Analys
Increased OPEC power in 2021 requires demand revival
Brent crude rebounded almost 1% yesterday to $64.62/bl and continues to tick a little higher this morning but still below the $65/bl mark. The signing of the US – China trade deal has given optimism for a revival in global manufacturing and thus stronger oil demand growth and this is what gives the oil price some vigour. It is very hard for OPEC to fight a war on two fronts with both rising non-OPEC supply and weakening global oil demand growth at the same time. A potential revival in global manufacturing (and oil demand growth) would thus be a great relief for OPEC and remove a lot of downside price risk for the oil price. The oil price is at its current level at the mercy of OPEC and OPEC’s current strategy of “price over volume”. If global oil demand continues at last year’s weaker than normal 1% growth rate also in 2020 and 2021 then OPEC and its allies might be forced to switch strategy to “volume over price” once again.
The monthly oil market report from EIA on Tuesday projected a lukewarm but stable outlook for the global oil market in 2020 and 2021 with Brent crude oil prices projected to average $64.8/bl in 2020 rising to $67.5/bl in 2021. It lifted its US shale oil production projection a tad for 2020 (+0.15 m bl/d) and extended the projection to 2021 with an average YoY growth of 0.4 m bl/d in 2021. That is a far cry from latest years booming US shale oil production growth. A shale oil production growth of +0.4 m bl/d per year is still a lot of new oil though.
Key assumptions in the US EIA forecast is that global demand will grow by 1.3% p.a. for the coming two years and that OPEC will stick to its current “price over volume” strategy and continue to hold back supply. EIA’s supply/demand balance “allows” OPEC to produce 29.2 m bl/d on average through the forecast horizon. The sharp decline in the need for OPEC oil over the latest couple of years is projected to halt and stabilize at around that level and then rise marginally in 2021. I.e. it projects that OPEC will be handed back a little bit of volume and market power and thus room to manoeuvre towards the end of 2021. But not a lot.
If EIA’s forecast materializes with no major disruptions in middle east supply, then we are looking at a very stable oil market with low oil price volatility for the coming two years: US shale oil production growth is slowing down and OPEC’s challenged position over the latest years is stabilizing while global oil inventories are projected to stay elevated and plentiful.
The oil price is now getting some vigour on the back of the US – China trade deal with hopes for global manufacturing revival and stronger oil demand growth. If this materializes it will put OPEC on a more stable footing and thus increase the probability that they will be able to stick with “price over volume” throughout the forecast horizon to end of 2021.
But even with a historically normal oil demand growth of 1.3% per year the oil price will still be at the mercy of OPEC’s choice of market strategy even in 2021. The US EIA is projecting non-OPEC production to grow by 0.9 m bl/d in 2021. If global oil demand grows at 1.3% that year it will hand some volume back to OPEC. Global inventories will still be high at that point, but it could be the gradual start of some lost volume starting to return back to OPEC.
True oil market strength won’t come before non-OPEC production starts to grow more slowly than global oil demand growth. This would mean increased call-on-OPEC crude oil and would hand some of the lost volume over the past years back to OPEC again. It would place OPEC in proper control of the market again with significantly reduced risk for a switch to back to “volume over price” (which would lead to a collapse in the oil price).
The US EIA projects that non-OPEC production will grow at +0.9 m bl/d YoY in 2021. This is below the historical oil demand growth rate of about 1.3% YoY (about 1.3 m bl/d) and thus projects a possible return of volume back to OPEC. That’s the turning point OPEC is looking for. However, the increase in call-on-OPEC in 2021 cannot all that easily be realized as increased production because inventories will still be high. If OPEC wants to draw down inventories at that time, they will still need to hold back production at unchanged level. EIA’s outlook is positive for OPEC, but it is at the very end of the two-year forecast period and highly vulnerable if global oil demand growth is weak. Global manufacturing revival will thus be key.
Ch1: US EIA Supply/demand balance. Fairly stable with plenty of oil in the market. Could imply low price volatility if OPEC sticks to its “price over volume” strategy all through the period. Some deficit in 2021 hands some volume back to OPEC as non-OPEC production is projected to grow at only 0.9 m bl/d YoY that year versus normal oil demand growth of 1.3 m bl/d.
Ch2: EIA projects OECD inventories to rise in 2020 and then a marginal decline in 2021. Plenty of oil in the market next two years unless we get a considerable supply outage in the middle east.
Ch3: EIA’s historical and projected OPEC production. Stabilizing next two years after a steep decline past two years. I.e. OPEC’s position looks set to stabilize at around 29.2 m bl/d versus a production of 29.6 m bl/d in December. What the outlook shows is that oil prices forecasted by the US EIA are totally reliant on OPEC sticking with “price over volume” for the coming two years and only produce about 29.2 m bl/d. No more
Ch4: The US EIA lifted its projection for US shale oil production by 150 k bl/d in 2020 and extended its forecast to 2021. Steady growth rate of 0.4 m bl/d in 2021. No flat-lining from 2020 to 2021
Market is starting to take US/Iran headlines with a pinch of salt. Brent crude rose $2.8/b yesterday to an official close of $112.1/b. But after that it traded as low as $108.05/b before ending late night at around $109.7/b. Through the day it traded in a range of $106.87 – 112.72/b amid a flurry of news or rumors from Iran and the US. ”US temporary sanctions during negotiations” (falls alarm). ”We will bomb Iran” (not anyhow),… etc. While the market is still fluctuating to this kind of news flow, it is starting to take such headlines with a pinch of salt.
We’ll see. Maybe, maybe not. The Brent M1 contract is trading at $110.2/b this morning which very close to the average ticks through yesterday of $110.4/b.
Trump with bearish, verbal intervention whenever Brent trades above $110/b it seems. What seems to be a pattern is that Trump states something like ”very good negotiations going on with Iran”, ”New leaders in Iran are great,..”, ”Great progress in negotiations,…”, ”Deal in sight,..” etc whenever the Brent M1 contract trades above $110/b. An effort to cool the market. These hot air verbal interventions from Trump used to have a heavy bearish impact on prices, but they now seems to have less and less effect unless they are backed by reality.
As far as we can see there has been no real progress in the negotiations between the US and Iran with both sides still standing by their previous demands.
Iran is getting stronger while the cease fire lasts making a return to war for Trump yet harder. Iran is naturally in constant preparation for a return to war given Trump’s steady threats of bombing Iran again. Iran is naturally doing what ever is possible to prepare for a return to war. And every day the cease fire lasts it is better prepared. This naturally makes it more and more difficult and dangerous for the US to return to warring activity versus Iran as the consequences for energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf will be more and more severe the longer the cease fire lasts. Israel seems to see it this way as well. That the war is not won and that current frozen state of a cease fire gives Iran opportunity to rebuild military and politically.
Global inventories are drawing down day by day. How much? In the meantime the Strait of Hormuz stays closed. There is varying measures and estimates of how much global inventories are drawing down. Our rough estimate, back of the envelope, is that global inventories are drawing down by at least some 10 mb/d or about 300 mb/d in a balance between loss of supply versus demand destruction. Other estimates we see are a monthly draw of 250-270 mb/d. The IEA only ’measured’ a draw in global observable stocks of 117 mb in April with oil on water rising 53 mb while on shore stocks fell 170 mb. But global stocks are hard to measure with large invisible, unmeasured stocks. As such a back of the envelope approach may be better.
Oil products is what the world is consuming. Oil product prices likely to rise while product stocks fall. Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) are predominantly crude oil. Discharging oil from OECD SPR stocks, a sharp reduction in Chinese crude imports and a reduction in global refinery throughput of 6-7 mb/d has helped to keep crude oil markets satisfactorily supplied. But global inventories are drawing down none the less. And oil products is really what the world is consuming. So if global refinery throughput stays subdued, then demand will eventually have to match the supply of oil products. The likely path forward this summer is a steady draw down in jet fuel, diesel and gasoline. Higher prices for these. Then, if possible, higher refinery throughput and higher usage of crude in response to very profitable refinery margins. And lastly sharper draw in crude stocks and higher prices for these. But some 6 mb/d of oil products used to be exported through the Strait of Hormuz. And it may not be so easy to ramp up refinery activity across the world to compensate. Especially as Ukraine continues to damage Russian refineries as well as Russian crude production and export facilities.
Watch oil product stocks and prices as well as Brent calendar 2027. What to watch for this summer is thus oil product inventories falling and oil product premiums to crude rising. Another measure to watch is the Brent crude 2027 contract as it rises steadily day by day as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed and global oil inventories decline. The latter is close to the highest level since the start of the war and keeps rising.
The Brent M1 contract and the Brent 2027 prices and current price of jet fuel in Europe (ARA). All in USD/b
Our back of the envelope calculation of the global shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Note that 3.5 mb/d of discharge from SPR is also a draw. Note also that ’Forced demand loss’ of 2.5 mb/d is probably temporary and will fall back towards zero as logistics are sorted out leaving ’Price demand loss’ to do the job of balancing the market. Thus a shortfall of at least 9 mb/d created by the closure. More if SPR discharge is included and more if Forced demand loss recedes.
Brent is climbing higher. Front-month is at USD 106.3/bl this morning, close to a weekly high and a USD 9/bl jump from Mondays open. This is the move we flagged as a risk earlier in the week: the market shifting from ”a deal is around the corner” to ”this is going to take longer than we thought”.
Analyst Commodities, SEB
During April, rest-of-year Brent remained remarkably stable around USD 90/bl. A stability which rested on one single assumption: the SoH reopens around 1 May. That assumption is now slowly falling apart.
As we highlighted yesterday: every week of delay beyond 1 May adds (theoretically) ish USD 5/bl to the rest-of-year average, as global inventories draw 100 million barrels per week. i.e., a mid-May reopening implies rest-of-year Brent closer to USD 100/bl, and anything pushing into June or July takes us meaningfully higher.
What’s changed in the last 48 hours:
#1: The US military has formally warned that clearing suspected sea mines from SoH could take up to six months. That is a completely different timescale from what the financial market is pricing. Even a political deal tomorrow does not immediately reopen the strait.
#2: Trump has shifted his tone from urgency to ”strategic patience”. In yesterday’s press conference: ”Don’t rush me… I want a great deal.” The market is reading this as a president no longer feeling pressured by timelines, with the naval blockade running in the background.
#3: So far, the military activity is escalating, not de-escalating. Axios reports Iran is laying more mines in SoH. The US 3rd carrier strike group (USS George H.W. Bush) is arriving with two countermine vessels. Trump yesterday ordered the US Navy to destroy any Iranian boats caught laying mines. While CNN reports that the Pentagon is actively drawing up plans to strike Iranian SoH capabilities and individual Iranian military leaders if the ceasefire collapses. i.e., NOT a attitude consistent with an imminent deal!
Spot crude and product prices eased off the early-April highs on a combination of system rerouting and deal optimism. Both now weakening. Goldman estimates April Gulf output is reduced by 14.5 mbl/d, or 57% of pre-war supply, a number that keeps getting worse the longer this drags on.
Demand-side adaptation is ongoing: S. Korea has cut its Middle East crude dependence from 69% to 56% by pulling more from the Americas and Africa, and Japan is kicking off a second round of SPR releases from 1 May. But SPRs are finite.
Ref. to the negotiations, we should not bet on speed. The current Iranian leadership is dominated by genuine hardliners willing to absorb economic pain and run the clock to extract concessions. That is not a setup for a rapid resolution. US/Israeli media briefings keep framing the delay as ”internal Iranian divisions”, the reality is more complicated and points toward weeks and months, not days.
Our point is that the complexity is large, and higher prices have only just started (given a scenario where the negotiations drag out in time). The market spent April leaning on the USD 90/bl rest-of-year assumption; that case is diminishing by the hour. If ”early May reopening” is replaced by ”June, July or later” over the next week or two, both crude and products have meaningful room to reprice higher from here. There is a high risk being short energy and betting on any immediate political resolution(!).
Down on Friday. Up on Monday. The Brent June crude oil contract traded down 5.1% last week to a close of $90.38/b. It reached a high of $103.87/b last Monday and a low of $86.09/b on Friday as Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open for transit. That quickly changed over the weekend as the US upheld its blockade of Iranian oil exports while Iran naturally responded by closing the SoH again. The US blew a hole in the engine room of the Iranian ship TOUSKA and took custody of the ship on Sunday. Brent crude is up 5.6% this morning to $95.4/b.
The cease-fire is expiring tomorrow. The US has said it will send a delegation for a second round of negotiations in Islamabad in Pakistan. But Iran has for now rejected a second round of talks as it views US demands as unrealistic and excessive while the US is also blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
While Brent is up 5% this morning, the financial market is still very optimistic that progress will be made. That talks will continue and that the SoH will fully open by the start of May which is consistent with a rest-of-year average Brent crude oil price of around $90/b with the market now trading that balance at around $88/b.
Financial optimism vs. physical deterioration. We have a divergence where the financial market is trading negotiations, improvements and resolution while at the same time the physical market is deteriorating day by day. Physical oil flows remain constrained by disrupted flows, longer voyage times and elevated freight and insurance costs.
Financial markets are betting that a US/Iranian resolution will save us in time from violent shortages down the road. But every day that the SoH remains closed is bringing us closer to a potentially very painful point of shortages and much higher prices.
The US blockade is also a weapon of leverage against its European and Asian allies. When Iran closed the SoH it held the world economy as a hostage against the US. The US blockade of the SoH is of course blocking Iranian oil exports. But it is also an action of disruption directed towards Europe and Asia. The US has called for the rest of the world to engaged in the war with Iran: ”If you want oil from the Persian Gulf, then go and get it”. A risk is that the US plays brinkmanship with the global oil market directed towards its European and Asian allies and maybe even towards China to force them to engage and take part. Maybe unthinkable. But unthinkable has become the norm with Trump in the White House.
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Oil product price pain is set to rise as the Strait of Hormuz stays closed into summer
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