Analys
EU sanctions on Russian alu will likely drive EU premiums higher
The LME 3mth alu price has bounced 4.5% past two days but its a far cry from 2022 impacts. The 3mth aluminum price has bounced 4.5% (+96 USD/ton) to USD 2256.5/ton on news that the EU is considering an embargo on Russian aluminum. It’s a notable gain amid an otherwise lukewarm and bearish energy complex where natural gas and coal prices have been trending steadily lower since October last year. But it is nothing compared to what happened in 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine. The 3mth aluminum price then rallied to USD 3849/ton and the EU aluminum premium rallied to USD 505/ton versus a more normal USD 100/ton. Thus so far the the price action in aluminum is nothing like what we experienced in 2022.
It looks likely to us that the EU will indeed impose sanctions on Russian aluminium. We don’t know yet if the EU actually will implement sanctions on Russian aluminum. Personally I think its likely that they will do it as it is kind of a moral stand and the last large piece of the Russian energy complex which is possible to place under sanctions. But the actual effects both on the EU and Russia will likely be limited. Russia will not stop producing and exporting aluminium. Rather it will export it and send it elsewhere in the world. That is what happened to Russian crude and product exports. They weren’t lost in terms of global supply, but rerouted elsewhere.
New sanctions will have limited effect on Russia and dissipate over time. It’s a moral stand. Previously it was possible to enforce effective sanctions on one specific country. Those were the days when the US ruled the world and China chose to side with the US. For example with sanctions on Iran. These sanctions have not at all been lifted yet. But Iranian oil exports have rebounded from 1.9 m b/d at the low in 2019 to now 3.2 m b/d as China now is accepting to import Iranian crude oil and is placing less emphasis on the US.
The effect of sanctions have a tendency to deteriorate over time. Even when the US ruled the world and China played along. But sanctions today will leak massively if China isn’t playing along with what the EU and the US wants. And China isn’t playing along.
The goal is to hurt Russia’s income from aluminum exports. But the effect will be limited. The aim with the sanctions towards Russian oil, and now possibly also aluminum, isn’t to bar the supply from the global market. Rather the opposite. Neither the US nor the EU wants to put a stop to Russian raw materials exports as it could drive up the price of these globally which would hurt consumers and generate inflation. The aim is to keep exports flowing but to try to hurt Russian earnings from the exports. The same will likely be the case for the potentially upcoming EU sanctions on aluminum.
But even the ”hurt the income” strategy with a cap on the price of Russian crude and products has deteriorated over time. Russian Urals crude had a discount to Brent crude in 2022 of as much as USD 36/b and today it is only USD 12/b below Brent.
Russia has probably made contingency plans a long time ago. Russia has also probably made contingency plans for its aluminum exports as the risk has been there all along since 2022. Thus new EU sanctions towards Russian aluminium exports will likely be less of a shock today versus when all hell broke lose in 2022.
Europe has also already reduced its Russian imports of primary aluminium, to about 10% of its primary needs. A large proportion of imports are now increasingly coming from middle eastern producers.
EU alu premiums already rising along with Mid-East issues (Red Sea). Will rise further with sanctions. Issues in the region has pushed up freight costs, insurance costs and added transit delays and length of journey to Europe. A combination of these issues have already lifted the European premium. New sanctions on Russia will likely lift the regional premiums further.
The dirty details. How deeply is EU’s industrial supply chains embedded in Russian alu semies? The actual effects of new EU sanctions on Russian aluminum will be down to the dirty details. An important question is how deeply Russian semies, and prefabricated aluminum parts (which also looks to be sanctioned) are embedded and integrated in the European industrial system (supply chains). If the EU is deeply dependent of pre-fabricated aluminum parts from Russia, then it could be painful for EU to disentangle from these imports.
Sanctions = additional costs and frictions as global aluminum flows are rerouted. New sanctions will naturally lead to frictions and some added price due to that. Aluminum can of course be transported across the world. It is cheaper to transport it from Russia to Europe and that is why it historically has landed in the EU. But, if need be, due to possible EU sanctions towards Russia on aluminum, then Russia can and will send its aluminum to other global regions, maybe and possibly predominantly, to China. Then the EU can and must import more aluminum from other places instead. Probably the middle east and maybe from China
The Global LME 3mth price will likely rise only marginally as no supply is actually lost. Just rerouted. The price of aluminum across the world may increase a little bit due to such sanction-frictions but probably not all that much since there will not be any loss of supply and only added transportation frictions and costs.
EU aluminum premiums will naturally rise in order to attract non-Russian supply from further away. EU Alu-premiums should naturally increase in order to attract aluminum from further away. China will probably be able to import Russian aluminum on the cheap. So Russia will lose some income on its aluminum exports as it potentially has to cover transportation costs all the way to China and possibly an additional discount in order for China to take it. China may only import a lot of Russian aluminium if it can get it on the cheap. China can then export more as its country balance will improve and possibly export all the way back to Europe.
A weak macro-backdrop in Europe makes sanctions easier. The backdrop to all of this is very weak aluminum demand in Europe amid a bleak macro-picture. Disruption of Russian supply to the EU should thus be less painful than it otherwise would have been.
What to do with Russian alu stocks already in EU LME storage? Consume it or export it? A tricky question is what to do about all the Russian aluminum which currently is sitting at EU LME storage sites where it is constituting some 90% of aluminum stocks. If it has to leave EU LME storage sites due to sanctions then it may have to be sold at a discount in order to get it to flow elsewhere. Maybe it will create deep front-end contango is one speculation. A natural solution however would be that sanctions allows consumption of Russian aluminum currently in stock in the EU but bans new and further stocking of Russian aluminum. Then these Russian stocks would gradually be consumed and dissipate and instead gradually be replaced by non-Russian aluminum.
”Futures market can tighten quickly and spreads could rally.” The following is a comment from one of SEB’s metals traders: ”The futures market could get very tight very quickly following EU sanctions on Russian aluminum. Spreads could tighten aggressively until market reaches a new balance.”
The LME 3mth aluminum price rallied to USD 3,849/ton when Russia attacked Ukraine. Price has now gained a little (+4.5%) to USD 2,254/ton on possible EU sanctions.
Aluminum premiums across the world. EU premiums rallied to USD 505/ton and USD 615/ton (duty unpaid and paid resp.) in 2022 vs normal USD 100-150/ton. Now gained a little on Mid-East troubles and rerouting. Could rise much more on EU sanctions.
Russia probably has a normal, net export of alu semies and primary alu of around 3 m mtpa. This would normally be destined to Europe.
Analys
Crude oil comment: US inventories remain well below averages despite yesterday’s build
Brent crude prices have remained stable since the sharp price surge on Monday afternoon, when the price jumped from USD 71.5 per barrel to USD 73.5 per barrel – close to current levels (now trading at USD 73.45 per barrel). The initial price spike was triggered by short-term supply disruptions at Norway’s Johan Sverdrup field and Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field.
While the disruptions in Norway have been resolved and production at Tengiz is expected to return to full capacity by the weekend, elevated prices have persisted. The market’s focus has now shifted to heightened concerns about an escalation in the war in Ukraine. This geopolitical uncertainty continues to support safe-haven assets, including gold and government bonds. Consequently, safe-haven currencies such as the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc have also strengthened.
U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excl. SPR) increased by 0.5 million barrels last week, according to U.S DOE. This build contrasts with expectations, as consensus had predicted no change (0.0 million barrels), and the API forecast projected a much larger increase of 4.8 million barrels. With last week’s build, crude oil inventories now stand at 430.3 million barrels, yet down 18 million barrels(!) compared to the same week last year and ish 4% below the five-year average for this time of year.
Gasoline inventories rose by 2.1 million barrels (still 4% below their five-year average), defying consensus expectations of a slight draw of 0.1 million barrels. Distillate (diesel) inventories, on the other hand, fell by 0.1 million barrels, aligning closely with expectations of no change (0.0 million barrels) but also remain 4% below their five-year average. In total, combined stocks of crude, gasoline, and distillates increased by 2.5 million barrels last week.
U.S. demand data showed mixed trends. Over the past four weeks, total petroleum products supplied averaged 20.7 million barrels per day, representing a 1.2% increase compared to the same period last year. Motor gasoline demand remained relatively stable at 8.9 million barrels per day, a 0.5% rise year-over-year. In contrast, distillate fuel demand continued to weaken, averaging 3.8 million barrels per day, down 6.4% from a year ago. Jet fuel demand also softened, falling 1.3% compared to the same four-week period in 2023.
Analys
China is turning the corner and oil sentiment will likely turn with it
Brent crude is maintaining its gains from Monday and ticking yet higher. Brent crude made a jump of 3.2% on Monday to USD 73.5/b and has managed to maintain the gain since then. Virtually no price change yesterday and opening this morning at USD 73.3/b.
Emerging positive signs from the Chinese economy may lift oil market sentiment. Chinese economic weakness in general and shockingly weak oil demand there has been pestering the oil price since its peak of USD 92.2/b in mid-April. Net Chinese crude and product imports has been negative since May as measured by 3mth y/y changes. This measure reached minus 10% in July and was still minus 3% in September. And on a year to Sep, y/y it is down 2%. Chinese oil demand growth has been a cornerstone of global oil demand over the past decades accounting for a growth of around half a million barrels per day per year or around 40% of yearly global oil demand growth. Electrification and gassification (LNG HDTrucking) of transportation is part of the reason, but that should only have weakened China’s oil demand growth and not turned it abruptly negative. Historically it has been running at around +3-4% pa.
With a sense of ’no end in sight’ for China’ ills and with a trade war rapidly approaching with Trump in charge next year, the oil bears have been in charge of the oil market. Oil prices have moved lower and lower since April. Refinery margins have also fallen sharply along with weaker oil products demand. The front-month gasoil crack to Brent peaked this year at USD 34.4/b (premium to Brent) in February and fell all the way to USD 14.4/b in mid October. Several dollar below its normal seasonal level. Now however it has recovered to a more normal, healthy seasonal level of USD 18.2/b.
But Chinese stimulus measures are already working. The best immediate measure of that is the China surprise index which has rallied from -40 at the end of September to now +20. This is probably starting to filter in to the oil market sentiment.
The market has for quite some time now been staring down towards the USD 60/b. But this may now start to change with a bit more optimistic tones emerging from the Chinese economy.
China economic surprise index (white). Front-month ARA Gasoil crack to Brent in USD/b (blue)
The IEA could be too bearish by up to 0.8 mb/d. IEA’s calculations for Q3-24 are off by 0.8 mb/d. OECD inventories fell by 1.16 mb/d in Q3 according to the IEA’s latest OMR. But according to the IEA’s supply/demand balance the decline should only have been 0.38 mb/d. I.e. the supply/demand balance of IEA for Q3-24 was much less bullish than how the inventories actually developed by a full 0.8 mb/d. If we assume that the OECD inventory changes in Q3-24 is the ”proof of the pudding”, then IEA’s estimated supply/demand balance was off by a full 0.8 mb/d. That is a lot. It could have a significant consequence for 2025 where the IEA is estimating that call-on-OPEC will decline by 0.9 mb/d y/y according to its estimated supply/demand balance. But if the IEA is off by 0.8 mb/d in Q3-24, it could be equally off by 0.8 mb/d for 2025 as a whole as well. Leading to a change in the call-on-OPEC of only 0.1 mb/d y/y instead. Story by Bloomberg: {NSN SMXSUYT1UM0W <GO>}. And looking at US oil inventories they have consistently fallen significantly more than normal since June this year. See below.
Later today at 16:30 CET we’ll have the US oil inventory data. Bearish indic by API, but could be a bullish surprise yet again. Last night the US API indicated that US crude stocks rose by 4.8 mb, gasoline stocks fell by 2.5 mb and distillates fell by 0.7 mb. In total a gain of 1.6 mb. Total US crude and product stocks normally decline by 3.7 mb for week 46.
The trend since June has been that US oil inventories have been falling significantly versus normal seasonal trends. US oil inventories stood 16 mb above the seasonal 2015-19 average on 21 June. In week 45 they ended 34 mb below their 2015-19 seasonal average. Recent news is that US Gulf refineries are running close to max in order to satisfy Lat Am demand for oil products.
US oil inventories versus the 2015-19 seasonal averages.
Analys
Crude oil comment: Europe’s largest oil field halted – driving prices higher
Since market opening on Monday, November 18, Brent crude prices have climbed steadily. Starting the week at approximately USD 70.7 per barrel, prices rose to USD 71.5 per barrel by noon yesterday. However, in the afternoon, Brent crude surged by nearly USD 2 per barrel, reaching USD 73.5 per barrel, which is close to where we are currently trading.
This sharp price increase has been driven by supply disruptions at two major oil fields: Norway’s Johan Sverdrup and Kazakhstan’s Tengiz. The Brent benchmark is now continuing to trade above USD 73 per barrel as the market reacts to heightened concerns about short-term supply tightness.
Norway’s Johan Sverdrup field, Europe’s largest and one of the top 10 globally in terms of estimated recoverable reserves, temporarily halted production on Monday afternoon due to an onshore power outage. According to Equinor, the issue was quickly identified but resulted in a complete shutdown of the field. Restoration efforts are underway. With a production capacity of 755,000 barrels per day, Sverdrup accounts for approximately 36% of Norway’s total oil output, making it a critical player in the country’s production. The unexpected outage has significantly supported Brent prices as the market evaluates its impact on overall supply.
Adding to the bullish momentum, supply constraints at Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field have further intensified concerns. Tengiz, with a production capacity of around 700,000 barrels per day, has seen output cut by approximately 30% this month due to ongoing repairs, exceeding earlier estimates of a 20% reduction. Repairs are expected to conclude by November 23, but in the meantime, supply tightness persists, amplifying market vol.
On a broader scale, a pullback in the U.S. dollar yesterday (down 0.15%) provided additional tailwinds for crude prices, making oil more attractive to international buyers. However, over the past few weeks, Brent crude has alternated between gains and losses as market participants juggle multiple factors, including U.S. monetary policy, concerns over Chinese demand, and the evolving supply strategy of OPEC+.
The latter remains a critical factor, as unused production capacity within OPEC continues to exert downward pressure on prices. An acceleration in the global economy will be crucial to improving demand fundamentals.
Despite these short-term fluctuations, we see encouraging signs of a recovering global economy and remain moderately bullish. We are holding to our price forecast of USD 75 per barrel in 2025, followed by USD 87.5 in 2026.
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