Analys
When affordable gas and expensive carbon puts coal in the corner
Coal and nat gas prices are increasingly quite normal versus real average prices from 2010 to 2019 during which TTF nat gas averaged EUR 27/MWh and ARA coal prices averaged USD 108/ton in real-terms. In the current environment of ”normal” coal and nat gas prices we now see a darkening picture for coal fired power generation where coal is becoming less and less competitive over the coming 2-3 years with cost of coal fired generation is trading more and more out-of-the money versus both forward power prices and the cost of nat gas + CO2. Coal fired power generation will however still be needed many places where there is no local substitution and limited grid access to other locations with other types of power supply. These coal fired power-hubs will then become high-power-cost-hubs. And that may become a challenge for the local power consumers in these locations.
When affordable gas and expensive carbon puts coal in the corner. The power sector accounts for some 50% of emissions in the EU ETS system in a mix of coal and nat gas burn for power. The sector is also highly dynamic, adaptive and actively trading. This sector has been and still is the primary battleground in the EU ETS where a fight between high CO2 intensity coal versus lower CO2 intensity nat gas is playing out.
Coal fired power is dominant over nat gas power when the carbon market is loose and the EUA price is low. The years 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 were typical example-years of this. Coal fired power was then in-the-money for around 7000 hours (one year = 8760 hours) in Germany. Nat gas fired power was however only in the money for about 2500 hours per year and was predominantly functioning as peak-load supply.
Then the carbon market was tightened by politicians with ”back-loading” and the MSR mechanism which drove the EUA price up to EUR 20/ton in 2019 and to EUR 60/ton in 2021. Nat gas fired power and coal fired power were then both in-the-money for almost 5000 hours per year from 2016 to 2023. The EUA price was in the middle-ground in the fight between the two. In 2023 however, nat gas was in-the-money for 4000 hours while coal was only in-the-money for 3000 hours. For coal that is a dramatic change from the 2012-2015 period when it was in the money for 7000 hours per year.
And it is getting worse and worse for coal fired generation when we look forward. That is of course the political/environmental plan as well. It is still painful of course for coal power.
On a forward basis the cost of Coal+EUA is increasingly way, way above the forward German power prices. Coal is basically out-of-the money for more and more hours every year going forward. It may be temporary, but it fits the overall political/environmental plan and also the increasing penetration of renewable energy which will push aside more and more fossil power as we move forward.
But coal power cannot easily and quickly be shut down all over the place in preference to cheaper nat gas based power. Coal fired power will be the primary source of power in many places with no local alternative and limited grid capacity to other sources of power elsewhere.
The consequence is that those places where coal fired power generation cannot be easily substituted and closed down will be ”high power price hubs”. If we imagine physical power prices as a topological map, geographically across Germany then the locations where coal fired power is needed will rise up like power price hill-tops amid a sea of lower power prices set by cheaper nat gas + CO2 or power prices depressed by high penetration of renewable energy.
Coal fired power generation used to be a cheap and safe power bet. Those forced to rely on coal fired power will however in the coming years face higher and higher, local power costs both in absolute terms and in relative terms to other non-coal-based power locations.
Coal fired power in Germany is increasingly very expensive both versus the cost of nat gas + CO2 and versus forward German power prices. Auch, it will hurt more and more for coal fired power producers and more and more for consumers needing to buy it.
And if we graph in the most efficient nat gas power plants, CCGTs, then nat gas + CO2 is today mostly at the money for the nearest three years while coal + CO2 is way above both forward power prices and forward nat gas + CO2 costs.
Number of hours in the year (normal year = 8760 hrs) when the cost of coal + CO2 and nat gas + CO2 in the German spot power market (hour by hour) historically has been in the money. Coal power used to run 7000 hours per year in 2012-2016, Baseload. Coal in Germany was only in-th-money for 3000 hours in 2023. That is versus the average, hourly system prices in Germany. But local, physical prices will likely have been higher where coal is concentrated and where there is no local substitution for coal in the short to medium term. Coal power will run more hours in those areas and local, physical prices need to be higher there to support the higher cost of coal + CO2.
Sharply lower yesterday with negative US consumer confidence. Brent crude fell like a rock to USD 73.02/b (-2.4%) yesterday following the publishing of US consumer confidence which fell to 98.3 in February from 105.3 in January (100 is neutral). Intraday Brent fell as low as USD 72.7/b. The closing yesterday was the lowest since late December and at a level where Brent frequently crossed over from September to the end of last year. Brent has now lost both the late December, early January Trump-optimism gains as well as the Biden-spike in mid-Jan and is back in the range from this Autumn. This morning it is staging a small rebound to USD 73.2/b but with little conviction it seems. The US sentiment readings since Friday last week is damaging evidence of the negative fallout Trump is creating.
Evidence growing that Trump-turmoil are having negative effects on the US economy. The US consumer confidence index has been in a seesaw pattern since mid-2022 and the reading yesterday was reached twice in 2024 and close to it also in 2023. But the reading yesterday needs to be seen in the context of Donald Trump being inaugurated as president again on 20 January. The reading must thus be interpreted as direct response by US consumers to what Trump has been doing since he became president and all the uncertainty it has created. The negative reading yesterday also falls into line with the negative readings on Friday, amplifying the message that Trump action will indeed have a negative fallout. At least the first-round effects of it. The market is staging a small rebound this morning to USD 73.3/b. But the genie is out of the bottle: Trump actions is having a negative effect on US consumers and businesses and thus the US economy. Likely effects will be reduced spending by consumers and reduced capex spending by businesses.
Brent crude falling lowest since late December and a level it frequently crossed during autumn.
White: US Conference Board Consumer Confidence (published yesterday). Blue: US Services PMI Business activity (published last Friday). Red: US University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment (published last Friday). All three falling sharply in February. Indexed 100 on Feb-2022.
Brent crude prices bottomed out at USD 74.20 per barrel at the close of trading on Friday, following a steep decline from USD 77.15 per barrel on Thursday evening (February 20th). During yesterday’s trading session, prices steadily climbed by roughly USD 1 per barrel (1.20%), reaching the current level of USD 75 per barrel.
Yesterday’s price rebound, which has continued into today, is primarily driven by recent U.S. actions aimed at intensifying pressure on Iran. These moves were formalized in the second round of sanctions since the presidential shift, specifically targeting Iranian oil exports. Notably, the U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned several Iran-related oil companies, added 13 new tankers to the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) sanctions list, and sanctioned individuals, oil brokers, and terminals connected to Iran’s oil trade.
The National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 now calls for the U.S. to ”drive Iran’s oil exports to zero,” further asserting that Iran ”can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.” This intensified focus on Iran’s oil exports is naturally fueling market expectations of tighter supply. Yet, OPEC+ spare capacity remains robust, standing at 5.3 million barrels per day, with Saudi Arabia holding 3.1 million, the UAE 1.1 million, Iraq 600k, and Kuwait 400k. As such, any significant price spirals are not expected, given the current OPEC+ supply buffer.
Further contributing to recent price movements, OPEC has yet to decide on its stance regarding production cuts for Q2 2025. The group remains in control of the market, evaluating global supply and demand dynamics on a monthly basis. Given the current state of the market, we believe there is limited capacity for additional OPEC production without risking further price declines.
On a more bullish note, Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to the OPEC+ agreement yesterday, signaling that it would present an updated plan to compensate for any overproduction, which supports ongoing market stability.
Yesterday’s US DOE report revealed an increase of 4.6 million barrels in US crude oil inventories for the week ending February 14. This build was slightly higher than the API’s forecast of +3.3 million barrels and compared with a consensus estimate of +3.5 million barrels. As of this week, total US crude inventories stand at 432.5 million barrels – ish 3% below the five-year average for this time of year.
In addition, gasoline inventories saw a slight decrease of 0.2 million barrels, now about 1% below the five-year average. Diesel inventories decreased by 2.1 million barrels, marking a 12% drop from the five-year average for this period.
Refinery utilization averaged 84.9% of operable capacity, a slight decrease from the previous week. Refinery inputs averaged 15.4 million barrels per day, down by 15 thousand barrels per day from the prior week. Gasoline production decreased to an average of 9.2 million barrels per day, while diesel production increased to 4.7 million barrels per day.
Total products supplied (implied demand) over the last four-week period averaged 20.4 million barrels per day, reflecting a 3.7% increase compared to the same period in 2024. Specifically, motor gasoline demand averaged 8.4 million barrels per day, up by 0.4% year-on-year, and diesel demand averaged 4.3 million barrels per day, showing a strong 14.2% increase compared to last year. Jet fuel demand also rose by 4.3% compared to the same period in 2024.
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