Analys
The cutters should utilize seasonal strong demand in H2-18 to wind down cuts

Headlines this morning gives the impression that all are now on-board for extending the cuts to the end of 2018. Reading in more detail however shows that it is not at all yet a done deal. And in addition it does not say whether the cuts will be maintained at current level all to the end of 2018. Specifically it seems like there is going to be an option to review and revise strategy at the next meeting in June. I.e. “maintain cuts if needed, but only if needed”. Russian producers are deeply concerned about the end-game. How to wind down the cuts without risking to crash the oil price. As such a sensible outcome in our eyes would be to wind down the cuts gradually through seasonal demand strength in H2-18. The cutters probably do not want to surprise the market positively risking firing up the oil price yet more at the same time as Rystad Energy is calling US crude oil production to hit 9.9 mb/d end of 2017 while also the US oil rig count has started to rise.
We have seen great reluctance from the Russian side in the run-up to this meeting and decision. Key has been the ”independent” oil companies in Russia who are getting ready dispatch new green field projects in 2018 in addition to what they have been holding back this year. These companies are getting very eager to get these new projects into production as well as the side lined once.
These companies fear that unconditional promises of cuts to the end of 2018 will fire up the oil market yet more with yet more stimulus of US shale oil production thus making it difficult for them to get back into the market at the start of 2019 without risking crashing the oil price then.
Thus exit of cuts has come into focus and has been a key point for Russian oil companies and thus the Russian delegation in Vienna.
I do not expect to see an unconditional extension of cuts to end of 2018 coming out of today’s meeting. A sensible outcome would be to keep current production cap through H1-18 and then ramp down the cuts through H2-18 during seasonally high demand in H2-18. And finally to have a touchdown in November 2018 assessing whether there is a need to trim production during seasonal weakness in H1-19.
This kind of outcome is probably less than what the market is hoping for and pricing in. Such an outcome would thus likely lead to some sell-off in the crude oil market.
Nonetheless in terms of appearance of price action ahead of the meeting the market seems extremely relaxed in terms of interpreting oil price action in the run-up to the meeting. I think the market is correctly assessing that OPEC/Non-OPEC is highly unlikely to throw away all what they have achieved over the past year (inventory draw down and a major shift from contango to backwardation, from spot price discount to spot price premium versus longer dated prices). However, it is probably wrong in assuming a full Christmas present with unconditional cuts to end of 2018.
Speculative net long crude oil positions in the market are currently at the second highest level in history. The fairly muted price action ahead of this meeting may thus be completely misguided in terms of possible price reaction to the outcome of this meeting in case the market is significantly disappointed by the outcome.
My expectation in terms of outcome of the meeting is thus that cuts are maintained during H1-18 and then gradually ramped down in H2-18 with a possible trimming during seasonal weakness in H1-19 if needed.
The message will be clear that they are NOT shifting from current strategy of “Price over volume” and back again to “Volume over price”. However, they are neither willing to drive the Brent crude oil price to the sky risking further strong acceleration of US shale oil production at the same time as OPEC/Non-OPEC cutters are holding back production. Yesterday’s news that US crude oil production is likely going to reach 9.9 mb/d by end of 2017 according to Rystad Energy’s estimates is a very clear message that OPEC/Non-OPEC cutters needs to tread carefully both when it comes to actual further cut extensions as well as how it communicates its plans and ambitions in terms of prices and goals.
As such the group should not really want to surprise the market positively today.
Rather it should want to give reassurance and confidence.
The perfect outcome for the group today would be if the oil price does not move at all.
Ch1: “I want $69.63/b!”
Brent crude oil 1mth contract in USD/bl
But the market has gone in a one way street upwards since June.
Will we get there this time around or will we need a round of speculative re-set before heading for the $69.63/bl at a later stage?
Ch3: And speculators have positioned themselves accordingly. A sell-off ahead in the making?
Riding the upwards trend since June has been a good thing adding more and more length on the way upwards
Ch4: Record high net long spec position (Brent + WTI) when counting contracts and barrels
Almost doubling since June!
There will be a reset at one point. Maybe today or maybe later
Ch5: Brent Dated crude oil price has started to weaken versus the Brent 1mth price signalling weakness in the physical Brent crude oil market
Should be trading on par if market is tight
Kind regards
Bjarne Schieldrop
Chief analyst, Commodities
SEB Markets
Merchant Banking
Analys
OPEC+ will likely unwind 500 kb/d of voluntary quotas in October. But a full unwind of 1.5 mb/d in one go could be in the cards

Down to mid-60ies as Iraq lifts production while Saudi may be tired of voluntary cut frugality. The Brent December contract dropped 1.6% yesterday to USD 66.03/b. This morning it is down another 0.3% to USD 65.8/b. The drop in the price came on the back of the combined news that Iraq has resumed 190 kb/d of production in Kurdistan with exports through Turkey while OPEC+ delegates send signals that the group will unwind the remaining 1.65 mb/d (less the 137 kb/d in October) of voluntary cuts at a pace of 500 kb/d per month pace.

Signals of accelerated unwind and Iraqi increase may be connected. Russia, Kazakhstan and Iraq were main offenders versus the voluntary quotas they had agreed to follow. Russia had a production ’debt’ (cumulative overproduction versus quota) of close to 90 mb in March this year while Kazakhstan had a ’debt’ of about 60 mb and the same for Iraq. This apparently made Saudi Arabia angry this spring. Why should Saudi Arabia hold back if the other voluntary cutters were just freeriding? Thus the sudden rapid unwinding of voluntary cuts. That is at least one angle of explanations for the accelerated unwinding.
If the offenders with production debts then refrained from lifting production as the voluntary cuts were rapidly unwinded, then they could ’pay back’ their ’debts’ as they would under-produce versus the new and steadily higher quotas.
Forget about Kazakhstan. Its production was just too far above the quotas with no hope that the country would hold back production due to cross-ownership of oil assets by international oil companies. But Russia and Iraq should be able to do it.
Iraqi cumulative overproduction versus quotas could reach 85-90 mb in October. Iraq has however steadily continued to overproduce by 3-5 mb per month. In July its new and gradually higher quota came close to equal with a cumulative overproduction of only 0.6 mb that month. In August again however its production had an overshoot of 100 kb/d or 3.1 mb for the month. Its cumulative production debt had then risen to close to 80 mb. We don’t know for September yet. But looking at October we now know that its production will likely average close to 4.5 mb/d due to the revival of 190 kb/d of production in Kurdistan. Its quota however will only be 4.24 mb/d. Its overproduction in October will thus likely be around 250 kb/d above its quota with its production debt rising another 7-8 mb to a total of close to 90 mb.
Again, why should Saudi Arabia be frugal while Iraq is freeriding. Better to get rid of the voluntary quotas as quickly as possible and then start all over with clean sheets.
Unwinding the remaining 1.513 mb/d in one go in October? If OPEC+ unwinds the remaining 1.513 mb/d of voluntary cuts in one big go in October, then Iraq’s quota will be around 4.4 mb/d for October versus its likely production of close to 4.5 mb/d for the coming month..
OPEC+ should thus unwind the remaining 1.513 mb/d (1.65 – 0.137 mb/d) in one go for October in order for the quota of Iraq to be able to keep track with Iraq’s actual production increase.
October 5 will show how it plays out. But a quota unwind of at least 500 kb/d for Oct seems likely. An overall increase of at least 500 kb/d in the voluntary quota for October looks likely. But it could be the whole 1.513 mb/d in one go. If the increase in the quota is ’only’ 500 kb/d then Iraqi cumulative production will still rise by 5.7 mb to a total of 85 mb in October.
Iraqi production debt versus quotas will likely rise by 5.7 mb in October if OPEC+ only lifts the overall quota by 500 kb/d in October. Here assuming historical production debt did not rise in September. That Iraq lifts its production by 190 kb/d in October to 4.47 mb/d (August level + 190 kb/d) and that OPEC+ unwinds 500 kb/d of the remining quotas in October when they decide on this on 5 October.

Analys
Modest draws, flat demand, and diesel back in focus

U.S. commercial crude inventories posted a marginal draw last week, falling by 0.6 million barrels to 414.8 million barrels. Inventories remain 4% below the five-year seasonal average, but the draw is far smaller than last week’s massive 9.3-million-barrel decline. Higher crude imports (+803,000 bl d WoW) and steady refinery runs (93% utilization) helped keep the crude balance relatively neutral.

Yet another drawdown indicates commercial crude inventories continue to trend below the 2015–2022 seasonal norm (~440 million barrels), though at 414.8 million barrels, levels are now almost exactly in line with both the 2023 and 2024 trajectory, suggesting stable YoY conditions (see page 3 attached).
Gasoline inventories dropped by 1.1 million barrels and are now 2% below the five-year average. The decline was broad-based, with both finished gasoline and blending components falling, indicating lower output and resilient end-user demand as we enter the shoulder season post-summer (see page 6 attached).
On the diesel side, distillate inventories declined by 1.7 million barrels, snapping a two-week streak of strong builds. At 125 million barrels, diesel inventories are once again 8% below the five-year average and trending near the low end of the historical range.
In total, commercial petroleum inventories (excl. SPR) slipped by 0.5 million barrels on the week to ish 1,281.5 million barrels. While essentially flat, this ends a two-week streak of meaningful builds, reflecting a return to a slightly tighter situation.
On the demand side, the DOE’s ‘products supplied’ metric (see page 6 attached), a proxy for implied consumption, softened slightly. Total demand for crude oil over the past four weeks averaged 20.5 million barrels per day, up just 0.9% YoY.
Summing up: This week’s report shows a re-tightening in diesel supply and modest draws across the board, while demand growth is beginning to flatten. Inventories remain structurally low, but the tone is less bullish than in recent weeks.


Analys
Are Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure working?

Brent crude rose 1.6% yesterday. After trading in a range of USD 66.1 – 68.09/b it settled at USD 67.63/b. A level which we are well accustomed to see Brent crude flipping around since late August. This morning it is trading 0.5% higher at USD 68/b. The market was expecting an increase of 230 kb/d in Iraqi crude exports from Kurdistan through Turkey to the Cheyhan port but that has so far failed to materialize. This probably helped to drive Brent crude higher yesterday. Indications last evening that US crude oil inventories likely fell 3.8 mb last week (indicative numbers by API) probably also added some strength to Brent crude late in the session. The market continues to await the much heralded global surplus materializing as rising crude and product inventories in OECD countries in general and the US specifically.

The oil market is starting to focus increasingly on the successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. Especially the attacks on Russian refineries. Refineries are highly complex and much harder to repair than simple crude oil facilities like export pipelines, ports and hubs. It can take months and months to repair complex refineries. It is thus mainly Russian oil products which will be hurt by this. First oil product exports will go down, thereafter Russia will have to ration oil product consumption domestically. Russian crude exports may not be hurt as much. Its crude exports could actually go up as its capacity to process crude goes down. SEB’s Emerging Market strategist Erik Meyersson wrote about the Ukrainian campaign this morning: ”Are Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure working?”. Phillips P O’Brian published an interesting not on this as well yesterday: ”An Update On The Ukrainian Campaign Against Russian Refineries”. It is a pay-for article, but it is well worth reading. Amongst other things it highlights the strategic focus of Ukraine towards Russia’s energy infrastructure. A Ukrainian on the matter also put out a visual representation of the attacks on twitter. We have not verified the data representation. It needs to be interpreted with caution in terms of magnitude of impact and current outage.
Complex Russian oil refineries are sitting ducks in the new, modern long-range drone war. Ukraine is building a range of new weapons as well according to O’Brian. The problem with attacks on Russian refineries is thus on the rise. This will likely be an escalating problem for Russia. And oil products around the world may rise versus the crude oil price while the crude oil price itself may not rise all that much due to this.
Russian clean oil product exports as presented by SEB’s Erik Meyersson in his note this morning.

The ICE Gasoil crack and the 3.5% fuel oil crack has been strengthening. The 3.5% crack should have weakened along with rising exports of sour crude from OPEC+, but it hasn’t. Rather it has moved higher instead. The higher cracks could in part be due to the Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Ukrainian inhabitants graphical representation of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries on Twitter. Highlighting date of attacks, size of refineries and distance from Ukraine. We have not verified the detailed information. And you cannot derive the amount of outage as a consequence of this.

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