Analys
EU sanctions on Russian alu will likely drive EU premiums higher
The LME 3mth alu price has bounced 4.5% past two days but its a far cry from 2022 impacts. The 3mth aluminum price has bounced 4.5% (+96 USD/ton) to USD 2256.5/ton on news that the EU is considering an embargo on Russian aluminum. It’s a notable gain amid an otherwise lukewarm and bearish energy complex where natural gas and coal prices have been trending steadily lower since October last year. But it is nothing compared to what happened in 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine. The 3mth aluminum price then rallied to USD 3849/ton and the EU aluminum premium rallied to USD 505/ton versus a more normal USD 100/ton. Thus so far the the price action in aluminum is nothing like what we experienced in 2022.

It looks likely to us that the EU will indeed impose sanctions on Russian aluminium. We don’t know yet if the EU actually will implement sanctions on Russian aluminum. Personally I think its likely that they will do it as it is kind of a moral stand and the last large piece of the Russian energy complex which is possible to place under sanctions. But the actual effects both on the EU and Russia will likely be limited. Russia will not stop producing and exporting aluminium. Rather it will export it and send it elsewhere in the world. That is what happened to Russian crude and product exports. They weren’t lost in terms of global supply, but rerouted elsewhere.
New sanctions will have limited effect on Russia and dissipate over time. It’s a moral stand. Previously it was possible to enforce effective sanctions on one specific country. Those were the days when the US ruled the world and China chose to side with the US. For example with sanctions on Iran. These sanctions have not at all been lifted yet. But Iranian oil exports have rebounded from 1.9 m b/d at the low in 2019 to now 3.2 m b/d as China now is accepting to import Iranian crude oil and is placing less emphasis on the US.
The effect of sanctions have a tendency to deteriorate over time. Even when the US ruled the world and China played along. But sanctions today will leak massively if China isn’t playing along with what the EU and the US wants. And China isn’t playing along.
The goal is to hurt Russia’s income from aluminum exports. But the effect will be limited. The aim with the sanctions towards Russian oil, and now possibly also aluminum, isn’t to bar the supply from the global market. Rather the opposite. Neither the US nor the EU wants to put a stop to Russian raw materials exports as it could drive up the price of these globally which would hurt consumers and generate inflation. The aim is to keep exports flowing but to try to hurt Russian earnings from the exports. The same will likely be the case for the potentially upcoming EU sanctions on aluminum.
But even the ”hurt the income” strategy with a cap on the price of Russian crude and products has deteriorated over time. Russian Urals crude had a discount to Brent crude in 2022 of as much as USD 36/b and today it is only USD 12/b below Brent.
Russia has probably made contingency plans a long time ago. Russia has also probably made contingency plans for its aluminum exports as the risk has been there all along since 2022. Thus new EU sanctions towards Russian aluminium exports will likely be less of a shock today versus when all hell broke lose in 2022.
Europe has also already reduced its Russian imports of primary aluminium, to about 10% of its primary needs. A large proportion of imports are now increasingly coming from middle eastern producers.
EU alu premiums already rising along with Mid-East issues (Red Sea). Will rise further with sanctions. Issues in the region has pushed up freight costs, insurance costs and added transit delays and length of journey to Europe. A combination of these issues have already lifted the European premium. New sanctions on Russia will likely lift the regional premiums further.
The dirty details. How deeply is EU’s industrial supply chains embedded in Russian alu semies? The actual effects of new EU sanctions on Russian aluminum will be down to the dirty details. An important question is how deeply Russian semies, and prefabricated aluminum parts (which also looks to be sanctioned) are embedded and integrated in the European industrial system (supply chains). If the EU is deeply dependent of pre-fabricated aluminum parts from Russia, then it could be painful for EU to disentangle from these imports.
Sanctions = additional costs and frictions as global aluminum flows are rerouted. New sanctions will naturally lead to frictions and some added price due to that. Aluminum can of course be transported across the world. It is cheaper to transport it from Russia to Europe and that is why it historically has landed in the EU. But, if need be, due to possible EU sanctions towards Russia on aluminum, then Russia can and will send its aluminum to other global regions, maybe and possibly predominantly, to China. Then the EU can and must import more aluminum from other places instead. Probably the middle east and maybe from China
The Global LME 3mth price will likely rise only marginally as no supply is actually lost. Just rerouted. The price of aluminum across the world may increase a little bit due to such sanction-frictions but probably not all that much since there will not be any loss of supply and only added transportation frictions and costs.
EU aluminum premiums will naturally rise in order to attract non-Russian supply from further away. EU Alu-premiums should naturally increase in order to attract aluminum from further away. China will probably be able to import Russian aluminum on the cheap. So Russia will lose some income on its aluminum exports as it potentially has to cover transportation costs all the way to China and possibly an additional discount in order for China to take it. China may only import a lot of Russian aluminium if it can get it on the cheap. China can then export more as its country balance will improve and possibly export all the way back to Europe.
A weak macro-backdrop in Europe makes sanctions easier. The backdrop to all of this is very weak aluminum demand in Europe amid a bleak macro-picture. Disruption of Russian supply to the EU should thus be less painful than it otherwise would have been.
What to do with Russian alu stocks already in EU LME storage? Consume it or export it? A tricky question is what to do about all the Russian aluminum which currently is sitting at EU LME storage sites where it is constituting some 90% of aluminum stocks. If it has to leave EU LME storage sites due to sanctions then it may have to be sold at a discount in order to get it to flow elsewhere. Maybe it will create deep front-end contango is one speculation. A natural solution however would be that sanctions allows consumption of Russian aluminum currently in stock in the EU but bans new and further stocking of Russian aluminum. Then these Russian stocks would gradually be consumed and dissipate and instead gradually be replaced by non-Russian aluminum.
”Futures market can tighten quickly and spreads could rally.” The following is a comment from one of SEB’s metals traders: ”The futures market could get very tight very quickly following EU sanctions on Russian aluminum. Spreads could tighten aggressively until market reaches a new balance.”
The LME 3mth aluminum price rallied to USD 3,849/ton when Russia attacked Ukraine. Price has now gained a little (+4.5%) to USD 2,254/ton on possible EU sanctions.

Aluminum premiums across the world. EU premiums rallied to USD 505/ton and USD 615/ton (duty unpaid and paid resp.) in 2022 vs normal USD 100-150/ton. Now gained a little on Mid-East troubles and rerouting. Could rise much more on EU sanctions.

Russia probably has a normal, net export of alu semies and primary alu of around 3 m mtpa. This would normally be destined to Europe.

Analys
Tightness today versus risk of surplus tomorrow
Oil markets remain tight as the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) continues to be constrained. Things could become much tighter if it is fully closed. However, the outlook could change rapidly if flows normalise in early 2027. A large underlying surplus, rebuilding supply and the risk of more volume from OPEC+ could turn today’s tightness into a significantly weaker oil market in 2027-28.

Eventual reopening looks set to bring surplus
The SoH is constrained, not fully closed. Enough crude is escaping, while alternative pipelines, decreased Chinese imports and SPR releases have helped keep Brent at c. USD 90/bbl. Oil products are much tighter. A full reopening of the SoH would flip the market into surplus. We assume SoH flows normalise from early 2027. The market could then face a 4-5m bbl/d surplus before restocking. We forecast Brent at USD 75/bbl in 2027 and USD 70/bbl in 2028.
We expect OPEC+ to opt for more volume once SoH exports normalise
OPEC+ will likely opt for more volume. The UAE has already chosen volume, Iraq wants to expand and Venezuela looks set to exit. There is a clear risk of controlled OPEC+ supply growth, adding to downside risks for 2027-28.
Natural gas market: Winter risk ahead, yet LNG balance to loosen from 2026
Natural gas inventories in Europe are well below normal. The market had hoped for a revival in Persian Gulf LNG exports from Qatar. However, with no signs of any imminent reopening of the SoH, it might be too late for Middle East LNG cargoes to arrive in Europe before the end of winter 2026/27. TTF natural gas winter prices have rallied in response, but that is predominantly a winter risk with prices trading sharply lower after March 2027. Growing global LNG export capacity in the years to come should push prices lower.
Analys
Oil close to technical levels while EU nat gas is gripped by winter-panic
Brent crude converging to technical levels. Brent crude has traded in a range of $90-95/b over the past five days. It pulled back 2.4% yesterday to a close of $92.17/b. This morning it is trading close to unchanged at $92.1/b. That is just above the 100dma of $91.9/b and the 50% Fibo level of $92.6/b. The next technical level would be $100/b. Vortexa stated in a report ydy that ”Record crude shortfall building – and market may miss it in summer lull”. If so, then $100/b is maybe where we are heading in the near term. Argus reported however on Friday that CPC Blend exports (Kazakhstan) has increased to 1.8 mb/d from only 0.85 mb/d in the second half of July. This has eased the crude tightness in Europe as it coincides with lower crude processing by European refineries due to maintenance and seasonal turnarounds.

China is standing in the way for US sanctions towards Iran. The US is threatening Iran with economic destruction via sanctions. But China is normally buying 90% of Iran’s crude and is strongly opposed to sanctions arguing that they don’t work. China cannot allow the US to dictate from whom it can buy crude oil or not. Xi Jinping is set to meet Trump in the US in a couple of weeks from now. There is no chance that the US will hit secondary sanctions on Chinese entities dealing in Iranian oil. How to make economic sanctions against Iran work when China is not a part of if is Trump’s big headache.
Natural gas – Winter panic sets in as there is no opening of Hormuz in sight. European natural gas is rallying amid low seasonal nat gas stocks and no reopening of the SoH in sight. European nat gas for December delivery is trading at EUR 67.5/MWh or about $136/boe. That is more than a 50% premium to Brent crude delivered in December. That measure traded in a range of 30% to 40% premium from mid-July to mid-August but has now jumped straight to 50%.
European natural gas inventories are currently at 63% versus a seasonal norm of 80.6%. That is 17.6% lower than 2010-2025 average.
The European nat gas market has stayed relatively calm for a long time in the hope that the Strait of Hormuz would open ”very soon” as Trump insisted all the time. Assuming that stocks ahead of winter could be rebuilt rapidly once the SoH was reopened. Now, however, there is no clarity on a reopening. No one expects it to happen anytime soon. As a result, the European nat gas market has run into a bit of a winter-panic over the past week.
Asian LNG buyers are part of the winter bidding-war. The European nat gas prices are however not set by European nat gas buyers alone. It is set in a cross-bidding for LNG cargoes between Asia and Europe. The fact that nat gas for December delivery has rallied to a 50% premium to Brent crude is probably indicating that Asian buyers are bidding strongly into this rally as well.
There are no strategic reserves for natural gas. The problem with natural gas is that there are no large inventories since gas is difficult and expensive to store. That is why the nat gas market is much more stressed over having lost 20% of seaborn supply normally coming from the SoH.
Dry rivers and low hydroelectric levels adds to Europe’s winter risk. Europe has also gotten into trouble due to the record hot and dry summer. Hydroelectric reservoirs are unusually low ahead of winter while low river levels are holding back nuclear and other thermal power plants from running.
A warm 2026/27 winter would help a lot. But the 2026/27 winter looks set to be warmer than normal according to seasonal forecasts for what they are worth.
European natural gas inventories are significantly below the 2010-2025 average

TTF nat gas for December delivery has jumped to a 53% premium to Brent crude.

Nat gas forward prices versus Brent crude forward prices. Nat gas is about winter risk as there are no strategic reserves (inventories) of natural gas other than commercial stocks.

Analys
Stay long or buy-on-dips in the run-up to the US midterm elections on 3 Nov
Brent rose 6% last week as hopes for a reopening faded. Brent crude rose 6% last week as hopes for ”an imminent reopening” of the SoH, as heralded by Trump again and again, faded completely. Brent traded in a range of $81.5 – 90.07/b before closing the week at $88.52/b. That is very close to the average Brent price year to date with Brent 1 month contract having averaged $86.9/b and the Dated Brent spot price having averaged $91.5/b. This morning Brent is trading close to unchanged at $88.6/b

The ceasefire between the US and Iran is today officially over. Trump of course has declared Iran for badly beaten and that the SoH could soon become ”a territory of the United States”. Trump is for sure a great entertainer! Iran’s response: ”The Strait of Hormuz cannot be seized by tweet.”
Economic sanctions isn’t going to change things. The fact is that the US is out of options and low on critical defensive ammunition to the point that it cannot any longer go on attacking Iran. Instead the path forward will be economic sanctions which everyone knows is a very lengthy process with highly uncertain outcome. If Iran doesn’t bow to bombs it will for sure not bow to sanctions. The general thinking and experience is that sanctions do not work. Trump desperately wants to extricate himself from the war with Iran in order to focus on the US midterm elections. But Iran won’t let him.
Netanyahu is not sitting still and bombed Lebanon over the weekend. Strikes have also resumed in Gaza while Israeli settlers are making trouble in the west bank. Trump doesn’t control any of it while Iran is demanding a resolution to these conflicts and end of hostilities. This of course complicates things further for Trump.
Iran and Oman continues to discuss how the SoH is going to be administrated in the future. They agreeing does not imply a reopening though has Iran stated.
For the time being there is enough crude oil in the market preventing crude oil stocks from falling sharply and preventing Brent crude from rallying higher.
Back of the envelope calculations of how the loss of 14 mb/d of crude normally passing through the SoH are currently compensated by different elements.

Helps to explain why Brent hasn’t rallied to $150/b or higher. This table helps to explain why global crude stocks are not falling rapidly and why Brent crude is not rising exponentially as a result.
Two very important elements. What stands out here is the importance of two elements. 1) The escape of oil out of the SoH of maybe as much as 5 mb/d and 2) The Saudi Arabian redirection of 3 mb/d to the Red Sea. Shut these two off and the market is quickly in a significant deficit.
Iran is controlling them both. A powerful threat to Trump’s midterm elections. The big headache for Trump is that Iran directly and indirectly controls them both. For all we know Iran is allowing 5 mb/d to traverse the SoH every day. It probably isn’t all that difficult for Iran to up the game and totally halt the flow at night out of the SoH. Ukraine got better and better at hitting Russian refineries deep inside Russia. Iran will get better at hitting convoys at night trying to sneak out. But maybe Iran isn’t even trying so hard and is just biding its time for when to choke it fully. Iran can also activate the Houthis more aggressively to halt the flow of oil out of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait thus in part also chocking off the Yanbu redirect.
Stay long or buy-on-dips over the coming 2-3 months to the US midterm election. It is very plausible that Iran can fully close of the SoH and and also activate a closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait if and when it wants to. Further that it will play with such closures over the coming 2-3 months to the US midterm elections on 3 November. Iran won’t let Trump extricate himself from this war and Iran won’t allow this to be easy sailing for Trump.
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