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Risk for OPEC dissapointment and a short term sell-off as all bets are on the long side

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SEB - Prognoser på råvaror - CommodityMarked has placed all chips on the long side betting on an extension of OPEC/non-OPEC production cuts which officially ends in Q1-18. In general we do think that OPEC/non-OPEC will manage the market and hold back production if needed through 2018 in order to secure further gradual draw down of OECD inventories. However we also think that it would be better for OPEC/non-OPEC to make hard decissions on this in Feb/Mar getting as much data as possible before making that decission. That is also what the group has mostly consistengly communicated through the autumn. The market seems to expect and demand a firm decission right now this week. As such the market is rigged for dissapointment with a possible short term sell-off as all chips are on the long side.

On Thursday 30th OPEC and some non-OPEC producers will meet in Vienna to discuss whether to extend current production cuts or not.

The communication all through the autumn has been that they want to make this decission in February/March 2018 in order to have as much data on the table as possible before making the decission.

That makes a lot of sense since there is substantial dissagreement with respect to how much oil is needed from OPEC in 2018.

Somehow the market has geared it self up to an expectation that OPEC/non-OPEC needs to make a firm decission on this right now on Thursday. And further that the decission will be an extension of current cuts maintained all to the end of 2018.

As such it seems to us that there is a substantial risk that the market is setting it self up for a dissapointment this week. For us it makes much more sense for the group to make this call in Feb/Mar which is also what they mostly have been communicating all through the autumn.

The challenge for the group this is week may thus be all about managing the market’s expectations. How not to let the market down when it communicates that the decission will be taken in Feb/March.

And if there is a decission this week it is likely going to be a sign of intention: “If needed we’ll maintain cuts to the end of 2018”, or “We’ll maintain cuts to June 2018 and then make a new assessment”, or “We are all in agreement that we’ll extend cuts as long as needed in order to drive OECD inventories down to the 5 year average”.

That is indeed a trickey reference. This is because for every month we move forward the 5 year average reference is rising. Since March 2017 the OECD inventories have declined some 0.7 mb/d when adjusting for seasonal trends (given by the 2010-2014 seasonal average profile). If we extend this decline rate on top of the seasonal trend (2010-2014) we actually almost get all the way down the 2013-2017 average profile.

As such one can say that in February when we get the OECD inventory data for December 2017 the goal of getting inventories down to the 5 year average (2013-2017) will have been achieved. The goal of getting OECD inventories down to the 5 year average is thus a trickey goal and a moving target.

The big question though is what is really needed in order to secure a balanced oil market in 2018? There is a significant dissagreement on this. The IEA says that call-on-OPEC will be 32.4 mb/d in 2018. SEB’s estimate is 32.7 mb/d, the US EIA’s is 32.7 mb/d while OPEC’s own estimate is 33.4 mb/d. Variations on this comes down to projections for demand, US shale oil production and the level of OPEC’s NGL production in 2018.

The OECD draw down since March this year of 0.7 mb/d (adjusted for seasonallity) indicates an implied oil market deficit of 0.7 mb/d thrugh Q2 and Q3 this year during which OPEC produced 32.55 mb/d. However, if we assume that the OECD inventories only cover half or a third of global inventories then what we see of deficit implied by the draw down in the OECD inventories could actually be two or three times as much if there have been comparable draw downs in non-OECD inventories.

Thus beeing carefule about committing to further cuts now on Thursday seems kind of sensible with the aim of instead making that decission in Feb/Mar.

Market participants are seemingly all expecting OPEC/non-OPEC to make a firm and clear decission this Thursday for extending current cuts to Dec-2018. Net long speculative positions for Brent and WTI together are now very close to all time high. US oil rig count has started to rise again (+9 rigs last week). The decission to add these 9 rigs was probably taken some 6-8 weeks ago when the WTI forward price only stood at $51-52/b. Now that reference WTI price stands at $55/bl with a clear risk for a rise in rig count in the weeks to come. The outage of the 590 kbl/d Keystone pipeline due to an oil spill has reduced supply into Cushing Oklahoma by some 4 mbl/week. It has helped to reduce Chushing inventories and to drive also the WTI crude curve into backwardation. However, the Keystone pipline is likely to back in operation within a week or so.

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Thus overall there is a fair chance that the market will be dissapointed on Thursday. That there will be no firm decission even though there will be firm support for further cuts if needed. And if OPEC/non-OPEC actually do make a firm decission to maintain cuts all to the end of 2018 then there may not be much upside price action since that decission is already so highly priced in already.

Thus buying a put option on the front month WTI contract with short time to expiry may be a good strattegy in the run-up to this week’s digital OPEC/non-OPEC decission risk on Thursday.

Our general stand on OPEC/non-OPEC cuts for 2018 is that further cuts are likely needed but also that if needed we expect OPEC/non-OPEC to manage the market in order to prevent inventories from rising back up.
Needed cuts will likely be of a magnitude which are perfectly manageable for the group. Why through away all they have acchieved in 2017 with inventory draw downs when they can hold back a little supply.

Ch1: OECD inventories with extrapolation to end of 2017 of the 0.7 mb/d draw down in Q2 and Q3 2017
Getting closer to the 2010-2014 average in December 2017

OECD inventories with extrapolation to end of 2017 of the 0.7 mb/d draw down in Q2 and Q3 2017

Ch2: OECD inventories. Which 5 year normal should you use? The 2013-2017?
If the latter then mission acomplished in December 2017, but we won’t know before February

OECD inventories. Which 5 year normal should you use? The 2013-2017?

Ch3: Call-on-OPEC 2018? – Big dissagreement!
Who knows OPEC NGL the best? Account for 0.6 mb/d difference to the IEA!

Call-on-OPEC 2018? – Big dissagreement!

Oil

Ch4: Close to record USD allocation in net long speculative Brent crude oil positions
Makes it vulnerable to downside corrections and OPEC/non-OPEC dissapointments
Net long Brent crude oil speculative positions are now at the 3rd highest over the past 52 weeks

Close to record USD allocation in net long speculative Brent crude oil positions

Ch5: US oil rig count has started to rise again

US oil rig count has started to rise againOil

Ch6 The increas in rig count we see now came from price signals some 6-8 weeks ago
Since then the WTI curve price has moved from $51/bl to $55/bl.
The effect of the price rise over the past 6-8 weeks will be visible in terms of rig count over the coming 6-8 weeks

The increas in rig count we see now came from price signals some 6-8 weeks ago

Ch7: Risk of rising rig count in the weeks to come
Could weight bearishly on the WTI crude oil price

Risk of rising rig count in the weeks to come

Ch8: While US crude oil production continues to rise
Will it rise 0.7 mb/d or 1.5 mb/d next year?

While US crude oil production continues to rise

Ch9: WTI crude oil curve shifted into backwardation following the outage of the Keystone pipeline which feeds 590 kbl/d of Canadian oil into Chushing Oklahoma
The Keystone pipeline is likely going to be back on line within a week or so which could push the WTI curve back into contango again

WTI crude oil curve shifted into backwardation following the outage of the Keystone pipeline

Kind regards

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Bjarne Schieldrop
Chief analyst, Commodities
SEB Markets
Merchant Banking

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Analys

Market Still Betting on Timely Resolution, But Each Day Raises Shortage Risk

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Down on Friday. Up on Monday. The Brent June crude oil contract traded down 5.1% last week to a close of $90.38/b. It reached a high of $103.87/b last Monday and a low of $86.09/b on Friday as Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open for transit. That quickly changed over the weekend as the US upheld its blockade of Iranian oil exports while Iran naturally responded by closing the SoH again. The US blew a hole in the engine room of the Iranian ship TOUSKA and took custody of the ship on Sunday. Brent crude is up 5.6% this morning to $95.4/b.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

The cease-fire is expiring tomorrow. The US has said it will send a delegation for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad in Pakistan. But Iran has for now rejected a second round of talks as it views US demands as  unrealistic and excessive while the US is also blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

While Brent is up 5% this morning, the financial market is still very optimistic that progress will be made. That talks will continue and that the SoH will fully open by the start of May which is consistent with a rest-of-year average Brent crude oil price of around $90/b with the market now trading that balance at around $88/b.

Financial optimism vs. physical deterioration. We have a divergence where the financial market is trading negotiations, improvements and resolution while at the same time the physical market is deteriorating day by day. Physical oil flows remain constrained by disrupted flows, longer voyage times and elevated freight and insurance costs.  

Financial markets are betting that a US/Iranian resolution will save us in time from violent shortages down the road. But every day that the SoH remains closed is bringing us closer to a potentially very painful point of shortages and much higher prices.

The US blockade is also a weapon of leverage against its European and Asian allies. When Iran closed the SoH it held the world economy as a hostage against the US. The US blockade of the SoH is of course blocking Iranian oil exports. But it is also an action of disruption directed towards Europe and Asia. The US has called for the rest of the world to engaged in the war with Iran: ”If you want oil from the Persian Gulf, then go and get it”. A risk is that the US plays brinkmanship with the global oil market directed towards its  European and Asian allies and maybe even towards China to force them to engage and take part. Maybe unthinkable. But unthinkable has become the norm with Trump in the White House.

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Analys

TACO (or Whatever It Was) Sends Oil Lower — Iran Keeps Choking Hormuz

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Wild moves yesterday. Brent crude traded to a high of $114.43/b and a low of $96.0/b and closed at $99.94/b yesterday. 

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

US – Iran negotiations ongoing or not? What a day. Donald Trump announced that good talks were ongoing between Iran and the US and that the 48 hour deadline before bombing Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure was postponed by five days subject to success of ongoing meetings. Iranian media meanwhile stated that no meetings were ongoing at all.

Today we are scratching our heads trying to figure out what yesterday was all about.

Friends and family playing the market? Was it just Trump and his friends and family who were playing with oil and equity markets with $580m and $1.46bn in bets being placed by someone in oil and equity markets just 15 minutes before Trump’s announcement?

Was Trump pulling a TACO as he reached his political and economic pain point: Brent at $112/b, US Gas at $4/gal, SPX below 200dma and US 10yr above 4.4%?

Different Iranian factions with Trump talking with one of them? Are there real negotiations going on but with the US talking to one faction in Iran while another, the hardliners, are not involved and are denying any such negotiations going on?

Extending the ultimatum to attack and invade Kharg island next weekend? Or, is the five day delay of the deadline a tactical decision to allow US amphibious assault ships and marines to arrive in the Gulf in the upcoming weekend while US and Israeli continues to degrade Iranian military targets till then. And then next weekend a move by the US/Israel to attack and conquer for example the Kharg island?

We do not really know which it is or maybe a combination of these.

We did get some kind of TACO ydy. But markets have been waiting for some kind of TACO to happen and yesterday we got some kind of TACO. And Brent crude is now trading at $101.5/b as a result rather than at $112-114/b as it did no the high yesterday.

But what really matters in our view is the political situation on the ground in Iran. Will hardliners continue to hold power or will a more pragmatic faction gain power?

If the hardliners remain in power then oil pain should extend all the way to US midterm elections. The hardliners were apparently still in charge as of last week. Iran immediately retaliated and damaged LNG infrastructure in Qatar after Israel hit Iranian South Pars. The SoH was still closed and all messages coming out of Iran indicated defiance. Hardliners continues in power has a huge consequence for oil prices going forward. The regime has played its ’oil-weapon’ (closing or chocking the Strait of Hormuz). It is using it to achieve political goals. Deterrence: it needs to be so politically and economically expensive to attack Iran that it won’t happen again in the future. Or at least that the US/Israel thinks 10-times over before they attack again. The highest Brent crude oil closing price since the start of the war is $112.19/b last Friday. In comparison the 20-year inflation adjusted Brent price is $103/b. So Brent crude last Friday at $112.19/b isn’t a shockingly high price. And it is still far below the nominal high of $148/b from 2008 which is $220/b if inflation adjusted. So once in a lifetime Iran activates its most powerful weapon. The oil weapon. It needs to show the power of this weapon and it needs to reap political gains. Getting Brent to $112/b and intraday high of $119.5/b (9 March) isn’t a display of the power of that weapon. And it is not a deterrence against future attacks.

So if the hardliners remain in power in Iran, then the SoH will likely remain chocked all the way to US midterm elections and Brent crude will at a minimum go above the historical nominal high of $148/b from 2008.

Thus the outlook for the oil price for the rest of the year doesn’t depend all that much of whether Trump pulls a TACO or not. Stops bombing or not. It depends more on who is in charge in Iran. If it is the hardliners, then deterrence against future attacks via chocking of the SoH and high oil prices is the likely line of action. It is impacting the world but the Iranian ’oil-weapon’ is directed towards the US president and the the US midterm elections.

If a pragmatic faction gets to power in Iran, then a very prosperous future is possible. However, if power is shifting towards a more pragmatic faction in Iran then a completely different direction could evolve. Such a faction could possibly be open for cooperation with the US and the GCC and possibly put its issues versus Israel aside. Then the prosperity we have seen evolving in Dubai could be a possible future also for Iran.

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So far it looks like the hardliners are fully in charge. As far as we can see, the hardliners are still fully in control in Iran. That points towards continued chocking of the SoH and oil prices ticking higher as global inventories (the oil market buffers) are drawn lower. And not just for a few more weeks, but possibly all the way to the US midterm elections. 

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Analys

Oil stress is rising as the supply chains and buffers are drained

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A brief sigh of relief yesterday as oil infra at Kharg wasn’t damaged. But higher today. Brent crude dabbled around a bit yesterday in relief that oil infrastructure at Iran’s Kharg island wasn’t damaged. It traded briefly below the 100-line and in a range of $99.54 – 106.5/b. Its close was near the low at $100.21/b.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

No easy victorious way out for Trump. So no end in sight yet. Brent is up 3.2% today to $103.4/b with no signs that the war will end anytime soon. Trump has no easy way to declare victory and mission accomplished as long as Iran is in full control of the Strait of Hormuz while also holding some 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% and not far from weapons grade at 90%. As long as these two factors are unresolved it is difficult for Trump to pull out of the Middle East. Naturally he gets increasingly frustrated over the situation as the oil price and US retail gas prices keeps ticking higher while the US is tied into the mess in the Middle East. Trying to drag NATO members into his mess but not much luck there. 

When commodity prices spike they spike 2x, 3x, 4x or 5x. Supply and demand for commodities are notoriously inflexible. When either of them shifts sharply, the the price can easily go to zero (April 2022) or multiply 2x, 3x, or even 5x of normal. Examples in case cobalt in 2025 where Kongo restricted supply and the price doubled. Global LNG in 2022 where the price went 5x normal for the full year average. Demand for tungsten in ammunition is up strongly along with full war in the middle east. And its price? Up 537%. 

Why hasn’t the Brent crude oil price gone 2x, 3x, 4x or 5x versus its normal of $68/b given close to full stop in the flow of oil of the Strait of Hormuz? We are after all talking about close to 20% of global supply being disrupted. The reason is the buffers. It is fairly easy to store oil. Commercial operators only hold stocks for logistical variations. It is a lot of oil in commercial stocks, but that is predominantly because the whole oil system is so huge. In addition we have Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs) of close to 2500 mb of crude and 1000 mb of oil products. The IEA last week decided to release 400 mb from global SPR. Equal to 20 days of full closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Thus oil in commercial stocks on land, commercial oil in transit at sea and release of oil from SPRs is currently buffering the situation.

But we are running the buffers down day by day. As a result we see gradually increasing stress here and there in the global oil market. Asia is feeling the pinch the most. It has very low self sufficiency of oil and most of the exports from the Gulf normally head to Asia. Availability of propane and butane many places in India (LPG) has dried up very quickly. Local prices have tripled as a result. Local availability of crude, bunker oil, fuel oil, jet fuel, naphtha and other oil products is quickly running down to critical levels many places in Asia with prices shooting up. Oman crude oil is marked at $153/b. Jet fuel in Singapore is marked at $191/b.

Oil at sea originating from Strait of Hormuz from before 28 Feb is rapidly emptied. Oil at sea is a large pool of commercial oil. An inventory of oil in constant move.  If we assume that the average journey from the Persian Gulf to its destinations has a volume weighted average of 13.5 days then the amount of oil at sea originating from the Persian Gulf when the the US/Israel attacked on 28 Feb was 13.5 days * 20 mb/d = 269 mb. Since the strait closed, this oil has increasingly been delivered at its destinations. Those closest to the Strait, like Pakistan, felt the emptying of this supply chain the fastest. Propane prices shooting to 3x normal there already last week and restaurants serving cold food this week is a result of that. Some 50-60% of Asia’s imports of Naphtha normally originates from the Persian Gulf. So naphtha is a natural pain point for Asia. The Gulf also a large and important exporter of Jet fuel. That shut in has lifted jet prices above $200/b.

To simplify our calculations we assume that no oil has left the Strait since that date and that there is no increase in Saudi exports from Yanbu. Then the draining of this inventory at sea originated from the Persian Gulf will essentially look like this:

The supply chain of oil at sea originating from the Strait of Hormuz is soon empty. Except for oil allowed through the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and increased exports from Yanbu in the Red Sea. Not included here.

The supply chain of oil at sea originating from the Strait of Hormuz is soon empty.
Source: ChatGPT estimates of journey days and distribution of exports. SEB extension in time and graph

Oil at sea is falling fast as oil is delivered without any new refill in the Persian Gulf. Waivers for Russian crude is also shifting Russian crude to consumers. Brent crude will likely start to feel the pinch much more forcefully when oil at sea is drawn down another 200 mb to around 1000 mb. That is not much more than 10 days from here. 

Oil at sea is falling fast as oil is delivered without any new refill in the Persian Gulf.
Source: SEB graph, Vortexa

Oil and oil products are starting to become very pricy many places. Brent crude has still been shielded from spiking like the others.

Oil and oil products are starting to become very pricy many places.
Source: SEB graph, Bloomberg data
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