Analys
US crude recovery could cover all OPEC cuts
Over the last two weeks Brent crude has fallen close to $4/b. Market perception has shifted from “OPEC will do the job and US crude production will recover gradually” to instead “Can OPEC do the job? and US production is rebounding strongly”. The hypothesis that US crude oil production will only recover gradually and slowly as long as the oil price stays below $60/b has clearly fallen. The US EIA projects that US crude production will move above its April 2015 peak of 9.6 mb/d in February 2018. We think that this will happen already in October 2017. However, if we extrapolate the average weekly increase since the start of 2017 (+33.9 kb/d/week) we get that with a starting point of 9.1 mb/d on the 10th of March then US crude production will pass the 9.6 mb/d already in June 2017. Thus full attention to the US EIA’s weekly publishing of US crude production is clearly warranted.
If US production had only recovered slowly as long as the oil price stayed below $60/b, then it would easily have been in OPEC’s power to drive the oil price rather quickly back to $60/b. However, US shale oil rig count rose by 7 rigs per week in H2-17 when the WTI 15mth forward price averaged around $52/b in H2-16. When that part of the forward curve was pushed up to $55-56/b following OPEC’s decision to cut it lifted the weekly rig count additions to 9.2 rigs/week on average so far in 2017. Along with the latest sell-off the WTI 15mths price has now fallen back to $50.5/b. This can be interpreted as an effort by the market to push back the current acceleration in shale oil investments. If this price stays at this level of about $50/b then we won’t know the effect of this before some 6-8 weeks down the road which is the typical lag between price action to rig count reaction. Thus the growth in US shale oil rig count is likely to continue unabated all through April.
OPEC will meet on the 25th of May this year to discuss whether to continue its cuts or not. US crude oil production stood at 8.7 mb/d when OPEC decided to cut at its 30th November meeting in 2016. That was only 0.25 mb/b above the US crude production trough of 8.45 mb/d in July/August 2016. The general view then was clearly that US crude production would recover gradually. There would not be much acceleration unless the oil price moved up to $60/b. OPEC decided to cut 1.16 mb/d from its October production level which lead to a production target of 31.8 mb/d for H1-17. So far OPEC has cut 0.4 mb/d less than planned with an averaged Jan/Feb production of 32.2 mb/d. I.e. the organisation has cut some 0.8 mb/d versus its October 2016 level. Back in November a US crude production rebound was not even on the horizon and not much discussed. The US EIA’s monthly report only stretched out to the end of 2017 with a prediction that US crude production would hit 8.94 mb/d in Dec 2017 which was just 250 kb/d above the US crude production in November 2016.
Now it all looks different. If we look away from EIA’s projection of US hitting 9.6 mb/d in Feb 2018 and instead focus on the latest weekly production data of 9.1 mb/d and extend it with the growth trend so far this year then US production would hit close to 9.5 mb/d just when OPEC’s members meet on the 25th of May. US production would then have increased by close to 0.8 mb/d since OPEC decided to cut in November 2016. That is close to exactly what OPEC has cut in Jan and Feb. Thus if OPEC’s compliance to the decided cuts don’t rise from here then US crude oil production recovery could end up rising equaly much as OPEC ended up cutting. The previous oil minister in Saudi Arabia, Ali al-Naimi’s words that an OPEC cut would only yield a lower market share while not necessarily lift the oil price may start to ring in the back of the head of OPEC’s members. We don’t expect OPEC to extend its cuts into H2-17. We have this itching feeling that OPEC compliance to cuts may start to erode towards the end of H1-17. Especially if the expectation is that there will be no further cuts.
Speculative market repositioning helped to shift oil prices lower
The pullback in the oil price last two weeks was clearly a repositioning in speculative positions as holders of long positions started to be concerned about the increasingly visible strong US production recovery. Net long speculative positions in WTI reached close to 600 mb some 4 weeks ago but have now sold off back down to 500 mb. A more neutral level is however around 350 mb. Thus there is still risk for further bearish repositioning.
We still expect Brent crude at $57.5/b in Q2-17 before falling back to $52.5/b in Q4-17
We are still positive for crude oil prices into Q2-17 where we expect front month Brent to average $57.5/b. We expect to see inventories to start to draw any moment as OPEC’s elevated production in Nov and Dec now increasingly is assimilated. Global refineries are also now increasingly coming back on line thus starting to process crude oil again. As oil inventories continues to draw as it did all through H2-16 we expect the forward crude oil curves to flip fully into backwardation. This will then enable the Brent crude oil front month contract to move up to $57.5/b while still leaving the WTI 15mth contract at around $51-52/b. Our outlook for Q2-17 is however at risk if US crude oil production continues to grow at its current trend rate. We still expect Brent crude to head down to average $52.5/b in Q4-17 in order to cool US shale oil production growth.
We expect OECD inventories to draw down 160 million barrels in 2017
The market was disappointed when it heard from IEA that OECD inventories rose by 48 mb in January. In perspective however, OECD inventories normally increase by some 30 mb from Dec to Jan. Thus the increase in inventories was only 18 mb more than normal. What is striking is that OECD’s inventories trended downwards all through H2-16 and ended down y/y for the first time in a long, long time in both December and January. And this was even without the help of OPEC cuts. We still expect the oil market to run a deficit of some 0.4 mb/d in 2017 thus resulting in a steady draw in inventories. Thus we have passed the OECD peak inventories and we are now heading downwards. The higher activation of US shale oil rigs than expected over the last two to three months has however impacted our projected supply/demand balance for 2018 leading to virtually no deficit in 2018 and thus very limited draws. Thus 2018 look likely to be a waiting year for the oil market with still plenty of oil in OECD inventories and with few pressure points.
Ch1: OECD down y/y for the first time in a long time in Dec and Jan
We are past the peak OECD inventories. To draw down from here
Ch2: Strong US production growth recovery is posing a problem for OPEC
OPEC cuts unlikely to continue in H2-17 as US production may reach 9.5 mb/d already in late May (trend extrapolation)
Ch3: Latest sell-off has increased the depth of front end crude curve contango
This contango and discount for spot crude prices versus longer dated contracts is just what OPEC wants to get away from
The 1-2 year forward WTI curve has shifted down to $50/b which would reduce the profitability for new shale oil investments
Ch4: Net long speculative WTI positions has pulled back but are still high
Now standing at 500,000 contracts or 500 million barrels.
Neutral level would be around 350 million barrels
Ch5: OPEC production at 32.16 mb/d in Feb and thus some 350 kb/d above its target.
Will OPEC compliance fall apart if it becomes increasingly clear that there will be no cuts in H2-17?
Ch6: We still expect a deficit the next three years despite strong US production growth
The balance assumes no OPEC cuts after H1-17
Ch7: Due to current high OECD inventories the global oil market is fine all through 2017 and 2018.
Not a lot of pressure points to be seen before 2019
Ch8: And yes, we are bullish US crude oil production but even more than that is needed in 2019
Then it all boils down to “too little too late” or “too much too soon”.
The US EIA is lifting its prognosis every month all since last July.
We expect them to continue to do that going forward as well as the EIA prognosis is still way behind the curve in our view.
Kind regards
Bjarne Schieldrop
Chief analyst, Commodities
SEB Markets
Merchant Banking
Analys
Brent falling like a rock with oil likely to flow from SoH until at least 3 November
Brent M1 moving below the 200 dma of $78.7/b. Brent crude continued its move lower yesterday with a decline of 3.3% to $77.9/b. This morning it is adding another drop of 1.4% to $76.8/b. Israel bombing Lebanon during the weekend was a violence of the MoU and Iran was quick to declare the SoH closed again. But the willingness to move forward by both the US and Iran obviously trumped the bombing in Lebanon making the event more of a hiccup on the road of further negotiations.

The US has now waived sanctions against Iranian oil exports for two months allowing Iran to sell its oil all over the world, though sanctions instated in Europe will take more time to unwind. Oil from Iran, Russia as well as Venezuela can for the time being be sold across the world without any sharp discount due to sanctions. Chinese Tea-pot refineries will suffer as they previously could buy rebated crude while selling products at market prices.
Crude oil is no flowing out of the SoH with latest number close to 7 mb/d on a three day moving average. That is still well below the 14 mb/d of crude and 6 mb/d of products normally flowing out of the SoH. Latest estimate is that there is around 80 mb of crude on water inside the Persian Gulf and maybe another 80 mb of oil products on water as well. If crude is exiting the SoH at a rate of around 7 mb/d, then the 80 mb of crude would be depleted within 10-15 days and there after the flow would rely on new crude tankers entering, loading and then exiting the SoH to continue further flows. Given the uncertainties surrounding the status of the SoH with Iran stating that it was closed again as recent as this weekend, there is likely an asymmetry here where ships and oil stranded in the SoH for months are much more eager to exit than new ships are eager to enter.
For now Brent crude keeps falling like a rock with the front-end Brent contract now only trading at a premium of $7.6/b above the five year contract. Quickly heading towards parity. The Brent M1 contract has now broken below its 200 dma of $78.7/b and is closing in on the Fibo-level at $74.7/b. Below that there is not much more supporting levels to be found before $73/b which would close the gap from February 3.
Brent crude M1 technical levels

Net long speculative positions are also falling like a rock and as of Tuesday last week the net long positioning in Brent and WTI together summed to 314 million barrels and falling fast.

Will there be a rebound? A possible combination could be an exhaustion of the oil blob caught within the SoH within 1-2 weeks if exits continue at current rate while new ships entering are much more cautious, more Israeli bombardments in Lebanon as Netanyahu fights for re-election, a temporary closure of the SoH again while speculative short positions take cover buying back and covering their positions.
US and Israeli stands versus Iran could harden beyond elections so 2027 surplus is far from given. But Iran and the US are all in all moving towards a set of solutions with both clearly eager to reopen the SoH and keep it open. And that is what the market is pricing along with sharply falling prices. The ongoing discussions will likely take months and last beyond both the upcoming Israeli election (before 27 oct) and the US midterm elections on 3 Nov. Beyond those dates the stance by both Israel and the US may harden again versus Iran. But Iran knows that and is most likely preparing for such a hardening turn. Thus a surplus of oil and global oil stock rebuilding in 2027 (as now is mostly projected) is far from given.
Analys
Selling down on a ”deal”
Selling down on a ”deal”. Brent crude fell 6.2% last week with accelerated weakness towards the end of the week. Close of the week at $87.33/b and low of the week (and on Friday) of $85.8/b. Brent is falling another 4% this morning to $83.7/b on confirmation by Iran that a MoU text has been reached and that it will be signed on Friday this week.

So what is this ”deal” worth? Talk on the desk here this morning is that it is much like ”putting lipstick on a pig” where Trump has to sell this at home as a victory where ”the SoH has reopened”, the nuclear issue will be ironed out over the coming 60 days (or maybe 600 days?) and US consumers are getting a lower gasoline price and maybe US republicans survives the midterm elections.
The importance for Iran is that it emerges as the defacto winner of this war in the eyes of the non-US public world. That Iran now onwards is the ”ruler of the SoH” (combo of geography and new weapons systems like drones) or more softer: ”the guarantor of safe passage through the SoH”.
Iran doesn’t need nuclear weapons any more. Nuclear deterrence doesn’t work any more. Ukraine has made many attacks deep into Russia without being nuked in return. Plenty of Iranian ballistic rockets blasts over Israel but Iran wasn’t nuked in return.
There is no trust between the US and Iran. We don’t know all the details yet of the MoU. But what we do know is that there is no trust between the US and Iran what so ever. This is probably more like a descriptive text on how they can cooperate in a way where both sides keeps tactical leverage. Neither side makes irreversible concessions. Violations can be punished quickly. Cooperation produces immediate benefits.
This is a fragile structure. It can easily break down. There may be details which cannot be overcome. To be seen on Friday. The US has to show that it is willing put enough force behind managing and restraining Israel versus Hezbollah in Lebanon. We have seen that Netanyahu hasn’t listened all that much to Trump’s directives and wishes. This could be a major obstacle.
A gradual reopening is tactically preferable for Iran. A tactical leverage for Iran right now is that global oil stocks have been drawn down towards painful and increasingly dangerous levels with increasing risks for oil price spikes in mid-July to August. This together with US midterm elections on 3 November gives tactical leverage to Iran. Iran probably doesn’t want to fully give up on that leverage. A rapid, full reopening where global stocks are able to refill over the coming 60 days will significantly erode that leverage. If Iran reinstates a closure of the SoH after 60 days (if talks break down again), then the effect won’t be that impactful in terms of prices and the US midterm elections.
So a gradual and partial reopening where global markets gets the oil they need while they are unable to rebuild stocks could be a practical middle way for both parties. Trump can sell it as ”the SoH has reopened” and get affordable gasoline for US consumers. Iran can sell it as ”the SoH has fully reopened, but there is some friction” so flow is only 60-80% of normal.
Not much real demand destruction below $100/b. What we do know is that there is not much real price pain demand destruction for oil globally at an oil price below $100/b. A lot of demand-shock destruction. Fear. But demand should now come roaring back towards normal with fear for exceptionally high prices now is rapidly receding.
Sudden China demand destruction due to EVs? Bullocks. EV share of total Chinese carpool now around 13%. Share of new sales of EVs has reached 50%. This is a very gradual process. It doesn’t make oil demand fall like a rock over night. When EV new sales share reaches 100%, then the gasoline car pool will contract by some 5-10% per year. But that is only gasoline. Sudden reduction in Chinese oil demand is more about shock and risk.
Chinese crude oil imports will come roaring back. At what price? Today’s ”neutral” oil price is $70/b. That is the five year price which has steadily traded around the $70/b mark over the past 3-4 years. With still a risky picture one would think that China and the rest of the world will be big buyers of oil in the range of $70-85/b.
Global demand will likely snap back towards normal, forecasted demand and growth at such prices.
Physical reopening is a gradual process. The physical and practical reopening of the SoH will likely be gradual rather than sudden. And that probably suites Iran tactically as well.
Brent M1 price versus the Brent 5-yr (today’s ”normal” price)

Analys
Oil product price pain is set to rise as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed into summer
Market is starting to take US/Iran headlines with a pinch of salt. Brent crude rose $2.8/b yesterday to an official close of $112.1/b. But after that it traded as low as $108.05/b before ending late night at around $109.7/b. Through the day it traded in a range of $106.87 – 112.72/b amid a flurry of news or rumors from Iran and the US. ”US temporary sanctions during negotiations” (falls alarm). ”We will bomb Iran” (not anyhow),… etc. While the market is still fluctuating to this kind of news flow, it is starting to take such headlines with a pinch of salt.

We’ll see. Maybe, maybe not. The Brent M1 contract is trading at $110.2/b this morning which very close to the average ticks through yesterday of $110.4/b.
Trump with bearish, verbal intervention whenever Brent trades above $110/b it seems. What seems to be a pattern is that Trump states something like ”very good negotiations going on with Iran”, ”New leaders in Iran are great,..”, ”Great progress in negotiations,…”, ”Deal in sight,..” etc whenever the Brent M1 contract trades above $110/b. An effort to cool the market. These hot air verbal interventions from Trump used to have a heavy bearish impact on prices, but they now seems to have less and less effect unless they are backed by reality.
As far as we can see there has been no real progress in the negotiations between the US and Iran with both sides still standing by their previous demands.
Iran is getting stronger while the cease fire lasts making a return to war for Trump yet harder. Iran is naturally in constant preparation for a return to war given Trump’s steady threats of bombing Iran again. Iran is naturally doing what ever is possible to prepare for a return to war. And every day the cease fire lasts it is better prepared. This naturally makes it more and more difficult and dangerous for the US to return to warring activity versus Iran as the consequences for energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf will be more and more severe the longer the cease fire lasts. Israel seems to see it this way as well. That the war is not won and that current frozen state of a cease fire gives Iran opportunity to rebuild military and politically.
Global inventories are drawing down day by day. How much? In the meantime the Strait of Hormuz stays closed. There is varying measures and estimates of how much global inventories are drawing down. Our rough estimate, back of the envelope, is that global inventories are drawing down by at least some 10 mb/d or about 300 mb/d in a balance between loss of supply versus demand destruction. Other estimates we see are a monthly draw of 250-270 mb/d. The IEA only ’measured’ a draw in global observable stocks of 117 mb in April with oil on water rising 53 mb while on shore stocks fell 170 mb. But global stocks are hard to measure with large invisible, unmeasured stocks. As such a back of the envelope approach may be better.
Oil products is what the world is consuming. Oil product prices likely to rise while product stocks fall. Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) are predominantly crude oil. Discharging oil from OECD SPR stocks, a sharp reduction in Chinese crude imports and a reduction in global refinery throughput of 6-7 mb/d has helped to keep crude oil markets satisfactorily supplied. But global inventories are drawing down none the less. And oil products is really what the world is consuming. So if global refinery throughput stays subdued, then demand will eventually have to match the supply of oil products. The likely path forward this summer is a steady draw down in jet fuel, diesel and gasoline. Higher prices for these. Then, if possible, higher refinery throughput and higher usage of crude in response to very profitable refinery margins. And lastly sharper draw in crude stocks and higher prices for these. But some 6 mb/d of oil products used to be exported through the Strait of Hormuz. And it may not be so easy to ramp up refinery activity across the world to compensate. Especially as Ukraine continues to damage Russian refineries as well as Russian crude production and export facilities.
Watch oil product stocks and prices as well as Brent calendar 2027. What to watch for this summer is thus oil product inventories falling and oil product premiums to crude rising. Another measure to watch is the Brent crude 2027 contract as it rises steadily day by day as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed and global oil inventories decline. The latter is close to the highest level since the start of the war and keeps rising.
The Brent M1 contract and the Brent 2027 prices and current price of jet fuel in Europe (ARA). All in USD/b

Our back of the envelope calculation of the global shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Note that 3.5 mb/d of discharge from SPR is also a draw. Note also that ’Forced demand loss’ of 2.5 mb/d is probably temporary and will fall back towards zero as logistics are sorted out leaving ’Price demand loss’ to do the job of balancing the market. Thus a shortfall of at least 9 mb/d created by the closure. More if SPR discharge is included and more if Forced demand loss recedes.

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