Analys
SEB Jordbruksprodukter, 14 oktober 2013

Vete, raps, potatis och socker gick upp förra veckan, majs och sojabönor ner. Det var en lugn vecka förra veckan, främst på grund av European Exchange, som gick av stapeln i Paris under torsdagen och fredagen. Med nästan hela den Europeiska marknaden i Paris blev handeln tunn.
Vete
November månads terminskontrakt på Matif har gått upp mot 200 euro, ett tekniskt motstånd. Det har varit en god uppgång och många kommer att vilja sälja till 200 euro. Vi gissar en det kommer en rekyl nedåt den här veckan, vilket vi tror är ett köptillfälle.
Decemberkontraktet på CBOT har haft svårt att ta sig över 700 cent, på samma sätt som Matif kämpar med 200 euro.
Nedan ser vi terminskurvorna för Chicagovete och Matif. Det är nästan backwardation i Matifmarknaden. Det är en återspegling av att så många lantbrukare håller på sitt vete för att de tror att priset ska stiga. Istället borde de sälja sin spannmål och ta sin position genom att köpa terminer. Det bytet innebär samma position i marknaden, samma antal ton, men pengar på banken (räntevinst), ingen risk för försämring av varan i lager och möjligheten att köpa på termin utan terminspåslag.
GASC ratade erbjudandena i veckan därför att man tyckte att priset var för högt.
Argentinas BAGE estimerade den kommande Argentinska veteskörden till drygt 10 mt. USDA:s senaste WASDE i september angav den till 12 mt.
USA:s jordbruksdepartement är stängt pga budgetproblemen, vilket innebär att vi inte har några crop conditions, inga exportsiffror och ingen WASDE-rapport. Den skulle ha kommit den 11 september och analytikerna behöver ca 10 dagar på sig. Det innebär att den kan komma först den 24 oktober. Då är det nästan ingen idé att publicera den, vilket kan innebära att den helt kommer att utgå.
Även Europa var lugnt mot slutet av veckan på grund av European Exchange i Paris i torsdags och fredags. European Exchange är en mötesplats för alla i den europeiska spannmålsbranschen.
Den långsamma sådden i Ukraina är en faktor som påverkat prisutvecklingen positivt. Nu har vädret blivit bättre, vilket gör att höstarbetet underlättas.
Vi får en del frågor om optioner. Den som vill köpa en option via SEB kan göra det. Det behövs ett ramavtal, men däremot behöver banken inte göra en kreditprövning och man behöver inte heller ställa säkerhet, eftersom man som kund betalar priset (”premien”) i början och sedan erhåller eventuellt realvärde vid optionens lösen. Man behöver inte heller påkalla lösen själv, utan det sköts automatiskt till kontot i banken.
Det är så kort tid kvar till förfallet för novemberterminen 2013, så nedan ser vi priserna på köpoptioner på Matif på November-2014 (Matif vete). Notera att volatiliteten 13% är ganska låg. Volatiliteten brukar vara låg när priserna är låga.
Nedanstående optioner är köpoptioner. Terminen (Nov 2014) handlas i 194.25 euro per ton. En köpoption om ett ton vete, som ger rätt att köpa vete för 200 euro kostar 10.78 euro, eller 6% av 194.25 euro. När man köper optionen får man betala det beloppet (plus lite till för säljkurs, detta är senast betalt). Om priset i oktober (vid förfall) nästa år är 250 euro på terminen betalar banken 50 euro till optionsinnehavaren (omräknat till kronor om man vill och kommer överens om det). Om terminen står i 190 euro (under lösenpriset) förfaller optionen värdelös och inget belopp betalas ut.
Nedanstående är priser på säljoptioner. Om du köpt optionen med lösenpris 200 euro (för 16.51) och terminen i oktober nästa år står i 180 euro, betalar banken ut 20 euro. Om terminspriset är över 200 euro betalar banken inte ut någonting alls och optionen förfaller värdelös.
En del använder optioner för att spekulera kortsiktigt. Som du ser av kolumnen Pris% 5d, som visar den procentuella prisförändringen på respektive option, rör sig priser på optioner med en väsentlig utväxling i förhållande till förändringar i terminspriset.
Vi har alltså köprekommendation på vete, men tror att en rekyl nedåt kan komma. Vi betraktar en sådan rekyl nedåt som ett köptillfälle.
Maltkorn
Terminspriset (november) ligger återigen under Matif:s kvarnvetekontrakt för november.
Som vi ser av diagrammet nedan, ligger novembers maltkornskontrakt under vetet, men januari, mars och maj ligger alla över. Det indikerar ett ”överutbud” av maltkorn just nu och / eller en brist på kvarnvete.
Majs
Majspriset (december 2013) har fortsatt att falla. Nyhetsflödet har gett bränsle åt nedgången: Dels har siffrorna på väntad skörd per acre i USA fortsatt att förbättras, dels har brasilianska CONAB estimerat landets skörd 2014 till 78 – 80 mt i veckan. Det ska jämföras med USDA:s senaste estimat på 72 mt. Tidigare rapporter indikerade också lägre sådd av majs och motsvarande mer av sojabönor. Även på efterfrågesidan har negativ information kommit. Amerikanska EPA väntas sänka inblandningsmandatet av etanol i bensin med 1.4 miljarder gallons, vilket leder till en minskad efterfrågan på majs med upp till 500 miljoner bushels. Efterfrågan till etanol har inte ökat alls de senaste åren, efter att man kommit upp i 10% (”blending wall”) etanol.
Det är oroväckande att majsen handlats så svagt, men vi tror ändå att priserna är nära botten och att förhållandet mellan sojabönor (oljeväxter) och majs (spannmål) leder till mindre produktion av majs – med högre pris i framtiden som konsekvens.
Vi väljer att hålla fast vid köprekommendationen.
Sojabönor
Novemberkontraktet på sojabönor slutade förra veckan med ett rejält prisfall. Priset närmar sig den nivå på 1250 som vi talade om för några veckor sedan. Bakom fredagens prisfall låg samma faktor som bakom prisfallet i majsmarknaden – en oro för att EPA ska komma att sänka inblandningskravet avseende biobränslen, i fallet för sojabönor gällde det biodiesel.
Brasilianska CONAB estimerar landets skörd 2014 till 87.6 – 89.7 mt. Det är något högre än USDA:s 88 mt.
I USA talar en del nu, något oväntat, om en skörd på 43 bushels per acre. Efter torkan i augusti har marknaden tagit emot en serie av estimat från privata firmor och analytiker som visar på bättre skörd än befarat.
Vi behåller säljrekommendation.
Raps
Rapspriset (november 2013) fortsatte att stiga i början av förra veckan efter beskedet om att en strafftull kommer att införas mot 90% av EU:s import av biodiesel. Den här frågan var ”snackisen” på European Exchange som gick av stapeln i Paris i torsdags och fredags. Samtalet rörde främst ”vem” som fått kännedom om beslutet innan det offentliggjordes.
Vi behåller säljrekommendationen på raps.
Potatis
Potatispriset av årets skörd, som handlas i april-kontraktet på Eurex, har vänt upp till den högsta nivån på en månad, en uppgång från början av oktober med 15%, till 23.10 euro per dt. 24 euro ser ut att vara inom räckhåll.
Gris
Prist på Lean Hogs fortsatta att röra sig ”sidledes” inom vad vi tolkar som en ”toppformation”, baserat på kända mönster inom den tekniska analys-skolan.
Mjölk
Terminerna på smör och skummjölkspulver vid Eurex-börsen var stabila och rörde sig inte mycket under veckan som gick. Fonterras pris steg något, efter det kraftiga prisfall från toppen som varit.
Socker
Marskontraktet på råsocker steg kraftigt upp till 18.93 cent på marskontraktet. Vid 19 cent finns ett starkt motstånd och det skulle inte förvåna om vinsthemtagningar sätter in, som kan ta ner priset till 18 cent. Vi tror att det, om det händer, är ett utmärkt köptillfälle.
Gödsel
Priset på kväve / urea var stabilt i veckan som gick med endast små kursförändringar.
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Analys
SEB Metals price forecast update

Softer economic growth in 2024 calls for somewhat softer metals prices in 2024. Industrial metals prices as well as other commodity prices exploded during Covid-19 as governments around the world unleashed stimuli in the magnitude of 10x of what was done during the global financial crisis in 2008/09. Consumers shifting spending from services to consumer goods added to the boom. Bloomberg’s industrial metals price index was up 91% in March 2022 versus January 2020 because of this. Global manufacturing PMI peaked in May 2021 and has been fading since and below the 50-line from September 2022 with latest reading at 48.8. Industrial metals prices have faded since their peak in March 2022 but are still 30% higher than they were in January 2020. Even zinc, the worst performing metal, is still 9% above where it was in January 2020. As such one could possibly argue that industrial metals have not yet fully faded from their Covid-19 stimulus boom. One possible explanation could be inflation where US inflation is up 19% over the period. But this still leaves industrial metals up 11% in real terms. Another possible explanation is the big jump in energy prices over the period. While coal and gas prices have fallen back a lot, they are still quite high. The coal price in western Europe is 110% above where it was at the start 2020 and 50% above its 2010-2019 average. Most industrial metals are highly energy intensive to produce with digging and crushing of rocks, smelting, and refining of ore. The current aluminium price of USD 2215/ton is for example well aligned with coal prices. In addition to this there has also been significant closures of zinc and aluminium smelting capacity in Europe which probably have supported prices for these metals.
Global economic growth is forecasted to slow from 3.5% in 2022, to 3.0% in 2023 and then again to 2.9% in 2024 as the big jump in interest rates induce economic pain with a lag. Aligned with this we expect lower industrial metals prices in 2024 than in 2023 though only marginally lower for most of the metals. But the field of metals is wide, and the price action is thus adverse. Copper is likely the metal with the most strained supply and with huge needs in the global energy transition.
Aluminium: Prices will likely be depressed versus marginal costs in 2024. Aluminium from Russia is flowing unhindered to the market. Most is going to China for reprocessing and potentially re-exported while some is going to Turkey and Italy. It is all flowing into the global pool of aluminium and as such impacting the global market balance. The LME 3mth aluminium price is currently well aligned with coal prices and both have traded mostly sideways since June this year. Aluminium premiums in the EU have however fallen 30-40% since mid-June in a sign of weakness there. The global market will likely run a surplus in 2024 with depressed prices versus the marginal cost of production.
Copper: Softer fundamentals in 2024 but with accelerating tightness on the horizon. Copper is currently trading at USD 8470/ton and close to 37% above its early Jan 2020 level. The market is expected to run a slight surplus in 2024 followed by accelerating tightness the following years. Downside price risk for 2024 is thus warranted along with softer global growth. The power of Unions is however getting stronger in Latin America with demands for higher salaries. Strikes have broken out in Peru with production at the Las Bambas copper mine at only 20%. Further strikes and disruptions could quickly put the market into deficit also in 2024.
Nickel: Indonesia pursuing market share over price pushing the price down the cost curve. Indonesia’s nickel production is growing rapidly. Its production reached 1.6 million ton in 2022 (+54% YoY) and accounted for close to 50% of total global supply in 2022. Its share looks set to reach 70% by 2030. Lower prices will stimulate demand and will also force higher cost producers to shut down thus making room for the wave of new supply from Indonesia. Prices will be sluggis the nearest years as Indonesia aims for market share over price.
Zinc: Price has stabilized around USD 2500/t. Weakness in global construction will drive prices lower at times in 2024. The 3mth LME zinc price has fallen from a peak of USD 4499/ton in April 2022 to only USD 2248/ton in May 2023. Since then, it has recovered steadily to USD 2500/ton. Demand could struggle in 2024 as construction globally will likely struggle with high interest rates. But mine closures is a natural counter effect of low prices and will put a floor under prices.
Price outlook

Bjarne Schieldrop
Cheif Commodities Analyst
SEB Commodity Research
Analys
Now it’s up to OPEC+

All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics. OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE. The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.

Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.
Brent crude fell 4.6% ydy to USD 77.4/b and over the last three trading sessions it has lost USD 5.1/b. This morning it is trading only marginally higher at USD 77.6/b which is no vote of confidence. A good dose of rebound this morning would have been a signal that the sell-off yesterday possibly was exaggerated and solely driven by investors with long positions flocking to the exit. So there’s likely more downside to come.
In general there is a quite good relationship between net long speculative positions in Brent crude and WTI versus the global manufacturing cycle. Oil investors overall typically have an aversion of holding long positions in oil when the global economy is slowing down. As of yet there are few signs that the global economic cycle is about to turn. Rather the opposite seems to be the case. Global manufacturing fell in October and yesterday we saw US industrial production fall 0.6% MoM while continued jobless claims rose more than expected and to the highest level in two years. This matches well with the logic that the strong rise in interest rates since March 2022 is inflicting pain on the economy with more pain ahead as the effect comes with a lag.
Most estimates are that the global oil market is running a solid deficit in Q4-23. The IEA has an implied deficit in the global oil market of 1 m b/d in Q4-23 if we assume that OPEC will produce 28 m b/d vs. a call-on-OPEC at 29 m b/d. But prices in the oil market is telling a different story with weakening crude curves, weakening refining margins and a sharp sell-off in oil prices.
For 2024 the general forecasts are that global economic growth will slow, global oil demand growth will slow and also that the need for oil from OPEC will fall from 28.7 m b/d to 28.4 m b/d (IEA). This is a bearish environment for oil. The average Brent crude oil price so far this year is about USD 83/b. It should essentially be expected to deliver lower in 2024 with the negatives mentioned above.
Two things however will likely counter this and they are interconnected. US shale oil activity has been slowing with falling drilling rig count since early December 2022 and that has been happening at an average WTI price of USD 78/b. The result is that total US liquids production is set to grow by only 0.3 m b/d YoY in Q4-24. This allows OPEC+ to support the oil price at USD 80-90/b through 2024 without fear of loosing a significant market share to US oil production. Thus slowing US liquids production and active price management by OPEC+ goes hand in hand. As such we do expect OPEC+ to step up to the task.
So far it has predominantly been Saudi Arabia with a little help from Russia which together proactively have managed the oil market and the oil price through significant cuts. Saudi Arabia produced 10.5 m b/d in April but then cut production rapidly to only 9.0 m b/d which is what it still produces. Its normal production is about 10 m b/d.
What has made the situation more difficult for Saudi Arabia is the combination of solid growth in non-OPEC supply in 2023 (+2.1 m b/d YoY; IEA) but also a substantial revival in production by Venezuela and Iran. The two produced 660 k b/d more in October than they on average did in 2022. So the need for oil from Saudi Arabia is squeezed from both sides.
All eyes are now back at OPEC+ after the recent fall in oil prices along with weakening crude curve structures and weakening economic statistics.
OPEC+ will have to step up the game and give solid guidance of what it intends to do in 2024. If Saudi Arabia is to carry the burden alone (with only a little help from Russia) then it will likely need to keep its production at around 9.0 m b/d on average for 2024 and drop it down towards 8.5 m b/d in Q1-24. This may be too much to ask from Saudi Arabia and it may demand some of the other OPEC members to step up and join in on the task to regulate the market in 2024. More specifically this means Iraq, Kuwait and UAE.
The oil market will likely be quite nervous until a firm message from Saudi/Russia/OPEC+ is delivered to the market some time in December.
Saudi Arabia may get some help from President Joe Biden though as his energy secretary adviser, Amos Hochstein, has stated that the US will enforce sanctions on Iran on more than 1 m b/d.
Analys
More from Venezuela and Iran means smaller pie for Saudi

Production in Venezuela and Iran is on the rise and is set to rise further in the coming months and in 2024. Combined their production could grow by 0.8 m b/d YoY to 2024 (average year to average year). The IEA projected in its latest OMR (Oct-2023) that call-on-OPEC will fall to 28.3 m b/d in 2024, a decline of 0.5 m b/d. This combination would drive implied call-on-Saudi from 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to only 9.1 m b/d in 2024 and as low as 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24 if Saudi Arabia has to do all the heavy lifting alone. Wider core OPEC cooperation may be required.

The IEA is out in the news today projecting peak oil demand this decade with global demand standing at no more than 102 m b/d towards the end of this decade. If so it would imply a call-on-Non-OPEC of only 66.4 m b/d in 2028 assuming that OPEC in general will demand a market share of 30 m b/d + NGL of 5.6 m b/d. The IEA (Oct-23) projects non-OPEC production to average 68.8 m b/d in 2024. That’s already 2.4 m b/d more than what would be sustainable over time if global oil demand is set to peak later this decade. Oil producers in general cannot have a production growth strategy in a peak oil demand world.
The US has decided to lift sanctions towards Venezuela for six months (18 April) as a measure to tempt it to move towards more democratic processes. And if it does, then the lifting of sanctions could continue after the 6 months. A primary opposition election took place this weekend with lawmaker Maria Corina Machado currently holding 93% of the vote count. Venezuela will next year hold a presidential election but fair play seems unlikely with Maduro in charge. The lifting of sanctions allows Venezuela’s PdV to resume exports to all destinations. Bans on new, foreign investments in the oil and gas sector are also lifted though Russian entities and JV’s are still barred.
Venezuela produced 0.8 m b/d in September and indicates that it can lift production by 0.2 m b/d by year and with more rigs and wells by 0.5 m b/d to 1.3 m b/d in the medium term.
Oil production in Iran has been on a steady rise since its low-point of 2.0 m b/d in 2020. Last year it produced 2.5 m b/d. In September it produced 3.1 m b/d, but Iran’s oil minister says production now is at 3.3 m b/d. Iran’s rising production and exports is not about the US being more lenient in its enforcement of sanctions towards Iran. It is more about Iran finding better ways to circumvent them but even more importantly that China is importing more and more oil from Iran.
Production by Iran and Venezuela is recovering. YoY production from the two could rise by close to 0.8 m b/d in 2024. This will lead to a decline in call-on-Saudi oil.

The IEA estimated in its latest OMR report that call-on-OPEC will fall from 28.8 m b/d in 2023 to 28.3 m b/d in 2024. If all OPEC members except Saudi Arabia produces the same amount in 2024 as in 2023, then the need for Saudi Arabia’s oil (call-on-Saudi) will fall from a healthy 10.4 m b/d in 2023 to a still acceptable 9.9 m b/d in 2024. Its normal production is roughly 10 m b/d.
If however production by Iran and Venezuela rise by a combined 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024, then call-on-Saudi will fall to 9.4 m b/d which is not so good but still manageable. But if Iran’s oil minister is correct when he says that its current production now is at 3.3 m b/d, then it is not far fetched to assume that Iran’s oil production may average maybe 3.4-3.5 m b/d in 2024. That would yield a YoY rise of 0.6 m b/d just for Iran. If we also assume that Venezuela manages to lift its production from 0.8 m b/d this year to 1.0 m b/d in 2024, then the combined growth from the two is closer to 0.8 m b/d. That would push call-on-Saudi down to only 9.1 m b/d which is not good at all. It would require Saudi Arabia to produce at its current production of 9.0 m b/d all through 2024.
The IEA further estimates that call-on-OPEC will average 27.7 m b/d in Q1-24. If we assume Iran @ 3.4 m b/d and Venezuela @ 1.0 m b/d then call-on-Saudi in Q1-24 will only be 8.6 m b/d. I.e. Saudi Arabia will have to cut production further to 8.6 m b/d in Q1-24. At that point Saudi Arabia will likely need or like other core OPEC members like Iraq, Kuwait and UAE as well as Russia to join in.
Implied call-on-Saudi. Call-on-OPEC is set to decline from 28.8 m b/d to 28.3 m b/d to 2024. If all OPEC members produced the same in 2024 as in 2023 then call-on-Saudi would fall by 0.5 m b/d to 9.9 m b/d. But if Venezuela and Iran increases their combined production by 0.8 m b/d YoY in 2024 then call-on-Saudi falls to 9.1 m b/d.

If we look a little broader on this topic and also include Libya, Nigeria and Angola we see that this group of OPEC members produced 11.4 m b/d in 2010, 10.1 m b/d in 2017 and only 5.1 m b/d at the low-point in August 2020. The decline by these OPEC members has of course the other OPEC and OPEC+ members to stem the rising flood of US shale oil production. The production from this unfortunate group of OPEC-laggards is however now on the rise reaching 7.5 m b/d in September. With more from Iran and Venezuela it could rise to 8.0 m b/d in 2024. Production from Nigeria and Angola though still looks to be in gradual decline while Libya looks more sideways. So for the time being it is all about the revival of Iran and Venezuela.
The unfortunate OPEC-laggards had a production of 11.4 m b/d in 2010. But production then fell to only 5.1 m b/d in August 2020. It helped the rest of OPEC’s members to manage the huge increase in US shale oil production. Production from these countries are now on the rebound. Though Nigeria and Angola still seems to be in gradual decline.

What everyone needs to be attentive to is that call-on-OPEC and even more importantly call-on-Saudi can only erode to a limit before Saudi/OPEC/Russia will have to take action. Especially if the forecast for needed oil from OPEC/Saudi for the nearest 2-3 years is in significant decline. Then they will have to take action in the sense that they stop defending the price and allows the price to fall sharply along with higher production. And yet again it is US shale oil producers who will have to take the brunt of the pain. They are the only oil producers in the world who can naturally and significantly reduce their production rather quickly. I.e. the US shale oil players will have to be punished into obedience, if possible, yet one more time.
We don’t think that it is any immediate risk for this to happen as US shale oil activity is slowing while global oil demand has rebounded following Covid-lockdowns. But one needs to keep a watch on projections for call-on-OPEC and call-on-Saudi stretching 1-2-3 years forward on a continuous basis.
In its medium term oil market outlook, Oil2023, the IEA projected a fairly healthy development for call-on-OPEC to 2028. First bottoming out at 29.4 m b/d in 2024 before rising gradually to 30.6 m b/d in 2028. The basis for this was a slowing though steady rise in global oil demand to 105.7 m b/d in 2028 together with stagnant non-OPEC production due to muted capex spending over the past decade. But this projection has already been significantly dented and reduced in IEA’s latest OMR from October where call-on-OPEC for 2024 is projected at only 28.3 m b/d.
In a statement today the IEA projects that global oil demand will peak this decade and consume no more than 102 m b/d in the late 2020ies due to (in large part) rapid growth in EV sales. This would imply a call-on-OPEC of only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. It is not a viable path for OPEC to produce only 26.9 m b/d in 2028. Especially if production by Iran and Venezuela is set to revive. I.e. OPEC’s pie is shrinking while at the same time Iran and Venezuela is producing more. In this outlook something will have to give and it is not OPEC.
One should here turn this on its head and assume that OPEC will produce 30 m b/d in 2028. Add OPEC NGLs of 5.6 m b/d and we get 35.6 m b/d. If global oil demand in 2028 stands at only 102 m b/d then call-on-Non-OPEC equates to 66.4 m b/d. That is 3.1 m b/d less than IEA’s non-OPEC production projection for 2028 of 69.5 m b/d but also higher than non-OPEC production projection of 68.8 m b/d (IEA, Oct-23) is already 2.4 m b/d too high versus what is a sustainable level.
What this of course naturally means is that oil producers in general cannot have production growth as a strategy in a peak-oil-demand-world with non-OPEC in 2024 already at 2.4 m b/d above its sustainable level.
The US is set to growth its hydrocarbon liquids by 0.5 m b/d YoY in 2024. But in a zero oil demand growth world that is way, way too much.

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