Analys
The value of an EUA spot contract is at least EUR 80/ton

A fight between short-term C-t-G differentials at EUR 40-60/ton and longer term values of EUR 100/ton already in 2026. The value of an EUA today is thus at least EUR 80/ton.

Low emissions, falling nat gas and C-t-G differentials and EUA prices falling along with that is all the range in current market dynamics. But it won’t last as the MSR will quickly remove surpluses and the steep decline in supply of EUAs from 2026 onward will quickly drive the EUA price back up and above C-t-G differentials. The EUA price will then stop relating to power market dynamics as C-t-G switching is maxed out.
The EUA market is currently driven by front-end and front-year Coal-to-Gas dynamics and differentials with the EUA price in the balance between the two. At the very front-end (1-2-3 mths) the C-t-G differentials implies an EUA price close to EUR 40/ton while the front-year 2025 has a C-t-G differential of a little over EUR 60/ton. Thus the front-year is probably a better and stronger guide right now.
But C-t-G differentials holds wide ranges of values and are very sensitive to changes in coal and nat gas prices. So the simple rule of trading approach is probably: ”Sell EUAs if the nat gas price falls”.
The total capacity to switch between coal and gas and thus flex the total amount of emissions is quite limited with a capacity of maybe only 100 mt reduction potential. Thus as the number of allowances declines in the coming years the C-t-G differentials will stop to matter as the switch will max out. Implied by modeling (Blbrg) and also by market pricing of calendar 2026 and 2027 this looks set to happen over the coming 2-3 years. The consequence will be EUA prices which will be above C-t-G differential values and disjoint from power market dynamics.
The EU ETS market probably experienced an emission reduction shock in 2023 where total German emissions are estimated to have fallen by 73 mt YoY to 2023 or some 10%. If we assume that this also is true for the whole EU ETS sector and run Bloomberg’s Carbon Price Model we see that the consequence of this emission reduction shock is washed out by 2026 with the EUA price then back at EUR 100/ton and above. The reason for this is probably due to the Market Stability Reserve dynamics which quickly removes any surplus EUAs in the market and brings the TNAC quickly down below the 833 mt upper trigger level again.
The model runs tells us that no matter what happens to gas prices and EUA prices and emissions in 2023/24, it will all wash out withing three years with the EUA price back at EUR 100/ton in 2026. If we assume a cost of carry of 7% it implies that the value of an EUA today is minimum EUR 80/ton due to bankability (buy today and hold to 2026 and then sell).
The sell-off in natural gas prices has been the guiding light for the sell-off in EUAs. Accelerated decline in natural gas prices seems to be the guiding light for the EUA price. The decline in the front-year TTF nat gas price accelerated from late October 2023 and continues to trade lower and lower. The front-year 2025 yesterday closed at EUR 32/MWh (-1.1% on the day) while the year 2027 traded down 0.9% to EUR 27.1/MWh. In comparison the average nominal TTF nat gas price from 2010 to 2019 was EUR 20/MWh while the inflation adjusted price was EUR 26/MWh. The 2027 TTF nat gas contract is thus now trading very close to the historical inflation adjusted average.
The falling nat gas price is in part a fundamental driver and in part an associated driver for the EUA price. The fundamental dynamics of the EU ETS market are highly complex because there are so many different participants with different strategies and abatement cost curves. As such it is hard to base trading of EUAs on a complex fundamental bottom up model. The more robust and simple thinking which we think traders may follow is: ”Natural gas is a low CO2 emitting fossil fuel. If the price of nat gas falls then it gets cheaper to switch to a lower emitting fossil fuel. I.e. it gets cheaper to be semi-green.” The trading rule then becomes: ”Sell EUAs if the price of nat gas falls”. With little further in-depth analysis. It’s an associated trading strategy and we think this strategy has been hard at work sine October/November 2023.
The front-year TTF nat gas contract versus the front-month EUA price since Jan 2023. Accelerated selling from Oct/Nov last year.
The good old Coal-to-Gas abatement dynamics is the cornerstone to ”sell EUAs if gas prices fall”. Almost half of emissions in the EU ETS system stems from the power sector running on a mix of coal, gas and other non-emitting sources of power. There is an assumed flex between coal and gas power production and this flex is driven by relative prices in coal, gas and CO2. So if the nat gas price falls, the power sector will burn more gas because it is cheaper, emit less CO2 so the EUA price falls.
If the EU ETS market is massively oversupplied as it was from 2008 to 2019 it hands no constraints at all on the emitters. The result is no dynamical price interaction between the EUA price and Coal-to-Gas differentials. But if the EU ETS market is nicely balanced then C-t-G dynamics kicks in and the EUA price will start to trade on the balance ”Coal+CO2 = Nat gas + CO2” where nat gas of course has a much lower carbon emitting intensity.
But there is not one switching balance as there are many coal and gas plants with different efficiencies. If we choose three different sets of coal and nat gas power plant efficiency combinations and graph them back in time with focus on front-end power market dynamics we typically get the following.
Coal-to-Gas switching price bands given by front-end power market dynamics are basically saying: ”What should the CO2 price have been for coal and nat gas power plants to be equally competitive.” Here compared with the actual front-month EUA price.
The same graph but starting in 2023. These implied Coal-to-Gas switching bands are highly sensitive to changes in coal and nat gas prices. This probably makes them partially difficult to trade on on a daily basis. Thus trading strategies typically end up with a simpler rule: ”Sell EUAs if the nat gas price falls”.
Coal-to-Gas switching price bands given by front-end power market dynamics are basically saying: ”What should the CO2 price have been for coal and nat gas power plants to be equally competitive.” Here compared with the actual front-month EUA price.

But the possible combination of efficiencies between coal and nat gas is much wider. Coal power plant efficiencies in Europe are assumed to have a range of 35% to 46% while nat gas power plants have an assumed range of 49% to 58%. The following graph has made all the combinatoric crosses in 1% incremental steps. All for the same given set of coal and gas price which here was chosen as the front-year ARA coal price of USD 94/ton versus the front-year (2025) nat gas price of EUR 31.5/MWh. Then all these outcomes are sorted from low to high.
What this distribution shows is that if the ”fair” EUA price stemming from C-t-G differentials can be very wide depending on how loose or tight the EUA market is. If it is quite loose, but just tight enough for C-t-G differentials to matter then the fair EUA price for this given set of coal and gas prices could be as low as EUR 30/ton. Conversely, if the EUA market is so tight that C-t-G differentials are on the verge to not matter any more, then the fair price could be as high as EUR 100/ton.
But the average of all these cross-combinations is EUR 59.1/ton which is quite close to where the front-year EUA is trading today.
Distribution of front-year implied EUA prices given by C-t-G differentials based on front-year coal and nat gas prices
In the following graph we have done the same cross-calculations but for calendar 2027. What we see here is that the current EUA Dec-2027 is trading far up in the distribution of switches to the level where switching is maxed out completely to the point where C-t-G differentials do not matter any more
Distribution of calendar 2027 implied EUA prices given by C-t-G differentials based on Y2027 coal and nat gas prices and compared to the current Dec-27 EUA price. It may be random, but interpretation here is that by 2027, the power market dynamics will start to matter little for the EUA price as the capacity to switch to nat gas has maxed out completely.
This is also visible when we calculate the cost of coal+CO2 and gas+CO2 for the nearest three years to 2027 and compare them to German power prices for these years. What we see is that coal power plants are completely price out of the stack and are no longer competitive. Unless of course they are located in a place where they cannot be out-competed by nat gas power plants due to grid restrictions. The result is high, local power prices instead.
The market price of German power for 2025/26/27 versus the cost of production by coal and gas with CO2 market prices included.
Sharp reduction in emissions due to the energy crisis has a maximum three year impact before the EUA price is back to EUR 100/ton. Early in January it was reported by Agora Energiewende and then further by Blbrg that German emissions dropped YoY by 73 mt to 70-year low in 2023. That is roughly a 10% YoY reduction in emissions. But it is for the whole economy and not just for the part of German emissions which are compliant under the EU ETS. Further it was stated that only 15% of the 73 mt YoY reduction was of permanent nature while 85% was deemed temporary. I.e. they will kick back over time.
We have used Blbrgs Carbon Price Model to run different scenarios with emission reduction shocks. We have assumed that what happened with emissions in Germany in 2023 is representative for the whole EU ETS to a lesser and larger degree. The model is of course a simplified, stylistic representation of the world so result must be treated with caution.
In the first set of scenarios we assume that the market ”only has 1-year forward vision” and then knows nothing about the future tightening. I.e. it is consistently front-end or front-year spot market balance and dynamics which dictates the prices. What these runs indicates is that the whole emission reduction shock from the recent energy crisis will by wiped away by 2026 with EUA prices then again trading back at EUR 100/ton. One likely reason for this is the MSR dynamic which quickly removes surplus EUAs from the market and brings TNAC (Total Number of Allowances in Circulation) back below the upper trigger level of 833 mt.
Since EUAs are bankable anyone can borrow money today and buy an EUA and carry it on an account for three years for three years to 2026 when the price will be back to EUR 100/b. Depending on what cost of carry you assume the implied value of an EUA today is thus at least EUR 80/ton.
The following model runs have only one year forward vision and as such cannot ”see” future coming tightness. As such the EUA price can crash for a single year as it is constantly the front-end fundamentals which dictates the price dynamics rather than longer-term fundamentals.
Scenarios on Blbrgs Carbon Price Model assuming emission reduction shock in 2023. All price paths are back to EUR 100/ton by 2026. This implies a value of an EUA spot today of at least EUR 80/ton
Analys
All eyes on OPEC V8 and their July quota decision on Saturday

Tariffs or no tariffs played ping pong with Brent crude yesterday. Brent crude traded to a joyous high of USD 66.13/b yesterday as a US court rejected Trump’s tariffs. Though that ruling was later overturned again with Brent closing down 1.2% on the day to USD 64.15/b.

US commercial oil inventories fell 0.7 mb last week versus a seasonal normal rise of 3-6 mb. US commercial crude and product stocks fell 0.7 mb last week which is fairly bullish since the seasonal normal is for a rise of 4.3 mb. US crude stocks fell 2.8 mb, Distillates fell 0.7 mb and Gasoline stocks fell 2.4 mb.
All eyes are now on OPEC V8 (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Algeria, Russia, Oman, Kazakhstan) which will make a decision tomorrow on what to do with production for July. Overall they are in a process of placing 2.2 mb/d of cuts back into the market over a period stretching out to December 2026. Following an expected hike of 137 kb/d in April they surprised the market by lifting production targets by 411 kb/d for May and then an additional 411 kb/d again for June. It is widely expected that the group will decide to lift production targets by another 411 kb/d also for July. That is probably mostly priced in the market. As such it will probably not have all that much of a bearish bearish price impact on Monday if they do.
It is still a bit unclear what is going on and why they are lifting production so rapidly rather than at a very gradual pace towards the end of 2026. One argument is that the oil is needed in the market as Middle East demand rises sharply in summertime. Another is that the group is partially listening to Donald Trump which has called for more oil and a lower price. The last is that Saudi Arabia is angry with Kazakhstan which has produced 300 kb/d more than its quota with no indications that they will adhere to their quota.
So far we have heard no explicit signal from the group that they have abandoned the plan of measured increases with monthly assessments so that the 2.2 mb/d is fully back in the market by the end of 2026. If the V8 group continues to lift quotas by 411 kb/d every month they will have revived the production by the full 2.2 mb/d already in September this year. There are clearly some expectations in the market that this is indeed what they actually will do. But this is far from given. Thus any verbal wrapping around the decision for July quotas on Saturday will be very important and can have a significant impact on the oil price. So far they have been tightlipped beyond what they will do beyond the month in question and have said nothing about abandoning the ”gradually towards the end of 2026” plan. It is thus a good chance that they will ease back on the hikes come August, maybe do no changes for a couple of months or even cut the quotas back a little if needed.
Significant OPEC+ spare capacity will be placed back into the market over the coming 1-2 years. What we do know though is that OPEC+ as a whole as well as the V8 subgroup specifically have significant spare capacity at hand which will be placed back into the market over the coming year or two or three. Probably an increase of around 3.0 – 3.5 mb/d. There is only two ways to get it back into the market. The oil price must be sufficiently low so that 1) Demand growth is stronger and 2) US shale oil backs off. In combo allowing the spare capacity back into the market.
Low global inventories stands ready to soak up 200-300 mb of oil. What will cushion the downside for the oil price for a while over the coming year is that current, global oil inventories are low and stand ready to soak up surplus production to the tune of 200-300 mb.
Analys
Brent steady at $65 ahead of OPEC+ and Iran outcomes

Following the rebound on Wednesday last week – when Brent reached an intra-week high of USD 66.6 per barrel – crude oil prices have since trended lower. Since opening at USD 65.4 per barrel on Monday this week, prices have softened slightly and are currently trading around USD 64.7 per barrel.

This morning, oil prices are trading sideways to slightly positive, supported by signs of easing trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU. European equities climbed while long-term government bond yields declined after President Trump announced a pause in new tariffs yesterday, encouraging hopes of a transatlantic trade agreement.
The optimisms were further supported by reports indicating that the EU has agreed to fast-track trade negotiations with the U.S.
More significantly, crude prices appear to be consolidating around the USD 65 level as markets await the upcoming OPEC+ meeting. We expect the group to finalize its July output plans – driven by the eight key producers known as the “Voluntary Eight” – on May 31st, one day ahead of the original schedule.
We assign a high probability to another sizeable output increase of 411,000 barrels per day. However, this potential hike seems largely priced in already. While a minor price dip may occur on opening next week (Monday morning), we expect market reactions to remain relatively muted.
Meanwhile, the U.S. president expressed optimism following the latest round of nuclear talks with Iran in Rome, describing them as “very good.” Although such statements should be taken with caution, a positive outcome now appears more plausible. A successful agreement could eventually lead to the return of more Iranian barrels to the global market.
Analys
A shift to surplus will likely drive Brent towards the 60-line and the high 50ies

Brent sinks lower as OPEC+ looks likely to lift production in July by another 400 kb/d. Brent crude declined 0.7% yesterday to USD 64.44/b and traded in a range of USD 63.54 – 65.03/b. This morning Brent is down another 0.7% to USD 64/b along with expectations that OPEC+ will lift its production quota by another 411 kb/d in July.

Kazakhstan would be in breach even if the whole 2.2 mb/d of voluntary cuts are unwounded. The eight countries behind the 2.2 mb/d of voluntary cuts, the V8, have lifted their production quotas by close to 950 kb/d from April to June with unwinding starting in April. Over the coming week towards the end of May, the group will discuss what to do with quotas in July. Market expectations as well as indications from within the group is for another 411 kb/d hike also in July. Higher oil demand during summer both in the Middle East and globally is one reason for the hikes. Most of the additional production will not leave the Middle East but be consumed locally this summer. But Kazakhstan is also a major problem. The country produced 1.77 mb/d in April and 300 kb/d above its quota level. To maintain cohesion and credibility the group needs internal cooperation and harmony. Kazakhstan seems to have no plans to reduce production down to its quota. The alternative solution to reestablish internal harmony is to lift quotas up to where production is. The problem is that Kazakhstan only accounts for less than 5% of the overall production of V8. Thus even after unwinding all of the 2.2 mb/d, the quota of Kazakhstan would not rise much more than 100 kb/d. Far from the country’s overproduction of 300 kb/d in April.
A shift to surplus will likely drive Brent towards the 60-line and high 50ies. Losing front-end backwardation implies Brent crude down to the 60-line and high 50ies. Currently the Brent crude curve holds a front-end backwardation premium of USD 1.5/b versus the November price currently at USD 62.6/b. A result of an oil market which is still tight here and now. But if OPEC+ lifts production to a level where the market starts to run a surplus, then the front-end contract will flip from a USD 1.5/b premium vs. 4 months out to instead a comparable USD 1.5/b discount to 4 months out. That would bring the front-end contract down towards the 60-line and the high 50ies. This because a full out contango market usually also will drive the deferred contracts a bit lower as well. But this may not be all doom and gloom. A softer USD and a lower oil price is a powerful combo for global consumption. Global oil stocks are also low. This will help to cushion the downside.
Brent crude forward curve. Surplus and full contango would eradicate the front-end backwardation and drive Brent crude down towards the 60-line and high 50ies.

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