Analys
OPEC+ in comfortable position as U.S. shale oil slows down


This week is the week of monthly oil market reports from the three main energy organisations IEA, EIA and OPEC. The US EIA is first out with its monthly update today at 18:00 CET. Then OPEC on Wednesday and the IEA on Thursday at 10:00 CET.
We expect to see a further downward revision today of U.S. shale oil production growth for 2020 today by the U.S. EIA. In its data tables it does not specify shale oil production specifically but its projection for “Lower 48 States (excl. GOM)” is pretty much shale oil production. In its December report it projected U.S. shale oil production to grow by only 0.3 m bl/d from Dec-19 to Dec-20. That’s a far cry from the booming production growth of 1.74 m bl/d from Dec-17 to Dec-18. It also projected basically flat U.S. shale oil production in H2-20 with a contraction at the very end of the year. We expect these projections to be reduced further in its report today.

Schlumberger yesterday commented that most U.S. production projections are probably too high with peak production now reached in both Bakken and Eagle Ford. Further that at a WTI price of $55/bl there would be no production growth in the years to come and that at a WTI price of $70/bl U.S. production will probably grow at a yearly rate of 0.5 m bl/d per year. The WTI forward 5-year price strip is currently trading at $53/bl ($50.5/bl real-term).
We fully agree with Schlumberger’s comment yesterday. We have frequently seen statements from Rystad Energy about the waste reserves of U.S. shale oil deposits. We agree with that too and that U.S. shale oil production can grow robustly and even at a stunning pace also in the years to come. The big question is at what price will/can this happen while at the same time keeping investors satisfied with their returns on investments. Schlumberger’s comment yesterday is basically that there will be no further growth at the current forward WTI price level and that the forward WTI price needs to be lifted to $70/bl in order to get a 0.5 m bl/d US shale oil production growth in the years to come.
Add to this that non-OPEC, non-US crude oil production is increasingly projected to be in contraction from 2021 onwards as a result of the deep slump in off-shore investments since the oil price took a dive in 2014. Investments were booming in the five years running up to 2014. That led to a stream of new supply coming online during the following five years of 2015/16/17/18/19. Over the past five years the world has been feeding off legacy off-shore investments from 2014 and before as well as a hugely debt-driven U.S. shale oil production growth.
The year 2020 is probably going to be the last year of new non-OPEC, non-US production coming online in a magnitude that offsets production declines. I.e. non-OPEC, non-US production is likely to be in sideways to lower from 2021 onwards due to the slump in investments in this sector since 2014.
This should leave OPEC(+) in a very good position already by the middle of this year and for quite a few years after that. Why on earth should OPEC(+) throw in the towel on its “price over volume” strategy when the forward horizon looks like this? We don’t think they will. And that is of course hugely important for the oil price outlook for 2020. By and large the more significant oil price moves since mid-2014 (when Saudi Arabia stopped defending the oil price) has plain and simply been decided by shifts in OPEC(+)’s strategy between “price over volume” and “volume over price”. So if OPEC(+) sticks to “price over volume” as we think they will (we see increasing compliance to pledges) then Brent is unlikely to average sub-$60/bl in 2020.
Our Brent crude oil 2020 price forecast of $70/bl was largely viewed as close to outrageously high just a few months ago. Now we see that forecasts are gradually lifted higher and calls for $65-75/bl Brent crude oil price range in 2020 are starting to emerge as US shale oil production growth continues to slow and OPEC(+) sticks to its “price over volume” strategy. Add some improvements in global manufacturing and this will likely be the view of many.
Ch1: Strategy by OPEC(+). “Price over volume” or “Volume over price”.
Saudi Arabia did not increase production from mid-2014 but it started to lower its official selling prices and stopped defending the oil price. It could have lowered its production and defended the price, but it didn’t. So basically, it shifted to “volume over price” already in mid-2014 even if it did not become official before the OPEC meeting at the end of 2014.
The strategy shifted to “price over volume” at the OPEC meeting on November 30 in 2016 with additional help from 10 non-OPEC countries. The strategy then shifted back to “volume over price” for a brief period from June 2018 to Dec 2018 before cuts were implemented again. The strategy is currently “price over volume” and we think OPEC(+) will stick comfortably with this strategy in 2020.

Analys
OPEC+ will likely unwind 500 kb/d of voluntary quotas in October. But a full unwind of 1.5 mb/d in one go could be in the cards

Down to mid-60ies as Iraq lifts production while Saudi may be tired of voluntary cut frugality. The Brent December contract dropped 1.6% yesterday to USD 66.03/b. This morning it is down another 0.3% to USD 65.8/b. The drop in the price came on the back of the combined news that Iraq has resumed 190 kb/d of production in Kurdistan with exports through Turkey while OPEC+ delegates send signals that the group will unwind the remaining 1.65 mb/d (less the 137 kb/d in October) of voluntary cuts at a pace of 500 kb/d per month pace.

Signals of accelerated unwind and Iraqi increase may be connected. Russia, Kazakhstan and Iraq were main offenders versus the voluntary quotas they had agreed to follow. Russia had a production ’debt’ (cumulative overproduction versus quota) of close to 90 mb in March this year while Kazakhstan had a ’debt’ of about 60 mb and the same for Iraq. This apparently made Saudi Arabia angry this spring. Why should Saudi Arabia hold back if the other voluntary cutters were just freeriding? Thus the sudden rapid unwinding of voluntary cuts. That is at least one angle of explanations for the accelerated unwinding.
If the offenders with production debts then refrained from lifting production as the voluntary cuts were rapidly unwinded, then they could ’pay back’ their ’debts’ as they would under-produce versus the new and steadily higher quotas.
Forget about Kazakhstan. Its production was just too far above the quotas with no hope that the country would hold back production due to cross-ownership of oil assets by international oil companies. But Russia and Iraq should be able to do it.
Iraqi cumulative overproduction versus quotas could reach 85-90 mb in October. Iraq has however steadily continued to overproduce by 3-5 mb per month. In July its new and gradually higher quota came close to equal with a cumulative overproduction of only 0.6 mb that month. In August again however its production had an overshoot of 100 kb/d or 3.1 mb for the month. Its cumulative production debt had then risen to close to 80 mb. We don’t know for September yet. But looking at October we now know that its production will likely average close to 4.5 mb/d due to the revival of 190 kb/d of production in Kurdistan. Its quota however will only be 4.24 mb/d. Its overproduction in October will thus likely be around 250 kb/d above its quota with its production debt rising another 7-8 mb to a total of close to 90 mb.
Again, why should Saudi Arabia be frugal while Iraq is freeriding. Better to get rid of the voluntary quotas as quickly as possible and then start all over with clean sheets.
Unwinding the remaining 1.513 mb/d in one go in October? If OPEC+ unwinds the remaining 1.513 mb/d of voluntary cuts in one big go in October, then Iraq’s quota will be around 4.4 mb/d for October versus its likely production of close to 4.5 mb/d for the coming month..
OPEC+ should thus unwind the remaining 1.513 mb/d (1.65 – 0.137 mb/d) in one go for October in order for the quota of Iraq to be able to keep track with Iraq’s actual production increase.
October 5 will show how it plays out. But a quota unwind of at least 500 kb/d for Oct seems likely. An overall increase of at least 500 kb/d in the voluntary quota for October looks likely. But it could be the whole 1.513 mb/d in one go. If the increase in the quota is ’only’ 500 kb/d then Iraqi cumulative production will still rise by 5.7 mb to a total of 85 mb in October.
Iraqi production debt versus quotas will likely rise by 5.7 mb in October if OPEC+ only lifts the overall quota by 500 kb/d in October. Here assuming historical production debt did not rise in September. That Iraq lifts its production by 190 kb/d in October to 4.47 mb/d (August level + 190 kb/d) and that OPEC+ unwinds 500 kb/d of the remining quotas in October when they decide on this on 5 October.

Analys
Modest draws, flat demand, and diesel back in focus

U.S. commercial crude inventories posted a marginal draw last week, falling by 0.6 million barrels to 414.8 million barrels. Inventories remain 4% below the five-year seasonal average, but the draw is far smaller than last week’s massive 9.3-million-barrel decline. Higher crude imports (+803,000 bl d WoW) and steady refinery runs (93% utilization) helped keep the crude balance relatively neutral.

Yet another drawdown indicates commercial crude inventories continue to trend below the 2015–2022 seasonal norm (~440 million barrels), though at 414.8 million barrels, levels are now almost exactly in line with both the 2023 and 2024 trajectory, suggesting stable YoY conditions (see page 3 attached).
Gasoline inventories dropped by 1.1 million barrels and are now 2% below the five-year average. The decline was broad-based, with both finished gasoline and blending components falling, indicating lower output and resilient end-user demand as we enter the shoulder season post-summer (see page 6 attached).
On the diesel side, distillate inventories declined by 1.7 million barrels, snapping a two-week streak of strong builds. At 125 million barrels, diesel inventories are once again 8% below the five-year average and trending near the low end of the historical range.
In total, commercial petroleum inventories (excl. SPR) slipped by 0.5 million barrels on the week to ish 1,281.5 million barrels. While essentially flat, this ends a two-week streak of meaningful builds, reflecting a return to a slightly tighter situation.
On the demand side, the DOE’s ‘products supplied’ metric (see page 6 attached), a proxy for implied consumption, softened slightly. Total demand for crude oil over the past four weeks averaged 20.5 million barrels per day, up just 0.9% YoY.
Summing up: This week’s report shows a re-tightening in diesel supply and modest draws across the board, while demand growth is beginning to flatten. Inventories remain structurally low, but the tone is less bullish than in recent weeks.


Analys
Are Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure working?

Brent crude rose 1.6% yesterday. After trading in a range of USD 66.1 – 68.09/b it settled at USD 67.63/b. A level which we are well accustomed to see Brent crude flipping around since late August. This morning it is trading 0.5% higher at USD 68/b. The market was expecting an increase of 230 kb/d in Iraqi crude exports from Kurdistan through Turkey to the Cheyhan port but that has so far failed to materialize. This probably helped to drive Brent crude higher yesterday. Indications last evening that US crude oil inventories likely fell 3.8 mb last week (indicative numbers by API) probably also added some strength to Brent crude late in the session. The market continues to await the much heralded global surplus materializing as rising crude and product inventories in OECD countries in general and the US specifically.

The oil market is starting to focus increasingly on the successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. Especially the attacks on Russian refineries. Refineries are highly complex and much harder to repair than simple crude oil facilities like export pipelines, ports and hubs. It can take months and months to repair complex refineries. It is thus mainly Russian oil products which will be hurt by this. First oil product exports will go down, thereafter Russia will have to ration oil product consumption domestically. Russian crude exports may not be hurt as much. Its crude exports could actually go up as its capacity to process crude goes down. SEB’s Emerging Market strategist Erik Meyersson wrote about the Ukrainian campaign this morning: ”Are Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure working?”. Phillips P O’Brian published an interesting not on this as well yesterday: ”An Update On The Ukrainian Campaign Against Russian Refineries”. It is a pay-for article, but it is well worth reading. Amongst other things it highlights the strategic focus of Ukraine towards Russia’s energy infrastructure. A Ukrainian on the matter also put out a visual representation of the attacks on twitter. We have not verified the data representation. It needs to be interpreted with caution in terms of magnitude of impact and current outage.
Complex Russian oil refineries are sitting ducks in the new, modern long-range drone war. Ukraine is building a range of new weapons as well according to O’Brian. The problem with attacks on Russian refineries is thus on the rise. This will likely be an escalating problem for Russia. And oil products around the world may rise versus the crude oil price while the crude oil price itself may not rise all that much due to this.
Russian clean oil product exports as presented by SEB’s Erik Meyersson in his note this morning.

The ICE Gasoil crack and the 3.5% fuel oil crack has been strengthening. The 3.5% crack should have weakened along with rising exports of sour crude from OPEC+, but it hasn’t. Rather it has moved higher instead. The higher cracks could in part be due to the Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Ukrainian inhabitants graphical representation of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries on Twitter. Highlighting date of attacks, size of refineries and distance from Ukraine. We have not verified the detailed information. And you cannot derive the amount of outage as a consequence of this.

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