Analys

SEB Jordbruksprodukter, 13 september 2012

Publicerat

11 år sedan

den

13 september, 2012

USDA släppte sin WASDE-rapport för september igår. Den var bearish för vete och majs och bullish för sojabönor. Om man tar siffrorna som de står vill säga.

Själva rapporten innehåller en hel del märkligheter. Medan hela världen ställt in sig på en skörd av vete i Australien på 22.5 mt, låter USDA bli att justera ner den från 26 mt. När det gäller majs gör man något så märkligt som att låta det som är skördat före 1 september hamna på utgående lager för förra året, men man ser inte riktigt effekten av detta på innevarande års utgående lager. För att lyckas med det här tycks man t ex ha låtit EU:s husdjur konsumera 4 mt mindre spannmål i år, och lämna EU med tre veckors lager av vete den sista juni nästa år.

Den oberoende (?) ryska analysfirman IKAR rapporterade igår också att skörden i Ryssland bara ger ett exportutrymme på 2 – 6 mt vete. Inte 12 som Kreml meddelade för en vecka sedan.

Vi väljer dock på tekniska grunder att rekommendera neutral position i vete och majs, men risken är på uppsidan om det skulle (be)visa sig att USDA varit allt för optimistiska. Sojabönor är vi positiva till, liksom raps. Socker kan ha funnit en botten.

Odlingsväder

ENSO har minskat tendensen till El Niño den senaste veckan. Vi ser att Southern Oscillation Index har fortsatt att stiga och ligger på +1.2 nu. Ett värde under -8 indikerar El Niño-förhållanden. Molnighet och vindar stämmer överens med neutrala ENSO-förhållanden.

Bureau of Meteorology har också publicerat en ny ensembleprognos för ENSO och den ser vi nedan.

Vi ser att prognosen ligger nära El Niño-förhållanden, men nu lite lägre (lite mindre El Niño) än i förra prognosen som kom för en månad sedan.

Vete

Tekniskt har Matif:s novemberkontrakt brutit nedåt, men stödet på 260 verkar ännu vara obrutet. Den tekniska bilden är otydlig, men man kan ändå säga att marknaden ur ett tekniskt perspektiv ser betydligt mindre positiv ut än förra veckan. Vi väljer därför att gå över till en neutral rekommendation.

Som vi ska se nedan tror vi svagheten i priset beror på att marknaden tog fasta på att WASDE-rapporten var mer rosenröd än befarat. Vi ska också visa att det finns en hel del svagheter bakom den rosigheten och vad gäller den fundamentala utbuds- och efterfrågesituationen, att läget kan vara väsentligt mörkare än vad USDA:s WASDE-rapport ger sken av.

Det kom dock igår också data från Frankrikes FranceAgriMer, som förutspådde att Frankrikes veteexport, som är den största bland de europeiska länderna, kommer att uppgå till 17.1 mt under marknadsföringsåret som slutar i juni nästa år. Året innan var exporten 16 mt. Exporten väntas öka till Spanien, UK och Egypten. Matif kan ha tyngts av detta också (mer än Chicago).

Nedan ser vi Chicagovetet med leverans i december. Den tekniska bilden här visar inte på samma svaghet – och här har priset under kvällen hunnit vända upp från dagens bottennivåer.

I diagrammet nedan ser vi terminspriserna framåt i tiden för Chicago och Matif och förändringen från 7 dagar sedan.

Nedan ser vi produktionsestimaten för de största producentländerna i världen från onsdagens WASDE-rapport.

Vi ser att man bara justerat ner Rysslands produktion. Och den har man bara justerat ner med 4 mt, vilket är mindre än vad ryssarna själva gjorde. Märkligt nog har man inte justerat Australiens, trots att ABARES i Australien själva säger att veteskörden kommer att bli 22.5 mt. Profarmer skriver att de flesta analytiker estimerar att skörden hamnar på 22.5 mt. Det är i linje med vad vi själva räknade ut genom att utgå från förändringen i skörd som normalt sker när det blir ett El Niño-år. Vi kan inte tro annat än att USDA mer eller mindre medvetet har kablat ut en felaktig siffra, eller så är man så tvärsäker på att man vet bäst, bättre än alla andra. Australien har varit utsedd till världens näst största exportör av vete efter USA och det kanske landet blir, men med största sannolikhet med 3.5 mt mindre än vad som sägs här.

Utgående lager förändras inte i USDA:s rapport. Man sänker användningen av vete som foder, huvudsakligen i Ryssland. Notera att fd Sovjetunionen väntas ha högre utgående lager jämfört med vad man trodde i augusti!

För EU-27 har man sänkt skörden och ökat exporten, så att bara tre veckors konsumtion återstår den sista juni nästa år. Hur sannolikt är det?

Det här är en skum rapport för vete och utbuds/efterfrågebalansen är så ”tunn” att om det visar sig (som det har stor sannolikhet att göra) att något land bluffar, inför exportstopp eller vad som helst, som kan hända, då borde folk vara beredda att betala en hel del mer för det lilla som kommer att finnas på världsmarknaden.

När det gäller exportstopp hörde en uppmärksam läsare av veckobrevet av sig förra veckan och berättade att det lilla landet Kroatien redan infört exportstopp. Ukraina har gjort en frivillig uppgörelse med exportörerna som i praktiken innebär exportstopp. Exporten lär ta slut inom kort i alla fall, när majs fyller exportsilona i hamnarna. Rysslands ministrar ska snart träffas igen och kanske då sänka produktionen ytterligare, med följande minskning av ”exportpotentialen”.

Och visst finns det fristående analysfirmor som är dissidenter med såväl USDA som den officiella ryska rapporteringen och de finns i Moskva. Igår publicerade the Institute for Agricultural Market Studies (”IKAR” på ryska), avvikande data. De sade att per den första augusti var lagren av spannmål i Ryssland 10 mt lägre än de var i torkåret 2010 och faktiskt lägre än de varit något av de senaste fem åren. Vetelagren är 15-17% lägre än de var 2010. IKAR förutstår att spannmålsproduktionen hamnar på 69 – 72 mt. De förutspår att inhemsk konsumtion blir 66-67 mt. Exportpotentialen är alltså bara 2 – 6 mt, enligt IKAR. Inte 12 mt som Rysslands AgMin sade den 6 september.

Vi väljer alltså på tekniska grunder att förhålla oss neutrala till marknaden, men risken är allt jämt på uppsidan. Mot slutet av september ska USDA berätta om lagren av spannmål, t ex majs, per 1 september. Eftersom WASDE för majs målades i lika rosa skimmer, är det möjligt att det blir en trigger, eller så hinner något land införa exportbegräsningar innan.

Maltkorn

Novemberkontraktet på maltkorn ligger kvar kring 260 euro per ton och vi väntar oss sidledes rörelse i veckan som kommer.

Potatis

Förra veckan skrev vi att priset verkar ha stabiliserat sig mellan 20 och 24 euro per deciton och så ser det ut. Får vi se priser över 24 euro, kan det vara början på en ny prisuppgångsfas, ett pris under 22 kan å andra sidan signalera säljtryck.

Majs

För två veckor sedan skrev vi att ett brott nedåt inte skulle vara bra och skulle innebära att vi skulle gå ur alla positioner och rentav kanske gå kort. Förra veckan skrev vi att detta just hänt. Nu kan vi följa upp och konstatera att priset fallit relativt ordentligt. Prisfallet har också accelererat, såsom det ofta gör när det går upp för marknaden att priset är för högt och att fallet kan bli djupt.

USDA justerade ner global produktion i gårdagens WASDE-rapport. Fristående analytiker som t ex Noel Fryer har dock sågat WASDE vid fotknölarna för den mycket blygsamma nedjusteringen av USA:s produktion. Han kallade det för ”impressive crap”.

Nedan ser vi USDA:s tankar kring utgående lager.

Notera den märkliga höjningen av utgående lager för 2011/12 i USA. Det här kommer från den tidiga skörden, där 11% av amerikansk majs är skördat före den 1 september. De skriver så här: “150 Mbu old crop corn displaced from feed due to early new crop, which will also boost old crop stocks”. Men vänta lite… borde inte detta på något sätt ha påverkat 2012/13? 11% mindre hamnar trots allt på 2012/13.

För EU-27 sänkte man konsumtionen av majs med 4 mt. Men man justerade inte foderåtgången i EU med korn eller vete. Det är svångremstider även för djuren i Euroland.

En sälj-trigger vore om majs till etanol begränsades, men tiden rinner ut för att ta detta före valet i USA i november. Kongressen har misslyckats med att behandla och fatta beslut om den nya ”Farm bill” som ska gälla i de kommande fem åren. Den gamla går ut den sista september och då återvänder USA till den lag som stiftades 1949. Det mesta som är väsentligt som t ex crop insurance och food stamps (USDA:s största utgiftspost) styrs dock av andra lagar idag. Den republikanska majoriteten i Kongressen väntas faktiskt vilja vänta med förslaget till efter presidentvalet. Man kan tolka detta som att sannolikheten för att det ska hända något med majs-etanol-frågan är ganska liten i år.

Sojabönor

Sojabönsrapporten från USDA var tycks till skillnad från vete och majs, vara ganska genomtänkt. Den var ”bullish” för sojabönor och priset, som handlades ner innan, fick ny skjuts uppåt på rapporten.

Nedan ser vi WASDE-rapportens produktionsestimat för olika länder och totalt i världen.

USA:s produktion väntas falla till den lägsta nivån på nio år. Den har fallit tre år i rad. USDA nämner den varmaste och torraste perioden juni-juli på 76 år som orsak. Skörden väntas bli 71.69 mt, vilket är lägre än vad analytiker tillfrågade av Bloomberg innan rapporten trodde. Skörden per acre väntas uppgå till 35.3 bushels, den lägsta nivån sedan 2008. I augusti trodde USDA att skörden skulle bli 36.1 bu/acre. Förra året låg den på 41.5 bu/acre.

Ovanför ser vi globala utgående lager. USDA gör ett litet trick här för att lämna utgående lager 2012/13 nästan oförändrade. Man höjer utgående lager i Argentina och Brasilien och Kina med nästan 2 mt. Det verkar nästan för bra för att vara sant.

Det är, även utan att ifrågasätta hur man så lägligt kunde hitta mer sojabönor i Kina, en bullish rapport, som borde ta upp priset.

Det finns börsnoterade företag i USA som köper sojamjöl och producerar kött. Ett sådant bolag är Smithfield Foods. Ett annat är Tyson Foods. Nedan kan du se kursutvecklingen för den aktien. Notera hur tvärt kursuppgången, baserad på förhoppningar om mer helikopterpengar från Benny Bernanke, vände ner idag när WASDE-rapporten kom.

Raps

”Tryckkokaren” har fortsatt och ett utbrott uppåt rycker allt närmare. Vi rekommenderar att man behåller sin långa (köpta) position i rapsfrö. Om priset skulle gå under 497 bör man börja lätta på positionen, men priset kan faktiskt gå ända ner till bottennoteringen i augusti utan att den uppåtriktade trenden är bruten.

Gris

Grispriset befinner sig i en tydlig bear market. Men tycks ha kommit till en konsolideringsfas. 70 cent per pund ser ut att vara golvet på konsolideringsområdet.

Mjölk

Priset på mjölkpulver i Nordeuropa ligger på samma prisnivå som förra veckan. Det är den andra veckan sedan juli när priset inte har stigit. Priset på smör ligger också oförändrat på 3300 euro per ton. Jag hade tänkt gå lite djupare i analysen av mjölkmarknaden den här veckan, men fokus hamnade på WASDE-rapportens spannmålsdelar.

Nedan ser vi priset på smör, också oktoberkontraktet såsom handlat på EUREX. Priset är angivet i euro per ton.

På den amerikanska börsen CME i Chicago rekylerade priset upp efter WASDE-rapporten och det högre sojapriset. Att mjölkpriset följt sojapriset så väl den senaste tiden – och det faktum att sojan ser ut att gå mot högre höjder – gör att vi tror på ett nytt test av 20 cent per pund mjölk igen.

Vad säger då marknaden just nu om priserna för leverans av mjölk i USA i framtiden? Nedan ser vi terminspriserna som kurva som de ser ut idag och hur de såg ut för 7 dagar sedan. Alla priser är i euro per ton. Notera att jag också lagt in terminskurvorna idag och för 7 dagar sedan på Matifs kvarnvete.

Förra veckan berättade vi om det nya vasslepulverkontrakt som noteras på Eurex den 28 september. Det är ytterligare en viktig del för att prissätta mjölkprodukterna. Råolja prissätter man genom ”netback pricing”. Dvs genom att prissätta raffinaderiernas produkter, kan man räkna bakåt till vad ett fat råolja ”borde” vara värt. På samma sätt gör man med råvaran mjölk. Dvs man utgår från vad skummjölkspulver är värt och vad smör är värt och räknar bakåt till mjölken. Om man har ostpriser och lägger till vasslepulver, kan man räkna bakåt även för de produkterna. För att tillverka skummjölkspulver åtgår energi och tar man hänsyn till energikomponenten också kan man simulera ett mejeris marginal-ekonomi.

Socker

Priset på socker, tycks ha funnit ett stöd. Priset vände upp på samma nivå som i juni. Det skulle inte förvåna om priset nu steg upp mot motståndslinjen, dvs till 21 – 22 cent per pund.

EURSEK

EURSEK har nått så långt upp som den borde enligt teknisk analys. Tekniskt pekar det nedåt nu och vi har säljrekommendation på euro mot kronor.

USDSEK

Dollarn befinner sig på en kursnivå med gott om stöd, historiskt. Vi tror därför på ”sidledes rörelse”.

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Analys

Now it’s up to OPEC+

Publicerat

1 vecka sedan

den

20 november, 2023

Redaktionen

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics. OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE. The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities at SEB — Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.

Brent crude fell 4.6% ydy to USD 77.4/b and over the last three trading sessions it has lost USD 5.1/b. This morning it is trading only marginally higher at USD 77.6/b which is no vote of confidence. A good dose of rebound this morning would have been a signal that the sell-off yesterday possibly was exaggerated and solely driven by investors with long positions flocking to the exit. So there’s likely more downside to come.

In general there is a quite good relationship between net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI versus the global manufacturing cycle. Oil investors overall typically have an aversion of holding long positions in oil when the global economy is slowing down. As of yet there are few signs that the global economic cycle is about to turn. Rather the opposite seems to be the case. Global manufacturing fell in October and yesterday we saw US industrial production fall 0.6% MoM while continued jobless claims rose more than expected and to the highest level in two years. This matches well with the logic that the strong rise in interest rates since March 2022 is inflicting pain on the economy with more pain ahead as the effect comes with a lag.

Most estimates are that the global oil market is running a solid deficit in Q4-23. The IEA has an implied deficit in the global oil market of 1 m b/d in Q4-23 if we assume that OPEC will produce 28 m b/d vs. a call-on-OPEC at 29 m b/d. But prices in the oil market is telling a different story with weakening crude curves, weakening refining margins and a sharp sell-off in oil prices.

For 2024 the general forecasts are that global economic growth will slow, global oil demand growth will slow and also that the need for oil from OPEC will fall from 28.7 m b/d to 28.4 m b/d (IEA). This is a bearish environment for oil. The average Brent crude oil price so far this year is about USD 83/b. It should essentially be expected to deliver lower in 2024 with the negatives mentioned above.

Two things however will likely counter this and they are interconnected. US shale oil activity has been slowing with falling drilling rig count since early December 2022 and that has been happening at an average WTI price of USD 78/b. The result is that total US liquids production is set to grow by only 0.3 m b/d YoY in Q4-24. This allows OPEC+ to support the oil price at USD 80-90/b through 2024 without fear of loosing a significant market share to US oil production. Thus slowing US liquids production and active price management by OPEC+ goes hand in hand. As such we do expect OPEC+ to step up to the task.

So far it has predominantly been Saudi Arabia with a little help from Russia which together proactively have managed the oil market and the oil price through significant cuts. Saudi Arabia produced 10.5 m b/d in April but then cut production rapidly to only 9.0 m b/d which is what it still produces. Its normal production is about 10 m b/d.

What has made the situation more difficult for Saudi Arabia is the combination of solid growth in non-OPEC supply in 2023 (+2.1 m b/d YoY; IEA) but also a substantial revival in production by Venezuela and Iran. The two produced 660 k b/d more in October than they on average did in 2022. So the need for oil from Saudi Arabia is squeezed from both sides.

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics.

OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) then it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE.

The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.

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Analys

More from Venezuela and Iran means smaller pie for Saudi

Publicerat

1 månad sedan

den

24 oktober, 2023

Redaktionen

Production in Venezuela and Iran is on the rise and is set to rise further in the coming months and in 2024. Combined their production could grow by 0.8 m b/d YoY to 2024 (average year to average year). The IEA projected in its latest OMR (Oct-2023) that call-on-OPEC will fall to 28.3 m b/d in 2024, a decline of 0.5 m b/d. This combination would drive implied call-on-Saudi from 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to only 9.1 m b/d in 2024 and as low as 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24 if Saudi Arabia has to do all the heavy lifting alone. Wider core OPEC cooperation may be required.

The IEA is out in the news today projecting peak oil demand this decade with global demand standing at no more than 102 m b/d towards the end of this decade. If so it would imply a call-on-Non-OPEC of only 66.4 m b/d in 2028 assuming that OPEC in general will demand a market share of 30 m b/d + NGL of 5.6 m b/d. The IEA (Oct-23) projects non-OPEC production to average 68.8 m b/d in 2024. That’s already 2.4 m b/d more than what would be sustainable over time if global oil demand is set to peak later this decade. Oil producers in general cannot have a production growth strategy in a peak oil demand world.

The US has decided to lift sanctions towards Venezuela for six months (18 April) as a measure to tempt it to move towards more democratic processes. And if it does, then the lifting of sanctions could continue after the 6 months. A primary opposition election took place this weekend with lawmaker Maria Corina Machado currently holding 93% of the vote count. Venezuela will next year hold a presidential election but fair play seems unlikely with Maduro in charge. The lifting of sanctions allows Venezuela’s PdV to resume exports to all destinations. Bans on new, foreign investments in the oil and gas sector are also lifted though Russian entities and JV’s are still barred.

Venezuela produced 0.8 m b/d in September and indicates that it can lift production by 0.2 m b/d by year and with more rigs and wells by 0.5 m b/d to 1.3 m b/d in the medium term.

Oil production in Iran has been on a steady rise since its low-point of 2.0 m b/d in 2020. Last year it produced 2.5 m b/d. In September it produced 3.1 m b/d, but Iran’s oil minister says production now is at 3.3 m b/d. Iran’s rising production and exports is not about the US being more lenient in its enforcement of sanctions towards Iran. It is more about Iran finding better ways to circumvent them but even more importantly that China is importing more and more oil from Iran.

Production by Iran and Venezuela is recovering. YoY production from the two could rise by close to 0.8 m b/d in 2024. This will lead to a decline in call-on-Saudi oil.

Oil production by Iran and Venezuela — Source: SEB graph and asessments, Blbrg data and news

The IEA estimated in its latest OMR report that call-on-OPEC will fall from 28.8 m b/d in 2023 to 28.3 m b/d in 2024. If all OPEC members except Saudi Arabia produces the same amount in 2024 as in 2023, then the need for Saudi Arabia’s oil (call-on-Saudi) will fall from a healthy 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to a still acceptable 9.9 m b/d in 2024. Its normal production is roughly 10 m b/d.

If however production by Iran and Venezuela rise by a combined 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024, then call-on-Saudi will fall to 9.4 m b/d which is not so good but still manageable. But if Iran’s oil minister is correct when he says that its current production now is at 3.3 m b/d, then it is not far fetched to assume that Iran’s oil production may average maybe 3.4-3.5 m b/d in 2024. That would yield a YoY rise of 0.6 m b/d just for Iran. If we also assume that Venezuela manages to lift its production from 0.8 m b/d this year to 1.0 m b/d in 2024, then the combined growth from the two is closer to 0.8 m b/d. That would push call-on-Saudi down to only 9.1 m b/d which is not good at all. It would require Saudi Arabia to produce at its current production of 9.0 m b/d all through 2024.

The IEA further estimates that call-on-OPEC will average 27.7 m b/d in Q1-24. If we assume Iran @ 3.4 m b/d and Venezuela @ 1.0 m b/d then call-on-Saudi in Q1-24 will only be 8.6 m b/d. I.e. Saudi Arabia will have to cut production further to 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24. At that point Saudi Arabia will likely need or like other core OPEC members like Iraq, Kuwait and UAE as well as Russia to join in.

Implied call-on-Saudi. Call-on-OPEC is set to decline from 28.8 m b/d to 28.3 m b/d to 2024. If all OPEC members produced the same in 2024 as in 2023 then call-on-Saudi would fall by 0.5 m b/d to 9.9 m b/d. But if Venezuela and Iran increases their combined production by 0.8 m b/d YoY in 2024 then call-on-Saudi falls to 9.1 m b/d.

If we look a little broader on this topic and also include Libya, Nigeria and Angola we see that this group of OPEC members produced 11.4 m b/d in 2010, 10.1 m b/d in 2017 and only 5.1 m b/d at the low-point in August 2020. The decline by these OPEC members has of course the other OPEC and OPEC+ members to stem the rising flood of US shale oil production. The production from this unfortunate group of OPEC-laggards is however now on the rise reaching 7.5 m b/d in September. With more from Iran and Venezuela it could rise to 8.0 m b/d in 2024. Production from Nigeria and Angola though still looks to be in gradual decline while Libya looks more sideways. So for the time being it is all about the revival of Iran and Venezuela.

The unfortunate OPEC-laggards had a production of 11.4 m b/d in 2010. But production then fell to only 5.1 m b/d in August 2020. It helped the rest of OPEC’s members to manage the huge increase in US shale oil production. Production from these countries are now on the rebound. Though Nigeria and Angola still seems to be in gradual decline.

Oil production of some OPEC countries — Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

What everyone needs to be attentive to is that call-on-OPEC and even more importantly call-on-Saudi can only erode to a limit before Saudi/OPEC/Russia will have to take action. Especially if the forecast for needed oil from OPEC/Saudi for the nearest 2-3 years is in significant decline. Then they will have to take action in the sense that they stop defending the price and allows the price to fall sharply along with higher production. And yet again it is US shale oil producers who will have to take the brunt of the pain. They are the only oil producers in the world who can naturally and significantly reduce their production rather quickly. I.e. the US shale oil players will have to be punished into obedience, if possible, yet one more time.

We don’t think that it is any immediate risk for this to happen as US shale oil activity is slowing while global oil demand has rebounded following Covid-lockdowns. But one needs to keep a watch on projections for call-on-OPEC and call-on-Saudi stretching 1-2-3 years forward on a continuous basis.

In its medium term oil market outlook, Oil2023, the IEA projected a fairly healthy development for call-on-OPEC to 2028. First bottoming out at 29.4 m b/d in 2024 before rising gradually to 30.6 m b/d in 2028. The basis for this was a slowing though steady rise in global oil demand to 105.7 m b/d in 2028 together with stagnant non-OPEC production due to muted capex spending over the past decade. But this projection has already been significantly dented and reduced in IEA’s latest OMR from October where call-on-OPEC for 2024 is projected at only 28.3 m b/d.

In a statement today the IEA projects that global oil demand will peak this decade and consume no more than 102 m b/d in the late 2020ies due to (in large part) rapid growth in EV sales. This would imply a call-on-OPEC of only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. It is not a viable path for OPEC to produce only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. Especially if production by Iran and Venezuela is set to revive. I.e. OPEC’s pie is shrinking while at the same time Iran and Venezuela is producing more. In this outlook something will have to give and it is not OPEC.

One should here turn this on its head and assume that OPEC will produce 30 m b/d in 2028. Add OPEC NGLs of 5.6 m b/d and we get 35.6 m b/d. If global oil demand in 2028 stands at only 102 m b/d then call-on-Non-OPEC equates to 66.4 m b/d. That is 3.1 m b/d less than IEA’s non-OPEC production projection for 2028 of 69.5 m b/d but also higher than non-OPEC production projection of 68.8 m b/d (IEA, Oct-23) is already 2.4 m b/d too high versus what is a sustainable level.

What this of course naturally means is that oil producers in general cannot have production growth as a strategy in a peak-oil-demand-world with non-OPEC in 2024 already at 2.4 m b/d above its sustainable level.

The US is set to growth its hydrocarbon liquids by 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024. But in a zero oil demand growth world that is way, way too much.

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Reloading the US ’oil-gun’ (SPR) will have to wait until next downturn

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23 oktober, 2023

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Brent crude traded down 0.4% earlier this morning to USD 91.8/b but is unchanged at USD 92.2/b at the moment. Early softness was probably mostly about general market weakness than anything specific to oil as copper is down 0.7% while European equities are down 0.3%. No one knows the consequences of what a ground invasion of Gaza by Israel may bring except that it will be very, very bad for Palestinians, for Middle East politics for geopolitics and potentially destabilizing for global oil markets. As of yet the oil market seems to struggle with how to price the situation with fairly little risk premium priced in at the moment as far as we can see. Global financial markets however seems to have a clearer bearish take on this. Though rallying US rates and struggling Chinese property market may be part of that.

The US has drawn down its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) over the latest years to only 50% of capacity. Crude oil prices would probably have to rally to USD 150-200/b before the US would consider pushing another 100-200 m b from SPR into the commercial market. As such the fire-power of its SPR as a geopolitical oil pricing tool is now somewhat muted. The US would probably happily re-load its SPR but it is very difficult to do so while the global oil market is running a deficit. It will have to wait to the next oil market downturn. But that also implies that the next downturn will likely be fairly short-lived and also fairly shallow. Unless of course the US chooses to forgo the opportunity.

The US has drawn down its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) to only 50% of capacity over the latest years. Most of the draw-down was in response to the crisis in Ukraine as it was invaded by Russia with loss of oil supply from Russia thereafter.

The US has however no problems with security of supply of crude oil. US refineries have preferences for different kinds of crude slates and as a result it still imports significant volumes of crude of different qualities. But overall it is a net exporter of hydrocarbon liquids. It doesn’t need all that big strategic reserves as a security of supply any more. Following the oil crisis in the early 70ies the OECD countries created the International Energy Agency where all its members aimed to have some 100 days of forward oil import coverage. With US oil production at steady decline since the 70ies the US reached a peak in net imports of 13.4 m b/d in 2006. As such it should have held an SPR of 1340 million barrels. It kept building its SPR which peaked at 727 m b in 2012. But since 2006 its net imports have been in sharp decline and today it has a net export of 2.9 m b/d.

Essentially the US doesn’t need such a sizable SPR any more to secure coverage of its daily consumption. As a result it started to draw down its SPR well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But then of course it fell fast and is today at 351 m b or about 50% of capacity.

The US is the largest oil consumer in the world. As such it is highly vulnerable to the price level of oil. The US SPR today is much more of a geopolitical tool than a security of supply tool. It’s a tool to intervene in the global oil market. To intervene in the price setting of oil. The US SPR is now drawn down to 50% but it still holds a sizable amount of oil. But it is little in comparison to the firepower of OPEC. Saudi Arabia can lower its production by 1 m b/d for one year and it will have eradicated 365 million barrels in global oil inventories. And then it can the same the year after and then the year after that again.

The US has now fired one big bullet of SPR inventory draws. It really helped to balance the global oil market last year and prevented oil prices from going sky high. With 350 m b left in its SPR it can still do more if needed. But the situation would likely need to be way more critical before the US would consider pushing yet another 100-200 m b of oil from its SPR into the global commercial oil market. An oil price of USD 150-200/b would probably be needed before it would do so.

With new geopolitical realities the US probably will want to rebuild its SPR to higher levels as it is now an important geopolitical tool and an oil price management tool. But rebuilding the SPR now while the global oil market is running a deficit is a no-go as we see it.

An oil market downturn, a global recession, a global oil market surplus where OPEC no longer want to defend the oil price with reduced supply is needed for the US to be able to refill its SPR again unless it wants to drive the oil price significantly higher.

But this also implies that the next oil price downturn will likely be short-lived and shallow as the US will have to use that opportunity to rebuild its SPR. It’s kind off like reloading its geopolitical oil gun. If it instead decides to forgo such an opportunity then it will have to accept that its geopolitical maneuverability in the global oil market stays muted.

Net US oil imports in m b/d and US Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) in million barrels. The US doesn’t need strategic petroleum reserves for the sake of security of supply any more. But it is a great geopolitical energy-tool to intervene in the price setting of oil in the global market place.