Analys
US shale oil production growth to slow sharply in 2020
Baker Hughes US oil rig count has declined by 178 rigs since the recent peak of 888 rigs in mid-November 2018 with latest count now at 710. If anything the rig count decline has accelerated since July as investors have closed their pockets for debt based production growth with no profit to show for.
US oil rig count is now drawing down by about 3.5% per month. US shale oil producers are now completing more wells than they are drilling. As a consequence the DUC inventory of Drilled but uncompleted wells which ballooned from 5400 wells in late 2016 to a peak of 8246 in March 2019 has now been drawing down since April and is now drawing down at an accelerating pace.
The more the rig count falls the faster will be the DUC inventory draw-down be as producers work hard to maintain the monthly rate of well completions. In the end producers will have no other choice than to reduce the monthly rate of completed wells or to increase drilling activity and that is the point in time when US shale oil production growth will start to slow sharply. We think that in the end a higher oil price is needed to drive drilling activity higher.
If we assume that the drilling rig count continues to fall by 20 rigs per month to the end of this year and then stabilizes then marginal US shale oil production growth is likely to slow sharply from March 2020 before contracting in September 2020.
The US EIA has a very simplistic method of calculating shale oil drilling productivity. The consequence is that they underestimate productivity in periods when the DUC inventory is growing (Dec-2016 to Mar-2019) and overestimate it when the DUC inventory is declining as it has been doing now since April. As a consequence they also have too high production forecasts when the DUC inventory is drawing down like it is now.
The US EIA is now probably overestimating US oil production for 2020 by some 300 k bl/d with a projection that production will average 13.17 m bl/d in 2020 (US EIA STEO report released yesterday). They did reduce their 2020 US production forecast yesterday from 13.23 m bl/d in their September STEO forecast to 13.17 m bl/d yesterday but they are probably still some 300 k bl/d too high.
US shale oil production is still growing by a marginal, annualized pace of 0.9 m bl/d (75 k bl/d/mth) now in October according to the latest US EIA DPR report in September. Thus the current very strong marginal US production growth still gives a very strong bearish impulse to the global oil market. This bearish impulse is however going to slow sharply from March onwards next year and potentially go to neutral and turn to bullish in September next year.
Year on year production growth in the US is still going to be significant in 2020 due to base effects. The US EIA STEO report yesterday projects a US liquids production growth of 1.56 m bl/d y/y from 2019 to 2020. We think that this is probably in the ball-park some 0.3 m bl/d to high. That still leaves a very strong 1.2 m bl/d y/y average growth in 2020. The monthly production growth and thus marginal bearish impulse to the global oil market is however likely going to slow sharply from March next year. On a Jan-2020 to Jan-2021 basis the US crude oil production is probably not going to increase by more than 100 k bl/d unless drilling picks up.
In order to instigate an expansion again in US drilling rig count the shale oil players will need a higher oil price than we have now. The Permian oil price has averaged $56/bl during the oil rig draw-down since January. The WTI price has averaged $57/bl and the 18 month forward WTI price has averaged $55/bl. These prices probably need to move up to $65-70/bl in order to instigate an expansion US shale oil drilling again. Right now we have Permian = $54/bl, WTI 1mth = $53/bl and WTI 18mth = $49.9/bl. I.e. all these prices are today lower than what they have been on average during the rig count draw down since January so further draw down in US oil rig count should be expected.
Ch1: Local Permian oil price in USD/bl versus 4 weeks change in US oil rig count. The Permian oil price has averaged $56/bl during the draw-down phase and probably needs to move up by some $10/bl in order to instigate drilling rig count expansion again. Latest Permian oil price is $54/bl
Ch2: The US EIA’s latest STEO report is also forecasting a sharply lower marginal, annualized production growth in US Lower 48 states (excl GOM) which is mostly shale oil production. They are forecasting a marginal, annualized production growth rate of 0.3 m bl/d/yr on average in 2020 versus an average growth rate of 0.84 m bl/d in 2019. Thus the US EIA is also forecasting a sharply slower production growth for US shale next year. However, we do think that their projections are probably too high and needs to be adjusted lower towards zero marginal production growth through 2020.
Ch3: US marginal, annualized production growth is still very strong with an annualized growth rate of 0.9 m bl/d according to the US EIA September DPR report. The estimate of 0.9 m bl/d/y for October is probably a bit on the high side. Nonetheless it is in decline. Shale oil players are probably going to start to reduce monthly well completion rates from January onwards as the DUC inventory starts to decline. That will rapidly drive the marginal production growth rate lower
Ch4: The US inventory of DUCs has now been drawing down since April and the draw down is accelerating. It will probably draw down to about 5,500 at around the end of 2020.
Ch5: US shale oil well productivity has halted its historical relentless productivity growth and has pulled back a little.
Ch6: Official US EIA drilling rig productivity measure has risen strongly since the end of 2018. In our view this is primarily due to the accelerating draw down in the US DUC inventory which technically is leading to an overestimation in drilling productivity according to the EIA’s methodology of calculating it as [New production at time T]/[Rig count in T-2]. If a significant amount of new production stems for the DUC draw down then production will be high while the rig count number will be low thus leading to an overestimation of the rig productivity
Ch7: US shale oil production is growing strongly but slowing and the slowing will accelerate in March 2020 onwards
Ch8: US production growth is likely to slow sharply in Q2-2020 onwards as well completions are likely to decline along with the declining DUC inventory
Ch9: US oil rig count is falling sharply and the decline seems to accelerate. Completions of shale oil wells per month has managed to hold up due to the DUC inventory but impact is likely to be significant in Q2-2020 leading in the end to lower well completion rates
Market is starting to take US/Iran headlines with a pinch of salt. Brent crude rose $2.8/b yesterday to an official close of $112.1/b. But after that it traded as low as $108.05/b before ending late night at around $109.7/b. Through the day it traded in a range of $106.87 – 112.72/b amid a flurry of news or rumors from Iran and the US. ”US temporary sanctions during negotiations” (falls alarm). ”We will bomb Iran” (not anyhow),… etc. While the market is still fluctuating to this kind of news flow, it is starting to take such headlines with a pinch of salt.
We’ll see. Maybe, maybe not. The Brent M1 contract is trading at $110.2/b this morning which very close to the average ticks through yesterday of $110.4/b.
Trump with bearish, verbal intervention whenever Brent trades above $110/b it seems. What seems to be a pattern is that Trump states something like ”very good negotiations going on with Iran”, ”New leaders in Iran are great,..”, ”Great progress in negotiations,…”, ”Deal in sight,..” etc whenever the Brent M1 contract trades above $110/b. An effort to cool the market. These hot air verbal interventions from Trump used to have a heavy bearish impact on prices, but they now seems to have less and less effect unless they are backed by reality.
As far as we can see there has been no real progress in the negotiations between the US and Iran with both sides still standing by their previous demands.
Iran is getting stronger while the cease fire lasts making a return to war for Trump yet harder. Iran is naturally in constant preparation for a return to war given Trump’s steady threats of bombing Iran again. Iran is naturally doing what ever is possible to prepare for a return to war. And every day the cease fire lasts it is better prepared. This naturally makes it more and more difficult and dangerous for the US to return to warring activity versus Iran as the consequences for energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf will be more and more severe the longer the cease fire lasts. Israel seems to see it this way as well. That the war is not won and that current frozen state of a cease fire gives Iran opportunity to rebuild military and politically.
Global inventories are drawing down day by day. How much? In the meantime the Strait of Hormuz stays closed. There is varying measures and estimates of how much global inventories are drawing down. Our rough estimate, back of the envelope, is that global inventories are drawing down by at least some 10 mb/d or about 300 mb/d in a balance between loss of supply versus demand destruction. Other estimates we see are a monthly draw of 250-270 mb/d. The IEA only ’measured’ a draw in global observable stocks of 117 mb in April with oil on water rising 53 mb while on shore stocks fell 170 mb. But global stocks are hard to measure with large invisible, unmeasured stocks. As such a back of the envelope approach may be better.
Oil products is what the world is consuming. Oil product prices likely to rise while product stocks fall. Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) are predominantly crude oil. Discharging oil from OECD SPR stocks, a sharp reduction in Chinese crude imports and a reduction in global refinery throughput of 6-7 mb/d has helped to keep crude oil markets satisfactorily supplied. But global inventories are drawing down none the less. And oil products is really what the world is consuming. So if global refinery throughput stays subdued, then demand will eventually have to match the supply of oil products. The likely path forward this summer is a steady draw down in jet fuel, diesel and gasoline. Higher prices for these. Then, if possible, higher refinery throughput and higher usage of crude in response to very profitable refinery margins. And lastly sharper draw in crude stocks and higher prices for these. But some 6 mb/d of oil products used to be exported through the Strait of Hormuz. And it may not be so easy to ramp up refinery activity across the world to compensate. Especially as Ukraine continues to damage Russian refineries as well as Russian crude production and export facilities.
Watch oil product stocks and prices as well as Brent calendar 2027. What to watch for this summer is thus oil product inventories falling and oil product premiums to crude rising. Another measure to watch is the Brent crude 2027 contract as it rises steadily day by day as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed and global oil inventories decline. The latter is close to the highest level since the start of the war and keeps rising.
The Brent M1 contract and the Brent 2027 prices and current price of jet fuel in Europe (ARA). All in USD/b
Our back of the envelope calculation of the global shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Note that 3.5 mb/d of discharge from SPR is also a draw. Note also that ’Forced demand loss’ of 2.5 mb/d is probably temporary and will fall back towards zero as logistics are sorted out leaving ’Price demand loss’ to do the job of balancing the market. Thus a shortfall of at least 9 mb/d created by the closure. More if SPR discharge is included and more if Forced demand loss recedes.
Brent is climbing higher. Front-month is at USD 106.3/bl this morning, close to a weekly high and a USD 9/bl jump from Mondays open. This is the move we flagged as a risk earlier in the week: the market shifting from ”a deal is around the corner” to ”this is going to take longer than we thought”.
Analyst Commodities, SEB
During April, rest-of-year Brent remained remarkably stable around USD 90/bl. A stability which rested on one single assumption: the SoH reopens around 1 May. That assumption is now slowly falling apart.
As we highlighted yesterday: every week of delay beyond 1 May adds (theoretically) ish USD 5/bl to the rest-of-year average, as global inventories draw 100 million barrels per week. i.e., a mid-May reopening implies rest-of-year Brent closer to USD 100/bl, and anything pushing into June or July takes us meaningfully higher.
What’s changed in the last 48 hours:
#1: The US military has formally warned that clearing suspected sea mines from SoH could take up to six months. That is a completely different timescale from what the financial market is pricing. Even a political deal tomorrow does not immediately reopen the strait.
#2: Trump has shifted his tone from urgency to ”strategic patience”. In yesterday’s press conference: ”Don’t rush me… I want a great deal.” The market is reading this as a president no longer feeling pressured by timelines, with the naval blockade running in the background.
#3: So far, the military activity is escalating, not de-escalating. Axios reports Iran is laying more mines in SoH. The US 3rd carrier strike group (USS George H.W. Bush) is arriving with two countermine vessels. Trump yesterday ordered the US Navy to destroy any Iranian boats caught laying mines. While CNN reports that the Pentagon is actively drawing up plans to strike Iranian SoH capabilities and individual Iranian military leaders if the ceasefire collapses. i.e., NOT a attitude consistent with an imminent deal!
Spot crude and product prices eased off the early-April highs on a combination of system rerouting and deal optimism. Both now weakening. Goldman estimates April Gulf output is reduced by 14.5 mbl/d, or 57% of pre-war supply, a number that keeps getting worse the longer this drags on.
Demand-side adaptation is ongoing: S. Korea has cut its Middle East crude dependence from 69% to 56% by pulling more from the Americas and Africa, and Japan is kicking off a second round of SPR releases from 1 May. But SPRs are finite.
Ref. to the negotiations, we should not bet on speed. The current Iranian leadership is dominated by genuine hardliners willing to absorb economic pain and run the clock to extract concessions. That is not a setup for a rapid resolution. US/Israeli media briefings keep framing the delay as ”internal Iranian divisions”, the reality is more complicated and points toward weeks and months, not days.
Our point is that the complexity is large, and higher prices have only just started (given a scenario where the negotiations drag out in time). The market spent April leaning on the USD 90/bl rest-of-year assumption; that case is diminishing by the hour. If ”early May reopening” is replaced by ”June, July or later” over the next week or two, both crude and products have meaningful room to reprice higher from here. There is a high risk being short energy and betting on any immediate political resolution(!).
Down on Friday. Up on Monday. The Brent June crude oil contract traded down 5.1% last week to a close of $90.38/b. It reached a high of $103.87/b last Monday and a low of $86.09/b on Friday as Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open for transit. That quickly changed over the weekend as the US upheld its blockade of Iranian oil exports while Iran naturally responded by closing the SoH again. The US blew a hole in the engine room of the Iranian ship TOUSKA and took custody of the ship on Sunday. Brent crude is up 5.6% this morning to $95.4/b.
The cease-fire is expiring tomorrow. The US has said it will send a delegation for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad in Pakistan. But Iran has for now rejected a second round of talks as it views US demands as unrealistic and excessive while the US is also blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
While Brent is up 5% this morning, the financial market is still very optimistic that progress will be made. That talks will continue and that the SoH will fully open by the start of May which is consistent with a rest-of-year average Brent crude oil price of around $90/b with the market now trading that balance at around $88/b.
Financial optimism vs. physical deterioration. We have a divergence where the financial market is trading negotiations, improvements and resolution while at the same time the physical market is deteriorating day by day. Physical oil flows remain constrained by disrupted flows, longer voyage times and elevated freight and insurance costs.
Financial markets are betting that a US/Iranian resolution will save us in time from violent shortages down the road. But every day that the SoH remains closed is bringing us closer to a potentially very painful point of shortages and much higher prices.
The US blockade is also a weapon of leverage against its European and Asian allies. When Iran closed the SoH it held the world economy as a hostage against the US. The US blockade of the SoH is of course blocking Iranian oil exports. But it is also an action of disruption directed towards Europe and Asia. The US has called for the rest of the world to engaged in the war with Iran: ”If you want oil from the Persian Gulf, then go and get it”. A risk is that the US plays brinkmanship with the global oil market directed towards its European and Asian allies and maybe even towards China to force them to engage and take part. Maybe unthinkable. But unthinkable has become the norm with Trump in the White House.
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Oil product price pain is set to rise as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed into summer
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