Analys
EU sanctions on Russian alu will likely drive EU premiums higher
The LME 3mth alu price has bounced 4.5% past two days but its a far cry from 2022 impacts. The 3mth aluminum price has bounced 4.5% (+96 USD/ton) to USD 2256.5/ton on news that the EU is considering an embargo on Russian aluminum. It’s a notable gain amid an otherwise lukewarm and bearish energy complex where natural gas and coal prices have been trending steadily lower since October last year. But it is nothing compared to what happened in 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine. The 3mth aluminum price then rallied to USD 3849/ton and the EU aluminum premium rallied to USD 505/ton versus a more normal USD 100/ton. Thus so far the the price action in aluminum is nothing like what we experienced in 2022.
It looks likely to us that the EU will indeed impose sanctions on Russian aluminium. We don’t know yet if the EU actually will implement sanctions on Russian aluminum. Personally I think its likely that they will do it as it is kind of a moral stand and the last large piece of the Russian energy complex which is possible to place under sanctions. But the actual effects both on the EU and Russia will likely be limited. Russia will not stop producing and exporting aluminium. Rather it will export it and send it elsewhere in the world. That is what happened to Russian crude and product exports. They weren’t lost in terms of global supply, but rerouted elsewhere.
New sanctions will have limited effect on Russia and dissipate over time. It’s a moral stand. Previously it was possible to enforce effective sanctions on one specific country. Those were the days when the US ruled the world and China chose to side with the US. For example with sanctions on Iran. These sanctions have not at all been lifted yet. But Iranian oil exports have rebounded from 1.9 m b/d at the low in 2019 to now 3.2 m b/d as China now is accepting to import Iranian crude oil and is placing less emphasis on the US.
The effect of sanctions have a tendency to deteriorate over time. Even when the US ruled the world and China played along. But sanctions today will leak massively if China isn’t playing along with what the EU and the US wants. And China isn’t playing along.
The goal is to hurt Russia’s income from aluminum exports. But the effect will be limited. The aim with the sanctions towards Russian oil, and now possibly also aluminum, isn’t to bar the supply from the global market. Rather the opposite. Neither the US nor the EU wants to put a stop to Russian raw materials exports as it could drive up the price of these globally which would hurt consumers and generate inflation. The aim is to keep exports flowing but to try to hurt Russian earnings from the exports. The same will likely be the case for the potentially upcoming EU sanctions on aluminum.
But even the ”hurt the income” strategy with a cap on the price of Russian crude and products has deteriorated over time. Russian Urals crude had a discount to Brent crude in 2022 of as much as USD 36/b and today it is only USD 12/b below Brent.
Russia has probably made contingency plans a long time ago. Russia has also probably made contingency plans for its aluminum exports as the risk has been there all along since 2022. Thus new EU sanctions towards Russian aluminium exports will likely be less of a shock today versus when all hell broke lose in 2022.
Europe has also already reduced its Russian imports of primary aluminium, to about 10% of its primary needs. A large proportion of imports are now increasingly coming from middle eastern producers.
EU alu premiums already rising along with Mid-East issues (Red Sea). Will rise further with sanctions. Issues in the region has pushed up freight costs, insurance costs and added transit delays and length of journey to Europe. A combination of these issues have already lifted the European premium. New sanctions on Russia will likely lift the regional premiums further.
The dirty details. How deeply is EU’s industrial supply chains embedded in Russian alu semies? The actual effects of new EU sanctions on Russian aluminum will be down to the dirty details. An important question is how deeply Russian semies, and prefabricated aluminum parts (which also looks to be sanctioned) are embedded and integrated in the European industrial system (supply chains). If the EU is deeply dependent of pre-fabricated aluminum parts from Russia, then it could be painful for EU to disentangle from these imports.
Sanctions = additional costs and frictions as global aluminum flows are rerouted. New sanctions will naturally lead to frictions and some added price due to that. Aluminum can of course be transported across the world. It is cheaper to transport it from Russia to Europe and that is why it historically has landed in the EU. But, if need be, due to possible EU sanctions towards Russia on aluminum, then Russia can and will send its aluminum to other global regions, maybe and possibly predominantly, to China. Then the EU can and must import more aluminum from other places instead. Probably the middle east and maybe from China
The Global LME 3mth price will likely rise only marginally as no supply is actually lost. Just rerouted. The price of aluminum across the world may increase a little bit due to such sanction-frictions but probably not all that much since there will not be any loss of supply and only added transportation frictions and costs.
EU aluminum premiums will naturally rise in order to attract non-Russian supply from further away. EU Alu-premiums should naturally increase in order to attract aluminum from further away. China will probably be able to import Russian aluminum on the cheap. So Russia will lose some income on its aluminum exports as it potentially has to cover transportation costs all the way to China and possibly an additional discount in order for China to take it. China may only import a lot of Russian aluminium if it can get it on the cheap. China can then export more as its country balance will improve and possibly export all the way back to Europe.
A weak macro-backdrop in Europe makes sanctions easier. The backdrop to all of this is very weak aluminum demand in Europe amid a bleak macro-picture. Disruption of Russian supply to the EU should thus be less painful than it otherwise would have been.
What to do with Russian alu stocks already in EU LME storage? Consume it or export it? A tricky question is what to do about all the Russian aluminum which currently is sitting at EU LME storage sites where it is constituting some 90% of aluminum stocks. If it has to leave EU LME storage sites due to sanctions then it may have to be sold at a discount in order to get it to flow elsewhere. Maybe it will create deep front-end contango is one speculation. A natural solution however would be that sanctions allows consumption of Russian aluminum currently in stock in the EU but bans new and further stocking of Russian aluminum. Then these Russian stocks would gradually be consumed and dissipate and instead gradually be replaced by non-Russian aluminum.
”Futures market can tighten quickly and spreads could rally.” The following is a comment from one of SEB’s metals traders: ”The futures market could get very tight very quickly following EU sanctions on Russian aluminum. Spreads could tighten aggressively until market reaches a new balance.”
The LME 3mth aluminum price rallied to USD 3,849/ton when Russia attacked Ukraine. Price has now gained a little (+4.5%) to USD 2,254/ton on possible EU sanctions.
Aluminum premiums across the world. EU premiums rallied to USD 505/ton and USD 615/ton (duty unpaid and paid resp.) in 2022 vs normal USD 100-150/ton. Now gained a little on Mid-East troubles and rerouting. Could rise much more on EU sanctions.
Russia probably has a normal, net export of alu semies and primary alu of around 3 m mtpa. This would normally be destined to Europe.
Analys
Brent prices slip on USD surge despite tight inventory conditions
Brent crude prices dropped by USD 1.4 per barrel yesterday evening, sliding from USD 74.2 to USD 72.8 per barrel overnight. However, prices have ticked slightly higher in early trading this morning and are currently hovering around USD 73.3 per barrel.
Yesterday’s decline was primarily driven by a significant strengthening of the U.S. dollar, fueled by expectations of fewer interest rate cuts by the Fed in the coming year. While the Fed lowered borrowing costs as anticipated, it signaled a more cautious approach to rate reductions in 2025. This pushed the U.S. dollar to its strongest level in over two years, raising the cost of commodities priced in dollars.
Earlier in the day (yesterday), crude prices briefly rose following reports of continued declines in U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excl. SPR), which fell by 0.9 million barrels last week to 421.0 million barrels. This level is approximately 6% below the five-year average for this time of year, highlighting persistently tight market conditions.
In contrast, total motor gasoline inventories saw a significant build of 2.3 million barrels but remain 3% below the five-year average. A closer look reveals that finished gasoline inventories declined, while blending components inventories increased.
Distillate (diesel) fuel inventories experienced a substantial draw of 3.2 million barrels and are now approximately 7% below the five-year average. Overall, total commercial petroleum inventories recorded a net decline of 3.2 million barrels last week, underscoring tightening market conditions across key product categories.
Despite the ongoing drawdowns in U.S. crude and product inventories, global oil prices have remained range-bound since mid-October. Market participants are balancing a muted outlook for Chinese demand and rising production from non-OPEC+ sources against elevated geopolitical risks. The potential for stricter sanctions on Iranian oil supply, particularly as Donald Trump prepares to re-enter the White House, has introduced an additional layer of uncertainty.
We remain cautiously optimistic about the oil market balance in 2025 and are maintaining our Brent price forecast of an average USD 75 per barrel for the year. We believe the market has both fundamental and technical support at these levels.
Analys
Oil falling only marginally on weak China data as Iran oil exports starts to struggle
Up 4.7% last week on US Iran hawkishness and China stimulus optimism. Brent crude gained 4.7% last week and closed on a high note at USD 74.49/b. Through the week it traded in a USD 70.92 – 74.59/b range. Increased optimism over China stimulus together with Iran hawkishness from the incoming Donald Trump administration were the main drivers. Technically Brent crude broke above the 50dma on Friday. On the upside it has the USD 75/b 100dma and on the downside it now has the 50dma at USD 73.84. It is likely to test both of these in the near term. With respect to the Relative Strength Index (RSI) it is neither cold nor warm.
Lower this morning as China November statistics still disappointing (stimulus isn’t here in size yet). This morning it is trading down 0.4% to USD 74.2/b following bearish statistics from China. Retail sales only rose 3% y/y and well short of Industrial production which rose 5.4% y/y, painting a lackluster picture of the demand side of the Chinese economy. This morning the Chinese 30-year bond rate fell below the 2% mark for the first time ever. Very weak demand for credit and investments is essentially what it is saying. Implied demand for oil down 2.1% in November and ytd y/y it was down 3.3%. Oil refining slipped to 5-month low (Bloomberg). This sets a bearish tone for oil at the start of the week. But it isn’t really killing off the oil price either except pushing it down a little this morning.
China will likely choose the US over Iranian oil as long as the oil market is plentiful. It is becoming increasingly apparent that exports of crude oil from Iran is being disrupted by broadening US sanctions on tankers according to Vortexa (Bloomberg). Some Iranian November oil cargoes still remain undelivered. Chinese buyers are increasingly saying no to sanctioned vessels. China import around 90% of Iranian crude oil. Looking forward to the Trump administration the choice for China will likely be easy when it comes to Iranian oil. China needs the US much more than it needs Iranian oil. At leas as long as there is plenty of oil in the market. OPEC+ is currently holds plenty of oil on the side-line waiting for room to re-enter. So if Iran goes out, then other oil from OPEC+ will come back in. So there won’t be any squeeze in the oil market and price shouldn’t move all that much up.
Analys
Brent crude inches higher as ”Maximum pressure on Iran” could remove all talk of surplus in 2025
Brent crude inch higher despite bearish Chinese equity backdrop. Brent crude traded between 72.42 and 74.0 USD/b yesterday before closing down 0.15% on the day at USD 73.41/b. Since last Friday Brent crude has gained 3.2%. This morning it is trading in marginal positive territory (+0.3%) at USD 73.65/b. Chinese equities are down 2% following disappointing signals from the Central Economic Work Conference. The dollar is also 0.2% stronger. None of this has been able to pull oil lower this morning.
”Maximum pressure on Iran” are the signals from the incoming US administration. Last time Donald Trump was president he drove down Iranian oil exports to close to zero as he exited the JCPOA Iranian nuclear deal and implemented maximum sanctions. A repeat of that would remove all talk about a surplus oil market next year leaving room for the rest of OPEC+ as well as the US to lift production a little. It would however probably require some kind of cooperation with China in some kind of overall US – China trade deal. Because it is hard to prevent oil flowing from Iran to China as long as China wants to buy large amounts.
Mildly bullish adjustment from the IEA but still with an overall bearish message for 2025. The IEA came out with a mildly bullish adjustment in its monthly Oil Market Report yesterday. For 2025 it adjusted global demand up by 0.1 mb/d to 103.9 mb/d (+1.1 mb/d y/y growth) while it also adjusted non-OPEC production down by 0.1 mb/d to 71.9 mb/d (+1.7 mb/d y/y). As a result its calculated call-on-OPEC rose by 0.2 mb/d y/y to 26.3 mb/d.
Overall the IEA still sees a market in 2025 where non-OPEC production grows considerably faster (+1.7 mb/d y/y) than demand (+1.1 mb/d y/y) which requires OPEC to cut its production by close to 700 kb/d in 2025 to keep the market balanced.
The IEA treats OPEC+ as it if doesn’t exist even if it is 8 years since it was established. The weird thing is that the IEA after 8 full years with the constellation of OPEC+ still calculates and argues as if the wider organisation which was established in December 2016 doesn’t exist. In its oil market balance it projects an increase from FSU of +0.3 mb/d in 2025. But FSU is predominantly part of OPEC+ and thus bound by production targets. Thus call on OPEC+ is only falling by 0.4 mb/d in 2025. In IEA’s calculations the OPEC+ group thus needs to cut production by 0.4 mb/d in 2024 or 0.4% of global demand. That is still a bearish outlook. But error of margin on such calculations are quite large so this prediction needs to be treated with a pinch of salt.
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