Analys

SEB Jordbruksprodukter, 29 april 2013

Publicerat

11 år sedan

den

29 april, 2013

SEB Veckobrev med prognoser på jordbruksråvaror

Sådden av majs i USA har inte kunnat ske på grund av den sena våren. Deadline, som anses vara den 10 maj närmar sig. Väderleksprognosen visar dock ett ”fönster” av gott väder, där sådden kan ske innan dess. De närmaste dagarnas väderutveckling kommer att ha ett avgörande inflytande över prisutvecklingen. Den kinesiska fågelinfluensan har sänkt konsumtionen av kyckling med upp till 80%. Det sänker efterfrågan på sojabönor i världen. Vi tror alltjämt på sjunkande priser på alla jordbruksprodukter. Grispriset i USA testar dock tekniska motståndsnivåer, möjligen just beroende på fågelinfluensan i Kina.

Odlingsväder

USA och Kanada var fortsatt kallare än normalt i veckan som gick. Prognosen för de kommande 7 dagarna är att detta ska bestå. Därefter för dag 7 till 14 väntas varmare väder, i synnerhet i Kanada.

I ett område från Tyskland och österut har varit varmare än normalt den senaste veckan. Prognosen för de närmaste 7 dagarna är normal temperatur i centrala och norra Europa. Däremot väntas det bli varmare än normalt i Italien, på Balkan och i Stillahavsområdet.

I Australien är det fortsatt väldigt torrt inför sådden som börjar snart.

MARS

Enligt den senaste rapporten från EU-kommissionens MARS-enhet så har den kyliga starten på våren i Europa, som har fått Mars månad att noteras som en av de kallaste någonsin, orsakat en kraftig försening – mer än en månad – gällande höstgrödornas utveckling, och dessutom försenat vårsådden (med undantag av Medelhavsområdet och runt Svarta Havet). Förseningar är särskilt tydliga i Storbritannien, men även i Tyskland och Frankrike. Trots detta gör de inga justeringar i sitt estimat för avkastning med motiveringen att det är för tidigt att uttala sig om en avkastning under genomsnittet.

Vete

Priset på november (2013) har hållit sig över 210 euro, som nu återigen fungerar som ett tekniskt stöd. Frågan är om priset ska bryta uppåt och testa 230.

Decemberkontraktet på CBOT ser mindre ”bullish” ut än grafen för Matif-vetet. Så som Chicagovetet handlats förefaller ett test av 700 cent på nedsidan vara troligare.

I onsdags drabbades Oklahoma av frost och det fick priset att gå upp temporärt.

Ser vi på den senaste veckan förändring av terminskurvorna, ser vi att priserna gått ner både i Europa och i USA och ungefär lika mycket oavsett löptid, undantaget gammal skörd. Weetabix har slutat producera vissa frukostflingor i väntan på ny skörd. Det saknas helt enkelt brittiskt vete av gammal skörd.

Måndagens crop condition-rapport ser vi i sammanfattning nedan.

Måndagens Crop Progress rapport från USDA visar att tillståndet för det amerikanska höstvetet har försämrats något. Sammantaget för de 18 största höstvete producerande så var 35% klassat som ”good/excellent” per den 21 januari, en marginell nedjustering från förra veckans 36%. Höstvete klassat som ”poor/very poor” justeras upp till 33% från förra veckans 31% och är en kategori som har ökat i bl.a Kansas och Colorado, men som har minskat kraftigt i South Dakota, Nebraska och Texas – även om klassificeringen ”good/excellent” i dessa stater fortfarande är urusla.

Sådden av vårvete gör minimala framsteg då endast 7% är avklarad i de 6 största staterna, vilket är en marginell ökning från förra veckans 6% och att jämföra med 52% för ett år sedan och det femåriga genomsnittet på 24%. Kallt väder och även snö har hindrat fältaktiviteter i vissa delar och hos topproducenten North Dakota har man ännu inte påbörjat sådden.

Ett tredje tecken på att skörden ligger efter i år är att bara 8% av höstvetet har gått i ax. Förra året den här tiden var det 42%.

StatsCanada skriver den 24 april att vårvetearealen ökar 14.4% till 19.4 miljoner acres. Det var mycket mer än marknaden väntat sig. Durum-arealen väntas också öka för tredje året i rad till 5.1 miljoner acres. I USDA:s prospective plantingsrapport för en månad sedan visades en minskning av arealen. Kanadensarna går alltså åt andra hållet.

Vi fortsätter att tro på sidledes eller lägre priser. Uppgångar bör ses som tillfällen att sälja.

Maltkorn

Priset på maltkorn med leverans i november har fortsatt att visa mer styrka än höstvetet / kvarnvetet på Matif.

StatsCanada rapporterar en korn-areal som är 2.2% mindre än förra året. Havrearealen ökar med 18.4%.

Lokala estimat pekar på väsentligt lägre sådd av maltkorn i Tyskland. På grund av den kalla och våta våren väntas arealen uppgå till 360,000 ha. Det är 40% mindre än förra året. Tyskland är EU:s största konsument av maltkorn och landet väntas behöva öka importen till 1 mt under 2013/14. Evergrain, den schweiziska mäklaren, estimerar Tysklands import i år (2012/13) till 265,000 ton.

Sådden av korn i USA ligger i linje med vad som är normalt. Tvärt emot vad som rapporterats på t ex Agrimoney. 23% är sått. Det var 43% förra året så här års, men 24% är det normala.

Det finns viss ”uppsidesrisk” för maltkornspriset med tanke på Kanadas och Tysklands mindre väntade skördar. Den senaste utvecklingen vi skriver om ovan, kan vi inte riktigt se fullt ut i starkare prisutveckling på maltkorn jämfört med vete.

Majs

Majspriset (december 2013) bröt stödet på 530 cent, rekylerade upp och slutade veckan nedåt igen. Trenden är stadigt nedåtriktad.

Sådden ligger kraftigt efter i USA. Den 19 april var endast 4% sått. Förra året var det 28% och det tidiga året 2010 var det 50%. En åkerareal stor som Belgien och Holland tillsammans borde ha varit sådd, men har inte blivit det på grund av det kalla vädret. Sådden har ännu inte börjats i den största producerande staten, Iowa, och inte heller i Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota eller i Wisconsin. I Illinois, Indiana och Ohio är sådden endast avklarad till 1%.

Nedan ser vi såddens framåtskridande i USA. 6-årsintervallet sträcker sig från 2007 till 2012.

Utvecklingen sker exakt lika långsamt som år 2008, ett år där priserna trots allt föll kraftigt. På grund av att vädret i veckan inte varit perfekt, kan man inte vänta sig att sådden kommit upp till mer än 6-10% nu i rapporten som kommer på måndagskvällen. Därefter väntas, som vi såg ovan under ”odlingsväder” bättre väder komma, vilket ger ett tillfälle att så. Sås majsen för sent, den 10 maj betraktas som en slags deadline, får varje försening en negativ effekt på avkastningen. De närmaste dagarnas väder är alltså avgörande för priset.

Väderleksrapporten säger att det kommer att gå bra. Därför tror vi alltjämt på fallande priser.

Sojabönor

Sojabönorna (november 2013) ligger i en stadigt sjunkande pristrend. Amerikans sådd av soja har inte kommit igång alls. Förra året var 6% sått redan. Den kinesiska fågelinfluensan har ökat i nyhetsflödet och det fjäderfä i Kina är närmast osäljbart vad vi kan förstå från nyhetsrapporteringen.

Den argentinska skörden är 56% klar, men bönderna håller inne med sin vara. BAGE estimerar skörden till 48.5 mt (USDA har den senat på 51.5 mt). Den argentinska staten har just klubbat igenom lagar som reducerar möjligheten för företag och privatpersoner att värna sin egendom gentemot staten.

Statsinkomsterna kommer till stor del från exportskatter på soja. Den argentinska peson handlas på gatan till halva den officiella växlingskursen. Presidentens socialistiska och värdenihilistiska politik ser ut att föra landet mot en mörk framtid.

Väderutvecklingen i USA och dämpad efterfrågan från Kina gör att vi tror att priset kommer att fortsätta falla och rekommenderar en såld position i sojabönor. 1150 cent är nästa målkurs.

Raps

Rapspriset (november 2013) ligger kvar på någorlunda hög nivå. En anledning är att skörden i Europa väntas bli ca 1 månad senare än normalt.

Förra veckan skrev vi om ”spreaden” mellan augustikontraktet och novemberkontraktet. Den prisskillnaden ligger fortsatt på en onormal nivå, som indikerar att många väntar sig ett högre pris på augusti (som för gammal skörd) än ny-skörds-kontraktet november. Vi tror att vädret kommer att fortsätta förbättras, så att augusti är säljvärt.

StatsCanada rapporterade i onsdags den 24 april att kanadensiska lantbrukare kommer att så 19.1 miljoner acres med canola. Det är 11% mindre än förra året och den första minskningen sedan 2006.

Det är ändå svårt att se att rapsmarknaden ska hålla sig så stark, medan priset på sojabönor faller. Vi fortsätter att rekommendera en såld position i raps. Den börjar dessutom bygga upp fallhöjd om och när ett brott av den tekniska stödnivån inträffar.

Gris

Grispriset (September 13) testar nu den nedåtgående trenden. Beroende på hur marknaden går i veckan, kan vi få en köpsignal från den tekniska analysen.

Mjölk

Eurexmarknaden gick ner i veckan som gick – på de korta kontrakten. De långa steg däremot både på SMP och smör.

I kursdiagrammet nedan ser vi priserna på Fonterras SMP, USDA:s prisnotering på SMP i Europa och Eurexbörsens pris, samt Eurex pris på smör. Alla priser är angivna i euro per ton.

Nedan ser vi terminskurvorna för smör och skummjölkspulver på Eurex i fredags vid börsens stängning och veckan innan.

SEB Commodities erbjuder ett litet ”prova-på” kontrakt som består av 0.5 ton Eurex-smör och 0.9 ton Eurex SMP. Ett paket som motsvarar 10 ton flytande mjölkråvara. Just nu är det underliggande värdet på ett sådant kontrakt drygt 33 000 kronor. Vi garanterar börspris eller bättre.

Den som vill följa priset på SMP på Eurex gör det via länken:

www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/products/com/agr/14016/

Vi tycker att den här haussen på världsmarknaden skapar ett bra tillfälle att säkra via terminer.

[box]SEB Veckobrev Jordbruksprodukter är producerat av SEB Merchant Banking och publiceras i samarbete och med tillstånd på Råvarumarknaden.se[/box]

Disclaimer

The information in this document has been compiled by SEB Merchant Banking, a division within Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (“SEB”).

Opinions contained in this report represent the bank’s present opinion only and are subject to change without notice. All information contained in this report has been compiled in good faith from sources believed to be reliable. However, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made with respect to the completeness or accuracy of its contents and the information is not to be relied upon as authoritative. Anyone considering taking actions based upon the content of this document is urged to base his or her investment decisions upon such investigations as he or she deems necessary. This document is being provided as information only, and no specific actions are being solicited as a result of it; to the extent permitted by law, no liability whatsoever is accepted for any direct or consequential loss arising from use of this document or its contents.

About SEB

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Analys

SEB Metals price forecast update

Publicerat

18 timmar sedan

den

30 november, 2023

Redaktionen

Softer economic growth in 2024 calls for somewhat softer metals prices in 2024. Industrial metals prices as well as other commodity prices exploded during Covid-19 as governments around the world unleashed stimuli in the magnitude of 10x of what was done during the global financial crisis in 2008/09. Consumers shifting spending from services to consumer goods added to the boom. Bloomberg’s industrial metals price index was up 91% in March 2022 versus January 2020 because of this. Global manufacturing PMI peaked in May 2021 and has been fading since and below the 50-line from September 2022 with latest reading at 48.8. Industrial metals prices have faded since their peak in March 2022 but are still 30% higher than they were in January 2020. Even zinc, the worst performing metal, is still 9% above where it was in January 2020. As such one could possibly argue that industrial metals have not yet fully faded from their Covid-19 stimulus boom. One possible explanation could be inflation where US inflation is up 19% over the period. But this still leaves industrial metals up 11% in real terms. Another possible explanation is the big jump in energy prices over the period. While coal and gas prices have fallen back a lot, they are still quite high. The coal price in western Europe is 110% above where it was at the start 2020 and 50% above its 2010-2019 average. Most industrial metals are highly energy intensive to produce with digging and crushing of rocks, smelting, and refining of ore. The current aluminium price of USD 2215/ton is for example well aligned with coal prices. In addition to this there has also been significant closures of zinc and aluminium smelting capacity in Europe which probably have supported prices for these metals.

Global economic growth is forecasted to slow from 3.5% in 2022, to 3.0% in 2023 and then again to 2.9% in 2024 as the big jump in interest rates induce economic pain with a lag. Aligned with this we expect lower industrial metals prices in 2024 than in 2023 though only marginally lower for most of the metals. But the field of metals is wide, and the price action is thus adverse. Copper is likely the metal with the most strained supply and with huge needs in the global energy transition.

Aluminium: Prices will likely be depressed versus marginal costs in 2024. Aluminium from Russia is flowing unhindered to the market. Most is going to China for reprocessing and potentially re-exported while some is going to Turkey and Italy. It is all flowing into the global pool of aluminium and as such impacting the global market balance. The LME 3mth aluminium price is currently well aligned with coal prices and both have traded mostly sideways since June this year. Aluminium premiums in the EU have however fallen 30-40% since mid-June in a sign of weakness there. The global market will likely run a surplus in 2024 with depressed prices versus the marginal cost of production.

Copper: Softer fundamentals in 2024 but with accelerating tightness on the horizon. Copper is currently trading at USD 8470/ton and close to 37% above its early Jan 2020 level. The market is expected to run a slight surplus in 2024 followed by accelerating tightness the following years. Downside price risk for 2024 is thus warranted along with softer global growth. The power of Unions is however getting stronger in Latin America with demands for higher salaries. Strikes have broken out in Peru with production at the Las Bambas copper mine at only 20%. Further strikes and disruptions could quickly put the market into deficit also in 2024.

Nickel: Indonesia pursuing market share over price pushing the price down the cost curve. Indonesia’s nickel production is growing rapidly. Its production reached 1.6 million ton in 2022 (+54% YoY) and accounted for close to 50% of total global supply in 2022. Its share looks set to reach 70% by 2030. Lower prices will stimulate demand and will also force higher cost producers to shut down thus making room for the wave of new supply from Indonesia. Prices will be sluggis the nearest years as Indonesia aims for market share over price.

Zinc: Price has stabilized around USD 2500/t. Weakness in global construction will drive prices lower at times in 2024. The 3mth LME zinc price has fallen from a peak of USD 4499/ton in April 2022 to only USD 2248/ton in May 2023. Since then, it has recovered steadily to USD 2500/ton. Demand could struggle in 2024 as construction globally will likely struggle with high interest rates. But mine closures is a natural counter effect of low prices and will put a floor under prices.

Price outlook

Bjarne Schieldrop
Cheif Commodities Analyst
SEB Commodity Research

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Analys

Now it’s up to OPEC+

Publicerat

2 veckor sedan

den

20 november, 2023

Redaktionen

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics. OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE. The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB — Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.

Brent crude fell 4.6% ydy to USD 77.4/b and over the last three trading sessions it has lost USD 5.1/b. This morning it is trading only marginally higher at USD 77.6/b which is no vote of confidence. A good dose of rebound this morning would have been a signal that the sell-off yesterday possibly was exaggerated and solely driven by investors with long positions flocking to the exit. So there’s likely more downside to come.

In general there is a quite good relationship between net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI versus the global manufacturing cycle. Oil investors overall typically have an aversion of holding long positions in oil when the global economy is slowing down. As of yet there are few signs that the global economic cycle is about to turn. Rather the opposite seems to be the case. Global manufacturing fell in October and yesterday we saw US industrial production fall 0.6% MoM while continued jobless claims rose more than expected and to the highest level in two years. This matches well with the logic that the strong rise in interest rates since March 2022 is inflicting pain on the economy with more pain ahead as the effect comes with a lag.

Most estimates are that the global oil market is running a solid deficit in Q4-23. The IEA has an implied deficit in the global oil market of 1 m b/d in Q4-23 if we assume that OPEC will produce 28 m b/d vs. a call-on-OPEC at 29 m b/d. But prices in the oil market is telling a different story with weakening crude curves, weakening refining margins and a sharp sell-off in oil prices.

For 2024 the general forecasts are that global economic growth will slow, global oil demand growth will slow and also that the need for oil from OPEC will fall from 28.7 m b/d to 28.4 m b/d (IEA). This is a bearish environment for oil. The average Brent crude oil price so far this year is about USD 83/b. It should essentially be expected to deliver lower in 2024 with the negatives mentioned above.

Two things however will likely counter this and they are interconnected. US shale oil activity has been slowing with falling drilling rig count since early December 2022 and that has been happening at an average WTI price of USD 78/b. The result is that total US liquids production is set to grow by only 0.3 m b/d YoY in Q4-24. This allows OPEC+ to support the oil price at USD 80-90/b through 2024 without fear of loosing a significant market share to US oil production. Thus slowing US liquids production and active price management by OPEC+ goes hand in hand. As such we do expect OPEC+ to step up to the task.

So far it has predominantly been Saudi Arabia with a little help from Russia which together proactively have managed the oil market and the oil price through significant cuts. Saudi Arabia produced 10.5 m b/d in April but then cut production rapidly to only 9.0 m b/d which is what it still produces. Its normal production is about 10 m b/d.

What has made the situation more difficult for Saudi Arabia is the combination of solid growth in non-OPEC supply in 2023 (+2.1 m b/d YoY; IEA) but also a substantial revival in production by Venezuela and Iran. The two produced 660 k b/d more in October than they on average did in 2022. So the need for oil from Saudi Arabia is squeezed from both sides.

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics.

OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) then it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE.

The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.

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Analys

More from Venezuela and Iran means smaller pie for Saudi

Publicerat

1 månad sedan

den

24 oktober, 2023

Redaktionen

Production in Venezuela and Iran is on the rise and is set to rise further in the coming months and in 2024. Combined their production could grow by 0.8 m b/d YoY to 2024 (average year to average year). The IEA projected in its latest OMR (Oct-2023) that call-on-OPEC will fall to 28.3 m b/d in 2024, a decline of 0.5 m b/d. This combination would drive implied call-on-Saudi from 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to only 9.1 m b/d in 2024 and as low as 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24 if Saudi Arabia has to do all the heavy lifting alone. Wider core OPEC cooperation may be required.

The IEA is out in the news today projecting peak oil demand this decade with global demand standing at no more than 102 m b/d towards the end of this decade. If so it would imply a call-on-Non-OPEC of only 66.4 m b/d in 2028 assuming that OPEC in general will demand a market share of 30 m b/d + NGL of 5.6 m b/d. The IEA (Oct-23) projects non-OPEC production to average 68.8 m b/d in 2024. That’s already 2.4 m b/d more than what would be sustainable over time if global oil demand is set to peak later this decade. Oil producers in general cannot have a production growth strategy in a peak oil demand world.

The US has decided to lift sanctions towards Venezuela for six months (18 April) as a measure to tempt it to move towards more democratic processes. And if it does, then the lifting of sanctions could continue after the 6 months. A primary opposition election took place this weekend with lawmaker Maria Corina Machado currently holding 93% of the vote count. Venezuela will next year hold a presidential election but fair play seems unlikely with Maduro in charge. The lifting of sanctions allows Venezuela’s PdV to resume exports to all destinations. Bans on new, foreign investments in the oil and gas sector are also lifted though Russian entities and JV’s are still barred.

Venezuela produced 0.8 m b/d in September and indicates that it can lift production by 0.2 m b/d by year and with more rigs and wells by 0.5 m b/d to 1.3 m b/d in the medium term.

Oil production in Iran has been on a steady rise since its low-point of 2.0 m b/d in 2020. Last year it produced 2.5 m b/d. In September it produced 3.1 m b/d, but Iran’s oil minister says production now is at 3.3 m b/d. Iran’s rising production and exports is not about the US being more lenient in its enforcement of sanctions towards Iran. It is more about Iran finding better ways to circumvent them but even more importantly that China is importing more and more oil from Iran.

Production by Iran and Venezuela is recovering. YoY production from the two could rise by close to 0.8 m b/d in 2024. This will lead to a decline in call-on-Saudi oil.

Oil production by Iran and Venezuela — Source: SEB graph and asessments, Blbrg data and news

The IEA estimated in its latest OMR report that call-on-OPEC will fall from 28.8 m b/d in 2023 to 28.3 m b/d in 2024. If all OPEC members except Saudi Arabia produces the same amount in 2024 as in 2023, then the need for Saudi Arabia’s oil (call-on-Saudi) will fall from a healthy 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to a still acceptable 9.9 m b/d in 2024. Its normal production is roughly 10 m b/d.

If however production by Iran and Venezuela rise by a combined 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024, then call-on-Saudi will fall to 9.4 m b/d which is not so good but still manageable. But if Iran’s oil minister is correct when he says that its current production now is at 3.3 m b/d, then it is not far fetched to assume that Iran’s oil production may average maybe 3.4-3.5 m b/d in 2024. That would yield a YoY rise of 0.6 m b/d just for Iran. If we also assume that Venezuela manages to lift its production from 0.8 m b/d this year to 1.0 m b/d in 2024, then the combined growth from the two is closer to 0.8 m b/d. That would push call-on-Saudi down to only 9.1 m b/d which is not good at all. It would require Saudi Arabia to produce at its current production of 9.0 m b/d all through 2024.

The IEA further estimates that call-on-OPEC will average 27.7 m b/d in Q1-24. If we assume Iran @ 3.4 m b/d and Venezuela @ 1.0 m b/d then call-on-Saudi in Q1-24 will only be 8.6 m b/d. I.e. Saudi Arabia will have to cut production further to 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24. At that point Saudi Arabia will likely need or like other core OPEC members like Iraq, Kuwait and UAE as well as Russia to join in.

Implied call-on-Saudi. Call-on-OPEC is set to decline from 28.8 m b/d to 28.3 m b/d to 2024. If all OPEC members produced the same in 2024 as in 2023 then call-on-Saudi would fall by 0.5 m b/d to 9.9 m b/d. But if Venezuela and Iran increases their combined production by 0.8 m b/d YoY in 2024 then call-on-Saudi falls to 9.1 m b/d.

If we look a little broader on this topic and also include Libya, Nigeria and Angola we see that this group of OPEC members produced 11.4 m b/d in 2010, 10.1 m b/d in 2017 and only 5.1 m b/d at the low-point in August 2020. The decline by these OPEC members has of course the other OPEC and OPEC+ members to stem the rising flood of US shale oil production. The production from this unfortunate group of OPEC-laggards is however now on the rise reaching 7.5 m b/d in September. With more from Iran and Venezuela it could rise to 8.0 m b/d in 2024. Production from Nigeria and Angola though still looks to be in gradual decline while Libya looks more sideways. So for the time being it is all about the revival of Iran and Venezuela.

The unfortunate OPEC-laggards had a production of 11.4 m b/d in 2010. But production then fell to only 5.1 m b/d in August 2020. It helped the rest of OPEC’s members to manage the huge increase in US shale oil production. Production from these countries are now on the rebound. Though Nigeria and Angola still seems to be in gradual decline.

Oil production of some OPEC countries — Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

What everyone needs to be attentive to is that call-on-OPEC and even more importantly call-on-Saudi can only erode to a limit before Saudi/OPEC/Russia will have to take action. Especially if the forecast for needed oil from OPEC/Saudi for the nearest 2-3 years is in significant decline. Then they will have to take action in the sense that they stop defending the price and allows the price to fall sharply along with higher production. And yet again it is US shale oil producers who will have to take the brunt of the pain. They are the only oil producers in the world who can naturally and significantly reduce their production rather quickly. I.e. the US shale oil players will have to be punished into obedience, if possible, yet one more time.

We don’t think that it is any immediate risk for this to happen as US shale oil activity is slowing while global oil demand has rebounded following Covid-lockdowns. But one needs to keep a watch on projections for call-on-OPEC and call-on-Saudi stretching 1-2-3 years forward on a continuous basis.

In its medium term oil market outlook, Oil2023, the IEA projected a fairly healthy development for call-on-OPEC to 2028. First bottoming out at 29.4 m b/d in 2024 before rising gradually to 30.6 m b/d in 2028. The basis for this was a slowing though steady rise in global oil demand to 105.7 m b/d in 2028 together with stagnant non-OPEC production due to muted capex spending over the past decade. But this projection has already been significantly dented and reduced in IEA’s latest OMR from October where call-on-OPEC for 2024 is projected at only 28.3 m b/d.

In a statement today the IEA projects that global oil demand will peak this decade and consume no more than 102 m b/d in the late 2020ies due to (in large part) rapid growth in EV sales. This would imply a call-on-OPEC of only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. It is not a viable path for OPEC to produce only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. Especially if production by Iran and Venezuela is set to revive. I.e. OPEC’s pie is shrinking while at the same time Iran and Venezuela is producing more. In this outlook something will have to give and it is not OPEC.

One should here turn this on its head and assume that OPEC will produce 30 m b/d in 2028. Add OPEC NGLs of 5.6 m b/d and we get 35.6 m b/d. If global oil demand in 2028 stands at only 102 m b/d then call-on-Non-OPEC equates to 66.4 m b/d. That is 3.1 m b/d less than IEA’s non-OPEC production projection for 2028 of 69.5 m b/d but also higher than non-OPEC production projection of 68.8 m b/d (IEA, Oct-23) is already 2.4 m b/d too high versus what is a sustainable level.

What this of course naturally means is that oil producers in general cannot have production growth as a strategy in a peak-oil-demand-world with non-OPEC in 2024 already at 2.4 m b/d above its sustainable level.

The US is set to growth its hydrocarbon liquids by 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024. But in a zero oil demand growth world that is way, way too much.