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SEB – Råvarukommentarer vecka 17 2012

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Sammanfattning: Föregående vecka

  • Analyser - Prognos på priser för råvarorBrett råvaruindex: +0,33 %
    UBS Bloomberg CMCI TR Index
  • Energi: +0,37 %
    UBS Bloomberg CMCI Energy TR Index
  • Ädelmetaller: -0,15 %
    UBS Bloomberg CMCI Precious Metals TR Index
  • Industrimetaller: +1,75 %
    UBS Bloomberg CMCI Industrial Metals TR Index
  • Jordbruk: +0,14 %
    UBS Bloomberg CMCI Agriculture TR Index

Kortsiktig marknadsvy:

  • Guld: Neutral
  • Olja: Sälj
  • Koppar: Sälj
  • Majs: Neutral/sälj
  • Vete: Neutral

Guld

Guldpriset och spekulativa positioner fram till 2012-04-20

  • Guldpriset föll 0,4 procent förra veckan. Under veckan låg fokus på spanska obligationsemissioner, spansk 10-års ränta steg igen över 6 procent.
  • Utvecklingen i Spanien är problematisk. Landet tyngs av stigande räntor, problem att få ner det offentliga underskottet och eventuella ytterligare behov att stötta banker.
  • Det krävs besparingar vilka riskerar en ännu sämre ekonomisk utveckling som följd.
  • Öppna positioner i terminskontrakt på Comex föll veckan som gick vilket grafen till vänster visar men fysiska guld ETF: er såg inga större in eller utflöden och världens största guld ETF SPDR har inte haft utflöden under veckan.
  • Efterfrågan på guld i Indien kommer sannolikt att öka i samband med veckans festival ”Akshaya Tritya”.
  • På onsdag riktas blickarna mot USA och räntebesked från FOMC. Indikationer på ytterligare QE3 kommer att ha stor betydelse för guldprisets utveckling.
  • Teknisk Analys: Efter ett försök upp i medelvärdesbanden har vi under inne-varande vecka åter drivit ned under dessa. Detta är dock ännu ingen fara på taket och vi vidhåller att en potentiell lågpunkt har passerats så länge vi inte faller under 1611. En uppgång och framför allt en stängning över 1680 skulle vara klart positivt för vår positiva vy,

Neutral åsikt om guldpriset på kort sikt

Olja

Brentoljans prisutveckling januari 2011 till april 2012

  • Oljepriset steg åter på fredagen och det prisfall vi sett i början av veckan återhämtades och priset stängde oförändrat jämfört med föregående vecka.
  • Oron kring Iran och landets atomenergiprogram har minskat efter förra helgen då västländer mötte Iran för samtal som beskrevs ha varit ”konstruktiva”.
  • Irans oljeminister uttalade emellertid förra veckan att Iran kommer att sluta exportera till Europa om inte nästa möte i Bagdad, den 23 maj, blir ”positivt”.
  • Europa har redan beslutat om ett totalförbud mot import av iransk olja från den först juli och många oljebolag har förberett sig på förbudet genom att leta substitut från bland annat Saudiarabien och Förenade Arabemiraten.
  • Tisdagens APIs oljestatistik visare att råoljelagersteg steg med 3,4 miljoner fat. DOE data på onsdagen visade att råoljelager steg med 3,9 miljoner fat.
  • Enligt Bloomberg News räknar 17 av 30 analytiker med sjunkande oljepriser
  • Teknisk Analys: I och med nedgången under 55dagars bandet har vi övergivit vår medelsiktigt positiva vy och anser att sannolikheten för att få se den sista (?) uppgången till 129- 131 nu måste betraktas som låg. Ett återtest av 55dagars bandet för att prova validiteten i brottet ligger i korten för nästkommande vecka. Vi tror att man ska sälja en sådan reaktion till 120/122.

Sälj olja med SEB råvarucertifikat Short Olja A S

Koppar

Spekulativa positioner i koppar - Graf

  • Kopparpriset steg 2,7 procent förra veckan.
  • HSBC:s inköpschefsindex för Kina visade 49.1 för april. Det var en ökning från förra månadens siffra, 48.3, men det är samtidigt den sjätte månaden i rad som indexet hamnar under 50-nivån (som innebär att fler ser försämring än förbättring).
  • Man har sett att fastighetspriser i 37 av 70 städer i Kina föll nio procent på årlig basis i mars vilket kan tyda på en viss nedkylning i landets ekonomi. Kinesiska myndigheter har uttryckt en önskan att se lägre fastighetspriser.
  • Kinas import av koppar har varit stadig en längre tid. Mycket tyder på att importen har hamnat i lager och många analytiker anser att kinesiska kopparlager ligger på rekordhöga nivåer.
  • Kortsiktigt fortsätter vi att tro på ett lägre kopparpris.
  • Teknisk Analys: Brottet ned ur topp formationen bör inom kort fortsätta pressa priserna lägre. Den lilla reaktion vi nu sett ifrån den medellånga stödlinjen ser väldigt svag ut och bör därför snart reverseras och en ny nedgångsfas ta vid.

Sälj koppar med Short KOPPA A S - SEB råvarucertifikat

Majs

Spekulativa positioner i majs fram tom april 2012

  • Vår kortsiktigt negativa syn på majsen har visat sig stämma förhållandevis väl den senaste tiden. Under förra veckan gick priset på majkontraktet i Chicago ned med 2,66 procent. Då den amerikanska dollarn försvagades under samma period var den motsvarande rörelsen i svenska kronor en nedgång med över 4 procent.
  • En stark drivkraft bakom förra veckans negativa prisutveckling var planteringen av majs i USA, där det amerikanska jordbruksdepartementet (USDA) i sin rap-port från den 17/4 meddelade att 17 procent av landets skörd nu har planterats. För ett år sedan hade 5 procent planterats och snittet de senaste fem åren ligger även det på 5 procent. Varmt väder under mars och god nederbörd under första halvan av april innebär mycket goda förutsättningar för planteringen av majs.
  • I Chicago fortsätter andelen spekulativa majsköpare att minska. Odlingsprocessen i USA samt positiva väderprognoser minskar incitamentet att ha majs i portföljen. Man bör dock vara medveten om att det från kinesiskt håll har uttryckts intresse för att köpa majs om priserna fortsätter falla, vilket innebär att det bör finnas ett golv för majsen. För att priset ska nå detta golv bör det nog falla runt 10 procent från nuvarande nivå.
  • Det som möjligen skulle kunna tala för majsen den närmaste tiden är fortsatta försämringar av utbudet från Argentina och Brasilien, detta efter ovanligt torra väderförhållanden de senaste månaderna.
  • Fundamentalt förhåller vi oss svagt negativa till majspriset.
  • Teknisk Analys: Det misslyckade brottet under 624 ½ tillsammans med relativt aggressivt köpande efter det falska brottet gör att vi ser en viss ytterligare uppåtpotential för nästkommande vecka. Om historien ska fortsätta upprepa sig borde vi inom ett par veckor igen testa den övre delen av årets intervall.

Kommande pris på majs

Vete

Prisutveckling på vete (Matif)

  • Till skillnad från vetet i Chicago kunde vi under förra veckan se en uppgång hos kvarnvetet i Paris. Bakgrunden till detta är att samtidigt som utsikterna för den amerikanska skörden ser goda ut är de desto sämre i Europa. En del analytiker bedömer att den franska veteskörden kommer att bli något sämre än tidigare, detta efter den kalla vintern.
  • Ett Europeiskt land som har stora problem med spannmålsproduktionen är Spanien, där det spanska jordbruksdepartementet i sin senaste prognos be-dömer att landets veteproduktion kommer att falla med 22 procent jämfört med förra året. Trots att den ryska skörden som en konsekvens av den kalla vin-tern väntas bli något lägre än föregående skördeår verkar landets export bli omfattande. Den stora flaskhalsen är dock logistiken, där dåliga vägar och svaga järnvägsförbindelser begränsar flödet från de centrala delarna av landet ut till hamnarna.
  • På investeringssidan fortsätter förvaltarna att dra ned sin exponering mot vete, en utveckling som varit rådande sedan slutet av mars.
  • Det är intressant att följa efterfrågerelationen mellan vete i USA och i Europa. Fortsätter priset att stiga i Europa och minska i USA bör reaktionen bli en minskad efterfrågan på MATIF-vete.
  • Fundamentalt är vi försiktiga säljare av vete, detta särskilt då majspriset fortsätter att falla. De tekniska signalerna visar istället på en fortsatt uppgång som mest trolig och därför är vi denna vecka neutrala när det gäller vetepriset.
  • Teknisk Analys: Så där jag, efter flera veckor av kontinuerligt köpande i 55dagars bandet har marknaden innevarande vecka dragit iväg norrut. Ett nytt årshögsta ligger i korten och ett lyckat brott över 219 sätter fokus på 2011 års topp, 254. Följaktligen rekommenderar vi att även framgent ligga lång. Möjligtvis kommer en viss vinsthemtagning att ske vid 221/22.

Neutral prognos på vete

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Disclaimer

The information in this document has been compiled by SEB Merchant Banking, a division within Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (“SEB”).

Opinions contained in this report represent the bank’s present opinion only and are subject to change without notice. All information contained in this report has been compiled in good faith from sources believed to be reliable. However, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made with respect to the completeness or accuracy of its contents and the information is not to be relied upon as authoritative. Anyone considering taking actions based upon the content of this document is urged to base his or her investment decisions upon such investigations as he or she deems necessary. This document is being provided as information only, and no specific actions are being solicited as a result of it; to the extent permitted by law, no liability whatsoever is accepted for any direct or consequential loss arising from use of this document or its contents.

About SEB

SEB is a public company incorporated in Stockholm, Sweden, with limited liability. It is a participant at major Nordic and other European Regulated Markets and Multilateral Trading Facilities (as well as some non-European equivalent markets) for trading in financial instruments, such as markets operated by NASDAQ OMX, NYSE Euronext, London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse, Swiss Exchanges, Turquoise and Chi-X. SEB is authorized and regulated by Finansinspektionen in Sweden; it is authorized and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Services Authority for the conduct of designated investment business in the UK, and is subject to the provisions of relevant regulators in all other jurisdictions where SEB conducts operations. SEB Merchant Banking. All rights reserved.

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Analys

SEB Metals price forecast update

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Softer economic growth in 2024 calls for somewhat softer metals prices in 2024. Industrial metals prices as well as other commodity prices exploded during Covid-19 as governments around the world unleashed stimuli in the magnitude of 10x of what was done during the global financial crisis in 2008/09. Consumers shifting spending from services to consumer goods added to the boom. Bloomberg’s industrial metals price index was up 91% in March 2022 versus January 2020 because of this. Global manufacturing PMI peaked in May 2021 and has been fading since and below the 50-line from September 2022 with latest reading at 48.8. Industrial metals prices have faded since their peak in March 2022 but are still 30% higher than they were in January 2020. Even zinc, the worst performing metal, is still 9% above where it was in January 2020. As such one could possibly argue that industrial metals have not yet fully faded from their Covid-19 stimulus boom. One possible explanation could be inflation where US inflation is up 19% over the period. But this still leaves industrial metals up 11% in real terms. Another possible explanation is the big jump in energy prices over the period. While coal and gas prices have fallen back a lot, they are still quite high. The coal price in western Europe is 110% above where it was at the start 2020 and 50% above its 2010-2019 average. Most industrial metals are highly energy intensive to produce with digging and crushing of rocks, smelting, and refining of ore. The current aluminium price of USD 2215/ton is for example well aligned with coal prices. In addition to this there has also been significant closures of zinc and aluminium smelting capacity in Europe which probably have supported prices for these metals.

Global economic growth is forecasted to slow from 3.5% in 2022, to 3.0% in 2023 and then again to 2.9% in 2024 as the big jump in interest rates induce economic pain with a lag. Aligned with this we expect lower industrial metals prices in 2024 than in 2023 though only marginally lower for most of the metals. But the field of metals is wide, and the price action is thus adverse. Copper is likely the metal with the most strained supply and with huge needs in the global energy transition. 

Aluminium: Prices will likely be depressed versus marginal costs in 2024. Aluminium from Russia is flowing unhindered to the market. Most is going to China for reprocessing and potentially re-exported while some is going to Turkey and Italy. It is all flowing into the global pool of aluminium and as such impacting the global market balance. The LME 3mth aluminium price is currently well aligned with coal prices and both have traded mostly sideways since June this year. Aluminium premiums in the EU have however fallen 30-40% since mid-June in a sign of weakness there. The global market will likely run a surplus in 2024 with depressed prices versus the marginal cost of production.

Copper: Softer fundamentals in 2024 but with accelerating tightness on the horizon. Copper is currently trading at USD 8470/ton and close to 37% above its early Jan 2020 level. The market is expected to run a slight surplus in 2024 followed by accelerating tightness the following years. Downside price risk for 2024 is thus warranted along with softer global growth. The power of Unions is however getting stronger in Latin America with demands for higher salaries. Strikes have broken out in Peru with production at the Las Bambas copper mine at only 20%. Further strikes and disruptions could quickly put the market into deficit also in 2024.

Nickel: Indonesia pursuing market share over price pushing the price down the cost curve. Indonesia’s nickel production is growing rapidly. Its production reached 1.6 million ton in 2022 (+54% YoY) and accounted for close to 50% of total global supply in 2022. Its share looks set to reach 70% by 2030. Lower prices will stimulate demand and will also force higher cost producers to shut down thus making room for the wave of new supply from Indonesia. Prices will be sluggis the nearest years as Indonesia aims for market share over price.

Zinc: Price has stabilized around USD 2500/t. Weakness in global construction will drive prices lower at times in 2024. The 3mth LME zinc price has fallen from a peak of USD 4499/ton in April 2022 to only USD 2248/ton in May 2023. Since then, it has recovered steadily to USD 2500/ton.  Demand could struggle in 2024 as construction globally will likely struggle with high interest rates. But mine closures is a natural counter effect of low prices and will put a floor under prices.

Price outlook

SEB Commodities price outlook
Source: Historical values from Bloomberg, Price forecast by SEB


Bjarne Schieldrop
Cheif Commodities Analyst
SEB Commodity Research

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Analys

Now it’s up to OPEC+

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All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics. OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE. The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d. 

Brent crude fell 4.6% ydy to USD 77.4/b and over the last three trading sessions it has lost USD 5.1/b. This morning it is trading only marginally higher at USD 77.6/b which is no vote of confidence. A good dose of rebound this morning would have been a signal that the sell-off yesterday possibly was exaggerated and solely driven by investors with long positions flocking to the exit. So there’s likely more downside to come.

In general there is a quite good relationship between net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI versus the global manufacturing cycle. Oil investors overall typically have an aversion of holding long positions in oil when the global economy is slowing down. As of yet there are few signs that the global economic cycle is about to turn. Rather the opposite seems to be the case. Global manufacturing fell in October and yesterday we saw US industrial production fall 0.6% MoM while continued jobless claims rose more than expected and to the highest level in two years. This matches well with the logic that the strong rise in interest rates since March 2022 is inflicting pain on the economy with more pain ahead as the effect comes with a lag.

Most estimates are that the global oil market is running a solid deficit in Q4-23. The IEA has an implied deficit in the global oil market of 1 m b/d in Q4-23 if we assume that OPEC will produce 28 m b/d vs. a call-on-OPEC at 29 m b/d. But prices in the oil market is telling a different story with weakening crude curves, weakening refining margins and a sharp sell-off in oil prices.

For 2024 the general forecasts are that global economic growth will slow, global oil demand growth will slow and also that the need for oil from OPEC will fall from 28.7 m b/d to 28.4 m b/d (IEA). This is a bearish environment for oil. The average Brent crude oil price so far this year is about USD 83/b. It should essentially be expected to deliver lower in 2024 with the negatives mentioned above.

Two things however will likely counter this and they are interconnected. US shale oil activity has been slowing with falling drilling rig count since early December 2022 and that has been happening at an average WTI price of USD 78/b. The result is that total US liquids production is set to grow by only 0.3 m b/d YoY in Q4-24. This allows OPEC+ to support the oil price at USD 80-90/b through 2024 without fear of loosing a significant market share to US oil production. Thus slowing US liquids production and active price management by OPEC+ goes hand in hand. As such we do expect OPEC+ to step up to the task.

So far it has predominantly been Saudi Arabia with a little help from Russia which together proactively have managed the oil market and the oil price through significant cuts. Saudi Arabia produced 10.5 m b/d in April but then cut production rapidly to only 9.0 m b/d which is what it still produces. Its normal production is about 10 m b/d.

What has made the situation more difficult for Saudi Arabia is the combination of solid growth in non-OPEC supply in 2023 (+2.1 m b/d YoY; IEA) but also a substantial revival in production by Venezuela and Iran. The two produced 660 k b/d more in October than they on average did in 2022. So the need for oil from Saudi Arabia is squeezed from both sides.

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics.

OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) then it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE.

The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.

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Analys

More from Venezuela and Iran means smaller pie for Saudi

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Production in Venezuela and Iran is on the rise and is set to rise further in the coming months and in 2024. Combined their production could grow by 0.8 m b/d YoY to 2024 (average year to average year). The IEA projected in its latest OMR (Oct-2023) that call-on-OPEC will fall to 28.3 m b/d in 2024, a decline of 0.5 m b/d. This combination would drive implied call-on-Saudi from 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to only 9.1 m b/d in 2024 and as low as 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24 if Saudi Arabia has to do all the heavy lifting alone. Wider core OPEC cooperation may be required.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

The IEA is out in the news today projecting peak oil demand this decade with global demand standing at no more than 102 m b/d towards the end of this decade. If so it would imply a call-on-Non-OPEC of only 66.4 m b/d in 2028 assuming that OPEC in general will demand a market share of 30 m b/d + NGL of 5.6 m b/d. The IEA (Oct-23) projects non-OPEC production to average 68.8 m b/d in 2024. That’s already 2.4 m b/d more than what would be sustainable over time if global oil demand is set to peak later this decade. Oil producers in general cannot have a production growth strategy in a peak oil demand world.

The US has decided to lift sanctions towards Venezuela for six months (18 April) as a measure to tempt it to move towards more democratic processes. And if it does, then the lifting of sanctions could continue after the 6 months. A primary opposition election took place this weekend with lawmaker Maria Corina Machado currently holding 93% of the vote count. Venezuela will next year hold a presidential election but fair play seems unlikely with Maduro in charge. The lifting of sanctions allows Venezuela’s PdV to resume exports to all destinations. Bans on new, foreign investments in the oil and gas sector are also lifted though Russian entities and JV’s are still barred.

Venezuela produced 0.8 m b/d in September and indicates that it can lift production by 0.2 m b/d by year and with more rigs and wells by 0.5 m b/d to 1.3 m b/d in the medium term.

Oil production in Iran has been on a steady rise since its low-point of 2.0 m b/d in 2020. Last year it produced 2.5 m b/d. In September it produced 3.1 m b/d, but Iran’s oil minister says production now is at 3.3 m b/d. Iran’s rising production and exports is not about the US being more lenient in its enforcement of sanctions towards Iran. It is more about Iran finding better ways to circumvent them but even more importantly that China is importing more and more oil from Iran.

Production by Iran and Venezuela is recovering. YoY production from the two could rise by close to 0.8 m b/d in 2024. This will lead to a decline in call-on-Saudi oil. 

Oil production by Iran and Venezuela
Source: SEB graph and asessments, Blbrg data and news

The IEA estimated in its latest OMR report that call-on-OPEC will fall from 28.8 m b/d in 2023 to 28.3 m b/d in 2024. If all OPEC members except Saudi Arabia produces the same amount in 2024 as in 2023, then the need for Saudi Arabia’s oil (call-on-Saudi) will fall from a healthy 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to a still acceptable 9.9 m b/d in 2024. Its normal production is roughly 10 m b/d.

If however production by Iran and Venezuela rise by a combined 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024, then call-on-Saudi will fall to 9.4 m b/d which is not so good but still manageable. But if Iran’s oil minister is correct when he says that its current production now is at 3.3 m b/d, then it is not far fetched to assume that Iran’s oil production may average maybe 3.4-3.5 m b/d in 2024. That would yield a YoY rise of 0.6 m b/d just for Iran. If we also assume that Venezuela manages to lift its production from 0.8 m b/d this year to 1.0 m b/d in 2024, then the combined growth from the two is closer to 0.8 m b/d. That would push call-on-Saudi down to only 9.1 m b/d which is not good at all. It would require Saudi Arabia to produce at its current production of 9.0 m b/d all through 2024.

The IEA further estimates that call-on-OPEC will average 27.7 m b/d in Q1-24. If we assume Iran @ 3.4 m b/d and Venezuela @ 1.0 m b/d then call-on-Saudi in Q1-24 will only be 8.6 m b/d. I.e. Saudi Arabia will have to cut production further to 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24. At that point Saudi Arabia will likely need or like other core OPEC members like Iraq, Kuwait and UAE as well as Russia to join in.

Implied call-on-Saudi. Call-on-OPEC is set to decline from 28.8 m b/d to 28.3 m b/d to 2024. If all OPEC members produced the same in 2024 as in 2023 then call-on-Saudi would fall by 0.5 m b/d to 9.9 m b/d. But if Venezuela and Iran increases their combined production by 0.8 m b/d YoY in 2024 then call-on-Saudi falls to 9.1 m b/d.

Implied call-on-Saudi.
Source: SEB graph and calculations, IEA data

If we look a little broader on this topic and also include Libya, Nigeria and Angola we see that this group of OPEC members produced 11.4 m b/d in 2010, 10.1 m b/d in 2017 and only 5.1 m b/d at the low-point in August 2020. The decline by these OPEC members has of course the other OPEC and OPEC+ members to stem the rising flood of US shale oil production. The production from this unfortunate group of OPEC-laggards is however now on the rise reaching 7.5 m b/d in September. With more from Iran and Venezuela it could rise to 8.0 m b/d in 2024. Production from Nigeria and Angola though still looks to be in gradual decline while Libya looks more sideways. So for the time being it is all about the revival of Iran and Venezuela.

The unfortunate OPEC-laggards had a production of 11.4 m b/d in 2010. But production then fell to only 5.1 m b/d in August 2020. It helped the rest of OPEC’s members to manage the huge increase in US shale oil production. Production from these countries are now on the rebound. Though Nigeria and Angola still seems to be in gradual decline.

Oil production of some OPEC countries
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

What everyone needs to be attentive to is that call-on-OPEC and even more importantly call-on-Saudi can only erode to a limit before Saudi/OPEC/Russia will have to take action. Especially if the forecast for needed oil from OPEC/Saudi for the nearest 2-3 years is in significant decline. Then they will have to take action in the sense that they stop defending the price and allows the price to fall sharply along with higher production. And yet again it is US shale oil producers who will have to take the brunt of the pain. They are the only oil producers in the world who can naturally and significantly reduce their production rather quickly. I.e. the US shale oil players will have to be punished into obedience, if possible, yet one more time.

We don’t think that it is any immediate risk for this to happen as US shale oil activity is slowing while global oil demand has rebounded following Covid-lockdowns. But one needs to keep a watch on projections for call-on-OPEC and call-on-Saudi stretching 1-2-3 years forward on a continuous basis. 

In its medium term oil market outlook, Oil2023, the IEA projected a fairly healthy development for call-on-OPEC to 2028. First bottoming out at 29.4 m b/d in 2024 before rising gradually to 30.6 m b/d in 2028. The basis for this was a slowing though steady rise in global oil demand to 105.7 m b/d in 2028 together with stagnant non-OPEC production due to muted capex spending over the past decade. But this projection has already been significantly dented and reduced in IEA’s latest OMR from October where call-on-OPEC for 2024 is projected at only 28.3 m b/d.

In a statement today the IEA projects that global oil demand will peak this decade and consume no more than 102 m b/d in the late 2020ies due to (in large part) rapid growth in EV sales. This would imply a call-on-OPEC of only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. It is not a viable path for OPEC to produce only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. Especially if production by Iran and Venezuela is set to revive. I.e. OPEC’s pie is shrinking while at the same time Iran and Venezuela is producing more. In this outlook something will have to give and it is not OPEC. 

One should here turn this on its head and assume that OPEC will produce 30 m b/d in 2028. Add OPEC NGLs of 5.6 m b/d and we get 35.6 m b/d. If global oil demand in 2028 stands at only 102 m b/d then call-on-Non-OPEC equates to 66.4 m b/d. That is 3.1 m b/d less than IEA’s non-OPEC production projection for 2028 of 69.5 m b/d but also higher than non-OPEC production projection of 68.8 m b/d (IEA, Oct-23) is already 2.4 m b/d too high versus what is a sustainable level.

What this of course naturally means is that oil producers in general cannot have production growth as a strategy in a peak-oil-demand-world with non-OPEC in 2024 already at 2.4 m b/d above its sustainable level.

The US is set to growth its hydrocarbon liquids by 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024. But in a zero oil demand growth world that is way, way too much.

Call-on-OPEC
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