Analys
The self-destructive force of unregulated solar power
Modifications
Solar and wind power production has increased rapidly over the latest years as LCOE costs have fallen sharply while government support schemes have given it an extra boost as well. Solar and wind power production is totally unregulated supply. They produce whenever they produce. Fossil power supply on the other hand is fully dispatchable to the degree that we tend to take it for granted. As such we have naturally tended to underestimate the consequences of not having dispatchability in solar and wind power.
When you start out with a large, fossil-based power system it is fairly easy to add unregulated power supply from solar and wind because it can piggyback on the dispatchability and flexibility of the fossil power system. But as the share of unregulated renewable energy rises to a larger and larger share of production, the flexibility in the fossil part of the system naturally gets smaller and smaller. This problem is accentuated further by the fact that solar power production has a very high concentration of production where 80% of production in a year is produced in only 20% of the hours in the year. Thus fossil flexibility and dispatchability is eroded much faster during these 20% hours.
Power prices typically collapse to zero or negative when demand is fully met or saturated by unregulated power supply. That again implies that solar power profitability collapse as well. And the result of that of course is that the exponential growth in solar power production which we now take for granted and which we expect will lead us all the way to zero emissions could come to a full stop as well.
This is already a rapidly increasing problem in California where more and more renewable energy is denied access to the grid because there simply isn’t enough demand for it just then or because the grid cannot handle it. But it is also becoming an increasing problem in Germany where the strong growth and high concentration of solar power increasingly is destroying the power prices just when they produce the most.
The need for biiiig, cheeeeap grid batteries are now becoming increasingly critical for the the exponential growth in solar and wind power to continue.
We fear that the self-destructive force on power prices, of exponential growth in unregulated solar power, is some kind of Solar-hara-kiri process with respect to its own profitability. And that it has the potential to develop along a curve of ”first gradually, then suddenly”. And when/if that happens the exponential growth in unregulated solar power production should naturally come to a screeching halt.
The resolution of the problem is of course the eventual arrival of biiiig, cheeeap grid batteries which then again will sett solar power production free to resume its exponential growth.
Feeding solar and wind power supply into a fossil system is easy to start with. Then very difficult. It is easy to build unregulated solar and wind power supply into a flexible fossil system. It is easy to infuse unregulated power supply (Solar and Wind) into a power system where there is lots and lots of fossil based power. Fossil supply can then back-off and make room for solar and wind power whenever the sun is shining or the wind is blowing and then ramp up again when it suddenly disappear. But when unregulated, renewable energy supply keeps growing it becomes harder and harder to infuse yet more of it into the system as the fossil flexibility is increasingly eroded. That’s when yet more supply of solar and wind is no longer pushing aside fossil supply but instead is starting to destroy their own prices.
Solar power produces 80% of its production during 20% of the hours in the year. Solar power has however a much more tightly focused production profile than wind. In Germany in 2023 some 80% of all solar power production was concentrated on only 20% of the hours of the year. For wind power the 80% share of production was spread out over 50% of the hours in the year. The reason is of course that the wind can blow both summer and winter and night and day. Solar power is instead focused during the day and during summer. It has a much higher concentration of production.
Power prices tend to collapse when demand is fully covered by unregulated power supply. When solar power production grows rapidly in a given power system then its high production concentration will eventually lead to full saturation during certain hours of the year. Demand during these hours will then be fully supplied and covered by unregulated power like solar, wind, run-of-river hydro and other unregulated supply. That is great as it means that the fossil share in these hours then are close to zero.
The problem is that power markets, more than any other commodity market in the world, are extremely sensitive to imbalances in supply and demand. A little bit too little supply and the power price can spike up to close to infinity. A little bit too much supply and the price crashes to zero or negative.
When unregulated power supply reaches full demand saturation during certain hours then power prices tend to collapse because it is so easy to get a little bit too much supply.
It is not a problem when power prices collapse for just a few hours per year. But the number of hours affected is growing rapidly many places. The US EIA highlighted in October 2023 (”Solar and wind power curtailments are rising in California”) that this is becoming a bigger and bigger problem in California. Since 2019 the power system operator there has been forced to curtail supply of unregulated power more and more. There simply isn’t enough demand in certain hours to meet the spikes in unregulated supply or the grid isn’t up to the task of distributing the unregulated supply in the system.
So when producers of unregulated supply produces the most they increasingly are denied access to sell it into the grid or if they are allowed to sell it into the grid the price is close to zero or even negative.
US EIA: Solar and wind power curtailments are rising in California
Germany is increasingly affected as booming solar production is depressing prices more and more. This is now also a rapidly increasing problem in Germany where rapid growth in supply of solar and wind power together increasingly are forcing power prices lower just when they produce the most.
Average German power prices for hour 1 to 24 for certain periods and years. Highly concentrated supply of solar power during summer and during the day is increasingly forcing power prices towards zero during these periods
It is like ”Solar hara-kiri” when increasing supply of solar power is killing its own prices and profits. It was not a big problem economically when only a few hours are affected. But as more and more hours are affected it is becoming an increasing problem. It is like ”Solar hara-kiri” where rapidly rising supply of solar power is increasingly killing its own prices. With that it is killing its profits. And if profits are killed than new-build and growth in supply will typically slow down rapidly as well.
This is probably not a big problem globally yet as the global power system is still predominantly fueled by fossil fuels which can back off when renewable energy spikes up. But in certain pockets of the world where penetration of unregulated power supply has reached high levels it is becoming an increasing problem. Like in California and in Germany.
The volume weighted solar power price in September 2023 in Germany had a 38% discount to power prices during non-solar power hours. And the discount looks like it is rapidly getting bigger and bigger.
The monthly average volume weighted solar power price versus the average volume weighted non-solar power price weighted by the inverse profile. In Germany in September 2023 solar power producers only achieved 62% of the average price during hours of the day when the sun wasn’t shining.
First gradually, then suddenly. There is a clear risk here that this progresses along a process of ”first gradually, then suddenly”. This is already what we have seen over the past couple of years: The discount for what solar power earns when it produces power versus what the power price is when it is not producing is increasing rapidly as more and more unregulated power supply hits right into the ”demand ceiling”. The inflicted pain from this process so far has to a large degree been masked by incredibly high natural gas prices. So even if the profitability for solar power has been eroding, the average power price in the system has been much higher than usual due to high natural gas and CO2 prices.
Graphing all the individual hourly data for solar power and power demand in Germany in 2022 we see that solar power alone is not yet reaching full saturation versus demand.
Germany 2022: Hourly German power demand and solar power supply in 2022. A total of 8760 hours for each in consecutive order. Her showing only Demand and Solar power production
The unregulated power supply is increasingly hitting the ”demand ceiling”. If we now add all the other sources of unregulated power supply, predominantly offshore and onshore wind and run of river, then we get the following picture where we see that unregulated German power supply increasingly is hitting right up and into the ”demand ceiling”. In those instances there will be no, flexible fossil power supply left to back off and that is typically when power prices collapse or go negative.
Germany 2022: Hourly German power demand (blue dots) and unregulated supply (solar, wind, run of river,…) in orange dots. A total of 8760 hours for each in consecutive order.
High unregulated power supply saturation vs demand implied lower power prices in 2022. Sorting 8760 individual power prices in Germany from Y2022 from lowest to highest shows that power German power prices were strongly related to the penetration of unregulated power supply. In the following graph, we have sorted the data from the lowest price to the highest price in the year 2022. Prices were ireasingly depressed when unregulated power penetrated up and into the ”demand ceiling”. Natural gas prices were extreme in 2022 and overall power prices were exceptionally high for that reason as well. But the tendency of price destruction in relation to high levels of unregulated power vs demand is clear.
Germany 2022: Hourly German power demand (blue dots) and unregulated supply (solar, wind, run of river,…) in orange dots. A total of 8760 hours. Sorted according to how hourly power prices were from lowest to highest.
The unregulated power supply penetrating vs demand was even deeper in 2023. If we make the same graph for the year 2023 from 1 Jan to 20 Oct, we can see how the unregulated power is penetrating deeper and deeper into the power ”demand ceiling”. As a result the solar power discount vs. non-solar power hours from March to September in 2023 reached an even higher discount in 2023 than in 2022.
2023 year to 20 October: Hourly German power demand (blue dots) and unregulated supply (solar, wind, run of river,…) in orange dots. A total of 8760 hours. Sorted according to how hourly power prices were from lowest to highest. German power demand was down 8.3% YoY in H1-2023 due to the European energy crisis and still very high power prices
Solar power hours and non-solar power hours is not given as a clear cut-off, but a gradual one. In the following graph given as average profiles of the year from hour 1 to hour 24. First calculated explicitly for solar power production and then the inverse is calculated from that one. These solar power profiles can then be calculated for each individual day in the year giving individual inverse-curves on a daily basis.
The daily ”solar power production profiles” and the ”non-solar power production profiles” typically looks like this graph but calculated individually per day as solar power production varies from day to day and through the seasons. The solar power production profile is explicitly given by the actual solar power production that day while the non-solar power profile is derived directly from this and the inverse of it on a daily basis.
The exponential growth in solar and wind power is likely to slow down in the years to come as grid constraints and lack of power cables is holding up growth in renewable energy with waiting times for access of 5-10 years:
”Offshore wind auction’s lack of bids must be ‘wake-up call’ for UK, says RWE chief”
FT: ”Gridlock: how a lack of power lines will delay the age of renewables”
FT: ”Will there be enough cables for the clean energy transition?”
Brent crude prices initially maintained the gains from late March and traded sideways during the first two trading days in April. Yesterday evening, the price even reached its highest point since mid-February, touching USD 75.5 per barrel.
However, after the U.S. president addressed the public and unveiled his new package of individual tariffs, the market reacted accordingly. Overnight, Brent crude dropped by close to USD 4 per barrel, now trading at USD 71.6 per barrel.
Key takeaways from the speech include a baseline tariff rate of 10% for all countries. Additionally, individual reciprocal tariffs will be imposed on countries with which the U.S. has the largest trade deficits. Many Asian economies end up at the higher end of the scale, with China facing a significant 54% tariff. In contrast, many North and South American countries are at the lower end, with a 10% tariff rate. The EU stands at 20%, which, while not unexpected given earlier signals, is still disappointing, especially after Trump’s previous suggestion that there might be some easing.
Once again, Trump has followed through on his promise, making it clear that he is serious about rebalancing the U.S. trade position with the world. While some negotiation may still occur, the primary objective is to achieve a more balanced trade environment. A weaker U.S. dollar is likely to be an integral part of this solution.
Yet, as the flow of physical goods to the U.S. declines, the natural question arises: where will these goods go? The EU may be forced to raise tariffs on China, mirroring U.S. actions to protect its industries from an influx of discounted Chinese goods.
Initially, we will observe the effects in soft economic data, such as sentiment indices reflecting investor, industry, and consumer confidence, followed by drops in equity markets and, very likely, declining oil prices. This will eventually be followed by more tangible data showing reductions in employment, spending, investments, and overall economic activity.
Ref oil prices moving forward, we have recently adjusted our Brent crude price forecast. The widespread imposition of strict tariffs is expected to foster fears of an economic slowdown, potentially reducing oil demand. Macroeconomic uncertainty, particularly regarding tariffs, warrants caution regarding the pace of demand growth. Our updated forecast of USD 70 per barrel for 2025 and 2026, and USD 75 per barrel for 2027, reflects a more conservative outlook, influenced by stronger-than-expected U.S. supply, a more politically influenced OPEC+, and an increased focus on fragile demand.
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US DOE data:
Last week, U.S. crude oil refinery inputs averaged 15.6 million barrels per day, a decrease of 192 thousand barrels per day from the previous week. Refineries operated at 86.0% of their total operable capacity during this period. Gasoline production increased slightly, averaging 9.3 million barrels per day, while distillate (diesel) production also rose, averaging 4.7 million barrels per day.
U.S. crude oil imports averaged 6.5 million barrels per day, up by 271 thousand barrels per day from the prior week. Over the past four weeks, imports averaged 5.9 million barrels per day, reflecting a 6.3% year-on-year decline compared to the same period last year.
The focus remains on U.S. crude and product inventories, which continue to impact short-term price dynamics in both WTI and Brent crude. Total commercial petroleum inventories (excl. SPR) increased by 5.4 million barrels, a modest build, yet insufficient to trigger significant price movements.
Commercial crude oil inventories (excl. SPR) rose by 6.2 million barrels, in line with the 6-million-barrel build forecasted by the API. With this latest increase, U.S. crude oil inventories now stand at 439.8 million barrels, which is 4% below the five-year average for this time of year.
Gasoline inventories decreased by 1.6 million barrels, exactly matching the API’s reported decline of 1.6 million barrels. Diesel inventories rose by 0.3 million barrels, which is close to the API’s forecast of an 11-thousand-barrel decrease. Diesel inventories are currently 6% below the five-year average.
Over the past four weeks, total products supplied, a proxy for U.S. demand, averaged 20.1 million barrels per day, a 1.2% decrease compared to the same period last year. Gasoline supplied averaged 8.8 million barrels per day, down 1.9% year-on-year. Diesel supplied averaged 3.8 million barrels per day, marking a 3.7% increase from the same period last year. Jet fuel demand also showed strength, rising 4.2% over the same four-week period.
Analys
Brent on a rollercoaster between bullish sanctions and bearish tariffs. Tariffs and demand side fears in focus today
Brent crude rallied to a high of USD 75.29/b yesterday, but wasn’t able to hold on to it and closed the day at USD 74.49/b. Brent crude has now crossed above both the 50- and 100-day moving average with the 200dma currently at USD 76.1/b. This morning it is trading a touch lower at USD 74.3/b
Brent riding a rollercoaster between bullish sanctions and bearish tariffs. Biden sanctions drove Brent to USD 82.63/b in mid-January. Trump tariffs then pulled it down to USD 68.33/b in early March with escalating concerns for oil demand growth and a sharp selloff in equities. New sanctions from Trump on Iran, Venezuela and threats of such also towards Russia then drove Brent crude back up to its recent high of USD 75.29/b. Brent is currently driving a rollercoaster between new demand damaging tariffs from Trump and new supply tightening sanctions towards oil producers (Iran, Venezuela, Russia) from Trump as well.
’Liberation day’ is today putting demand concerns in focus. Today we have ’Liberation day’ in the US with new, fresh tariffs to be released by Trump. We know it will be negative for trade, economic growth and thus oil demand growth. But we don’t know how bad it will be as the effects comes a little bit down the road. Especially bad if it turns into a global trade war escalating circus.
Focus today will naturally be on the negative side of demand. It will be hard for Brent to rally before we have the answer to what the extent these tariffs will be. Republicans lost the Supreme Court race in Wisconsin yesterday. So maybe the new Tariffs will be to the lighter side if Trump feels that he needs to tread a little bit more carefully.
OPEC+ controlling the oil market amid noise from tariffs and sanctions. In the background though sits OPEC+ with a huge surplus production capacity which it now will slice and dice out with gradual increases going forward. That is somehow drowning in the noise from sanctions and tariffs. But all in all, it is still OPEC+ who is setting the oil price these days.
US oil inventory data likely to show normal seasonal rise. Later today we’ll have US oil inventory data for last week. US API indicated last night that US crude and product stocks rose 4.4 mb last week. Close to the normal seasonal rise in week 13.
Higher last week and today as sanctions bite harder than recession fears. Brent crude gained 2% last week with a close on Friday of USD 73.63/b. It traded in a range of USD 71.8-74.17/b. It traded mostly higher through the week despite sharp, new selloffs in equities along with US consumer expectations falling to lowest level since 2013 (Consumer Conf. Board Expectations.) together with signals of new tariffs from the White House. Ahead this week looms the ”US Liberation Day” on April 2 when the White House will announce major changes in the country’s trade policy. Equity markets are down across the board this morning while Brent crude has traded higher and lower and is currently up 0.5% at USD 74.0/b at the moment.
New US sanctions towards Iran and Venezuela and threats of new sanctions towards Russia. New sanctions on Venezuela and Iran are helping to keep the market tight. Oil production in Venezuela reached 980 kb/d in February following a steady rise from 310 kb/d in mid-2020 while it used to produce 2.3 mb/d up to 2016. Trump last week allowed Chevron to import oil from Venezuela until 27 May. But he also said that any country taking oil or gas from Venezuela after 2 April will face 25% tariffs on any goods exported into the US. Trump is also threatening to sanction Russian oil further if Putin doesn’t move towards a peace solution with Ukraine.
The OPEC+ to meet on Saturday 5 April to decide whether to lift production in May or not. The OPEC+ Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee will meet on Saturday 5 April to review market conditions, compliance by the members versus their production targets and most importantly decide whether they shall increase production further in May following first production hike in April. We find it highly likely that they will continue to lift production also in May.
OPEC(+) crashed the oil price twice to curb US shale, but it kicked back quickly. OPEC(+) has twice crashed the oil price in an effort to hurt and disable booming US shale oil production. First in 2014/15/16 and then in the spring of 2020. The first later led to the creation of OPEC+ through the Declaration of Cooperation (DoC) in the autumn of 2016. The second was in part driven by Covid-19 as well as a quarrel between Russia and Saudi Arabia over market strategy. But the fundamental reason for that quarrel and the crash in the oil price was US shale oil producers taking more and more market share.
The experience by OPEC+ through both of these two events was that US shale oil quickly kicked back even bigger and better yielding very little for OPEC+ to cheer about.
OPEC+ has harvested an elevated oil price but is left with a large spare capacity. The group has held back large production volumes since Spring 2020. It yielded the group USD 100/b in 2022 (with some help from the war in Ukraine), USD 81/b on average in 2023/24 and USD 75/b so far this year. The group is however left with a large spare capacity with little room to place it back into the market without crashing the price. It needs non-OPEC+ in general and US shale oil especially to yield room for it to re-enter.
A quick crash and painful blow to US shale oil is no longer the strategy. The strategy this time is clearly very different from the previous two times. It is no longer about trying to give US shale oil producers a quick, painful blow in the hope that the sector will stay down for an extended period. It is instead a lengthier process of finding the pain-point of US shale oil players (and other non-OPEC+ producers) through a gradual increase in production by OPEC+ and a gradual decline in the oil price down to the point where non-OPEC+ in general and US liquids production especially will gradually tick lower and yield room to the reentry of OPEC+ spare capacity. It does not look like a plan for a crash and a rush, but instead a tedious process where OPEC+ will gradually force its volumes back into the market.
Where is the price pain-point for US shale oil players? The Brent crude oil price dropped from USD 84/b over the year to September last year to USD 74/b on average since 1 September. The values for US WTI were USD 79/b and USD 71/b respectively. A drop of USD 9/b for both crudes. There has however been no visible reaction in the US drilling rig count following the USD 9/b fall. The US drilling rig count has stayed unchanged at around 480 rigs since mid-2024 with the latest count at 484 operating rigs. While US liquids production growth is slowing, it is still set to grow by 580 kb/d in 2025 and 445 kb/d in 2026 (US EIA).
US shale oil average cost-break-even at sub USD 50/b (BNEF). Industry says it is USD 65/b. BNEF last autumn estimated that all US shale oil production fields had a cost-break-even below USD 60/b with a volume weighted average just below USD 50/b while conventional US onshore oil had a break-even of USD 65/b. A recent US Dallas Fed report which surveyed US oil producers did however yield a response that the US oil industry on average needed USD 65/b to break even. That is more than USD 15/b higher than the volume weighted average of the BNEF estimates.
The WTI 13-to-24-month strip is at USD 64/b. Probably the part of the curve controlling activity. As such it needs to move lower to curb US shale oil activity. The WTI price is currently at USD 69.7/b. But the US shale oil industry today works on a ”12-month drilling first, then fracking after” production cycle. When it considers whether to drill more or less or not, it is typically on a deferred 12-month forward price basis. The average WTI price for months 13 to 24 is today USD 64/b. The price signal from this part of the curve is thus already down at the pain-point highlighted by the US shale oil industry. In order to yield zero growth and possibly contraction in US shale oil production, this part of the curve needs to move below that point.
The real pain-point is where we’ll see US drilling rig count starting to decline. We still don’t know whether the actual average pain-point is around USD 50/b as BNEF estimate it is or whether it is closer to USD 65/b which the US shale oil bosses say it is. The actual pain-point is where we’ll see further decline in US drilling rig count. And there has been no visible change in the rig count since mid-2024. The WTI 13-to-24-month prices need to fall further to reveal where the US shale oil industry’ actual pain-point is. And then a little bit more in order to slow production growth further and likely into some decline to make room for reactivation of OPEC+ spare capacity.
The WTI forward price curve. The average of 13 to 24 month is now USD 64.3/b.
The average 13-to-24-month prices on the WTI price curve going back to primo January 2022. Recently dropping below USD 65/b for some extended period.
Oljepriserna slaktas på samtidiga negativa faktorer
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Brent on a rollercoaster between bullish sanctions and bearish tariffs. Tariffs and demand side fears in focus today
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