Analys
More from Venezuela and Iran means smaller pie for Saudi

Production in Venezuela and Iran is on the rise and is set to rise further in the coming months and in 2024. Combined their production could grow by 0.8 m b/d YoY to 2024 (average year to average year). The IEA projected in its latest OMR (Oct-2023) that call-on-OPEC will fall to 28.3 m b/d in 2024, a decline of 0.5 m b/d. This combination would drive implied call-on-Saudi from 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to only 9.1 m b/d in 2024 and as low as 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24 if Saudi Arabia has to do all the heavy lifting alone. Wider core OPEC cooperation may be required.

The IEA is out in the news today projecting peak oil demand this decade with global demand standing at no more than 102 m b/d towards the end of this decade. If so it would imply a call-on-Non-OPEC of only 66.4 m b/d in 2028 assuming that OPEC in general will demand a market share of 30 m b/d + NGL of 5.6 m b/d. The IEA (Oct-23) projects non-OPEC production to average 68.8 m b/d in 2024. That’s already 2.4 m b/d more than what would be sustainable over time if global oil demand is set to peak later this decade. Oil producers in general cannot have a production growth strategy in a peak oil demand world.
The US has decided to lift sanctions towards Venezuela for six months (18 April) as a measure to tempt it to move towards more democratic processes. And if it does, then the lifting of sanctions could continue after the 6 months. A primary opposition election took place this weekend with lawmaker Maria Corina Machado currently holding 93% of the vote count. Venezuela will next year hold a presidential election but fair play seems unlikely with Maduro in charge. The lifting of sanctions allows Venezuela’s PdV to resume exports to all destinations. Bans on new, foreign investments in the oil and gas sector are also lifted though Russian entities and JV’s are still barred.
Venezuela produced 0.8 m b/d in September and indicates that it can lift production by 0.2 m b/d by year and with more rigs and wells by 0.5 m b/d to 1.3 m b/d in the medium term.
Oil production in Iran has been on a steady rise since its low-point of 2.0 m b/d in 2020. Last year it produced 2.5 m b/d. In September it produced 3.1 m b/d, but Iran’s oil minister says production now is at 3.3 m b/d. Iran’s rising production and exports is not about the US being more lenient in its enforcement of sanctions towards Iran. It is more about Iran finding better ways to circumvent them but even more importantly that China is importing more and more oil from Iran.
Production by Iran and Venezuela is recovering. YoY production from the two could rise by close to 0.8 m b/d in 2024. This will lead to a decline in call-on-Saudi oil.
The IEA estimated in its latest OMR report that call-on-OPEC will fall from 28.8 m b/d in 2023 to 28.3 m b/d in 2024. If all OPEC members except Saudi Arabia produces the same amount in 2024 as in 2023, then the need for Saudi Arabia’s oil (call-on-Saudi) will fall from a healthy 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to a still acceptable 9.9 m b/d in 2024. Its normal production is roughly 10 m b/d.
If however production by Iran and Venezuela rise by a combined 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024, then call-on-Saudi will fall to 9.4 m b/d which is not so good but still manageable. But if Iran’s oil minister is correct when he says that its current production now is at 3.3 m b/d, then it is not far fetched to assume that Iran’s oil production may average maybe 3.4-3.5 m b/d in 2024. That would yield a YoY rise of 0.6 m b/d just for Iran. If we also assume that Venezuela manages to lift its production from 0.8 m b/d this year to 1.0 m b/d in 2024, then the combined growth from the two is closer to 0.8 m b/d. That would push call-on-Saudi down to only 9.1 m b/d which is not good at all. It would require Saudi Arabia to produce at its current production of 9.0 m b/d all through 2024.
The IEA further estimates that call-on-OPEC will average 27.7 m b/d in Q1-24. If we assume Iran @ 3.4 m b/d and Venezuela @ 1.0 m b/d then call-on-Saudi in Q1-24 will only be 8.6 m b/d. I.e. Saudi Arabia will have to cut production further to 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24. At that point Saudi Arabia will likely need or like other core OPEC members like Iraq, Kuwait and UAE as well as Russia to join in.
Implied call-on-Saudi. Call-on-OPEC is set to decline from 28.8 m b/d to 28.3 m b/d to 2024. If all OPEC members produced the same in 2024 as in 2023 then call-on-Saudi would fall by 0.5 m b/d to 9.9 m b/d. But if Venezuela and Iran increases their combined production by 0.8 m b/d YoY in 2024 then call-on-Saudi falls to 9.1 m b/d.
If we look a little broader on this topic and also include Libya, Nigeria and Angola we see that this group of OPEC members produced 11.4 m b/d in 2010, 10.1 m b/d in 2017 and only 5.1 m b/d at the low-point in August 2020. The decline by these OPEC members has of course the other OPEC and OPEC+ members to stem the rising flood of US shale oil production. The production from this unfortunate group of OPEC-laggards is however now on the rise reaching 7.5 m b/d in September. With more from Iran and Venezuela it could rise to 8.0 m b/d in 2024. Production from Nigeria and Angola though still looks to be in gradual decline while Libya looks more sideways. So for the time being it is all about the revival of Iran and Venezuela.
The unfortunate OPEC-laggards had a production of 11.4 m b/d in 2010. But production then fell to only 5.1 m b/d in August 2020. It helped the rest of OPEC’s members to manage the huge increase in US shale oil production. Production from these countries are now on the rebound. Though Nigeria and Angola still seems to be in gradual decline.
What everyone needs to be attentive to is that call-on-OPEC and even more importantly call-on-Saudi can only erode to a limit before Saudi/OPEC/Russia will have to take action. Especially if the forecast for needed oil from OPEC/Saudi for the nearest 2-3 years is in significant decline. Then they will have to take action in the sense that they stop defending the price and allows the price to fall sharply along with higher production. And yet again it is US shale oil producers who will have to take the brunt of the pain. They are the only oil producers in the world who can naturally and significantly reduce their production rather quickly. I.e. the US shale oil players will have to be punished into obedience, if possible, yet one more time.
We don’t think that it is any immediate risk for this to happen as US shale oil activity is slowing while global oil demand has rebounded following Covid-lockdowns. But one needs to keep a watch on projections for call-on-OPEC and call-on-Saudi stretching 1-2-3 years forward on a continuous basis.
In its medium term oil market outlook, Oil2023, the IEA projected a fairly healthy development for call-on-OPEC to 2028. First bottoming out at 29.4 m b/d in 2024 before rising gradually to 30.6 m b/d in 2028. The basis for this was a slowing though steady rise in global oil demand to 105.7 m b/d in 2028 together with stagnant non-OPEC production due to muted capex spending over the past decade. But this projection has already been significantly dented and reduced in IEA’s latest OMR from October where call-on-OPEC for 2024 is projected at only 28.3 m b/d.
In a statement today the IEA projects that global oil demand will peak this decade and consume no more than 102 m b/d in the late 2020ies due to (in large part) rapid growth in EV sales. This would imply a call-on-OPEC of only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. It is not a viable path for OPEC to produce only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. Especially if production by Iran and Venezuela is set to revive. I.e. OPEC’s pie is shrinking while at the same time Iran and Venezuela is producing more. In this outlook something will have to give and it is not OPEC.
One should here turn this on its head and assume that OPEC will produce 30 m b/d in 2028. Add OPEC NGLs of 5.6 m b/d and we get 35.6 m b/d. If global oil demand in 2028 stands at only 102 m b/d then call-on-Non-OPEC equates to 66.4 m b/d. That is 3.1 m b/d less than IEA’s non-OPEC production projection for 2028 of 69.5 m b/d but also higher than non-OPEC production projection of 68.8 m b/d (IEA, Oct-23) is already 2.4 m b/d too high versus what is a sustainable level.
What this of course naturally means is that oil producers in general cannot have production growth as a strategy in a peak-oil-demand-world with non-OPEC in 2024 already at 2.4 m b/d above its sustainable level.
The US is set to growth its hydrocarbon liquids by 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024. But in a zero oil demand growth world that is way, way too much.
Analys
June OPEC+ quota: Another triple increase or sticking to plan with +137 kb/d increase?

Rebounding from the sub-60-line for a second time. Following a low of USD 59.3/b, the Brent July contract rebounded and closed up 1.8% at USD 62.13/b. This was the second test of the 60-line with the previous on 9 April when it traded to a low of USD 58.4/b. But yet again it defied a close below the 60-line. US ISM Manufacturing fell to 48.7 in April from 49 in March. It was still better than the feared 47.9 consensus. Other oil supportive elements for oil yesterday were signs that there are movements towards tariff negotiations between the US and China, US crude oil production in February was down 279 kb/d versus December and that production by OPEC+ was down 200 kb/d in April rather than up as expected by the market and planned by the group.

All eyes on OPEC+ when they meet on Monday 5 May. What will they decide to do in June? Production declined by 200 kb/d in April (to 27.24 mb/d) rather than rising as the group had signaled and the market had expected. Half of it was Venezuela where Chevron reduced activity due to US sanctions. Report by Bloomberg here. Saudi Arabia added only 20 kb/d in April. The plan is for the group to lift production by 411 kb/d in May which is close to 3 times the monthly planned increases. But the actual increase will be much smaller if the previous quota offenders, Kazakhstan, Iraq and UAE restrain their production to compensate for previous offences.
The limited production increase from Saudi Arabia is confusing as it gives a flavor that the country deliberately aimed to support the price rather than to revive the planned supply. Recent statements from Saudi officials that the country is ready and able to sustain lower prices for an extended period instead is a message that reviving supply has priority versus the price.
OPEC+ will meet on Monday 5 May to decide what to do with production in June. The general expectation is that the group will lift quotas according to plans with 137 kb/d. But recent developments add a lot of uncertainty to what they will decide. Another triple quota increase as in May or none at all. Most likely they will stick to the original plan and decide lift by 137 kb/d in June.
US production surprised on the downside in February. Are prices starting to bite? US crude oil production fell sharply in January, but that is often quite normal due to winter hampering production. What was more surprising was that production only revived by 29 kb/d from January to February. Weekly data which are much more unreliable and approximate have indicated that production rebounded to 13.44 mb/d after the dip in January. The official February production of 13.159 mb/d is only 165 kb/d higher than the previous peak from November/December 2019. The US oil drilling rig count has however not change much since July last year and has been steady around 480 rigs in operation. Our bet is that the weaker than expected US production in February is mostly linked to weather and that it will converge to the weekly data in March and April.
Where is the new US shale oil price pain point? At USD 50/b or USD 65/b? The WTI price is now at USD 59.2/b and the average 13 to 24 mth forward WTI price has averaged USD 61.1/b over the past 30 days. The US oil industry has said that the average cost break even in US shale oil has increased from previous USD 50/b to now USD 65/b with that there is no free cashflow today for reinvestments if the WTI oil price is USD 50/b. Estimates from BNEF are however that the cost-break-even for US shale oil is from USD 40/b to US 60/b with a volume weighted average of around USD 50/b. The proof will be in the pudding. I.e. we will just have to wait and see where the new US shale oil ”price pain point” really is. At what price will we start to see US shale oil rig count starting to decline. We have not seen any decline yet. But if the WTI price stays sub-60, we should start to see a decline in the US rig count.
US crude oil production. Monthly and weekly production in kb/d.

Analys
Unusual strong bearish market conviction but OPEC+ market strategy is always a wildcard

Brent crude falls with strong conviction that trade war will hurt demand for oil. Brent crude sold off 2.4% yesterday to USD 64.25/b along with rising concerns that the US trade war with China will soon start to visibly hurt oil demand or that it has already started to happen. Tariffs between the two are currently at 145% and 125% in the US and China respectively which implies a sharp decline in trade between the two if at all. This morning Brent crude (June contract) is trading down another 1.2% to USD 63.3/b. The June contract is rolling off today and a big question is how that will leave the shape of the Brent crude forward curve. Will the front-end backwardation in the curve evaporate further or will the July contract, now at USD 62.35/b, move up to where the June contract is today?

The unusual ”weird smile” of Brent forward curve implies unusual strong bearish conviction amid current prompt tightness. the The Brent crude oil forward curve has displayed a very unusual shape lately with front-end backwardation combined with deferred contango. Market pricing tightness today but weakness tomorrow. We have commented on this several times lately and Morgan Stanly highlighted how unusual historically this shape is. The reason why it is unusual is probably because markets in general have a hard time pricing a future which is very different from the present. Bearishness in the oil market when it is shifting from tight to soft balance usually comes creeping in at the front-end of the curve. A slight contango at the front-end in combination with an overall backwardated curve. Then this slight contango widens and in the end the whole curve flips to full contango. The current shape of the forward curve implies a very, very strong conviction by the market that softness and surplus is coming. A conviction so strong that it overrules the present tightness. This conviction flows from the fundamental understanding that ongoing trade war is bad for the global economy, for oil demand and for the oil price.
Will OPEC+ switch to cuts or will it leave balancing to a lower price driving US production lower? Add of course also in that OPEC+ has signaled that it will lift production more rapidly and is currently no longer in the mode of holding back to keep Brent at USD 75/b due to an internal quarrel over quotas. That stand can of course change from one day to the next. That is a very clear risk to the upside and oil consumers around should keep that in the back of their minds that this could happen. Though we are not utterly convinced of the imminent risk of this. Before such a pivot happens, Iraq and Kazakhstan probably have to prove that they can live up to their promised cuts. And that will take a few months. Also, OPEC+ might also like to see where the pain-point for US shale oil producers’ price-vise really is today. So far, we have seen no decline in the number of US oil drilling rigs in operation which have steadily been running at around 480 rigs.
With a surplus oil market on the horizon, OPEC+ will have to make a choice. How shale this coming surplus be resolved? Shall OPEC+ cut in order to balance the market or shall lower oil prices drive pain and lower production in the US which then will result in a balanced market? Maybe it is the first or maybe the latter. The group currently has a bloated surplus balance which it needs to slim down at some point. And maybe now is the time. Allowing the oil price to slide. Economic pain for US shale oil producers to rise and US oil production to fall in order to balance the market and make room OPEC+ to redeploy its previous cuts back into the market.
Surplus is not yet here. US oil inventories likely fell close to 2 mb last week. US API yesterday released indications that US crude and product inventories fell 1.8 mb last week with crude up 3.8 mb, gasoline down 3.1 mb and distillates down 2.5 mb. So, in terms of a crude oil contango market (= surplus and rising inventories) we have not yet moved to the point where US inventories are showing that the global oil market now indeed is in surplus. Though Chinese purchases to build stocks may have helped to keep the market tight. Indications that Saudi Arabia may lift June Official Selling Prices is a signal that the oil market may not be all that close to unraveling in surplus.
The low point of the Brent crude oil curve is shifting closer to present. A sign that the current front-end backwardation of the Brent crude oil curve is about to evaporate.

Brent crude versus US Russel 2000 equity index. Is the equity market too optimistic or the oil market too bearish?

Analys
Oil demand at risk as US consumers soon will face hard tariff-realities

Muted sideways trading. Brent crude traded mostly sideways last week, but due to a relatively strong close on the Friday before, it ended the week down 1.6% at USD 66.87/b with a high-low range of USD 65.29 – 68.65/b. So muted price range action. Brent crude is trading marginally higher, up 0.3%, this morning amid mixed equity and commodity markets.

Strong Chinese buying in April as oil prices dipped. Chinese imports of crude continued to accelerate in April following a surge in March with data from Kepler indicating that Chinese imports averaged near 11 mb/d in April. That is an 18mth high and strongly up versus only 8.9 mb/d in January (FT.com today). That has most certainly helped to stem the rot in the oil price which bottomed at an intraday low of USD 58.4/b on 9 April. It has probably also helped to keep the front-end of the Brent crude oil forward curve in consistent backwardation. The strong buying from China is both opportunistic stockpiling due to the price slump but also rebuilding of oil inventories in general.
Oil speculators are cautious with oil demand at risk as US consumers soon will face hard tariff-realities. But oil market speculators are far from bullish. While net long speculative positions are up 52.2 mb over the week to last Tuesday, it is still only the 15th lowest speculative positioning over the past 52 weeks. The underlying concern is of course the US tariffs which is crippling exports of goods from China to the US with bookings of container freight down by 30% according to Hapag-Lloyd. Bloomberg’s Chief US economist, Anna Wong, is saying that empty shelves in US shops will soon be the reality. Thus US-China trade relations need to be fixed quickly to avoid hard realities for US consumers. The lead-times are long and the current tariffs and uncertainty around these is now risking availability for US consumer goods for the holiday seasons in H2-25. Tariff realities for US consumers are increasingly just around the corner. ”Rubber will hit the road” very soon and that is when we might see weaker oil demand as well.
Brent crude traded mostly sideways last week though ended down 1.6% in the end.

Net long speculative positions in Brent and WTI up 52.2 mb over week to last Tuesday but still at 15-week low over past 52 weeks.

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