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OPEC must talk bearish on the curve

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SEB - Prognoser på råvaror - CommodityIt was nothing wrong with OPEC’s decision on November 30th to cut production in H1-17 by 1.16 mb/d versus October levels. What they did wrong and why their decision ended up being close to a shot in their own foot rather than a solution was their communication. When they decided to cut they gave a shine that they actually were back as a price setting organisation. Not just for the short term but also for the medium to longer term. The feel from the organisation at the end of November last year was the communication, stated or not, that OPEC don’t want an oil price below $50/b and that OPEC is aiming for an oil price of $60/b and lastly that OPEC was ready to use its size and muscles to support and achieve that. OPEC gave the shine that it was not just about a short term operation of draining the inventories. OPEC was actually there to support the level of $50/b and aim for $60/b. They probably had some remote hope and dream as well that they could actually deliver on this over the medium to longer term. I.e. that OPEC would again become the factor in the market setting the oil price within reasonable ranges. Deep down however they know that this is not in their power. In the longer term they have no control over prices. If the oil price heads to $30/b or $70/b (+/- $20/b versus today’s spot price) over the longer term it will have nothing to do with OPEC’s decisions but instead have all to do with technology, economic growth, investment cycles, resource availability etc. OPEC’s primary goal is to draw down current elevated inventories in order to remove the spot price discount versus longer dated contracts (whatever they might be). Last year that discount was $12/b and that cost OPEC a lost income of $150-200 bn as the organisation is mostly selling crude oil at spot prices.

It is in OPEC’s power to cut production and draw down inventories in the short term and thus remove the discount in crude oil spot prices. That is what they want. When the job is done the plan is to move back into full production again. That is however difficult if non-OPEC production has risen since when OPEC started to cut. That is the problem with the rising US crude oil production. It might be problematic for OPEC to move back into full production again once inventories have drawn down. So OPEC can cut as long as non-OPEC doesn’t revive when they do it. And that is where OPEC failed when they gave the shine that they were there also for the medium to longer term to support and set prices. “OPEC is back” was the perception. The result of OPEC’s actions, production cut decision and communication was that the medium term WTI forward crude oil prices rose from $52/b to $55-56/b and thus accelerated US shale oil recovery even more. And now we are here with US crude oil production at 9.1 mb/d and possibly reaching 9.5 mb/d in the end of May (if we extrapolate US production trend since the start of the year) when OPEC meets in Vienna on the 25th of that month.

OPEC can extend and cut production successfully in H2-17 but only if they get the communication right. They need to make it entirely clear that they have no plan to support or steer oil prices in any direction or to support the oil price at any specific level in the medium to longer term other than what the market actually stets it at. Everybody knows this anyhow it is just that markets so easily mislead themselves and gets side-lined from reality for periods. If OPEC wants to cut and draw down inventories they need to talk bearish on the curve in order to prevent it from rising while they cut since a rise in the curve would lead to an acceleration in US shale oil production and thus make it difficult for OPEC to move back into full operation again following the cuts. OPEC should make it clear that they plan to increase production according to their current market share along with global oil demand growth. OPEC has an overall market share of about 40%. If global demand grows with 1.3 mb/d then OPEC should make it clear that they plan to increase their production by 0.5 mb/d every year going forward. OPEC’s market dream is a tight spot oil market with high spot prices holding a substantial premium to longer dated prices. That would hand them a nice cash flow from spot crude oil sales while the much lower medium to longer dated oil prices constantly works to temper non-OPEC investments. A medium term forward WTI curve at $45/b would do the trick. So OPEC needs to talk bearish on the curve if they want to be successful with the cuts. If OPEC follows this strattegy it does of course mean downside risk for the medium to longer dated contracts. That will of course be no prediciton of where spot crude oil prices will deliver in the end. The forward curve is a tool in order to control investments in new oil production. More so than ever before with agile shale invenstments reacting directly on where the level of the forward prices are.

 

Kind regards

Bjarne Schieldrop
Chief analyst, Commodities
SEB Markets
Merchant Banking

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Analys

Also OPEC+ wants to get compensation for inflation

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Brent crude has fallen USD 3/b since the peak of Iran-Israel concerns last week. Still lots of talk about significant Mid-East risk premium in the current oil price. But OPEC+ is in no way anywhere close to loosing control of the oil market. Thus what will really matter is what OPEC+ decides to do in June with respect to production in Q3-24 and the market knows this very well. Saudi Arabia’s social cost-break-even is estimated at USD 100/b today. Also Saudi Arabia’s purse is hurt by 21% US inflation since Jan 2020. Saudi needs more money to make ends meet. Why shouldn’t they get a higher nominal pay as everyone else. Saudi will ask for it

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Brent is down USD 3/b vs. last week as the immediate risk for Iran-Israel has faded. But risk is far from over says experts. The Brent crude oil price has fallen 3% to now USD 87.3/b since it became clear that Israel was willing to restrain itself with only a muted counter attack versus Israel while Iran at the same time totally played down the counterattack by Israel. The hope now is of course that that was the end of it. The real fear has now receded for the scenario where Israeli and Iranian exchanges of rockets and drones would escalate to a point where also the US is dragged into it with Mid East oil supply being hurt in the end. Not everyone are as optimistic. Professor Meir Javedanfar who teaches Iranian-Israeli studies in Israel instead judges that ”this is just the beginning” and that they sooner or later will confront each other again according to NYT. While the the tension between Iran and Israel has faded significantly, the pain and anger spiraling out of destruction of Gaza will however close to guarantee that bombs and military strifes will take place left, right and center in the Middle East going forward.

Also OPEC+ wants to get paid. At the start of 2020 the 20 year inflation adjusted average Brent crude price stood at USD 76.6/b. If we keep the averaging period fixed and move forward till today that inflation adjusted average has risen to USD 92.5/b. So when OPEC looks in its purse and income stream it today needs a 21% higher oil price than in January 2020 in order to make ends meet and OPEC(+) is working hard to get it.

Much talk about Mid-East risk premium of USD 5-10-25/b. But OPEC+ is in control so why does it matter. There is much talk these days that there is a significant risk premium in Brent crude these days and that it could evaporate if the erratic state of the Middle East as well as Ukraine/Russia settles down. With the latest gains in US oil inventories one could maybe argue that there is a USD 5/b risk premium versus total US commercial crude and product inventories in the Brent crude oil price today. But what really matters for the oil price is what OPEC+ decides to do in June with respect to Q3-24 production. We are in no doubt that the group will steer this market to where they want it also in Q3-24. If there is a little bit too much oil in the market versus demand then they will trim supply accordingly.

Also OPEC+ wants to make ends meet. The 20-year real average Brent price from 2000 to 2019 stood at USD 76.6/b in Jan 2020. That same averaging period is today at USD 92.5/b in today’s money value. OPEC+ needs a higher nominal price to make ends meet and they will work hard to get it.

Price of brent crude
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Inflation adjusted Brent crude price versus total US commercial crude and product stocks. A bit above the regression line. Maybe USD 5/b risk premium. But type of inventories matter. Latest big gains were in Propane and Other oils and not so much in crude and products

Inflation adjusted Brent crude price versus total US commercial crude and product stocks.
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Total US commercial crude and product stocks usually rise by 4-5 m b per week this time of year. Gains have been very strong lately, but mostly in Propane and Other oils

Total US commercial crude and product stocks usually rise by 4-5 m b per week this time of year. Gains have been very strong lately, but mostly in Propane and Other oils
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Last week’s US inventory data. Big rise of 10 m b in commercial inventories. What really stands out is the big gains in Propane and Other oils

US inventory data
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Take actual changes minus normal seasonal changes we find that US commercial crude and regular products like diesel, gasoline, jet and bunker oil actually fell 3 m b versus normal change. 

Take actual changes minus normal seasonal changes we find that US commercial crude and regular products like diesel, gasoline, jet and bunker oil actually fell 3 m b versus normal change.
Source:  SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data
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Analys

Nat gas to EUA correlation will likely switch to negative in 2026/27 onward

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Historically positive Nat gas to EUA correlation will likely switch to negative in 2026/27 onward

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

Historically there has been a strong, positive correlation between EUAs and nat gas prices. That correlation is still fully intact and possibly even stronger than ever as traders increasingly takes this correlation as a given with possible amplification through trading action.

The correlation broke down in 2022 as nat gas prices went ballistic but overall the relationship has been very strong for quite a few years.

The correlation between nat gas and EUAs should be positive as long as there is a dynamical mix of coal and gas in EU power sector and the EUA market is neither too tight nor too weak:

Nat gas price UP  => ”you go black” by using more coal => higher emissions => EUA price UP

But in the future we’ll go beyond the dynamically capacity to flex between nat gas and coal. As the EUA price moves yet higher along with a tightening carbon market the dynamical coal to gas flex will max out. The EUA price will then trade significantly above where this flex technically will occur. There will still be quite a few coal fired power plants running since they are needed for grid stability and supply amid constrained local grids.

As it looks now we still have such overall coal to gas flex in 2024 and partially in 2025, but come 2026 it could be all maxed out. At least if we look at implied pricing on the forward curves where the forward EUA price for 2026 and 2027 are trading way above technical coal to gas differentials. The current forward pricing implications matches well with what we theoretically expect to see as the EUA market gets tighter and marginal abatement moves from the power sector to the industrial sector. The EUA price should then trade up and way above the technical coal to gas differentials. That is also what we see in current forward prices for 2026 and 2027.

The correlation between nat gas and EUAs should then (2026/27 onward) switch from positive to negative. What is left of coal in the power mix will then no longer be dynamically involved versus nat gas and EUAs. The overall power price will then be ruled by EUA prices, nat gas prices and renewable penetration. There will be pockets with high cost power in the geographical points where there are no other alternatives than coal.

The EUA price is an added cost of energy as long as we consume fossil energy. Thus both today and in future years we’ll have the following as long as we consume fossil energy:

EUA price UP => Pain for consumers of energy => lower energy consumption, faster implementation of energy efficiency and renewable energy  => lower emissions 

The whole idea with the EUA price is after all that emissions goes down when the EUA price goes up. Either due to reduced energy consumption directly, accelerated energy efficiency measures or faster switch to renewable energy etc.

Let’s say that the coal to gas flex is maxed out with an EUA price way above the technical coal to gas differentials in 2026/27 and later. If the nat gas price then goes up it will no longer be an option to ”go black” and use more coal as the distance to that is too far away price vise due to a tight carbon market and a high EUA price. We’ll then instead have that:

Nat gas higher => higher energy costs with pain for consumers => weaker nat gas / energy demand & stronger drive for energy efficiency implementation & stronger drive for more non-fossil energy => lower emissions => EUA price lower 

And if nat gas prices goes down it will give an incentive to consume more nat gas and thus emit more CO2:

Cheaper nat gas => Cheaper energy costs altogether, higher energy and nat gas consumption, less energy efficiency implementations in the broader economy => emissions either goes up or falls slower than before => EUA price UP 

Historical and current positive correlation between nat gas and EUA prices should thus not at all be taken for granted for ever and we do expect this correlation to switch to negative some time in 2026/27.

In the UK there is hardly any coal left at all in the power mix. There is thus no option to ”go black” and burn more coal if the nat gas price goes up. A higher nat gas price will instead inflict pain on consumers of energy and lead to lower energy consumption, lower nat gas consumption and lower emissions on the margin. There is still some positive correlation left between nat gas and UKAs but it is very weak and it could relate to correlations between power prices in the UK and the continent as well as some correlations between UKAs and EUAs.

Correlation of daily changes in front month EUA prices and front-year TTF nat gas prices, 250dma correlation.

Correlation of daily changes in front month EUA prices and front-year TTF nat gas prices
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data

EUA price vs front-year TTF nat gas price since March 2023

EUA price vs front-year TTF nat gas price since March 2023
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Front-month EUA price vs regression function of EUA price vs. nat gas derived from data from Apr to Nov last year.

Front-month EUA price vs regression function of EUA price vs. nat gas derived from data from Apr to Nov last year.
Source: SEB graph and calculation

The EUA price vs the UKA price. Correlations previously, but not much any more.

The EUA price vs the UKA price. Correlations previously, but not much any more.
Source: SEB graph, Blbrg data

Forward German power prices versus clean cost of coal and clean cost of gas power. Coal is totally priced out vs power and nat gas on a forward 2026/27 basis.

Forward German power prices versus clean cost of coal and clean cost of gas power. Coal is totally priced out vs power and nat gas on a forward 2026/27 basis.
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Forward price of EUAs versus technical level where dynamical coal to gas flex typically takes place. EUA price for 2026/27 is at a level where there is no longer any price dynamical interaction or flex between coal and nat gas. The EUA price should/could then start to be negatively correlated to nat gas.

Forward price of EUAs versus technical level
Source: SEB calculations and graph, Blbrg data

Forward EAU price vs. BNEF base model run (look for new update will come in late April), SEB’s EUA price forecast.

Forward EAU price vs. BNEF base model run
Source: SEB graph and calculations, Blbrg data
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Analys

Fear that retaliations will escalate but hopes that they are fading in magnitude

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Brent crude spikes to USD 90.75/b before falling back as Iran plays it down. Brent crude fell sharply on Wednesday following fairly bearish US oil inventory data and yesterday it fell all the way to USD 86.09/b before a close of USD 87.11/b. Quite close to where Brent traded before the 1 April attack. This morning Brent spiked back up to USD 90.75/b (+4%) on news of Israeli retaliatory attack on Iran. Since then it has quickly fallen back to USD 88.2/b, up only 1.3% vs. ydy close.

Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB
Bjarne Schieldrop, Chief analyst commodities, SEB

The fear is that we are on an escalating tit-for-tat retaliatory path. Following explosions in Iran this morning the immediate fear was that we now are on a tit-for-tat escalating retaliatory path which in the could end up in an uncontrollable war where the US unwillingly is pulled into an armed conflict with Iran. Iran has however largely diffused this fear as it has played down the whole thing thus signalling that the risk for yet another leg higher in retaliatory strikes from Iran towards Israel appears low.

The hope is that the retaliatory strikes will be fading in magnitude and then fizzle out. What we can hope for is that the current tit-for-tat retaliatory strikes are fading in magnitude rather than rising in magnitude. Yes, Iran may retaliate to what Israel did this morning, but the hope if it does is that it is of fading magnitude rather than escalating magnitude.

Israel is playing with ”US house money”. What is very clear is that neither the US nor Iran want to end up in an armed conflict with each other. The US concern is that it involuntary is dragged backwards into such a conflict if Israel cannot control itself. As one US official put it: ”Israel is playing with (US) house money”. One can only imagine how US diplomatic phone lines currently are running red-hot with frenetic diplomatic efforts to try to defuse the situation.

It will likely go well as neither the US nor Iran wants to end up in a military conflict with each other. The underlying position is that both the US and Iran seems to detest the though of getting involved in a direct military conflict with each other and that the US is doing its utmost to hold back Israel. This is probably going a long way to convince the market that this situation is not going to fully blow up.

The oil market is nonetheless concerned as there is too much oil supply at stake. The oil market is however still naturally concerned and uncomfortable about the whole situation as there is so much oil supply at stake if the situation actually did blow up. Reports of traders buying far out of the money call options is a witness of that.

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