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SEB Jordbruksprodukter, 8 december 2014

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SEB Veckobrev med prognoser på jordbruksråvaror

SEB - Prognoser på råvaror - CommodityRåvarors pristendenserVetepriset steg med 3% i Chicago under stigande dollarkurs och med 2% i för de korta kontrakten i Paris .Den dämpade prisutvecklingen i Paris har troligen sin förklaring i att franskt vete inte var billigast i veckans GASC.

Potatispriset i Frankfurt (snart Leipzig – handeln flyttar i maj) föll med 15%. Historiskt har december varit en stark månad och sedan har det gått utför. Mjölkprodukterna handlades någon procent lägre i Frankfurt, men föll med 10% i USA. På Global Dairy Trade i tisdags noterades lägre pris generellt, men på produkterna endast på WMP. Resten steg i pris, vilket de till slut som nämnt ovan inte gjorde på EUREX.

Årets sista WASDE-rapport kommer i veckan. Reuters har sammanställt analytikernas förväntningar på globala utgående lager till i genomsnitt 191.75 mt för vete (192.90 i novemberrapporten), 191.42 mt för majs (191.50 i november) och 89.70 mt för sojabönor (90.28 i november).

Odlingsväder

Southern Oscillation Index har sedan förra veckan sjunkit från -7.3 till -8.2. Ett SOI under -8 kan indikera ett El Niño. I diagrammet nedan ser vi ett 30-dagars glidande medelvärde av SOI.

Southern Oscillation Index

USA.s Climate Prediction Center sade i veckan att det är 65% chans att ett El Niño uppstår under vintern eller våren på norra halvklotet.

En sammanställning av ensembleprognoser som publiceras på Australian Bureau of Meteorologys hemsida visar att den genomsnittliga prognosen indikerar El Niño för december, men inte riktigt för februari och april. För april är det bara ECMWF och NASA som förutspår ett El Niño, men alla ligger åt det hållet.

El Niño

I USA blir det torrare än normalt i Mellanvästern, i Södern och i Sydväst. I Norra Mexico blir det däremot blötare än normalt.

Väderprognos

De kommande två veckorna blir samlad nederbörd över det normala i hela Europa, utom i södra Spanien och Portugal. Det är en mycket blötare prognos än vi såg förra veckan.

Odlingsväder

Även Ryssland kommer att få mer nederbörd än normalt och där faller det som snö. Ukraina får ännu mer regn än Ryssland.

Nederbörden i Brasilien fortsätter att vara rikligare än normalt även den kommande tvåveckorsperioden. Även Argentina fortsätter att få riktlig nederbörd.

Odlingsväder

Australiens prognos är även denna vecka nederbördsrik i öster och torr i väster.

Vete

Risken för utvintring av Rysslands höstvete, som var det tema som drev priset på vete uppåt, är nu redan diskonterat av marknaden och blickarna har vänts mot andra nyheter. Det rapporteras från Ryssland att det ligger snö över de flesta åkrar. Crop condition har nu slutat rapporteras för det amerikanska vetet som gått in i vintervilan. De andra nyheterna har inte varit positiva för vetepriset.

Dit hör t ex att Ukrainas jordbruksdepartement i veckan sade i att 7.5 mHa höstvete blev sått och att 72% av det är i bra eller tillfredsställande skick.

Dit hör också den senaste GASC-tendern. Egyptens GASC köpte 175,000 ton vete i veckan som gick. Resultaten kom ut i onsdags och när det visade sig att det inte var franskt vete som var billigast den här gången, föll Matifs terminer omedelbart med 3 euro. GASC-tendern gick till Rumänien med 120,000 ton för 260 dollar FOB och Ukraina med 55,000 ton till 257.50 dollar FOB. Priserna motsvarar 210 respektive 208.50 euro per ton.

EU gav exportlicens för 729,000 ton vete i veckan. Hittills i år ligger exporten en bra bit över förra årets 12.75 mt jämfört med 11.5 för samma vecka förra året. Fortsätter EU att exportera vete i den här takten kommer den att nå ca 32 mt fram till sista juni, eller ca 5 mt mer än förra året. USDA estimerade i november (och oktober) att exporten ska bli 28 mt, dvs ungefär lika hög som förra året. Det verkar nu ganska klart att exporten alltså kommer att bli högre. Det ska bli intressant att se att om USDA ändrar exportestimatet för EU i den WASDE-rapport som kommer i veckan.

Nedan ser vi en bild på exportlicenserna för vete som givit av Bryssel.

Vete

Det finns mycket vete lagrat på gårdarna i Europa i förhoppningen om högre pris. Tidigare år när det har lagrats in mycket vete har synen på lagringsidén varit annorlunda på Nyårsdagen än den varit före Julhelgen. Kanske har då blicken flyttat över till den kommande skörden, medan den gamla skördens öde förlorat det mesta av sin tidigare betydelse. Efter den prisuppgång som varit sedan slutet av september är priset också ganska attraktivt nu. Gissningsvis kommer en hel del vete att komma ut på marknaden den kommande månaden.

Matifs termin för december 2015 handlas i 196 euro per ton, motsvarande 1819 kr per ton. Detta är både i ett historiskt perspektiv och mot bakgrund av årets prisnivå, ett attraktivt pris att terminssäkra nästa års skörd till. Ännu bättre är förmodligen att göra detta via Chicagos veteterminer, som generellt sett alltid handlas på en lägre nivå, men som också uppvisar ett stort contango på 7% på årsbasis. Priset där är drygt 1700 kr / ton och det skall alltså ses mot bakgrund av att prisnivån generellt är lägre.

Statistics Canada estimerade skörden i landet till 29.3 mt, som är 1.8 mt mer än de trodde i oktober och mer än marknaden förväntade sig. Med ett ganska stort ingående lager innebär det att exporten den här säsongen kan bli (nästan) lika stor som förra årets 23 mt.

Nedan ser vi utvecklingen på januarikontraktet på Matif.

Vete - utvecklingen på januarikontraktet på Matif

Nedan ser vi prisutvecklingen på nästa års decemberkontrakt på Matif (de har bytt från november till december som förfallomånad).

Vetepris

Chicagovetet (mars) stötte på motstånd vid 600 cent, liksom under sensommaren. Ett nytt försök att gå högre kanske inträffar i veckan som kommer. Priset stängde på 594 cent i fredags.

Chicagovetet (mars)

Nedan ser vi terminskurvorna i fredags och en vecka tidigare för Matif respektive Chicago. Det är contango på båda marknader.

Vete-terminer

FAO / AMIS rapporterade i torsdags den 4 december. De höjde produktionsestimatet från 723 mt till 725 mt hänförligt till EU och Ryssland och höjde också utgående lager med 1 mt (huvudsakligen i Ryssland +3.3 mt och i Kina +3 mt).

Vetedata

Vi behåller neutral rekommendation på vetet.

Majs

Marskontraket CH4 har gått upp från 385 cent till fredagens 395 cent. Uppgången kom i torsdags efter att USDA sagt att exporten av majs varit större än förväntat.

Mato Grosso i Brasilien, som är den delstat där majs odlas mest som andragröda efter sojabönor, väntas enligt den första officiella prognosen producera 14.5 mt, jämfört med 17.7 mt förra året. Det beror på att arealen är 12% mindre än förra året. Detta kommer att slå direkt mot exportvolymen.

Majspris

Etanolproduktionen föll tillbaka något i veckan, från förra veckans rekordnivå.

Man tänker intuitivt att ett lägre oljepris och därmed ett lägre etanolpris ska leda till lägre pris på majs, men det är inte alls säkert. I USA är det krav på att bensin ska innehålla 10% etanol. Ett lägre bensinpris innebär åtminstone så småningom en högre efterfrågan på bensin och därmed också en högre efterfrågan på etanol – och majs. För priset på majs i USA, där nästan hälften av all majs redan används till etanoltillverkning, kan detta innebära att priset på majs går upp, inte ner.

Motsvarande mekanism finns inte för biodiesel. I EU går det mesta av rapsoljan till biodiesel.

Graf

Nedan ser vi ett diagram över priset på etanol (vit kurva) och bensin utan etanol som grön kurva. Vi ser att etanolpriset visserligen fallit lite i veckan, men i stort sett inte följt med bensinpriset ner under hösten.

Etanolpris

FAO / AMIS höjde produktionsestimatet med 5 mt till 1020 mt, hänförligt till Kina (+2.2 mt) och Mexiko (+1.5 mt). För USA gjorde de en sänkning med 1.7 mt. Utgående lager höjs med 2 mt. De noterar särskilt att utgående lager i USA ökar med 19.5 mt från förra året.

Majsdata

Vi fortsätter med neutral rekommendation på majs.

Sojabönor

Sojabönorna (SF5) föll inte, som många tekniska analytiker väntat sig. Priset vände upp kraftigt i fredags, förmodligen med stöd av tekniskt orienterade handlare som köpte tillbaka sålda terminer. Det är dock ännu för tidigt att säga att huvud-skuldra-formationen är historia. Man ser ibland sådana formationer som har flera ”skuldror”.

Sojabönor

Exporten av sojabönor var fortsatt hög, 1.18 mt, men inte så hög som veckan innan.

Sojabönor

Sojamjölet uppvisar samma mönster, alltså en potentiell ”huvud-skuldra formation”, som sojabönorna – och på samma sätt kan det handla om en ”falsk” sådan.

Sojamjöl

Sojaoljan föll under 32 cent som är en teknisk stödnivå. Mot slutet av veckan rekylerade priset upp mot 32 cent igen, vilket erbjuder ett bra säljtillfälle.

Sojaolja

Som vi har berört ovan, finns ingen mekanism liknande den för etanol, som skyddar biodieselråvaran mot prisfall i råolja. Råoljan har fallit kraftigt i pris den senaste tiden. Sojaoljan har varit i fallande pristrend längre, men det senaste fallet i råoljan borde ge ny fart nedåt i sojaoljan.

Grafer

FAO / AMIS höjer global produktion av sojabönor med 1 mt, hänförligt till högre hektarskörd i USA. De lämnar dock utgående lager oförändrat på 40 mt.

Sojadata

Vi fortsätter med säljrekommendation på sojabönor.

Raps

Februarikontraktet på rapsfrö steg med 3 euro under veckan till 340 euro.

Statistics Canada rapporterade att skörden av canola uppgick till 15.6 mt, vilket var mycket högre än det tidigare estimatet på 14.1 mt. Ingen i branschen hade väntat sig den stora skörden. Exporten av canola kommer därför förmodligen att vara ännu större än förra året, när skörden var förbluffande stor. Med tanke på att året började med snö och is som fördröjde sådden, var det väl ingen som trodde att skörden skulle kunna bli 13% större än redordskörden förra året.

Nedan ser vi skillnaden mellan canolaterminen (mars) och februari dito för rapsfrö, båda i euro per ton. Rapsfröet har stigit i pris i förhållande till canola och handlas 13.6% över canolan. Det finns potential för rapsfröet att gå ner lite i pris.

Raps

Dollarn har stärkts kraftigt mot Euron i veckan och det slutade med hausse i dollarn på fredagen efter att sysselsättningsstatistiken i USA publicerats. Dollarns styrka har bidragit till att priset på rapsfrö (i euro) inte fallit såsom den annars skulle ha gjort.

Raps

Vi fortsätter med neutral rekommendation på raps.

Potatis

Potatisterminen bröt stödet på 5.10 cent och eftersom vi också befinner oss i december, som tidigare år varit den säsongsmässig topp, innan priset fortsätter nedåt de år som haft en stor produktion, är det nog bäst att gå ur köpta positioner på potatis. Vi rekommenderar neutral position.

Potatispris

Gris

Lean hogs majkontrakt föll kraftigt i veckan. Efter att ha handlats på 96 cent i november har priset fallit ner till 89.75 cent. Det finns ganska stor fallhöjd i det amerikanska grispriset.

Grispriset

Mjölk

I tisdags var det återigen en Global Dairy Trade-auktion, med ännu lägre genomsnittligt pris. Det genomsnittliga priset föll med 1.1%. WMP sjönk med 7.1%, men det var den enda produkten som noterade lägre pris. Smör steg med 7.3% och SMP med 5.7%. Ostpriset steg också med 5.2%.

På EUREX har dock de lite längre terminerna på SMP handlats ner med 3% i veckan, medan smörpriset har handlats upp med 1%. En korg av dem som motsvarar mjölkråvara har gått ner med 1% i veckan till 2.79 Kr / Kg.

När vi frågar mjölkbönder vid vilken nivå de tror att de skulle vilja sälja terminer på mjölk verkar ”3.60 Kr / Kg” vara ett riktmärke.

I diagrammet nedan ser vi uppgången i SMP-noteringen på Fonterra-auktionen (grön linje). Notera också att priset på SMP i USA (rosa linje) gått lika mycket nedåt. Priserna på EUREX smör och SMP ser fortfarande ut att vara i stabilt fallande pristrend.

Blå kurva är visar dock liksom Fonterras SMP-noteringen en uppgång i december. Det är den första uppgången i WMP-noteringen sedan början på året, vilket i och för sig kan bero på att den föll mer än vanligt i november.

Mjölkpriser

Botten är inte nådd än.

Socker

Priset marskontraktet på NYBOT föll under den tekniska stödnivån och nådde ner till 15 cent där priset fann stöd. Tekniskt är trenden nedåtriktad och ur det perspektivet skulle priset gissningsvis fortsätta ner.

Kingsman sänkte estimatet för underskottet på socker med 60% till 600,000 ton. I oktober estimerade Kingsman underskottet till 1.66 mt. De hänvisar till högre produktion i Indien. Enligt Kingsman har det lägre priset på socker ännu inte påverkat produktionen i världen, utom i Mexiko och i södra Brasilien, där det inte investerats på flera år, enligt Kingsman.

Vi behåller neutral rekommendation.

Sockerpris

För ytterligare jordbruksanalyser, se SEBs andra analysbrev.

[box]SEB Veckobrev Jordbruksprodukter är producerat av SEB Commodities Sales desk och publiceras i samarbete och med tillstånd på Råvarumarknaden.se[/box]

Detta marknadsföringsmaterial, framtaget av SEB’s Commodities Sales desk, har upprättats enbart i informationssyfte.

Även om innehållet är baserat på källor som SEB bedömt som tillförlitliga ansvarar SEB inte för fel eller brister i informationen. Den utgör inte oberoende, objektiv investeringsanalys och skyddas därför inte av de bestämmelser som SEB har infört för att förebygga potentiella intressekonflikter. Yttranden från SEB’s Commodities Sales desk kan vara oförenliga med tidigare publicerat material från SEB, då den senare hänvisas uppmanas du att läsa den fullständiga rapporten innan någon åtgärd vidtas.

Dokumentationen utgör inte någon investeringsrådgivning och tillhandahålls till dig utan hänsyn till dina investeringsmål. Du uppmanas att självständigt bedöma och komplettera uppgifterna i denna dokumentation och att basera dina investeringsbeslut på material som bedöms erforderligt. Alla framåtblickande uttalanden, åsikter och förväntningar är föremål för risker, osäkerheter och andra faktorer och kan orsaka att det faktiska resultatet avviker väsentligt från det förväntade. Historisk avkastning är ingen garanti för framtida resultat. Detta dokument utgör inte ett erbjudande att teckna några värdepapper eller andra finansiella instrument. SEB svarar inte för förlust eller skada – direkt eller indirekt, eller av vad slag det vara må – som kan uppkomma till följd av användandet av detta material eller dess innehåll.

Observera att det kan förekomma att SEB, dess ledamöter, dess anställda eller dess moder- och/eller dotterbolag vid olika tillfällen innehar, har innehaft eller kommer att inneha aktier, positioner, rådgivningsuppdrag i samband med corporate finance-transaktioner, investment- eller merchantbankinguppdrag och/eller lån i de bolag/finansiella instrument som nämns i materialet.

Materialet är avsett för mottagaren, all spridning, distribuering mångfaldigande eller annan användning av detta meddelande får inte ske utan SEB:s medgivande. Oaktat detta får SEB tillåta omfördelning av materialet till utvald tredje part i enlighet med gällande avtal. Materialet får inte spridas till fysiska eller juridiska personer som är medborgare eller har hemvist i ett land där sådan spridning är otillåten enligt tillämplig lag eller annan bestämmelse.

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Analys

US inventories will likely rise less than normal in mths ahead and that is bullish

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

US commercial crude and product stocks will now most likely start to rise on a weekly basis and not really start to decline again before in week 38. We do however expect US inventories to rise less than normal in reflection of a global oil market in a slight deficit. This will likely hand support to the Brent crude oil price going forward.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Shedding some value along with bearish metals and China/HK equity losses. Brent crude has trailed lower since it jumped to an intraday high of USD 87.7/b on 19. March spurred by Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries. Ydy if fell back 0.6% and today it is pulling back another 1% to USD 85.4/b. But the decline today is accompanied by declines in industrial metals together with a 1.3% decline in Chinese and Hong Kong equities. Thus more broad based forces are helping to pull the oil price lower.

US API indicated a 5.4 m b rise in US oil stocks last week. But rising stocks are normal now onwards. The US API ydy indicated that US crude stocks rose 9.3 m b last week while gasoline stocks declined 4.4 m b while distillates rose 0.5 m b. I.e. a total rise in crude and products of 5.4 m b (actual EIA data today at 15:30 CET). That may have helped to push Brent crude lower this morning. It is however very important to be aware that US inventories seasonally tend to rise from week 12 to week 38. And from week 12 to 24 the average weekly rise is 4.1 m b per week. The increase indicated by the US API ydy is thus not at all way out of line with what is normally taking place in the months to come. What really matters is how US commercial inventories do versus what is normal at the time of year.

US commercial stocks have fallen 17 m b more than normal since end of 2023. So far this year we have seen a draw of  39 m b vs the last week of 2023. The normal draw over this period is only -22 m b. I.e. US commercial inventories have drawn down 17 m b more than normal over this period. This has been the gradual, bullish nudge on oil prices. US commercial stocks should normally rise 63.5 m b from week 12 to week 38. What matters to oil prices is thus whether US inventories rise more or less than that over this period.

Drone attacks on Russian refineries was a catalyst to release Brent to higher levels. Brent crude broke out to the upside on 13 March along with the Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries. Some 800 k b/d of refining capacity was hurt and probably went off line. But in the global scheme of things this is a mere 1% or so of total global refining capacity. And if we assume that it is off line for say 3 months, then it equates to maybe 0.25% impact on global refining activity in 2024 which is easy to adapt to. Refining margins have not moved  much at all. ARA spot diesel cracks are now USD 2.25/b lower than it was in 12 March 2024. Thus no crisis for refined products at all.

We’ll probably not return to pre-drone attack price level of USD 82/b any time soon. Though a dip to that price level is of course not at all out of the question. The oil market may send the oil price lower in the short term since very little material impact in the global scope of things seems to follow from the drone attacks on Russian refineries. Our view is however that the attacks were more like a catalyst to release the oil price to the upside following a steady and stronger than normal decline in US commercial inventories. I.e. the latest price gains in our view is not so much about an added risk premium in the oil price but more about oil price finally adjusting higher according to the fundamentals which have played out since the start of the year with stronger than normal declines in US commercial inventories. We thus see no immediate return to pre-drone-attack price level of USD 82/b. Rather we expect to see continued support to the upside through steady, gradual inventory erosion versus normal like we have seen so far this year.

Voluntary cuts by Russia in Q2-24 could be bullish if delivered as promised. Earlier in March we saw Russia’n willingness to cut back supply in Q2-24 in a mix of production restraints and export restraints. Saudi Arabia and Russia are equal partners in OPEC+ with equal magnitudes of production. In a reflection of this they set equal baselines in May 2020 of 11.0 m b/d. Saudi Arabia produced 9.0 m b/d in February while Russia produced 9.4 m b/d. This is probably why Russia in early March stated that they were willing to cut back in Q2-24. To align more with what Saudi Arabia is producing. It has been of huge importance that Saudi Arabia last year cut its production down to 9.0 m b/d and thus below Russian production. This reactivated Russia as a dynamic, proactive participant in OPEC+. The actual effect of proclaimed production/export cuts by Russia in Q2-24 remains to be seen, but calls for USD 100/b as a consequence of such cuts have surfaced.

So far we haven’t lost a single drop of oil due to Houthie attacks in the Red Sea. We have lost some up-time in Russia refining due to Ukrainian drone strikes lately. But nothing more than can be compensated elsewhere in the world. Temporarily reduced volumes of refined hydrocarbons from Russian will instead lead to higher exports of unrefined molecules (crude oil).

For now OPEC+ is comfortably controlling the oil market and the market will likely be running a slight deficit as a result with inventories getting a continued gradual widening, negative difference versus normal levels thus nudging the oil price yet higher. SEB’s forecast for Brent crude average 2024 is USD 85/b. This means that we’ll likely see both USD 90/b and maybe also USD 100/b some times during the year. But do make sure to evaluate changes in US oil inventories versus what is normal at the time of year. Rising inventories are bullish if they rise less than what is normal from now to week 38.

US commercial crude and product stocks will likely rise going forward. But since the global oil market is likely going to be in slight deficit we’ll likely see slower than normal rise in US inventories with an increasing negative difference to normal inventory levels.

US commercial crude and product stocks
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data feed, EIA data

Total US crude and product stocks incl. SPR are now 4 m b below the low-point from December 2022

Total US crude and product stocks incl. SPR
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data feed, EIA data
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Analys

From surge to slump for natural gas: Navigating the new normal in Europe

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SEB - analysbrev på råvaror

Over the past 4-5 months, EU natural gas prices, indicated by the TTF benchmark, have plummeted by 50% from an October high of EUR 56/MWh to the current EUR 28/MWh for the front-month contract, defying expectations of seasonal price increases. This downturn can be attributed to robust EU inventories at 59% capacity and persistently subdued natural gas demand, down by 11% compared to historical norms. Mild weather in Northwest Europe and a prolonged industrial recession have suppressed consumption, resulting in a significant gas surplus despite nearing the end of the winter heating season (90% complete). These factors collectively exert downward pressure on prices.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

The correlation between Brent and TTF prices remains from times partly “fluid”. In our December 2023 natural gas price update, we predicted a constrained global natural gas market, anticipating a swift resurgence in demand following a decline in gas prices. Our projections were underpinned by a robust Brent Crude price outlook, set at USD 85/bl, USD 87.5/bl, and USD 90/bl for 2024, 2025, and 2026 respectively, with a Crude-to-gas rate of 80%. However, this scenario has yet to materialize as the anticipated demand recovery has been notably delayed, requiring even lower prices than initially predicted for its realization—a phenomenon unique in recent memory.

Achieving a global natural gas price convergence towards levels more aligned with Brent Crude appears plausible, signaling a return to a measure of normalcy. The absence of a winter premium during the 2023/24 winter season suggests a healthier outlook for Q2-24, mitigating the risk of substantial short-term price spikes in European gas markets. The sporadic spikes witnessed in 2022 and partially in 2023 are now a thing of the past, indicating a change from the volatility experienced in recent years.

Short-term EU gas prices hinge heavily on immediate weather patterns and industrial gas demand, both exerting considerable influence on inventory levels, which serve as a critical gauge of supply and demand dynamics. Looking further ahead, the trajectory of prices is linked with the global LNG balance, particularly contingent upon factors such as projected US natural gas production and the capacity of US LNG exports to the global market.

Moreover, the declining influence of Russia on the European gas market is notable, with sporadic gas export halts from the former energy powerhouse carrying reduced impact. Global market recalibrations indicate a sustained elevation in price levels, with EUR 30/MWh emerging as a feasible benchmark for the foreseeable future. We also call “the end of the energy crisis”, as the worst is history. Reflecting on the current year, EU TTF prices hit the lowest point in late February, with expectations of a potential slide/climb from current prices at EUR 28/MWh.

In essence, our current natural gas price forecast hinges on a delicate equilibrium among three pivotal factors. Firstly, the TTF price must strike a balance, remaining sufficiently low to stimulate a resurgence in demand. For context, the historical average real price hovers around EUR 27/MWh, with EUR 30/MWh anticipated to gradually encourage demand recovery, thereby mitigating the effects of demand destruction. Secondly, the TTF price should maintain a relatively ”normal” relationship with Crude prices, as historical trends indicate a natural correlation between the two. A notably low rate would invariably attract heightened interest from Asian markets, as LNG emerges as a cost-effective alternative to oil in terms of energy content. Lastly, the TTF price must also exhibit a level of elevation to cover the expenses associated with producing and transporting US natural gas to the European market. This entails factoring in costs related to Henry Hub, tolling fees, liquefaction, transportation, and regasification, among other associated expenses. Achieving a delicate equilibrium among these factors is vital for ensuring the stability and sustainability of natural gas pricing dynamics in the European market.

Consequently, our current stance reflects a delicate balancing act among these three critical factors. Settling on EUR 30/MWh, we predict that prices lower than this threshold would catalyze a swifter demand resurgence, while simultaneously enhancing the appeal of natural gas against oil as the spread widens. Moreover, importation from the USA would encounter mounting challenges as prices decline, particularly approaching the EUR 25/MWh mark when landed in ARA.

The TTF market has been complexly interlinked with the global LNG market at the margins since 2015, many years before the energy crisis. While the proportion of LNG consumed in Europe has surged significantly, the concept of LNG prices influencing TTF prices at the margin is not new. However, in terms of volume, the current situation declares us notably more vulnerable than in previous years.

In our updated projections, we have revised our price forecasts downward, particularly notable at the front end, encompassing Q2-24, Q3-24, and the Full-year (FY) 2024. Other adjustments, though marginally smaller, remain for FY 2025, 2026, and 2027. Despite these reductions, we anticipate a trajectory of increasing European natural gas prices from their current levels. Notably, Q1-24 is now expected to average EUR 27/MWh, followed by predictions of EUR 25/MWh, EUR 28/MWh, and EUR 32/MWh for Q2-24, Q3-24, and Q4-24 respectively. Consequently, the average for FY 2024 is forecasted at EUR 28/MWh, marking a notable decline from the previous estimate of EUR 40/MWh.

In our outlook for longer-term pricing, we anticipate an average of EUR 30/MWh for the years 2025, 2026, and 2027—a reduction of EUR 10/MWh compared to our previous update in December 2023, which projected EUR 40/MWh. This long-term forecast only sits marginally higher, by EUR 3-4/MWh, than the historical average real price of approximately EUR 27/MWh. Such pricing aligns intending to stimulate further demand recovery and maintain consumer affordability within the European economy. Reflecting on historical trends, previous price levels in the European market might be seen as reliant on potentially risky agreements with Russia. Consequently, the era of exceptionally low-cost energy is drawing to a close, indicating a new paradigm where European gas and power are priced slightly higher, establishing a ”new normal” for the foreseeable future.

TTF spot prices

PRICE ACTION

The absence of a winter premium for global natural gas is notable. Our longer-term natural gas price projection, set at EUR 30/MWh, demonstrates resilience compared to historical market norms. Last quarter (Q4-23) closed at EUR 43/MWh for the front-month contract, a figure approximately EUR 10/MWh lower than our recent expectations. Noteworthy market adjustments have transpired not only within the European gas market but also on a global scale. This ongoing adaptation is expected to continue influencing the gas market into 2024, resulting in fewer severe price spikes and a return to more normal price differentials.

Global natural gas prices, EUR/MWh

Maintaining our gas price forecast at EUR 30/MWh for 2025 suggests an expectation for European natural gas prices to stabilize at current market rates. This projection extends to 2026 and 2027, which stand roughly 30% higher than historical norms – a contrast to the previous era of favorable deals with Russia flooding European consumers with low-cost piped natural gas.

Considerable attention is drawn to the relationship between gas and oil prices. With our oil market outlook projecting USD 85/bl, USD 87.5/bl, and USD 90/bl for 2024, 2025, and 2026 respectively, the convergence of gas prices to more normal circumstances implies a corresponding alignment with oil prices. Historically, EU natural gas prices have traded at 0.55-0.6 times Brent crude prices, a figure that is expected to converge closer to historical norms. However, our forecasts for 2024, 2025, and 2026 slightly exceed historical norms, at 0.62 x Brent, 0.65 x Brent, and 0.62 x Brent respectively, reflecting a tighter natural gas balance in the coming years.

The transformation of global LNG trade, from roughly 5% spot and short-term LNG trade in 2000 to roughly 30% in 2023, underscores a higher degree of flexibility in negotiating spot and short-term LNG contracts. This evolution suggests a shift towards contracts potentially decoupled from Brent indexations, challenging the conventional reliance on oil prices as a benchmarking tool for global natural gas prices.


US LNG

A significant surge in global liquefaction (export) capacity is anticipated from the US and Qatar starting in 2026 and beyond. These large-scale liquefaction projects typically entail long-term contracts with predefined off-takers or demand centers, primarily serving power plants or industrial applications. The transportation of substantial LNG volumes from the US to Europe underscores strategic economic and energy considerations. The US, propelled by abundant shale gas resources and extensive LNG liquefaction infrastructure, has emerged as a major LNG exporter. Europe, seeking to diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on Russia, offers an attractive market for American LNG. Additionally, LNG’s flexibility as a cleaner-burning fuel aligns with Europe’s environmental sustainability objectives and transition away from coal.

The transatlantic LNG trade between the US and Europe capitalizes on arbitrage opportunities driven by regional gas price variations and demand-supply imbalances. This flow not only enhances energy security for European nations but also aids NE Asia in meeting environmental obligations.

The US-Europe netback for LNG cargo depends on various economic factors, including global natural gas prices, US regional supply and demand dynamics, and fluctuations in shipping costs.

The competitiveness of US LNG in the European market is influenced by several factors, including the US benchmark price for domestic natural gas (Henry Hub), source gas costs, voyage costs, shipping costs, and regasification costs at the destination.

In more detail the competitiveness of US LNG in the European market is influenced by factors such as the US benchmark price for domestic natural gas (Henry Hub); Source gas cost (Henry Hub + Tolling fee and liquefaction fee); voyage cost (Insurance, port, canal, boil-off, and fuel cost); shipping cost at day rate; and regasification cost in the other end.

A simplified calculation demonstrates the US-EU arbitrage opportunity. At current market figures, the total cost of delivering LNG from the US to Europe is roughly USD 7.05/MMBtu or approximately EUR 22/MWh. Comparatively, the EU TTF front-month contract trades at EUR 28/MWh, indicating an average EUR 6/MWh arbitrage opportunity and an equal profit margin for traders. However, with state-of-the-art LNG vessels, the total cost could decrease significantly, resulting in a substantial profit margin for traders.

The calculation (with current market figures all in USD per MMBtu as a standard unit):
Front-month Henry Hub (1.65) + 15% tolling fee (0.25) and liquefaction fee for conventional LNG ships (2.5) + Insurance, port, and canal (on average 0.33) + boil-off and fuel cost (on average 1.2) + regasification (0.5) + shipping cost at current day rate (0.62).

i.e., for total cost from the US to Europe we get 1.65 + 0.25 + 2.5 + 0.33 + 1.2 + 0.5 + 0.62 = USD 7.05/MMBtu – or roughly EUR 22/MWh. At the time of writing, the EU TTF front-month contract is trading at EUR 28/MWh. Hence, in the current spot market, the US-EU arbitrage is at roughly on average EUR 6/MWh and equally EUR 6/MWh profit to trader. However, this is a conservative estimate. In a situation with a state-of-the-art MEGI / X-DF LNG vessel, we would have a lower liquefaction fee and per unit insurance, boil-off, and fuel cost, which would imply a total cost of USD 6.0/MMBtu (EUR 18.5/MWh) – consequently, a massive EUR 9.5/MWh profit to the trader. Understating the massive economic argument in shipping LNG from the US to the EU (at current market rates).

But even though a substantial arrival of LNG export capacity in the US is approaching, it is not like the US has unlimited natural gas production, or unlimited LNG capacity to feed the global thirst for LNG. Hence, it is not like the EU TTF will plunge to levels comparable to the US Henry Hub + all associated costs for delivering to the EU.

A substantial surge in LNG export capacity is imminent, fueled by significant investments totaling USD 235 billion directed towards upcoming super-chilled fuel projects since 2019. The majority of these projects are slated to come online from the second half of 2025 onward, with an additional USD 55 billion investment expected by 2025, driving a remarkable 45% surge in LNG liquefaction capacity by the end of the decade.

Currently, the global LNG export market boasts a total capacity of approximately 420 million tonnes, projected to expand significantly to 610 million tonnes by 2030. The bulk of this expansion will stem from Qatar, Russia, and the US, with capacities increasing by roughly 23, 26, and 117 million tonnes respectively from 2024 to 2030.

However, it’s worth noting that on January 26, 2024, the Biden Administration paused LNG exports to non-FTA countries, awaiting updated analyses by the DOE. This affects 4 major projects and risks WTO challenges. The DOE cites outdated assessments, signaling a policy shift and raising market uncertainties.

This pause could have significant geopolitical and trade implications, as it also becomes an election issue. Stakeholders, including exporters and developers, now face uncertainties and must review agreements. Overall, the pause prompts a broader review of LNG export policies, impacting domestic and international markets. However, it’s too early to fully assess its impact, so the aforementioned capacity forecast remains firm for now.

The industry’s confidence is underpinned by the anticipation of rising LNG demand, driven by Europe’s efforts to reduce reliance on Russian gas and Asia’s shift away from coal, particularly in China. Yet, this expansion is not merely speculative; it represents a long-term commitment between suppliers and off-takers. These projects typically entail long-term contracts of 20+ years, often supplying power plants or industrial applications. Consequently, the new LNG export capacity is expected to match a similar scale of demand.

The significant export ventures from the United States to Qatar will further cement LNG’s role in the global energy landscape, with contracts extending well into the 2050s, even surpassing some carbon-neutral targets.

Moreover, there remains ample room for natural gas in the long run. The COP28 acknowledged that transitional fuels like LNG can facilitate the energy transition, signaling implicit support for LNG over dirtier fossil fuels.

Critics argue that natural gas isn’t the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel due to potential methane leakage along the supply chain. However, such concerns arise belatedly as the wave of new facilities is already underway. With oil demand reaching its peak and coal declining gradually, gas is expected to maintain its prominence in the energy mix.


SUPPLY & DEMAND

In the short term, the winter wildcard/premium is gone, pointing to a healthier Q2 2024. We have, a while back, pinpointed that the European natural gas market is in a limbo state between supply uncertainties and demand uncertainties. With a consequence of a winter wildcard largely being balanced by the short/medium-term weather and withdrawal rate of European natural gas inventories.

Recent weather forecasts predict slightly colder temperatures in early April across Northwest Europe, but the preceding winter months saw normal to milder conditions, resulting in lower-than-expected inventory drawdowns and weak price trends.

Looking ahead, forecasts for April to June 2024 suggest above-normal temperatures in Northwest Europe, reducing heating and power demand and maintaining subdued gas consumption. Prices in Q2-24 are forecasted to average around EUR 25/MWh.

Daily LNG imports - Europe

Furthermore, it is easy to think of the faded energy crisis as a European crisis. But the adaptation for global gas markets has been equally/more important. Very high global gas prices have resulted in adaption in all corners of the globe, consequently, easing the global natural gas balance and freeing more gas volumes to the highest bidder at more “reasonable” prices. During the peak of the crisis, the highest bidder was naturally Europe which was sucking up all excess global LNG volumes. However, at the current price levels, the “three importing giants”, namely China, South Korea, and Japan have finally woken up, and are no longer “re-routing” their LNG cargos, while also actively participating in the short-term/spot market.

Russia’s grip over the EU is expected to weaken in the spring/summer of 2024. Since February/March 2022, President Putin sought to balance revenue generation and geopolitical pressure by controlling the energy supply to the EU. This strategy faced challenges: reducing exports to zero would jeopardize revenue, while high exports would alleviate the EU’s energy crisis, as seen in winter 2022/23. Despite efforts, Putin’s goal of using natural gas as a strategic tool faltered in winter 2023/24.

Russia - Europe pipeline flow of natural gas

Market adaptation ensued. Since December 2022, Russian piped gas supply to Europe has fluctuated between 10-25% of historical averages, currently nearing 20%. To intensify geopolitical pressure, Russia may need to further reduce flows, possibly to around 10% in winter 2024/25. Despite the distant outlook, the market has already factored in potential price increases for next winter.

Two main pipelines deliver Russian gas to Europe: ”Turkstream,” to Turkey, and the ”Brotherhood,” through Ukraine to Slovakia. These pipelines each contribute roughly 50% of the 0.75 TWh per day flow. The pipeline via Ukraine faces physical risks, and a supply halt is likely next winter as the transit agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz expires in December 2024, with little chance of renewal.


EU INVENTORIES

The trajectory of EU natural gas inventories for the upcoming summer is primarily influenced by both the global LNG market and European natural gas demand. In Q2-23 (one year ago), inventories commenced the injection season at an all-time high, leading to the current record-high inventory status. These comfortable inventories suggest the EU has the situation under control as it emerges from the winter season. Currently, inventories stand at 59%, a substantial 25% above the 2015-2022 average.

European natural gas inventories

Despite missing out on over 1,000 TWh of natural gas imports from Russia compared to historical levels, the mild winter of 2022/23, reduced demand due to high prices, and increased LNG imports compensated with an additional 1,400 TWh. This over-compensation of 400 TWh in Q1-23 facilitated an unprecedented injection rate into European inventories during Q1 and Q2 2023. As a result, European inventories shifted from a deficit of 180 TWh in January 2022 to a surplus of 259 TWh in April 2023, leading to the current record-high levels.

However, if NE Asia, predominantly led by China, continues to outbid the EU for LNG cargo and industrial gas demand increases due to favorable long-term hedging levels, current comfortable inventory levels will gradually return to normal. This suggests EU TTF prices will slowly climb towards over EUR 30/MWh by the next heating season, a trend partly factored into current pricing.

While the crisis urgency has faded, market adjustments now activate at lower price thresholds. Nonetheless, we anticipate slightly higher long-term price levels (EUR 30/MWh) due to increasing LNG bids from China (+NE Asia), a rebound in EU demand, and reduced LNG imports influenced by lower prices. This will result in a slower inventory build during Q2-24 and Q3-24 compared to last year. Despite diminishing supply from Russia, the EU remains focused on maintaining preparedness for future winters, leading to a new normal in natural gas inventory levels throughout the year.

The European energy crisis has significantly eased during 2023 and Q1-24. Softened front-end prices influence longer-dated prices, with the winter premium/seasonality fully washed out during the ongoing heating season. Healthy EU natural gas inventories, currently at 59% capacity (675 TWh) and surpassing the European Commission’s target of reaching 90% storage fullness by 1 November, contribute to this subsiding crisis. Continued subdued European consumption (11% below historical averages) and robust LNG imports set a ceiling on short-term prices, although increased EU demand could quickly alter this scenario, as EU demand has proven stickier than anticipated.

DEMAND RECOVERY

Reduced uncertainty and lower prices are expected to lead to more long-term hedging. Since the start of Q1 2024 (year-to-date), the TTF spot has averaged EUR 27/MWh, approximately USD 50/boe, only marginally below the ’historical norm’ when adjusted for inflation. Despite these price levels, a resurgence in European industrial gas consumption during the winter is not straightforward.

EU natura gas demand recuction vs normal

Industrial gas demand remains subdued, sitting 11% below historical averages. While this marks an improvement from the 25-30% drop experienced in mid-summer 2022 – a period characterized as the ”peak of the crisis” – when spot prices consistently traded at EUR 150/MWh (USD 255/boe).

The slower-than-expected recovery is largely attributed to industries hesitating to commit to longer-term prices. For example, during Q4 2023, despite tumbling spot prices, futures prices remained strong. In mid-October, gas for delivery in January 2024 was priced at EUR 55/MWh (USD 103/boe). Thus, during Q4 2023, peak-winter prices maintained a considerable premium over spot prices to a large extent.

However, the current landscape has changed. The winter premium has diminished as we exit the heating season, and weak spot prices predominantly drive forward. This reflects a market that is more certain and willing to forecast futures during a less turbulent phase. The convergence and narrowing gap between spot and long-term prices signify that ”peak natural gas has passed.” Major consumers in Europe are expected to adopt more long-term hedging for longer-term prices, ideally hedging these futures close to current spot prices. This suggests that current market prices will likely trigger increased consumption compared to Q3 and Q4 2023, although a full-scale comeback will take time.

As previously noted, substantial demand destruction occurred not only in Europe but also globally, particularly in Asia. Over the last couple of years, demand destruction amounted to approximately 800 TWh per year, while the normal growth rate in the global LNG market is 200 TWh per annum. This indicates that most of the demand will eventually return, although the timing remains uncertain. 


NE ASIAN LNG

EUR 25/MWh presents a favorable ”buy opportunity,” and prices are expected to either slide or climb from this point. The decline in prices can be attributed to sustained low demand and high inventories. We anticipate prices to either slide or increase from here, with minimal downside, as prices are likely to find support around EUR 25/MWh.

Forward prices for both JKM and TTF indicate that the NE Asian LNG market will remain a preferred destination for marginal LNG cargo in the near term. While the EU previously heavily relied on NE Asia, the European market can no longer solely depend on the economic vulnerabilities of NE Asia or China.

LNG arbitrage

A long-awaited pent-up demand for energy in China would lead to increased demand for goods and services, consequently boosting energy consumption, particularly natural gas, primarily in the form of LNG. In such a scenario, the JKM may command a larger premium over the TTF than the existing EUR 2.5/MWh (3-month rolling contract). This would divert LNG spot cargoes away from Europe, further reducing the EU’s natural gas surplus. Thus, the ongoing recovery in China’s economy is likely to stimulate Asia’s demand for natural gas, potentially resulting in EU LNG purchasers paying a premium to secure essential LNG imports in the future.

Daily LNG imports NE Asia

With current prices, we anticipate an increase in EU demand coupled with a decrease in EU LNG imports. This trend may persist until we observe a slight shortfall in compensation relative to the natural gas deficit from Russia, which could drive prices upward during the summer.


KEY TAKEAWAYS

The ongoing transition from coal to natural gas signifies a significant shift in the global energy landscape. Natural gas emerges as a crucial bridging technology, offering a cleaner alternative to coal and facilitating the transition toward widespread adoption of renewable energy sources. This transition underscores the environmental benefits of natural gas, positioning it as a pivotal component in mitigating climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Despite challenges such as the reduction in Russian gas supply, the natural gas market is adapting rapidly. Europe, in particular, faces competition for global LNG volumes, primarily sourced from the US and Qatar. The market’s ability to swiftly adjust reflects its adaptability and resilience on a global scale, highlighting the importance of diversifying energy sources and supply routes.

Our current natural gas price forecast relies on achieving a delicate equilibrium among key factors. This includes stimulating demand, maintaining a correlation with crude prices, and ensuring cost coverage for US natural gas transportation. Striking this balance is essential for maintaining stability and sustainability in European gas pricing dynamics, ensuring energy security.

In response to changing market conditions, we have revised our price outlook downward for the short term, notably for Q2-24, Q3-24, and FY 2024. Specifically, Q1-24 is forecasted to average EUR 27/MWh, followed by predictions of EUR 25/MWh for Q2-24, EUR 28/MWh for Q3-24, and EUR 32/MWh for Q4-24. However, prices are expected to gradually increase over the longer term, with an average forecast of EUR 30/MWh for the years 2025, 2026, and 2027, slightly higher than historical averages.

This revised outlook reflects the evolving nature of the natural gas market and the need for flexibility in response to changing geopolitical landscapes and supply dynamics. Looking ahead, natural gas remains a crucial bridge over coal, facilitating the transition towards cleaner energy sources.

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Fed cuts ahead bolstering oil prices

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Initially, Brent Crude experienced a decline yesterday following the release of US crude inventories data. However, nationwide US crude inventories, excluding those held in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), saw a decline for the second consecutive week, remaining below the five-year seasonal average. Additionally, there was a larger-than-expected decline in gasoline holdings. While the overall draw presents a bullish narrative, it required some support from yesterday’s Federal Reserve announcement to trend in a positive direction.

Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB
Ole R. Hvalbye, Analyst Commodities, SEB

The Brent Crude front-month contract strengthened before yesterday’s close and has continued this positive momentum into today, currently trading at USD 86.5 per barrel. This reflects an increase of roughly USD 1 per barrel (1%) compared to yesterday evening’s low point.

The Federal Reserve signaled its intention to adhere to its outlook for three rate cuts this year, boosting both risk appetite and weakening the US dollar, which has benefited global crude prices.

In our analysis, global crude prices are currently supported by strong fundamentals. Demand growth remains robust, complemented by significant production cuts by OPEC+ and subdued output from US shale oil producers. Consequently, the global oil market is operating at a slight deficit, resulting in a gradual depletion of oil inventories, as evidenced by the recent declines in US crude and product inventories (further details below). This trend is expected to provide support for oil prices and potentially drive them sideways to upwards, with limited downside risks.

However, it’s important to note that while fundamentals appear promising and the oil market has found some reassurance in yesterday’s Federal Reserve announcement, expectations for enduring inflation may act as a headwind for oil prices over the longer term, potentially capping a significant oil price rally.

As a reminder, our assumptions for Brent oil prices have remained firm since September 2023. We anticipate Brent Crude to average USD 85/bl and USD 87.5/bl for 2024 and 2025, respectively, with projections of USD 90/bl for 2026 and 2027.


Yet another week of drawdown in US inventories. Commercial crude oil inventories in the U.S., excluding those held in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, decreased by 2.0 million barrels from the previous week, reaching a total of 445.0 million barrels. This figure is approximately 3% below the five-year average for this time of year.

Total motor gasoline inventories saw a significant decline of 3.3 million barrels from the previous week, now standing approximately 2% below the five-year average. However, distillate fuel inventories experienced a marginal increase of 0.6 million barrels, remaining roughly 5% below the five-year average. Meanwhile, propane/propylene inventories rose by 0.4 million barrels, reaching a notable 9% above the five-year average.

Overall commercial petroleum inventories witnessed a decrease of 6.1 million barrels last week. Total products supplied over the last four-week period averaged 20.1 million barrels per day, indicating a 2.2% increase from the same period last year.

Motor gasoline product supplied averaged 8.8 million barrels per day over the past four weeks, showing a marginal increase of 0.3% from the same period last year. Conversely, distillate fuel product supplied averaged 3.7 million barrels per day, down by 1.9% from the same period last year. Jet fuel product supplied experienced a slight decrease of 0.2% compared to the same four-week period last year.

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