Analys
EU sanctions on Russian alu will likely drive EU premiums higher

The LME 3mth alu price has bounced 4.5% past two days but its a far cry from 2022 impacts. The 3mth aluminum price has bounced 4.5% (+96 USD/ton) to USD 2256.5/ton on news that the EU is considering an embargo on Russian aluminum. It’s a notable gain amid an otherwise lukewarm and bearish energy complex where natural gas and coal prices have been trending steadily lower since October last year. But it is nothing compared to what happened in 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine. The 3mth aluminum price then rallied to USD 3849/ton and the EU aluminum premium rallied to USD 505/ton versus a more normal USD 100/ton. Thus so far the the price action in aluminum is nothing like what we experienced in 2022.

It looks likely to us that the EU will indeed impose sanctions on Russian aluminium. We don’t know yet if the EU actually will implement sanctions on Russian aluminum. Personally I think its likely that they will do it as it is kind of a moral stand and the last large piece of the Russian energy complex which is possible to place under sanctions. But the actual effects both on the EU and Russia will likely be limited. Russia will not stop producing and exporting aluminium. Rather it will export it and send it elsewhere in the world. That is what happened to Russian crude and product exports. They weren’t lost in terms of global supply, but rerouted elsewhere.
New sanctions will have limited effect on Russia and dissipate over time. It’s a moral stand. Previously it was possible to enforce effective sanctions on one specific country. Those were the days when the US ruled the world and China chose to side with the US. For example with sanctions on Iran. These sanctions have not at all been lifted yet. But Iranian oil exports have rebounded from 1.9 m b/d at the low in 2019 to now 3.2 m b/d as China now is accepting to import Iranian crude oil and is placing less emphasis on the US.
The effect of sanctions have a tendency to deteriorate over time. Even when the US ruled the world and China played along. But sanctions today will leak massively if China isn’t playing along with what the EU and the US wants. And China isn’t playing along.
The goal is to hurt Russia’s income from aluminum exports. But the effect will be limited. The aim with the sanctions towards Russian oil, and now possibly also aluminum, isn’t to bar the supply from the global market. Rather the opposite. Neither the US nor the EU wants to put a stop to Russian raw materials exports as it could drive up the price of these globally which would hurt consumers and generate inflation. The aim is to keep exports flowing but to try to hurt Russian earnings from the exports. The same will likely be the case for the potentially upcoming EU sanctions on aluminum.
But even the ”hurt the income” strategy with a cap on the price of Russian crude and products has deteriorated over time. Russian Urals crude had a discount to Brent crude in 2022 of as much as USD 36/b and today it is only USD 12/b below Brent.
Russia has probably made contingency plans a long time ago. Russia has also probably made contingency plans for its aluminum exports as the risk has been there all along since 2022. Thus new EU sanctions towards Russian aluminium exports will likely be less of a shock today versus when all hell broke lose in 2022.
Europe has also already reduced its Russian imports of primary aluminium, to about 10% of its primary needs. A large proportion of imports are now increasingly coming from middle eastern producers.
EU alu premiums already rising along with Mid-East issues (Red Sea). Will rise further with sanctions. Issues in the region has pushed up freight costs, insurance costs and added transit delays and length of journey to Europe. A combination of these issues have already lifted the European premium. New sanctions on Russia will likely lift the regional premiums further.
The dirty details. How deeply is EU’s industrial supply chains embedded in Russian alu semies? The actual effects of new EU sanctions on Russian aluminum will be down to the dirty details. An important question is how deeply Russian semies, and prefabricated aluminum parts (which also looks to be sanctioned) are embedded and integrated in the European industrial system (supply chains). If the EU is deeply dependent of pre-fabricated aluminum parts from Russia, then it could be painful for EU to disentangle from these imports.
Sanctions = additional costs and frictions as global aluminum flows are rerouted. New sanctions will naturally lead to frictions and some added price due to that. Aluminum can of course be transported across the world. It is cheaper to transport it from Russia to Europe and that is why it historically has landed in the EU. But, if need be, due to possible EU sanctions towards Russia on aluminum, then Russia can and will send its aluminum to other global regions, maybe and possibly predominantly, to China. Then the EU can and must import more aluminum from other places instead. Probably the middle east and maybe from China
The Global LME 3mth price will likely rise only marginally as no supply is actually lost. Just rerouted. The price of aluminum across the world may increase a little bit due to such sanction-frictions but probably not all that much since there will not be any loss of supply and only added transportation frictions and costs.
EU aluminum premiums will naturally rise in order to attract non-Russian supply from further away. EU Alu-premiums should naturally increase in order to attract aluminum from further away. China will probably be able to import Russian aluminum on the cheap. So Russia will lose some income on its aluminum exports as it potentially has to cover transportation costs all the way to China and possibly an additional discount in order for China to take it. China may only import a lot of Russian aluminium if it can get it on the cheap. China can then export more as its country balance will improve and possibly export all the way back to Europe.
A weak macro-backdrop in Europe makes sanctions easier. The backdrop to all of this is very weak aluminum demand in Europe amid a bleak macro-picture. Disruption of Russian supply to the EU should thus be less painful than it otherwise would have been.
What to do with Russian alu stocks already in EU LME storage? Consume it or export it? A tricky question is what to do about all the Russian aluminum which currently is sitting at EU LME storage sites where it is constituting some 90% of aluminum stocks. If it has to leave EU LME storage sites due to sanctions then it may have to be sold at a discount in order to get it to flow elsewhere. Maybe it will create deep front-end contango is one speculation. A natural solution however would be that sanctions allows consumption of Russian aluminum currently in stock in the EU but bans new and further stocking of Russian aluminum. Then these Russian stocks would gradually be consumed and dissipate and instead gradually be replaced by non-Russian aluminum.
”Futures market can tighten quickly and spreads could rally.” The following is a comment from one of SEB’s metals traders: ”The futures market could get very tight very quickly following EU sanctions on Russian aluminum. Spreads could tighten aggressively until market reaches a new balance.”
The LME 3mth aluminum price rallied to USD 3,849/ton when Russia attacked Ukraine. Price has now gained a little (+4.5%) to USD 2,254/ton on possible EU sanctions.
Aluminum premiums across the world. EU premiums rallied to USD 505/ton and USD 615/ton (duty unpaid and paid resp.) in 2022 vs normal USD 100-150/ton. Now gained a little on Mid-East troubles and rerouting. Could rise much more on EU sanctions.
Russia probably has a normal, net export of alu semies and primary alu of around 3 m mtpa. This would normally be destined to Europe.
Analys
Oil slips as Iran signals sanctions breakthrough

After a positive start to the week, crude oil prices rose on Monday and Tuesday, with Brent peaking at USD 66.8 per barrel on Tuesday evening. Since then, prices have drifted lower, declining by roughly 5% to around USD 63.5 per barrel – below where the week began during Monday’s opening.

Iran is currently in the spotlight, having signaled its willingness to sign a nuclear deal with the U.S. in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Ali Shamkhani, a senior political, military, and nuclear adviser, spoke publicly about the ongoing negotiations. He indicated that Iran would commit to never developing nuclear weapons and could dismantle its stockpile of highly enriched uranium – provided there is immediate sanctions relief. While nothing is finalized, the rhetoric is notable and could theoretically lead to additional Iranian barrels entering the global market.
It’s worth recalling that in mid-March, Iran’s Oil Minister declared that the country’s oil exports were “unstoppable”, and that Iran would not relinquish its share of the global oil market – even in the face of new U.S. sanctions introduced earlier this year. In practice, however, this claim has proven exaggerated.
In February 2025, Iran’s crude production rose to 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd), staying above 3 million bpd since September 2023. Of this, approximately 1.74 million bpd were exported – primarily to Chinese private refiners (”teapots”). Early in the year, shipments to these teapots continued largely uninterrupted, as they have limited exposure to the U.S. financial system and remained willing buyers despite sanctions.
However, Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign has gradually constrained Iran’s ability to ship crude to China. By March 2025, Chinese imports of Iranian oil peaked at approximately 1.8 million bpd. In April, imports dropped sharply to around 1.3 million bpd, reflecting stricter U.S. sanctions targeting Chinese refineries and port operators involved in handling Iranian crude. Preliminary data for May suggest a further decline, with Iranian oil arrivals potentially falling to 1.0–1.2 million bpd, as Chinese refiners adopt a more cautious stance.
As a result, any immediate sanctions relief stemming from a nuclear agreement could unlock an additional 0.8 million bpd of Iranian crude for the global market – an undeniably bearish development for prices.
On the other hand, failure to reach a deal would likely mean continued or even intensified U.S. pressure under the Trump administration. In a worst-case scenario – where Iran loses its remaining 1.0–1.2 million bpd of exports – and if Saudi Arabia or other major producers do not promptly step in to offset the shortfall, global oil prices could experience an immediate upside of USD 4–6 per barrel.
Meanwhile, both OPEC and the IEA expect the oil market to remain well-supplied in 2025, with supply growth exceeding demand. OPEC holds its demand growth forecast at 1.3 million bpd, driven mainly by emerging markets in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. In contrast, the IEA sees more modest growth of 740,000 bpd, citing macroeconomic challenges and accelerating electric vehicle adoption – particularly in China, where petrochemical demand is now the primary growth engine.
On the supply side, OPEC has revised down its non-OPEC+ growth estimate to 800,000 bpd, citing weaker prices and reduced upstream investment. The IEA, however, expects global supply to expand by 1.6 million bpd, led by the U.S., Canada, Brazil, Guyana, and Argentina. Should OPEC+ proceed with unwinding voluntary cuts, the IEA warns that the market could face a surplus of up to 1.4 million bpd in 2025 – potentially exerting renewed downward pressure on prices.
_______________
EIA data released yesterday showed U.S. Crude inventories unexpectedly rose 3.45 million barrels with a drop in exports and despite a larger than expected increase in refinery runs.
U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excl. SPR) rose by 3.45 million barrels last week, reaching 441.8 million barrels – approximately 6% below the five-year seasonal average. Total gasoline inventories declined by 1 million barrels and now sit around 3% below the five-year average. Distillate (diesel) fuel inventories fell by 3.2 million barrels and remain roughly 16% below the seasonal norm. Meanwhile, propane/propylene inventories climbed by 2.2 million barrels but are still 9% below their five-year average. Overall, total commercial petroleum inventories rose by 4.9 million barrels over the week – overall a neutral report with limited immediate price impacts.


Analys
Rebound to $65: trade tensions ease, comeback in fundamentals

After a sharp selloff in late April and early May, Brent crude prices bottomed out at USD 58.5 per barrel on Monday, May 5th – the lowest level since April 9th. This was a natural reaction to higher-than-expected OPEC+ supply for both May and June.

Over the past week, however, oil prices have rebounded strongly, climbing by USD 7.9 per barrel on a week-over-week basis. Brent peaked at USD 66.4 per barrel yesterday afternoon before sliding slightly to USD 65 per barrel this morning.
Markets across the board saw significant moves yesterday after the U.S. and China agreed to temporarily lower tariffs and ease export restrictions for 90 days. Scott Bessent announced, the U.S. will lower its tariffs on Chinese goods to 30%, while China will reduce its tariffs on U.S. goods to 10%. While this is a temporary measure, the intent to reach a longer-term agreement is clearly gaining momentum. That said, the U.S. administration has layered tariffs extensively, making the exact average rate hard to pin down – estimates suggest it now sits around 20%.
In short, the macroeconomic outlook improved swiftly: equities rallied, long-term interest rates climbed, gold prices declined, and the USD strengthened. By yesterday’s close, the S&P 500 rose 3.3% and the Nasdaq jumped 4.4%, essentially recovering the losses sustained since April 2nd.
That said, some form of positive news was expected from the weekend meeting, and now oil markets appear to be pausing after three days of strong gains. Attention is shifting from U.S.-China trade de-escalation back toward market fundamentals and geopolitical developments in the Middle East.
On the supply side, the market is pricing in relaxed restrictions on Iranian crude exports after President Trump signaled progress in nuclear negotiations over the weekend. Further talks are expected within the next week.
Meanwhile, President Trump is visiting Saudi Arabia today – the key OPEC+ player – which has ramped up production to discipline non-compliant members by pressuring oil prices. This aligns well with U.S. interests, especially with the administration pushing for lower crude and refined product prices for its US domestic voters.
With Brent hovering around USD 65, it’s unlikely that oil prices will dominate the agenda during the Saudi visit. Instead, discussions are expected to focus on broader geopolitical issues in the Middle East.
Looking ahead, OPEC+ is expected to continue with its monthly meetings and market assessments. The group appears focused on navigating internal disputes and responding to shifts in global demand. Importantly, the recent increase in output doesn’t suggest an oversupplied market here and now – seasonal demand in the region also rises during the summer months, absorbing some of the additional barrels.
Analys
Whipping quota cheaters into line is still the most likely explanation

Strong rebound yesterday with further gains today. Brent crude rallied 3.2% with a close of USD 62.15/b yesterday and a high of the day of USD 62.8/b. This morning it is gaining another 0.9% to USD 62.7/b with signs that US and China may move towards trade talks.

Brent went lower on 9 April than on Monday. Looking back at the latest trough on Monday it traded to an intraday low of USD 58.5/b. In comparison it traded to an intraday low of USD 58.4/b on 9 April. While markets were in shock following 2 April (’Liberation Day’) one should think that the announcement from OPEC+ this weekend of a production increase of some 400 kb/d also in June would have chilled the oil market even more. But no.
’ Technically overbought’ may be the explanation. ’Technically overbought’ has been the main explanation for the rebound since Monday. Maybe so. But the fact that it went lower on 9 April than on Monday this week must imply that markets aren’t totally clear over what OPEC+ is currently doing and is planning to do. Is it the start of a flood or a brief period where disorderly members need to be whipped into line?
The official message is that this is punishment versus quota cheaters Iraq, UAE and Kazakhstan. Makes a lot of sense since it is hard to play as a team if the team strategy is not followed by all players. If the May and June hikes is punishment to force the cheaters into line, then there is very real possibility that they actually will fall in line. And voila. The May and June 4x jumps is what we got and then we are back to increases of 137 kb/d per month. Or we could even see a period with no increase at all or even reversals and cuts.
OPEC+ has after all not officially abandoned cooperation. It has not abandoned quotas. It is still an overall orderly agenda and message to the market. This isn’t like 2014/15 with ’no quotas’. Or like full throttle in spring 2020. The latter was resolved very quickly along with producer pain from very low prices. It is quite clear that Saudi Arabia was very angry with the quota cheaters when the production for May was discussed at the end of March. And that led to the 4x hike in May. And the same again this weekend as quota offenders couldn’t prove good behavior in April. But if the offenders now prove good behavior in May, then the message for July production could prove a very different message than the 4x for May and June.
Trade talk hopes, declining US crude stocks, backwardated Brent curve and shale oil pain lifts price. If so, then we are left with the risk for a US tariff war induced global recession. And with some glimmers of hope now that US and China will start to talk trade, we see Brent crude lifting higher today. Add in that US crude stocks indicatively fell 4.5 mb last week (actual data later today), that the Brent crude forward curve is still in front-end backwardation (no surplus quite yet) and that US shale oil production is starting to show signs of pain with cuts to capex spending and lowering of production estimates.
-
Nyheter4 veckor sedan
Ingenting stoppar guldets uppgång, nu 3400 USD per uns
-
Analys4 veckor sedan
Crude oil comment: The forward curve is pricing tightness today and surplus tomorrow
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Samtal om läget för guld, kobolt och sällsynta jordartsmetaller
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Agnico Eagle siktar på toppen – två av världens största guldgruvor i sikte
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Lägre elpriser och många minustimmar fram till midsommar
-
Analys2 veckor sedan
June OPEC+ quota: Another triple increase or sticking to plan with +137 kb/d increase?
-
Nyheter3 veckor sedan
Saudiarabien informerar att man är ok med ett lägre oljepris
-
Nyheter2 veckor sedan
Utbudsunderskott och stigande industriell efterfrågan av silver på marknaden