Analys
SEB Jordbruksprodukter – Vecka 46
Marknaderna för jordbruksprodukter har hållit sig väldigt lugna den senaste veckan. Det är endast priset på potatis som rört sig, minus 9%. Däremot sker det saker i bakgrunden, framförallt på etanolmarknaden, men även på exportmarknaden för vete och inte minst, i ekonomin i stort.
Att byta namn på premiärministrarna i Grekland och Italien skulle lösa några problem gick marknaden på i några minuter. Angela Merkels tyska CDU träffades i förrgår och det kom starka uttalanden därifrån om att hålla fast vid EU-projektet som det viktigaste för den här generationen.
Det är helt uppenbart att läxan från 1992 års uppgörelse med fasta växelkurser inte har fastnat. Läxan var att en för hög växelkurs som försvaras med allt högre räntor, leder till att räntorna slår ihjäl ekonomin i landet, vilket gör landet ännu mindre värt – dvs växelkursen borde vara ÄNNU lägre, och trycket på växelkursen blir ännu hårdare. Det är en spiral som endast kan ha flera lösningar, varav bankrutt är en av dem.
För några dagar sedan var räntan på italienska obligationer under 6%. Det var OK. Sedan gick räntan över och ligger nu på 7%. Förändringen av läge är som natt och dag. Länder som har så höga skulder byter spår i växeln från destination ”helt ok”, till destination ”bankrutt”.
EU-politikernas lätthet att snacka om skuldavskrivning för Grekland, har gjort att allt fler inser att ”skuldavskrivning” är slutdestinationen för länder med för höga skulder, att klara sig. Skuldavskrivning gör att banker i Frankrike, Tyskland, med flera länder, får det svårt. Krisen flyttas norrut, eftersom bankernas skulder blir Frankrikes och Tysklands statsskulder. Därför steg räntorna på franska statsobligationer och belgiska, t ex, i tisdags.
Varför är det här av intresse i ett brev om jordbruksprodukter? Jo, därför att lagren av spannmål i Frankrike, som dessutom inte sjunker som de ska, blir allt dyrare att finansiera. Det contango som finns på Matif måste bort. Lagren måste likvideras.
Detta om inte ECB tillåts genomföra en europeiska version av det amerikanska QE2 – dvs att trycka pengar och pumpa in dem i ekonomin. I vilket, fall borde euron falla mot dollarn. Men väljer man inflationsvägen för att bli av med de ohanterligt stora statsskulderna får man en boom i råvarupriser och markpriser. Till den punkten är det nog ändå en tid kvar. Till dess blir det nog en orolig färd.
Vete
Terminspriset på Matif-vete håller sig alltjämt över den psykologiskt viktiga 180-euro-nivån, men orosmolnen hopar sig. Ryssland och Ukrainas återinträde på världsmarknaden spelar en stor roll nu. Dessa exportländers volymer påverkar i synnerhet europeiska länders exportmarknad, som är Mellanöstern och Nordafrika. Särskilt märks detta för Frankrike, som är ett av världens största exportländer när det gäller vete. Frankrike har hittills på säsongen förlorat mer än ett dussin av Egyptens tenders; Egypten är världens viktigaste importland med ca 9 mt som årlig importvolym. Vete från Ryssland, Ukraina och Kazakstan väller ut över marknaden. Egypten har de senaste 17 gångerna valt vete från Svartahavsregionen. Exporten från Rouen, som är Europas största export-hub, noterade den 2 november fyra månaders lägsta nivå. Franska myndigheter räknar med 23% lägre export i perioden juli 2011 – juni 2012, jämfört med förra året. Det blir då den lägsta nivån på 10 år. Egypten har endast stått för 4% av Frankrikes export utanför EU sedan juli, mot 18% förra året.
Algeriet är ett land som gärna har köpt franskt vete. Algeriet vann självständighet från Frankrike år 1962. Brödet man äter är baguetter och det franska vetet passar utmärkt för detta. Enligt FAO äter den genomsnittlige algeriern 212 kg vete om året, en klar andraplats i världsligan efter grannlandet Tunisien. Förra året gick 24% av Frankrikes export till Algeriet, som är världens näst största importland efter Egypten. Algeriet har hårda krav på insektsskador och svartahavsregionen drabbas ofta av sköldskinnbaggar (eurygaster integricepts), som suger ur sädeskornen. Därför kan Frankrike känna sig ganska säker än så länge där.
Rysslands skörd blir enligt USDA:s WASDE den tredje största på 10 år och erbjuder vete ca 10 dollar per ton under franska priser. Rysslands export påverkar främst, men inte bara Europa. Enligt USDA kommer USA:s export att minska med 24% till 26.5 mt den här säsongen. -24% är det största fallet på ett kvartssekel.
Nedan ser vi januarikontraktet på Matif. Den tekniska, dvs psykologiskt viktiga stödnivån på 180 euro utgår allt jämt ett starkt stöd. Vi bedömer ändå, med tanke på den minskning av konsumtion som lär komma i spåren av alla sparprogram i EU, och överväldigande bevis på att priset är för högt för att vinna exportordrar, att 180 euro lär brytas.
Nedan ser vi terminskurvan för Chicagovete och Matif nu och för en vecka sedan.
Allt talar för att Matif-vete faller ner i första hand till 150 – 160 – euro-nivån.
Maltkorn
Maltkornsmarknaden följer vetet och det finns inga speciella nyheter att rapportera. Tekniskt ligger priset under glidande medelvärden. Den tekniska trenden är alltså nedåtriktad.
Potatis
Priset på potatis av årets skörd har fallit med 9% den senaste veckan. Det är den enda råvara som rört sig mer än någon procentenhet.
Nedan ser vi kursdiagrammet på europeisk potatis, som handlas på Eurex; terminen avser leverans april nästa år.
Majs
Liksom på vetemarknaden, vinner Ryssland och Ukraina exportordrar. Igår köpte Japan 800,000 ton majs från Ukraina istället för att köpa den dyrare amerikanska produkten. Japan är världens största importör av majs, som används i djurhållningen.
Nedan ser vi marskontraktet på CBOT, där priset backat under 233-dagars glidande medelvärde, något av en negativ teknsisk signal.
Det händer intressanta saker i bakgrunden till majsmarknaden. För det första handlar det om amerikansk etanolproduktion och för det andra om kinesisk fläskkonsumtion. Vi ser priserna i yuan per kilo (senast 24.75 yuan) i diagrammet nedan – notera det stora prisfallet som just pågår (två glidande medelvärden är också inritade):
När det gäller etanol är det boom i USA. Firman Agtradertalk som sammanställer statistik visar följande nettovinst per gallon på att producera etanol, baserat på spotpriser FOB Illinois.
Nu är det så att det finns en skatterabatt på 45 cent per gallon i USA, som ges till den som blandar etanol i bensin. Den heter Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit och introducerades av George W Bush år 2004 och trädde i kraft 2005. Skatten syftade till att minska importberoendet av råolja, men kostar i dagsläget 5.7 miljarder dollar för skattebetalarna.
Etanol borde kosta 70% av bensin, eftersom etanol har ett energivärde som ligger på 70% av bensinens, men i diagrammet nedan ser vi att etanol nu kostar 95% av bensinen. DLA är kortnamnet för etanolterminer i dollar per gallon och bensin som handlas i cent per gallon, heter XBA.
Särskilt märkligt blir det höga priset när USA:s 209 destillerier producerar mer än vad som förbrukas i USA. USA exporterar etanol till Kanada, Europa och till och med till Brasilien! Brasiliens skörd av sockerrör blir i år 459.6 mt mot 501.2 förra året och den brasilianska regeringen har minskat inblandningen av etanol från 25 till 20%. Industrin producerar också mer socker och mindre etanol.
EU:s krav på etanolinblandning har också lett till brist. En gallon etanol kostar 3.21 dollar i Rotterdams hamn och 2.94 dollar i New Yorks hamn.
Situationen är intressant eftersom skatterabatten på 45 cent går ut vid årsskiftet. Det gjorde den även förra året, men då fick branschen en förlängning. En republikansk senator försökte i juni ta bort subventionen men förlaget gick nätt och jämt inte igenom. Samtidigt noterar jordbruksmark i USA rekordpriser, vilket väl är de enda fastighetspriserna i USA som inte kraschar. Markpriserna tog ett skutt uppåt 2004-2005 (gissa varför…).
Nedan ser aktuell terminskurva (grön) och för en vecka sedan (blå). Vi ser att tendensen till mer backwardation.
Sojabönor
Priset på sojabönor befinner sig i sjunkande trend. Vi har redan sett de sjunkande priserna på fläskkött i Kina. Å andra sidan, China National Grain & Oils Information Center släppte en rapport i förrgår där de menar att Kinas import av sojabönor för marknadsföringsåret 2011-12 kan öka med 7% till 56 mt.
Nedan ser vi terminskurvorna (nu, grön) och för en vecka sedan.
Det mest sannolika är nog ett test nedåt på sojabönorna, men fundamenta ger stöd just nu. Vi väntar oss nog ändå att säljarna kommer in – från Brasilien om inte annat – och säljer ner sojabönorna under stödet på 1167. På tre månaders sikt är vi negativa.
Raps
Rapspriset håller sig högt pga den svaga euron, inget annat. Raps är dyrt i förhållande till sojabönor och ”borde” falla ner mot 400 euro i första hand.
Gris
Tekniskt vilar priset på lean hogs på de glidande medelvärdena, vilket kan ge visst stöd. Test av dessa ger viktig information om rörelsen på kort sikt. Det falska brottet uppåt i oktober, ger en stark varning om att ”bulls” håller på att förlora kriget. Det är ganska vanligt att marknaden faller av kraftigt efter att den visat en falsk köpsignal. Ytterligare säljasignal ges när de glidande medelvärdena bryts. Just nu ger de glidande medelvärdena stöd. Nedan ser vi decemberkontraktet på CME, där priset fortsatt har varit i rekyl från den falska köpsignalen för två veckor sedan.
På en veckas sikt är vi negativa till lean hogs, men priset står och väger, ännu.
Valutor
EURSEK handlas i ett volatilt brett intervall. Det finns inga signaler att utläsa alls.
EURUSD tycks slutligen bryta nedåt. Det korta besöket över de glidande medelvärdena (som båda säjer ”sälj”), stärker den negativa vyn. All fundamenta talar för att euron ska falla och det ordentligt.
Tekniskt är läget en klar säljsignal. I första hand är nästa stöd 1.3145 dollar. I andra hand är det botten nere vid 1.2 dollar.
Gödsel
Kalium
Priset på kalium ligger kvar på samma nivå som för ett par veckor sedan.
Kväve
Nedan ser vi prisutvecklingen på Urea FOB Yuzhny i dollar per ton.
Fosfor
Nedan ser vi prisutvecklingen på Diammoniumfosfat FOB Baltic i dollar per ton.
[box]SEB Veckobrev Jordbruksprodukter är producerat av SEB Merchant Banking och publiceras i samarbete och med tillstånd på Råvarumarknaden.se[/box]
Disclaimer
The information in this document has been compiled by SEB Merchant Banking, a division within Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (“SEB”).
Opinions contained in this report represent the bank’s present opinion only and are subject to change without notice. All information contained in this report has been compiled in good faith from sources believed to be reliable. However, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made with respect to the completeness or accuracy of its contents and the information is not to be relied upon as authoritative. Anyone considering taking actions based upon the content of this document is urged to base his or her investment decisions upon such investigations as he or she deems necessary. This document is being provided as information only, and no specific actions are being solicited as a result of it; to the extent permitted by law, no liability whatsoever is accepted for any direct or consequential loss arising from use of this document or its contents.
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Analys
Now it’s up to OPEC+

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics. OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE. The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.
Brent crude fell 4.6% ydy to USD 77.4/b and over the last three trading sessions it has lost USD 5.1/b. This morning it is trading only marginally higher at USD 77.6/b which is no vote of confidence. A good dose of rebound this morning would have been a signal that the sell-off yesterday possibly was exaggerated and solely driven by investors with long positions flocking to the exit. So there’s likely more downside to come.
In general there is a quite good relationship between net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI versus the global manufacturing cycle. Oil investors overall typically have an aversion of holding long positions in oil when the global economy is slowing down. As of yet there are few signs that the global economic cycle is about to turn. Rather the opposite seems to be the case. Global manufacturing fell in October and yesterday we saw US industrial production fall 0.6% MoM while continued jobless claims rose more than expected and to the highest level in two years. This matches well with the logic that the strong rise in interest rates since March 2022 is inflicting pain on the economy with more pain ahead as the effect comes with a lag.
Most estimates are that the global oil market is running a solid deficit in Q4-23. The IEA has an implied deficit in the global oil market of 1 m b/d in Q4-23 if we assume that OPEC will produce 28 m b/d vs. a call-on-OPEC at 29 m b/d. But prices in the oil market is telling a different story with weakening crude curves, weakening refining margins and a sharp sell-off in oil prices.
For 2024 the general forecasts are that global economic growth will slow, global oil demand growth will slow and also that the need for oil from OPEC will fall from 28.7 m b/d to 28.4 m b/d (IEA). This is a bearish environment for oil. The average Brent crude oil price so far this year is about USD 83/b. It should essentially be expected to deliver lower in 2024 with the negatives mentioned above.
Two things however will likely counter this and they are interconnected. US shale oil activity has been slowing with falling drilling rig count since early December 2022 and that has been happening at an average WTI price of USD 78/b. The result is that total US liquids production is set to grow by only 0.3 m b/d YoY in Q4-24. This allows OPEC+ to support the oil price at USD 80-90/b through 2024 without fear of loosing a significant market share to US oil production. Thus slowing US liquids production and active price management by OPEC+ goes hand in hand. As such we do expect OPEC+ to step up to the task.
So far it has predominantly been Saudi Arabia with a little help from Russia which together proactively have managed the oil market and the oil price through significant cuts. Saudi Arabia produced 10.5 m b/d in April but then cut production rapidly to only 9.0 m b/d which is what it still produces. Its normal production is about 10 m b/d.
What has made the situation more difficult for Saudi Arabia is the combination of solid growth in non-OPEC supply in 2023 (+2.1 m b/d YoY; IEA) but also a substantial revival in production by Venezuela and Iran. The two produced 660 k b/d more in October than they on average did in 2022. So the need for oil from Saudi Arabia is squeezed from both sides.
All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics.
OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) then it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE.
The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.
Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.
Analys
More from Venezuela and Iran means smaller pie for Saudi

Production in Venezuela and Iran is on the rise and is set to rise further in the coming months and in 2024. Combined their production could grow by 0.8 m b/d YoY to 2024 (average year to average year). The IEA projected in its latest OMR (Oct-2023) that call-on-OPEC will fall to 28.3 m b/d in 2024, a decline of 0.5 m b/d. This combination would drive implied call-on-Saudi from 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to only 9.1 m b/d in 2024 and as low as 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24 if Saudi Arabia has to do all the heavy lifting alone. Wider core OPEC cooperation may be required.

The IEA is out in the news today projecting peak oil demand this decade with global demand standing at no more than 102 m b/d towards the end of this decade. If so it would imply a call-on-Non-OPEC of only 66.4 m b/d in 2028 assuming that OPEC in general will demand a market share of 30 m b/d + NGL of 5.6 m b/d. The IEA (Oct-23) projects non-OPEC production to average 68.8 m b/d in 2024. That’s already 2.4 m b/d more than what would be sustainable over time if global oil demand is set to peak later this decade. Oil producers in general cannot have a production growth strategy in a peak oil demand world.
The US has decided to lift sanctions towards Venezuela for six months (18 April) as a measure to tempt it to move towards more democratic processes. And if it does, then the lifting of sanctions could continue after the 6 months. A primary opposition election took place this weekend with lawmaker Maria Corina Machado currently holding 93% of the vote count. Venezuela will next year hold a presidential election but fair play seems unlikely with Maduro in charge. The lifting of sanctions allows Venezuela’s PdV to resume exports to all destinations. Bans on new, foreign investments in the oil and gas sector are also lifted though Russian entities and JV’s are still barred.
Venezuela produced 0.8 m b/d in September and indicates that it can lift production by 0.2 m b/d by year and with more rigs and wells by 0.5 m b/d to 1.3 m b/d in the medium term.
Oil production in Iran has been on a steady rise since its low-point of 2.0 m b/d in 2020. Last year it produced 2.5 m b/d. In September it produced 3.1 m b/d, but Iran’s oil minister says production now is at 3.3 m b/d. Iran’s rising production and exports is not about the US being more lenient in its enforcement of sanctions towards Iran. It is more about Iran finding better ways to circumvent them but even more importantly that China is importing more and more oil from Iran.
Production by Iran and Venezuela is recovering. YoY production from the two could rise by close to 0.8 m b/d in 2024. This will lead to a decline in call-on-Saudi oil.

The IEA estimated in its latest OMR report that call-on-OPEC will fall from 28.8 m b/d in 2023 to 28.3 m b/d in 2024. If all OPEC members except Saudi Arabia produces the same amount in 2024 as in 2023, then the need for Saudi Arabia’s oil (call-on-Saudi) will fall from a healthy 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to a still acceptable 9.9 m b/d in 2024. Its normal production is roughly 10 m b/d.
If however production by Iran and Venezuela rise by a combined 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024, then call-on-Saudi will fall to 9.4 m b/d which is not so good but still manageable. But if Iran’s oil minister is correct when he says that its current production now is at 3.3 m b/d, then it is not far fetched to assume that Iran’s oil production may average maybe 3.4-3.5 m b/d in 2024. That would yield a YoY rise of 0.6 m b/d just for Iran. If we also assume that Venezuela manages to lift its production from 0.8 m b/d this year to 1.0 m b/d in 2024, then the combined growth from the two is closer to 0.8 m b/d. That would push call-on-Saudi down to only 9.1 m b/d which is not good at all. It would require Saudi Arabia to produce at its current production of 9.0 m b/d all through 2024.
The IEA further estimates that call-on-OPEC will average 27.7 m b/d in Q1-24. If we assume Iran @ 3.4 m b/d and Venezuela @ 1.0 m b/d then call-on-Saudi in Q1-24 will only be 8.6 m b/d. I.e. Saudi Arabia will have to cut production further to 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24. At that point Saudi Arabia will likely need or like other core OPEC members like Iraq, Kuwait and UAE as well as Russia to join in.
Implied call-on-Saudi. Call-on-OPEC is set to decline from 28.8 m b/d to 28.3 m b/d to 2024. If all OPEC members produced the same in 2024 as in 2023 then call-on-Saudi would fall by 0.5 m b/d to 9.9 m b/d. But if Venezuela and Iran increases their combined production by 0.8 m b/d YoY in 2024 then call-on-Saudi falls to 9.1 m b/d.

If we look a little broader on this topic and also include Libya, Nigeria and Angola we see that this group of OPEC members produced 11.4 m b/d in 2010, 10.1 m b/d in 2017 and only 5.1 m b/d at the low-point in August 2020. The decline by these OPEC members has of course the other OPEC and OPEC+ members to stem the rising flood of US shale oil production. The production from this unfortunate group of OPEC-laggards is however now on the rise reaching 7.5 m b/d in September. With more from Iran and Venezuela it could rise to 8.0 m b/d in 2024. Production from Nigeria and Angola though still looks to be in gradual decline while Libya looks more sideways. So for the time being it is all about the revival of Iran and Venezuela.
The unfortunate OPEC-laggards had a production of 11.4 m b/d in 2010. But production then fell to only 5.1 m b/d in August 2020. It helped the rest of OPEC’s members to manage the huge increase in US shale oil production. Production from these countries are now on the rebound. Though Nigeria and Angola still seems to be in gradual decline.

What everyone needs to be attentive to is that call-on-OPEC and even more importantly call-on-Saudi can only erode to a limit before Saudi/OPEC/Russia will have to take action. Especially if the forecast for needed oil from OPEC/Saudi for the nearest 2-3 years is in significant decline. Then they will have to take action in the sense that they stop defending the price and allows the price to fall sharply along with higher production. And yet again it is US shale oil producers who will have to take the brunt of the pain. They are the only oil producers in the world who can naturally and significantly reduce their production rather quickly. I.e. the US shale oil players will have to be punished into obedience, if possible, yet one more time.
We don’t think that it is any immediate risk for this to happen as US shale oil activity is slowing while global oil demand has rebounded following Covid-lockdowns. But one needs to keep a watch on projections for call-on-OPEC and call-on-Saudi stretching 1-2-3 years forward on a continuous basis.
In its medium term oil market outlook, Oil2023, the IEA projected a fairly healthy development for call-on-OPEC to 2028. First bottoming out at 29.4 m b/d in 2024 before rising gradually to 30.6 m b/d in 2028. The basis for this was a slowing though steady rise in global oil demand to 105.7 m b/d in 2028 together with stagnant non-OPEC production due to muted capex spending over the past decade. But this projection has already been significantly dented and reduced in IEA’s latest OMR from October where call-on-OPEC for 2024 is projected at only 28.3 m b/d.
In a statement today the IEA projects that global oil demand will peak this decade and consume no more than 102 m b/d in the late 2020ies due to (in large part) rapid growth in EV sales. This would imply a call-on-OPEC of only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. It is not a viable path for OPEC to produce only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. Especially if production by Iran and Venezuela is set to revive. I.e. OPEC’s pie is shrinking while at the same time Iran and Venezuela is producing more. In this outlook something will have to give and it is not OPEC.
One should here turn this on its head and assume that OPEC will produce 30 m b/d in 2028. Add OPEC NGLs of 5.6 m b/d and we get 35.6 m b/d. If global oil demand in 2028 stands at only 102 m b/d then call-on-Non-OPEC equates to 66.4 m b/d. That is 3.1 m b/d less than IEA’s non-OPEC production projection for 2028 of 69.5 m b/d but also higher than non-OPEC production projection of 68.8 m b/d (IEA, Oct-23) is already 2.4 m b/d too high versus what is a sustainable level.
What this of course naturally means is that oil producers in general cannot have production growth as a strategy in a peak-oil-demand-world with non-OPEC in 2024 already at 2.4 m b/d above its sustainable level.
The US is set to growth its hydrocarbon liquids by 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024. But in a zero oil demand growth world that is way, way too much.

Analys
Reloading the US ’oil-gun’ (SPR) will have to wait until next downturn

Brent crude traded down 0.4% earlier this morning to USD 91.8/b but is unchanged at USD 92.2/b at the moment. Early softness was probably mostly about general market weakness than anything specific to oil as copper is down 0.7% while European equities are down 0.3%. No one knows the consequences of what a ground invasion of Gaza by Israel may bring except that it will be very, very bad for Palestinians, for Middle East politics for geopolitics and potentially destabilizing for global oil markets. As of yet the oil market seems to struggle with how to price the situation with fairly little risk premium priced in at the moment as far as we can see. Global financial markets however seems to have a clearer bearish take on this. Though rallying US rates and struggling Chinese property market may be part of that.

The US has drawn down its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) over the latest years to only 50% of capacity. Crude oil prices would probably have to rally to USD 150-200/b before the US would consider pushing another 100-200 m b from SPR into the commercial market. As such the fire-power of its SPR as a geopolitical oil pricing tool is now somewhat muted. The US would probably happily re-load its SPR but it is very difficult to do so while the global oil market is running a deficit. It will have to wait to the next oil market downturn. But that also implies that the next downturn will likely be fairly short-lived and also fairly shallow. Unless of course the US chooses to forgo the opportunity.
The US has drawn down its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) to only 50% of capacity over the latest years. Most of the draw-down was in response to the crisis in Ukraine as it was invaded by Russia with loss of oil supply from Russia thereafter.
The US has however no problems with security of supply of crude oil. US refineries have preferences for different kinds of crude slates and as a result it still imports significant volumes of crude of different qualities. But overall it is a net exporter of hydrocarbon liquids. It doesn’t need all that big strategic reserves as a security of supply any more. Following the oil crisis in the early 70ies the OECD countries created the International Energy Agency where all its members aimed to have some 100 days of forward oil import coverage. With US oil production at steady decline since the 70ies the US reached a peak in net imports of 13.4 m b/d in 2006. As such it should have held an SPR of 1340 million barrels. It kept building its SPR which peaked at 727 m b in 2012. But since 2006 its net imports have been in sharp decline and today it has a net export of 2.9 m b/d.
Essentially the US doesn’t need such a sizable SPR any more to secure coverage of its daily consumption. As a result it started to draw down its SPR well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But then of course it fell fast and is today at 351 m b or about 50% of capacity.
The US is the largest oil consumer in the world. As such it is highly vulnerable to the price level of oil. The US SPR today is much more of a geopolitical tool than a security of supply tool. It’s a tool to intervene in the global oil market. To intervene in the price setting of oil. The US SPR is now drawn down to 50% but it still holds a sizable amount of oil. But it is little in comparison to the firepower of OPEC. Saudi Arabia can lower its production by 1 m b/d for one year and it will have eradicated 365 million barrels in global oil inventories. And then it can the same the year after and then the year after that again.
The US has now fired one big bullet of SPR inventory draws. It really helped to balance the global oil market last year and prevented oil prices from going sky high. With 350 m b left in its SPR it can still do more if needed. But the situation would likely need to be way more critical before the US would consider pushing yet another 100-200 m b of oil from its SPR into the global commercial oil market. An oil price of USD 150-200/b would probably be needed before it would do so.
With new geopolitical realities the US probably will want to rebuild its SPR to higher levels as it is now an important geopolitical tool and an oil price management tool. But rebuilding the SPR now while the global oil market is running a deficit is a no-go as we see it.
An oil market downturn, a global recession, a global oil market surplus where OPEC no longer want to defend the oil price with reduced supply is needed for the US to be able to refill its SPR again unless it wants to drive the oil price significantly higher.
But this also implies that the next oil price downturn will likely be short-lived and shallow as the US will have to use that opportunity to rebuild its SPR. It’s kind off like reloading its geopolitical oil gun. If it instead decides to forgo such an opportunity then it will have to accept that its geopolitical maneuverability in the global oil market stays muted.
Net US oil imports in m b/d and US Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) in million barrels. The US doesn’t need strategic petroleum reserves for the sake of security of supply any more. But it is a great geopolitical energy-tool to intervene in the price setting of oil in the global market place.

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