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EU sanctions on Russian alu will likely drive EU premiums higher

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The LME 3mth alu price has bounced 4.5% past two days but its a far cry from 2022 impacts. The 3mth aluminum price has bounced 4.5% (+96 USD/ton) to USD 2256.5/ton on news that the EU is considering an embargo on Russian aluminum. It’s a notable gain amid an otherwise lukewarm and bearish energy complex where natural gas and coal prices have been trending steadily lower since October last year. But it is nothing compared to what happened in 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine. The 3mth aluminum price then rallied to USD 3849/ton and the EU aluminum premium rallied to USD 505/ton versus a more normal USD 100/ton. Thus so far the the price action in aluminum is nothing like what we experienced in 2022.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

It looks likely to us that the EU will indeed impose sanctions on Russian aluminium. We don’t know yet if the EU actually will implement sanctions on Russian aluminum. Personally I think its likely that they will do it as it is kind of a moral stand and the last large piece of the Russian energy complex which is possible to place under sanctions. But the actual effects both on the EU and Russia will likely be limited. Russia will not stop producing and exporting aluminium. Rather it will export it and send it elsewhere in the world. That is what happened to Russian crude and product exports. They weren’t lost in terms of global supply, but rerouted elsewhere. 

New sanctions will have limited effect on Russia and dissipate over time. It’s a moral stand. Previously it was possible to enforce effective sanctions on one specific country. Those were the days when the US ruled the world and China chose to side with the US. For example with sanctions on Iran. These sanctions have not at all been lifted yet. But Iranian oil exports have rebounded from 1.9 m b/d at the low in 2019 to now 3.2 m b/d as China now is accepting to import Iranian crude oil and is placing less emphasis on the US.

The effect of sanctions have a tendency to deteriorate over time. Even when the US ruled the world and China played along. But sanctions today will leak massively if China isn’t playing along with what the EU and the US wants. And China isn’t playing along.

The goal is to hurt Russia’s income from aluminum exports. But the effect will be limited. The aim with the sanctions towards Russian oil, and now possibly also aluminum, isn’t to bar the supply from the global market. Rather the opposite. Neither the US nor the EU wants to put a stop to Russian raw materials exports as it could drive up the price of these globally which would hurt consumers and generate inflation. The aim is to keep exports flowing but to try to hurt Russian earnings from the exports. The same will likely be the case for the potentially upcoming EU sanctions on aluminum.

But even the ”hurt the income” strategy with a cap on the price of Russian crude and products has deteriorated over time. Russian Urals crude had a discount to Brent crude in 2022 of as much as USD 36/b and today it is only USD 12/b below Brent.

Russia has probably made contingency plans a long time ago. Russia has also probably made contingency plans for its aluminum exports as the risk has been there all along since 2022. Thus new EU sanctions towards Russian aluminium exports will likely be less of a shock today versus when all hell broke lose in 2022.

Europe has also already reduced its Russian imports of primary aluminium, to about 10% of its primary needs. A large proportion of imports are now increasingly coming from middle eastern producers.

EU alu premiums already rising along with Mid-East issues (Red Sea). Will rise further with sanctions. Issues in the region has pushed up freight costs, insurance costs and added transit delays and length of journey to Europe. A combination of these issues have already lifted the European premium. New sanctions on Russia will likely lift the regional premiums further.

The dirty details. How deeply is EU’s industrial supply chains embedded in Russian alu semies? The actual effects of new EU sanctions on Russian aluminum will be down to the dirty details. An important question is how deeply Russian semies, and prefabricated aluminum parts (which also looks to be sanctioned) are embedded and integrated in the European industrial system (supply chains). If the EU is deeply dependent of pre-fabricated aluminum parts from Russia, then it could be painful for EU to disentangle from these imports.

Sanctions = additional costs and frictions as global aluminum flows are rerouted. New sanctions will naturally lead to frictions and some added price due to that. Aluminum can of course be transported across the world. It is cheaper to transport it from Russia to Europe and that is why it historically has landed in the EU. But, if need be, due to possible EU sanctions towards Russia on aluminum, then Russia can and will send its aluminum to other global regions, maybe and possibly predominantly, to China. Then the EU can and must import more aluminum from other places instead. Probably the middle east and maybe from China

The Global LME 3mth price will likely rise only marginally as no supply is actually lost. Just rerouted. The price of aluminum across the world may increase a little bit due to such sanction-frictions but probably not all that much since there will not be any loss of supply and only added transportation frictions and costs.

EU aluminum premiums will naturally rise in order to attract non-Russian supply from further away. EU Alu-premiums should naturally increase in order to attract aluminum from further away. China will probably be able to import Russian aluminum on the cheap. So Russia will lose some income on its aluminum exports as it potentially has to cover transportation costs all the way to China and possibly an additional discount in order for China to take it. China may only import a lot of Russian aluminium if it can get it on the cheap. China can then export more as its country balance will improve and possibly export all the way back to Europe.

A weak macro-backdrop in Europe makes sanctions easier. The backdrop to all of this is very weak aluminum demand in Europe amid a bleak macro-picture. Disruption of Russian supply to the EU should thus be less painful than it otherwise would have been.

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What to do with Russian alu stocks already in EU LME storage? Consume it or export it? A tricky question is what to do about all the Russian aluminum which currently is sitting at EU LME storage sites where it is constituting some 90% of aluminum stocks. If it has to leave EU LME storage sites due to sanctions then it may have to be sold at a discount in order to get it to flow elsewhere. Maybe it will create deep front-end contango is one speculation. A natural solution however would be that sanctions allows consumption of Russian aluminum currently in stock in the EU but bans new and further stocking of Russian aluminum. Then these Russian stocks would gradually be consumed and dissipate and instead gradually be replaced by non-Russian aluminum.

”Futures market can tighten quickly and spreads could rally.” The following is a comment from one of SEB’s metals traders: ”The futures market could get very tight very quickly following EU sanctions on Russian aluminum. Spreads could tighten aggressively until market reaches a new balance.”

The LME 3mth aluminum price rallied to USD 3,849/ton when Russia attacked Ukraine. Price has now gained a little (+4.5%) to USD 2,254/ton on possible EU sanctions.

The LME 3mth aluminum price
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Aluminum premiums across the world. EU premiums rallied to USD 505/ton and USD 615/ton (duty unpaid and paid resp.) in 2022 vs normal USD 100-150/ton. Now gained a little on Mid-East troubles and rerouting. Could rise much more on EU sanctions.

Aluminum premiums across the world
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Russia probably has a normal, net export of alu semies and primary alu of around 3 m mtpa. This would normally be destined to Europe.

Russian aluminium balance
Source: SEB graph and implied net exports based on CRU data from 2020.

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Analys

Soon into the $50ies/b unless OPEC+ flips to production cuts

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Brent crude fell 3.8% yesterday to $62.71/b. With that Brent has eradicated most of the gains it got when the US announced sanctions related to oil sales by Rosneft and Lukeoil on 22 October.  Just before that it traded around $61/b and briefly touched $60.07/b. The US sanctions then distorted the reality of a global market in surplus. But reality has now reemerged. We never held much belief that 1) The sanctions would prevent Russian oil from flowing to the market via the dark fleet and diverse ship to ship transferee. Russia and the world has after all perfected this art since 2022. Extra friction in oil to market, yes, but no real hinderance. And 2) That Trump/US would really enforce these sanctions which won’t really kick in before 21 November. And post that date they will likely be rolled forward or discarded. So now we are almost back to where we were pre the US sanctions announcement. 

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

OPEC revising (and admitting) that the global oil market was running a surplus of 0.5 mb/d in Q3-25 probably helped to drive Brent crude lower yesterday. The group has steadfastly promoted a view of very strong demand while IEA and EIA have estimated supply/demand surpluses. Given OPEC’s heavy role in the physical global oil market the group has gotten the benefit of the doubt of the market. I.e. the group probably knows what it is talking about given its massive physical presence in the global oil market. The global oil market has also gotten increasingly less transparent over the past years as non-OECD increasingly holds the dominant share of global consumption. And visibility there is low.

US EIA report: US liquids production keeps growing by 243 kb/d YoY  in 2026. Brent = $55/b in 2026. The monthly energy report from the US energy department was neither a joy for oil prices yesterday. It estimated that total US hydrocarbon liquids production would grow by 243 kb/d YoY to 2026 to a total of 23.8 mb/d. It has upped its 2026 forecast from 23.4 mb/d in September to 23.6 mb/d in October and now 23.8 mb/d. For now prices are ticking lower while US EIA liquids production estimates keeps ticking higher. EIA expects Brent to average $55/b in 2026.

IEA OMR today. Call-on-OPEC 2026 at only 25.4 mb/d. I.e. OPEC needs to cut production by 3.7 mb/d if it wants to balance the market. The IEA estimated in its Monthly Oil Market Report that a balanced oil market in 2026 would require OPEC to produce only 25.4 mb/d. That is 3.7 mb/d less than the group’s production of 29.1 mb/d in October.

OPEC+ now has to make some hard choices. Will it choose market share or will it choose price? Since August there has been no further decline in US shale oil drilling rig count. It has instead ticked up 4 to now 414 rigs. A lower oil price is thus needed to drive US production lower and  make room for OPEC+. Down in the 50ies we need to go for that to happen. We think that first into the 50ies. Then lower US oil rig count. Then lastly OPEC+ action to stabilize the market.

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Analys

Trump’s China sanctions stance outweighs OPEC+ quota halt for Q1-26

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Easing last week and lower this morning as Trump ”non-enforcement of sanctions towards China” carries more weight than halt in OPEC+ quotas in Q1-26. Brent crude calmed and fell back 1.3% to $65.07/b last week following the rally the week before when it touched down to $60.07/b before rising to a high of $66.78/b on the back of new US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukeoil. These new sanctions naturally affect the biggest buyers of Russian crude oil which are India and China. Trump said after his meeting last week with Xi Jinping that: ”we didn’t really discuss the oil”. China has stated explicitly that it opposes the new unilateral US sanctions with no basis in international law. There is thus no point for Trump to try to enforce the new sanctions versus China. The meeting last week showed that he didn’t even want to talk to Xi Jinping about it. Keeping these sanctions operational on 21 November onwards when they kick into force will be an embarrassment for Donald Trump. Come that date, China will likely explicitly defy the new US sanctions in yet another show of force versus the US.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Halt in OPEC+ quotas shows that 2026 won’t be a bloodbath for oil. Though still surplus in the cards. Brent crude started up 0.4% this morning on the news that OPEC+ will keep quotas unchanged in Q1-26 following another increase of 137k b/d in December. But following a brief jump it has fallen back and is now down slightly at $64.7/b. The halt in quotas for Q1-26 doesn’t do anything to projected surplus in Q1-26. So rising stocks and a pressure towards the downside for oil is still the main picture ahead. But it shows that OPEC+ hasn’t forgotten about the price. It still cares about price. It tells us that 2026 won’t be a bloodbath or graveyard for oil with an average Brent crude oil price of say $45/b. The year will be controlled by OPEC+ according to how it wants to play it in a balance between price and volume where the group is in a process of taking back market share.

Better beyond the 2026 weakness. Increasing comments in the market that the oil market it will be better later. After some slight pain and surplus in 2026. This is definitely what it looks like. The production forecast for non-OPEC+ production by the US EIA is basically sideways with no growth from September 2025. Thus beyond surplus 2026, this places OPEC+ in a very comfortable situation and with good market control.

US IEA October forecast for US liquids and non-OPEC+, non-US production. No net production growth outside of OPEC+ from September 2025 to end of 2026. OPEC+ is already in good position to control the market. It still want’s to take back some more market share. Thus still 2026 weakness.

US IEA October forecast for US liquids and non-OPEC+, non-US production.
Source: SEB graph and highlights, US EIA data
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Analys

OPEC+ quotas looks set to rise and US oil sanctions looks set to be toothless

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Down this morning with concerns that US won’t enforce Russian oil sanctions towards China. Brent crude closed up 0.7% yesterday to a close of $65.0/b after having traded in a fairly narrow range of $64.06 – 65.15/b. This morning it is down 0.1% at $64.7/b while the ICE Gasoil crack is down 1% as reports from Trump’s high level talks with Xi Jinping sows doubts about the enforcement of the new US sanctions towards Russia’s Lukoil and Rosneft.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Concerns that US sanctions will create significant friction in crude and product markets. Much focus in the oil market yesterday was on whether the recent new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukeoil would have a material impact on the supply/demand balance in the global oil market. Total CEO, Patrick Pouyanne, said that the market was underestimating the sanctions with three Indian refineries accounting for half of India’s Russian crude oil imports now placing crude oil orders elsewhere. FGE added that there would be massive trade friction over the coming 6-8 weeks with 800k b/d of products and 1m b/d of crude at risk of being stranded at sea in November and December. While Brent crude traded to an intraday low of $60.07/b on 20 October, it is currently only up $3.4/b since its lowest recent close of $61.3/b on 17 October. That is not much in the scale of things. Maybe the market is underestimating the problem as argued by Total and FGE. But Russia and its shadow fleet companions have been hard at work avoiding western sanctions since 2022. Today they are experts at this. Ship to ship transfers of crude to hide that the oil is coming from Russia. Blending Russian crude into other streams. And if Russian crude oil is cheap then there is a lot of profits on the table for willing hands. 

But it is highly unlikely that the US will enforce Russian oil sanctions when it comes to China. Both crude oil and gasoil are down this morning in part because Trump said about his meeting with Xi Jinping that ”we really didn’t discuss the (Russian) oil”. China is one of the biggest buyers of Russian crude oil. Not discussing the new US sanctions with China is a clear signal that these sanctions won’t be enforced. China has been standing up against the US this year on any issue of importance. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated right after the new sanctions were announced that China “oppose unilateral sanctions which lack a basis in international law and authorization of the UN Security Council”. China won’t be bullied by over something as important as its oil purchases. If Trump tried to push the issue on sanctions on Russian oil versus China he would lose. He would get nowhere. So sensibly enough he didn’t lift the topic at the high level meeting. So China will likely pick up Russian crude cargoes who no one else dare to touch. Naturally at a bargain as well. If at all, the new sanctions are not in effect anyhow before 21 November. And as it said in the sanctions: ”may” and ”run the risk of” be prosecuted. Donald Trump thus stands free to not enforce the new sanctions. And how can he enforce them versus India if he can’t/won’t enforce them versus China. Again, as we said on 24 October: ”Sell the (sanctions) rally..”

OPEC+ likely to lift its December quotas by 137k b/d on 2 November. OPEC+ will on 2 November discuss what it wants to do with its quotas for December. We expect the group to lift its quotas with an additional 137k b/d as it has done the last couple of meetings.

Crude oil at sea rose 69m b over week to 26 October and is up 253m b since mid-August.

Crude oil at sea rose 69m b over week to 26 October and is up 253m b since mid-August.
Source: SEB graph and highlights, Vortexa data, Bloomberg data feed.
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