking ahead, forecasts for April to June 2024 suggest above-normal temperatures in Northwest Europe, reducing heating and power demand and maintaining subdued gas consumption. Prices in Q2-24 are forecasted to average around EUR 25/MWh.
Furthermore, it is easy to think of the faded energy crisis as a European crisis. But the adaptation for global gas markets has been equally/more important. Very high global gas prices have resulted in adaption in all corners of the globe, consequently, easing the global natural gas balance and freeing more gas volumes to the highest bidder at more “reasonable” prices. During the peak of the crisis, the highest bidder was naturally Europe which was sucking up all excess global LNG volumes. However, at the current price levels, the “three importing giants”, namely China, South Korea, and Japan have finally woken up, and are no longer “re-routing” their LNG cargos, while also actively participating in the short-term/spot market.
Russia’s grip over the EU is expected to weaken in the spring/summer of 2024. Since February/March 2022, President Putin sought to balance revenue generation and geopolitical pressure by controlling the energy supply to the EU. This strategy faced challenges: reducing exports to zero would jeopardize revenue, while high exports would alleviate the EU’s energy crisis, as seen in winter 2022/23. Despite efforts, Putin’s goal of using natural gas as a strategic tool faltered in winter 2023/24.
Market adaptation ensued. Since December 2022, Russian piped gas supply to Europe has fluctuated between 10-25% of historical averages, currently nearing 20%. To intensify geopolitical pressure, Russia may need to further reduce flows, possibly to around 10% in winter 2024/25. Despite the distant outlook, the market has already factored in potential price increases for next winter.
Two main pipelines deliver Russian gas to Europe: ”Turkstream,” to Turkey, and the ”Brotherhood,” through Ukraine to Slovakia. These pipelines each contribute roughly 50% of the 0.75 TWh per day flow. The pipeline via Ukraine faces physical risks, and a supply halt is likely next winter as the transit agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz expires in December 2024, with little chance of renewal.
EU INVENTORIES
The trajectory of EU natural gas inventories for the upcoming summer is primarily influenced by both the global LNG market and European natural gas demand. In Q2-23 (one year ago), inventories commenced the injection season at an all-time high, leading to the current record-high inventory status. These comfortable inventories suggest the EU has the situation under control as it emerges from the winter season. Currently, inventories stand at 59%, a substantial 25% above the 2015-2022 average.
Despite missing out on over 1,000 TWh of natural gas imports from Russia compared to historical levels, the mild winter of 2022/23, reduced demand due to high prices, and increased LNG imports compensated with an additional 1,400 TWh. This over-compensation of 400 TWh in Q1-23 facilitated an unprecedented injection rate into European inventories during Q1 and Q2 2023. As a result, European inventories shifted from a deficit of 180 TWh in January 2022 to a surplus of 259 TWh in April 2023, leading to the current record-high levels.
However, if NE Asia, predominantly led by China, continues to outbid the EU for LNG cargo and industrial gas demand increases due to favorable long-term hedging levels, current comfortable inventory levels will gradually return to normal. This suggests EU TTF prices will slowly climb towards over EUR 30/MWh by the next heating season, a trend partly factored into current pricing.
While the crisis urgency has faded, market adjustments now activate at lower price thresholds. Nonetheless, we anticipate slightly higher long-term price levels (EUR 30/MWh) due to increasing LNG bids from China (+NE Asia), a rebound in EU demand, and reduced LNG imports influenced by lower prices. This will result in a slower inventory build during Q2-24 and Q3-24 compared to last year. Despite diminishing supply from Russia, the EU remains focused on maintaining preparedness for future winters, leading to a new normal in natural gas inventory levels throughout the year.
The European energy crisis has significantly eased during 2023 and Q1-24. Softened front-end prices influence longer-dated prices, with the winter premium/seasonality fully washed out during the ongoing heating season. Healthy EU natural gas inventories, currently at 59% capacity (675 TWh) and surpassing the European Commission’s target of reaching 90% storage fullness by 1 November, contribute to this subsiding crisis. Continued subdued European consumption (11% below historical averages) and robust LNG imports set a ceiling on short-term prices, although increased EU demand could quickly alter this scenario, as EU demand has proven stickier than anticipated.
DEMAND RECOVERY
Reduced uncertainty and lower prices are expected to lead to more long-term hedging. Since the start of Q1 2024 (year-to-date), the TTF spot has averaged EUR 27/MWh, approximately USD 50/boe, only marginally below the ’historical norm’ when adjusted for inflation. Despite these price levels, a resurgence in European industrial gas consumption during the winter is not straightforward.
Industrial gas demand remains subdued, sitting 11% below historical averages. While this marks an improvement from the 25-30% drop experienced in mid-summer 2022 – a period characterized as the ”peak of the crisis” – when spot prices consistently traded at EUR 150/MWh (USD 255/boe).
The slower-than-expected recovery is largely attributed to industries hesitating to commit to longer-term prices. For example, during Q4 2023, despite tumbling spot prices, futures prices remained strong. In mid-October, gas for delivery in January 2024 was priced at EUR 55/MWh (USD 103/boe). Thus, during Q4 2023, peak-winter prices maintained a considerable premium over spot prices to a large extent.
However, the current landscape has changed. The winter premium has diminished as we exit the heating season, and weak spot prices predominantly drive forward. This reflects a market that is more certain and willing to forecast futures during a less turbulent phase. The convergence and narrowing gap between spot and long-term prices signify that ”peak natural gas has passed.” Major consumers in Europe are expected to adopt more long-term hedging for longer-term prices, ideally hedging these futures close to current spot prices. This suggests that current market prices will likely trigger increased consumption compared to Q3 and Q4 2023, although a full-scale comeback will take time.
As previously noted, substantial demand destruction occurred not only in Europe but also globally, particularly in Asia. Over the last couple of years, demand destruction amounted to approximately 800 TWh per year, while the normal growth rate in the global LNG market is 200 TWh per annum. This indicates that most of the demand will eventually return, although the timing remains uncertain.
NE ASIAN LNG
EUR 25/MWh presents a favorable ”buy opportunity,” and prices are expected to either slide or climb from this point. The decline in prices can be attributed to sustained low demand and high inventories. We anticipate prices to either slide or increase from here, with minimal downside, as prices are likely to find support around EUR 25/MWh.
Forward prices for both JKM and TTF indicate that the NE Asian LNG market will remain a preferred destination for marginal LNG cargo in the near term. While the EU previously heavily relied on NE Asia, the European market can no longer solely depend on the economic vulnerabilities of NE Asia or China.
A long-awaited pent-up demand for energy in China would lead to increased demand for goods and services, consequently boosting energy consumption, particularly natural gas, primarily in the form of LNG. In such a scenario, the JKM may command a larger premium over the TTF than the existing EUR 2.5/MWh (3-month rolling contract). This would divert LNG spot cargoes away from Europe, further reducing the EU’s natural gas surplus. Thus, the ongoing recovery in China’s economy is likely to stimulate Asia’s demand for natural gas, potentially resulting in EU LNG purchasers paying a premium to secure essential LNG imports in the future.
With current prices, we anticipate an increase in EU demand coupled with a decrease in EU LNG imports. This trend may persist until we observe a slight shortfall in compensation relative to the natural gas deficit from Russia, which could drive prices upward during the summer.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The ongoing transition from coal to natural gas signifies a significant shift in the global energy landscape. Natural gas emerges as a crucial bridging technology, offering a cleaner alternative to coal and facilitating the transition toward widespread adoption of renewable energy sources. This transition underscores the environmental benefits of natural gas, positioning it as a pivotal component in mitigating climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Despite challenges such as the reduction in Russian gas supply, the natural gas market is adapting rapidly. Europe, in particular, faces competition for global LNG volumes, primarily sourced from the US and Qatar. The market’s ability to swiftly adjust reflects its adaptability and resilience on a global scale, highlighting the importance of diversifying energy sources and supply routes.
Our current natural gas price forecast relies on achieving a delicate equilibrium among key factors. This includes stimulating demand, maintaining a correlation with crude prices, and ensuring cost coverage for US natural gas transportation. Striking this balance is essential for maintaining stability and sustainability in European gas pricing dynamics, ensuring energy security.
In response to changing market conditions, we have revised our price outlook downward for the short term, notably for Q2-24, Q3-24, and FY 2024. Specifically, Q1-24 is forecasted to average EUR 27/MWh, followed by predictions of EUR 25/MWh for Q2-24, EUR 28/MWh for Q3-24, and EUR 32/MWh for Q4-24. However, prices are expected to gradually increase over the longer term, with an average forecast of EUR 30/MWh for the years 2025, 2026, and 2027, slightly higher than historical averages.
This revised outlook reflects the evolving nature of the natural gas market and the need for flexibility in response to changing geopolitical landscapes and supply dynamics. Looking ahead, natural gas remains a crucial bridge over coal, facilitating the transition towards cleaner energy sources.
Analys
Very relaxed at USD 75/b. Risk barometer will likely fluctuate to higher levels with Brent into the 80ies or higher coming 2-3 weeks

Brent rallied 12% last week. But closed the week below USD 75/b and it is still there. Very relaxed. Brent crude rallied 12% to USD 78.5/b in the early hours of Friday as Israel attacked Iran. The highest level since 27 January this year. The level didn’t hold and Brent closed the day at USD 74.23/b which was up 5.7% on the day and 11.7% on the week. On Friday it was still very unclear how extensive and lasting this war between Iran and Israel would be. Energy assets in Iran had still not been touched and Iran had not targeted other Middle East countries’ energy assets or US military bases in the region. As such, the Brent crude closed the week comfortably at around USD 75/b. Which one cannot argue is very much of a stressed price level.

Israel is targeting Iran’s domestic energy infrastructure. Not its energy export facilities. For now. Over the weekend Israel has widened its targets to include fuel depots in Tehran, refineries supplying Iran domestically and also a processing plant at Iran’s South Pars gas field – the world’s largest. So far it appears that Israel has refrained from hurting Iranian oil and gas export facilities. Maybe adhering to Trump’s whish of low oil prices. Trump has been begging for a lower oil price. Would be very frustrating for him if Israel started to blow up Iran’s export facilities. Focus instead looks to be on Iran’s domestic energy supply and infrastructure. To weaken and disable the operations of Iran as a country while leaving Iran’s energy export facilities intact for now at least. That is probably why Brent crude this morning is only trading at USD 74.9/b with little change from Friday. An incredible relaxed price level given what is going on in the Middle East.
Israel seems to try to do to Iran what Israel recently did to Lebanon. Israel now seems to have close to total control of the Iranian air space. So called ”Air Supremacy” something which is rarely achieved according to Phillips P. O’Brian (see comment on this below with link). This is giving Israel close to total freedom in the airspace over Iran. Israel now seems to try to do to Iran what Israel recently did to Lebanon. Take out military and political commanders. Take out the air defenses. Then grind the rest of its defensive capacities to the ground over some time.
Continuous pressure. No rest. No letting up for several weeks seems likely. The current situation is a very rare opportunity for Israel to attack Iran with full force. Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian strongholds in Syria, are all severely weakened or disabled. And now also Air Supremacy of the airspace over Iran. It is natural to assume that Israel will not let this opportunity pass. As such it will likely continue with full force over several weeks to come, at least, with Israel grinding down the rest of Iran’s defensive capabilities and domestic energy supply facilities as far as possible. Continuous pressure. No rest. No letting up.
What to do with Fordow? Will Iran jump to weapons grade uranium? The big question is of course Iran’s nuclear facilities. Natanz with 16,000 enrichment centrifuges was destroyed by Israel on Friday. It was only maximum 20 meters below ground. It was where Iran had mass enrichment to low enrichment levels. Fordow is a completely different thing. It is 500 meters deep under a mountain. It is where enrichment towards weapons grade Uranium takes place. Iran today has 408 kg of highly enriched uranium (IAEA) which can be enriched to weapons grade. It is assumed that Iran will only need 2-3 days to make 25 kg of weapons grade uranium and three weeks to make enough for 9 nuclear warheads. How Israel decides to deal with Fordow is the big question. Ground forces? Help from the US?
Also, if Iran is pushed to the end of the line, then it might decide to enrich to weapons grade which again will lead to a cascade of consequences.
Brent is extremely relaxed at USD 75/b. But at times over coming 2-3 weeks the risk barometer will likely move higher with Brent moving into the 80ies or higher. The oil price today is extremely relaxed with the whole thing. Lots of OPEC+ spare capacity allows loss of Iranian oil exports. Israeli focus on Iran’s domestic energy systems rather than on its exports facilities is also soothing the market. But at times over the coming two, three weeks the risk barometer will likely move significantly higher as it might seem like the situation in the Middle East may move out of control. So Brent into the 80ies or higher seems highly likely in the weeks to come. At times at least. And if it all falls apart, the oil price will of course move well above 100.
Phillips P. OBrien on ”Air Supremacy” (embedded link): Air power historian Philip Meilinger: ”Air Superiority is defined as being able to conduct air operations “without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.” Air Supremacy goes further, wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.”
Thus, air supremacy is an entirely different beast from air superiority. It occurs when one power basically controls the skies over an enemy, and can operate practically anywhere/time that it wants without much fear of enemy interference in its operations.
The US had Air Supremacy over Germany in the second World War, but only at the very end when it was close to over. It only had Air Superiority in the Vietnam war, but not Supremacy. During Desert Storm in 1990-1991 however it did have Supremacy with devastating consequences for the enemy. (last paragraph is a condensed summary).
Analys
Brent needs to fall to USD 58/b to make cheating unprofitable for Kazakhstan

Brent jumping 2.4% as OPEC+ lifts quota by ”only” 411 kb/d in July. Brent crude is jumping 2.4% this morning to USD 64.3/b following the decision by OPEC+ this weekend to lift the production cap of ”Voluntary 8” (V8) by 411 kb/d in July and not more as was feared going into the weekend. The motivation for the triple hikes of 411 kb/d in May and June and now also in July has been a bit unclear: 1) Cheating by Kazakhstan and Iraq, 2) Muhammed bin Salman listening to Donald Trump for more oil and a lower oil price in exchange for weapons deals and political alignments in the Middle East and lastly 3) Higher supply to meet higher demand for oil this summer. The argument that they are taking back market share was already decided in the original plan of unwinding the 2.2 mb/d of V8 voluntary cuts by the end of 2026. The surprise has been the unexpected speed with monthly increases of 3×137 kb/d/mth rather than just 137 kb/d monthly steps.

No surplus yet. Time-spreads tightened last week. US inventories fell the week before last. In support of point 3) above it is worth noting that the Brent crude oil front-end backwardation strengthened last week (sign of tightness) even when the market was fearing for a production hike of more than 411 kb/d for July. US crude, diesel and gasoline stocks fell the week before last with overall commercial stocks falling 0.7 mb versus a normal rise this time of year of 3-6 mb per week. So surplus is not here yet. And more oil from OPEC+ is welcomed by consumers.
Saudi Arabia calling the shots with Russia objecting. This weekend however we got to know a little bit more. Saudi Arabia was predominantly calling the shots and decided the outcome. Russia together with Oman and Algeria opposed the hike in July and instead argued for zero increase. What this alures to in our view is that it is probably the cheating by Kazakhstan and Iraq which is at the heart of the unexpectedly fast monthly increases. Saudi Arabia cannot allow it to be profitable for the individual members to cheat. And especially so when Kazakhstan explicitly and blatantly rejects its quota obligation stating that they have no plans of cutting production from 1.77 mb/d to 1.47 mb/d. And when not even Russia is able to whip Kazakhstan into line, then the whole V8 project is kind of over.
Is it simply a decision by Saudi Arabia to unwind faster altogether? What is still puzzling though is that despite the three monthly hikes of 411 kb/d, the revival of the 2.2 mb/d of voluntary production cuts is still kind of orderly. Saudi Arabia could have just abandoned the whole V8 project from one month to the next. But we have seen no explicit communication that the plan of reviving the cuts by the end of 2026 has been abandoned. It may be that it is simply a general change of mind by Saudi Arabia where the new view is that production cuts altogether needs to be unwinded sooner rather than later. For Saudi Arabia it means getting its production back up to 10 mb/d. That implies first unwinding the 2.2 mb/d and then the next 1.6 mb/d.
Brent would likely crash with a fast unwind of 2.2 + 1.6 mb/d by year end. If Saudi Arabia has decided on a fast unwind it would meant that the group would lift the quotas by 411 kb/d both in August and in September. It would then basically be done with the 2.2 mb/d revival. Thereafter directly embark on reviving the remaining 1.6 mb/d. That would imply a very sad end of the year for the oil price. It would then probably crash in Q4-25. But it is far from clear that this is where we are heading.
Brent needs to fall to USD 58/b or lower to make it unprofitable for Kazakhstan to cheat. To make it unprofitable for Kazakhstan to cheat. Kazakhstan is currently producing 1.77 mb/d versus its quota which before the hikes stood at 1.47 kb/d. If they had cut back to the quota level they might have gotten USD 70/b or USD 103/day. Instead they choose to keep production at 1.77 mb/d. For Saudi Arabia to make it a loss-making business for Kazakhstan to cheat the oil price needs to fall below USD 58/b ( 103/1.77).
Analys
All eyes on OPEC V8 and their July quota decision on Saturday

Tariffs or no tariffs played ping pong with Brent crude yesterday. Brent crude traded to a joyous high of USD 66.13/b yesterday as a US court rejected Trump’s tariffs. Though that ruling was later overturned again with Brent closing down 1.2% on the day to USD 64.15/b.

US commercial oil inventories fell 0.7 mb last week versus a seasonal normal rise of 3-6 mb. US commercial crude and product stocks fell 0.7 mb last week which is fairly bullish since the seasonal normal is for a rise of 4.3 mb. US crude stocks fell 2.8 mb, Distillates fell 0.7 mb and Gasoline stocks fell 2.4 mb.
All eyes are now on OPEC V8 (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Algeria, Russia, Oman, Kazakhstan) which will make a decision tomorrow on what to do with production for July. Overall they are in a process of placing 2.2 mb/d of cuts back into the market over a period stretching out to December 2026. Following an expected hike of 137 kb/d in April they surprised the market by lifting production targets by 411 kb/d for May and then an additional 411 kb/d again for June. It is widely expected that the group will decide to lift production targets by another 411 kb/d also for July. That is probably mostly priced in the market. As such it will probably not have all that much of a bearish bearish price impact on Monday if they do.
It is still a bit unclear what is going on and why they are lifting production so rapidly rather than at a very gradual pace towards the end of 2026. One argument is that the oil is needed in the market as Middle East demand rises sharply in summertime. Another is that the group is partially listening to Donald Trump which has called for more oil and a lower price. The last is that Saudi Arabia is angry with Kazakhstan which has produced 300 kb/d more than its quota with no indications that they will adhere to their quota.
So far we have heard no explicit signal from the group that they have abandoned the plan of measured increases with monthly assessments so that the 2.2 mb/d is fully back in the market by the end of 2026. If the V8 group continues to lift quotas by 411 kb/d every month they will have revived the production by the full 2.2 mb/d already in September this year. There are clearly some expectations in the market that this is indeed what they actually will do. But this is far from given. Thus any verbal wrapping around the decision for July quotas on Saturday will be very important and can have a significant impact on the oil price. So far they have been tightlipped beyond what they will do beyond the month in question and have said nothing about abandoning the ”gradually towards the end of 2026” plan. It is thus a good chance that they will ease back on the hikes come August, maybe do no changes for a couple of months or even cut the quotas back a little if needed.
Significant OPEC+ spare capacity will be placed back into the market over the coming 1-2 years. What we do know though is that OPEC+ as a whole as well as the V8 subgroup specifically have significant spare capacity at hand which will be placed back into the market over the coming year or two or three. Probably an increase of around 3.0 – 3.5 mb/d. There is only two ways to get it back into the market. The oil price must be sufficiently low so that 1) Demand growth is stronger and 2) US shale oil backs off. In combo allowing the spare capacity back into the market.
Low global inventories stands ready to soak up 200-300 mb of oil. What will cushion the downside for the oil price for a while over the coming year is that current, global oil inventories are low and stand ready to soak up surplus production to the tune of 200-300 mb.
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