Analys
EU sanctions on Russian alu will likely drive EU premiums higher

The LME 3mth alu price has bounced 4.5% past two days but its a far cry from 2022 impacts. The 3mth aluminum price has bounced 4.5% (+96 USD/ton) to USD 2256.5/ton on news that the EU is considering an embargo on Russian aluminum. It’s a notable gain amid an otherwise lukewarm and bearish energy complex where natural gas and coal prices have been trending steadily lower since October last year. But it is nothing compared to what happened in 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine. The 3mth aluminum price then rallied to USD 3849/ton and the EU aluminum premium rallied to USD 505/ton versus a more normal USD 100/ton. Thus so far the the price action in aluminum is nothing like what we experienced in 2022.

It looks likely to us that the EU will indeed impose sanctions on Russian aluminium. We don’t know yet if the EU actually will implement sanctions on Russian aluminum. Personally I think its likely that they will do it as it is kind of a moral stand and the last large piece of the Russian energy complex which is possible to place under sanctions. But the actual effects both on the EU and Russia will likely be limited. Russia will not stop producing and exporting aluminium. Rather it will export it and send it elsewhere in the world. That is what happened to Russian crude and product exports. They weren’t lost in terms of global supply, but rerouted elsewhere.
New sanctions will have limited effect on Russia and dissipate over time. It’s a moral stand. Previously it was possible to enforce effective sanctions on one specific country. Those were the days when the US ruled the world and China chose to side with the US. For example with sanctions on Iran. These sanctions have not at all been lifted yet. But Iranian oil exports have rebounded from 1.9 m b/d at the low in 2019 to now 3.2 m b/d as China now is accepting to import Iranian crude oil and is placing less emphasis on the US.
The effect of sanctions have a tendency to deteriorate over time. Even when the US ruled the world and China played along. But sanctions today will leak massively if China isn’t playing along with what the EU and the US wants. And China isn’t playing along.
The goal is to hurt Russia’s income from aluminum exports. But the effect will be limited. The aim with the sanctions towards Russian oil, and now possibly also aluminum, isn’t to bar the supply from the global market. Rather the opposite. Neither the US nor the EU wants to put a stop to Russian raw materials exports as it could drive up the price of these globally which would hurt consumers and generate inflation. The aim is to keep exports flowing but to try to hurt Russian earnings from the exports. The same will likely be the case for the potentially upcoming EU sanctions on aluminum.
But even the ”hurt the income” strategy with a cap on the price of Russian crude and products has deteriorated over time. Russian Urals crude had a discount to Brent crude in 2022 of as much as USD 36/b and today it is only USD 12/b below Brent.
Russia has probably made contingency plans a long time ago. Russia has also probably made contingency plans for its aluminum exports as the risk has been there all along since 2022. Thus new EU sanctions towards Russian aluminium exports will likely be less of a shock today versus when all hell broke lose in 2022.
Europe has also already reduced its Russian imports of primary aluminium, to about 10% of its primary needs. A large proportion of imports are now increasingly coming from middle eastern producers.
EU alu premiums already rising along with Mid-East issues (Red Sea). Will rise further with sanctions. Issues in the region has pushed up freight costs, insurance costs and added transit delays and length of journey to Europe. A combination of these issues have already lifted the European premium. New sanctions on Russia will likely lift the regional premiums further.
The dirty details. How deeply is EU’s industrial supply chains embedded in Russian alu semies? The actual effects of new EU sanctions on Russian aluminum will be down to the dirty details. An important question is how deeply Russian semies, and prefabricated aluminum parts (which also looks to be sanctioned) are embedded and integrated in the European industrial system (supply chains). If the EU is deeply dependent of pre-fabricated aluminum parts from Russia, then it could be painful for EU to disentangle from these imports.
Sanctions = additional costs and frictions as global aluminum flows are rerouted. New sanctions will naturally lead to frictions and some added price due to that. Aluminum can of course be transported across the world. It is cheaper to transport it from Russia to Europe and that is why it historically has landed in the EU. But, if need be, due to possible EU sanctions towards Russia on aluminum, then Russia can and will send its aluminum to other global regions, maybe and possibly predominantly, to China. Then the EU can and must import more aluminum from other places instead. Probably the middle east and maybe from China
The Global LME 3mth price will likely rise only marginally as no supply is actually lost. Just rerouted. The price of aluminum across the world may increase a little bit due to such sanction-frictions but probably not all that much since there will not be any loss of supply and only added transportation frictions and costs.
EU aluminum premiums will naturally rise in order to attract non-Russian supply from further away. EU Alu-premiums should naturally increase in order to attract aluminum from further away. China will probably be able to import Russian aluminum on the cheap. So Russia will lose some income on its aluminum exports as it potentially has to cover transportation costs all the way to China and possibly an additional discount in order for China to take it. China may only import a lot of Russian aluminium if it can get it on the cheap. China can then export more as its country balance will improve and possibly export all the way back to Europe.
A weak macro-backdrop in Europe makes sanctions easier. The backdrop to all of this is very weak aluminum demand in Europe amid a bleak macro-picture. Disruption of Russian supply to the EU should thus be less painful than it otherwise would have been.
What to do with Russian alu stocks already in EU LME storage? Consume it or export it? A tricky question is what to do about all the Russian aluminum which currently is sitting at EU LME storage sites where it is constituting some 90% of aluminum stocks. If it has to leave EU LME storage sites due to sanctions then it may have to be sold at a discount in order to get it to flow elsewhere. Maybe it will create deep front-end contango is one speculation. A natural solution however would be that sanctions allows consumption of Russian aluminum currently in stock in the EU but bans new and further stocking of Russian aluminum. Then these Russian stocks would gradually be consumed and dissipate and instead gradually be replaced by non-Russian aluminum.
”Futures market can tighten quickly and spreads could rally.” The following is a comment from one of SEB’s metals traders: ”The futures market could get very tight very quickly following EU sanctions on Russian aluminum. Spreads could tighten aggressively until market reaches a new balance.”
The LME 3mth aluminum price rallied to USD 3,849/ton when Russia attacked Ukraine. Price has now gained a little (+4.5%) to USD 2,254/ton on possible EU sanctions.
Aluminum premiums across the world. EU premiums rallied to USD 505/ton and USD 615/ton (duty unpaid and paid resp.) in 2022 vs normal USD 100-150/ton. Now gained a little on Mid-East troubles and rerouting. Could rise much more on EU sanctions.
Russia probably has a normal, net export of alu semies and primary alu of around 3 m mtpa. This would normally be destined to Europe.
Analys
Quadruple whammy! Brent crude down $13 in four days

Brent Crude prices continued their decline heading into the weekend. On Friday, the price fell another USD 4 per barrel, followed by a further USD 3 per barrel drop this morning. This means Brent crude oil prices have crashed by a whopping USD 13 per barrel (-21%) since last Wednesday high, marking a significant decline in just four trading days. As of now, Brent crude is trading at USD 62.8 per barrel, its lowest point since February 2021.

The market has faced a ”quadruple whammy”:
#1: U.S. Tariffs: On Wednesday, the U.S. unveiled its new package of individual tariffs. The market reacted swiftly, as Trump followed through on his promise to rebalance the U.S. trade position with the world. His primary objective is a more balanced trade environment, which, naturally, weakened Brent crude prices. The widespread imposition of strict tariffs is likely to fuel concerns about an economic slowdown, which would weaken global oil demand. This macroeconomic uncertainty, especially regarding tariffs, calls for caution about the pace of demand growth.
#2: OPEC+ hike: Shortly after, OPEC+ announced plans to raise production in May by 41,000 bpd, exceeding earlier expectations with a three-monthly increment. OPEC emphasized that strong market fundamentals and a positive outlook were behind the decision. However, the decision likely stemmed from frustration within the cartel, particularly after months of excess production from Kazakhstan and Iraq. Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister seemed to have reached his limit, emphasizing that the larger-than-expected May output hike would only be a “prelude” if those countries didn’t improve their performance. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, this signals: ”All comply, or we will drag down the price.”
#3: China’s retaliation: Last Friday, even though the Chinese market was closed, firm indications came from China on how it plans to handle the U.S. tariffs. China is clearly meeting force with force, imposing 34% tariffs on all U.S. goods. This move raises fears of an economic slowdown due to reduced global trade, which would consequently weaken global oil demand going forward.
#4: Saudi price cuts: At the start of this week, oil prices continued to drop after Saudi Arabia slashed its flagship crude price by the most in over two years. Saudi Arabia reduced the Arab Light OSP by USD 2.3 per barrel for Asia in May, while prices to Europe and the U.S. were also cut.
These four key factors have driven the massive price drop over the last four trading days. The overarching theme is the fear of weaker demand and stronger supply. The escalating trade war has raised concerns about a potential global recession, leading to weaker demand, compounded by the surprisingly large output hike from OPEC+.
That said, it’s worth questioning whether the market is underestimating the risk of a U.S.-Iran conflict this year.
U.S. military mobilization and Iran’s resistance to diplomacy have raised the risk of conflict. Efforts to neutralize the Houthis suggest a buildup toward potential strikes on Iran. The recent Liberation Day episode further underscores that economic fallout is not a constraint for Trump, and markets may be underestimating the threat of war in the Middle East.
With this backdrop, we continue to forecast USD 70 per barrel for this year (2025). For reference, Brent crude averaged USD 75 per barrel in Q1-2025.
Analys
Lowest since Dec 2021. Kazakhstan likely reason for OPEC+ surprise hike in May

Collapsing after Trump tariffs and large surprise production hike by OPEC+ in May. Brent crude collapsed yesterday following the shock of the Trump tariffs on April 2 and even more so due to the unexpected announcement from OPEC+ that they will lift production by 411 kb/d in May which is three times as much as expected. Brent fell 6.4% yesterday with a close of USD 70.14/b and traded to a low of USD 69.48/b within the day. This morning it is down another 2.7% to USD 68.2/b. That is below the recent low point in early March of USD 68.33/b. Thus, a new ”lowest since December 2021” today.

Kazakhstan seems to be the problem and the reason for the unexpected large hike by OPEC+ in May. Kazakhstan has consistently breached its production cap. In February it produced 1.83 mb/d crude and 2.12 mb/d including condensates. In March its production reached a new record of 2.17 mb/d. Its crude production cap however is 1.468 mb/d. In February it thus exceeded its production cap by 362 kb/d.
Those who comply are getting frustrated with those who don’t. Internal compliance is an important and difficult issue when OPEC+ is holding back production. The problem naturally grows the bigger the cuts are and the longer they last as impatience grows over time. The cuts have been large, and they have lasted for a long time. And now some cracks are appearing. But that does not mean they cannot be mended. And it does not imply either that the group is totally shifting strategy from Price to Volume. It is still a measured approach. Also, by lifting all caps across the voluntary cutters, Kazakhstan becomes less out of compliance. Thus, less cuts by Kazakhstan are needed in order to become compliant.
While not a shift from Price to Volume, the surprise hike in May is clearly a sign of weakness. The struggle over internal compliance has now led to a rupture in strategy and more production in May than what was previously planned and signaled to the market. It is thus natural to assign a higher production path from the group for 2025 than previously assumed. Do however remember how quickly the price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia ended in the spring of 2020.
Higher production by OPEC+ will be partially countered by lower production from Venezuela and Iran. The new sanctions towards Iran and Venezuela can to a large degree counter the production increase from OPEC+. But to what extent is still unclear.
Buy some oil calls. Bullish risks are never far away. Rising risks for US/Israeli attack on Iran? The US has increased its indirect attacks on Iran by fresh attacks on Syria and Yemen lately. The US has also escalated sanctions towards the country in an effort to force Iran into a new nuclear deal. The UK newspaper TheSun yesterday ran the following story: ”ON THE BRINK US & Iran war is ‘INEVITABLE’, France warns as Trump masses huge strike force with THIRD of America’s stealth bombers”. This is indeed a clear risk which would lead to significant losses of supply of oil in the Middle East and probably not just from Iran. So, buying some oil calls amid the current selloff is probably a prudent thing to do for oil consumers.
Brent crude is rejoining the US equity selloff by its recent collapse though for partially different reasons. New painful tariffs from Trump in combination with more oil from OPEC+ is not a great combination.

Analys
Tariffs deepen economic concerns – significantly weighing on crude oil prices

Brent crude prices initially maintained the gains from late March and traded sideways during the first two trading days in April. Yesterday evening, the price even reached its highest point since mid-February, touching USD 75.5 per barrel.
However, after the U.S. president addressed the public and unveiled his new package of individual tariffs, the market reacted accordingly. Overnight, Brent crude dropped by close to USD 4 per barrel, now trading at USD 71.6 per barrel.
Key takeaways from the speech include a baseline tariff rate of 10% for all countries. Additionally, individual reciprocal tariffs will be imposed on countries with which the U.S. has the largest trade deficits. Many Asian economies end up at the higher end of the scale, with China facing a significant 54% tariff. In contrast, many North and South American countries are at the lower end, with a 10% tariff rate. The EU stands at 20%, which, while not unexpected given earlier signals, is still disappointing, especially after Trump’s previous suggestion that there might be some easing.
Once again, Trump has followed through on his promise, making it clear that he is serious about rebalancing the U.S. trade position with the world. While some negotiation may still occur, the primary objective is to achieve a more balanced trade environment. A weaker U.S. dollar is likely to be an integral part of this solution.
Yet, as the flow of physical goods to the U.S. declines, the natural question arises: where will these goods go? The EU may be forced to raise tariffs on China, mirroring U.S. actions to protect its industries from an influx of discounted Chinese goods.
Initially, we will observe the effects in soft economic data, such as sentiment indices reflecting investor, industry, and consumer confidence, followed by drops in equity markets and, very likely, declining oil prices. This will eventually be followed by more tangible data showing reductions in employment, spending, investments, and overall economic activity.
Ref oil prices moving forward, we have recently adjusted our Brent crude price forecast. The widespread imposition of strict tariffs is expected to foster fears of an economic slowdown, potentially reducing oil demand. Macroeconomic uncertainty, particularly regarding tariffs, warrants caution regarding the pace of demand growth. Our updated forecast of USD 70 per barrel for 2025 and 2026, and USD 75 per barrel for 2027, reflects a more conservative outlook, influenced by stronger-than-expected U.S. supply, a more politically influenced OPEC+, and an increased focus on fragile demand.
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US DOE data:
Last week, U.S. crude oil refinery inputs averaged 15.6 million barrels per day, a decrease of 192 thousand barrels per day from the previous week. Refineries operated at 86.0% of their total operable capacity during this period. Gasoline production increased slightly, averaging 9.3 million barrels per day, while distillate (diesel) production also rose, averaging 4.7 million barrels per day.
U.S. crude oil imports averaged 6.5 million barrels per day, up by 271 thousand barrels per day from the prior week. Over the past four weeks, imports averaged 5.9 million barrels per day, reflecting a 6.3% year-on-year decline compared to the same period last year.
The focus remains on U.S. crude and product inventories, which continue to impact short-term price dynamics in both WTI and Brent crude. Total commercial petroleum inventories (excl. SPR) increased by 5.4 million barrels, a modest build, yet insufficient to trigger significant price movements.
Commercial crude oil inventories (excl. SPR) rose by 6.2 million barrels, in line with the 6-million-barrel build forecasted by the API. With this latest increase, U.S. crude oil inventories now stand at 439.8 million barrels, which is 4% below the five-year average for this time of year.
Gasoline inventories decreased by 1.6 million barrels, exactly matching the API’s reported decline of 1.6 million barrels. Diesel inventories rose by 0.3 million barrels, which is close to the API’s forecast of an 11-thousand-barrel decrease. Diesel inventories are currently 6% below the five-year average.
Over the past four weeks, total products supplied, a proxy for U.S. demand, averaged 20.1 million barrels per day, a 1.2% decrease compared to the same period last year. Gasoline supplied averaged 8.8 million barrels per day, down 1.9% year-on-year. Diesel supplied averaged 3.8 million barrels per day, marking a 3.7% increase from the same period last year. Jet fuel demand also showed strength, rising 4.2% over the same four-week period.
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